CN110855438A - Quantum key distribution method and system based on annular QKD network - Google Patents
Quantum key distribution method and system based on annular QKD network Download PDFInfo
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- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
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Abstract
The invention relates to a quantum key distribution method and a quantum key distribution system based on a ring QKD network. The invention can realize quantum key distribution of the ring network between any two points under the scene of coexistence of the trusted relay and the untrusted relay, improves the safety compared with the trusted relay technology, and breaks the distance limit compared with MDI-QKD.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of quantum communication, in particular to a quantum key distribution method and system based on an annular QKD network.
Background
Quantum communication is an important branch of Quantum information science, and is a communication technology for performing information interaction by using Quantum bits as information carriers, and the Quantum communication has two most typical applications, one is Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), and the other is Quantum invisible state.
Unlike the classical cryptosystem, the security of quantum key distribution is based on the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics. Even if an eavesdropper controls a channel line, as long as the eavesdropper does not attack a side channel inside legal user equipment, the quantum key distribution technology enables spatially separated users to share a secure key. Academics refer to this security as "unconditional security," which refers to security possessing strict mathematical proofs. If all quantum nodes are completely trusted, quantum key distribution of any two points in a quantum network can be realized by means of a trusted relay technology, however, in practice, the quantum key distribution does not achieve unconditional security due to the fact that security of an internal side channel of a quantum device and the like cannot be guaranteed. The metering equipment Independent Quantum Key Distribution (MDI-QKD) proposed in 2012 has the performance of resisting detector attack, allows an untrusted third party to generate a security Key at two communication ends, and can establish a star network through an optical switch by the MDI-QKD, so that the cost brought by an expensive detector is saved. But the MDI-QKD has a limited effective distance, making it more applicable on the access side and difficult to apply in the backbone network.
In a real scene, most of backbone QKD networks are ring networks, and the security of each node cannot be completely guaranteed, so that a trusted relay node and an untrusted relay node coexist. The ring network has high survival capability and good service dredging and self-healing capability. Therefore, the ring topology is expected to be widely applied to the quantum backbone network. The ring network uses optical fiber or coaxial cable as transmission medium and consists of network nodes connected into a closed loop. The network form with the structure is mainly applied to a token network at present, and information sent by the whole network is transmitted in the closed loop. The ring network has obvious advantages: (1) the network is simple to realize, and the cost requirement is minimum; (2) the transmission speed is fast. But equally non-negligible are: (1) difficulty in maintenance; (2) the expandability is poor. All nodes of the whole network of the ring network are directly connected in series, and when any one node fails, the whole network can be interrupted and broken down, so that the maintenance is very inconvenient. Therefore, the biggest problem facing the quantum network is that when the ring type quantum network has untrusted nodes, the quantum key distribution process of the whole network is possibly threatened.
The quantum relay technology is difficult to implement, and therefore, the quantum relay technology cannot be used practically. At present, the scheme adopted for constructing the quantum key distribution network is a trusted relay scheme. By connecting a trusted repeater between two nodes, the nodes encrypt an initial key with a One-time-pad (OTP) by using an encryption key shared by the trusted repeater and then send the encrypted initial key to the trusted repeater, and the trusted repeater can decrypt the initial key to obtain the initial key. The trusted repeater encrypts and transmits the initial key to the next node by using the encryption key shared by the other node, and the next node can obtain the initial shared key through decryption to carry out encrypted communication with the previous node. But in the trusted relay node, the secret key loses the quantum characteristic and is not protected by the quantum principle any more. Therefore, in order to enhance the security protection of the trusted relay, an improved trusted relay scheme is generated: an exclusive or relay technique. The difference of the scheme is that only the quantum key after exclusive-or is temporarily stored at the relay node, the quantum key plaintext appears only in a short time after the key is generated at the relay node, and an attacker is difficult to know the generation time point of the quantum key, so that the security of the user key is improved.
MDI-QKD systems typically include a measurement device, two senders, and a corresponding data post-processing system. Here the two senders are participants in the QKD key agreement process, who independently send quantum states to the measurement device, which intervenes and measures the received quantum states and then publishes the measurement results. Two senders can establish association to the quantum state randomly transmitted by the two parties by using the measurement result, and further realize key agreement. The device needed by the receiver for preparing the measurement is also needed in most MDI-QKD measurement devices, and the difference is that the interference of two remote independent quantum states needs to be realized in the MDI measurement, and the requirements on the homologies of light sources, the compensation of channel transmission, the precision of time synchronization, the stability of interference instruments in the measurement devices and the like are high.
The trusted relay technology cannot guarantee the security of each trusted relay node, so that the security of the whole sub-network cannot be effectively guaranteed. In a real ring-type quantity subnet, a trusted relay node and an untrusted relay node coexist together, so that the trusted relay technology still has a non-negligible safety problem in a real scene.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of this, the present invention provides a quantum key distribution method and system based on a ring QKD network, which can implement quantum key distribution between any two points of the ring network in a scenario where trusted relay and untrusted relay coexist, improve security compared to the trusted relay technology, and break distance limitation compared to MDI-QKD.
The invention is realized by adopting the following scheme: in the ring network, when an uncontinuous non-trusted relay node exists in a transmission path, the non-trusted node is used as an MDI-QKD detector to generate a key, and then the shared key is transmitted by an exclusive-or relay method.
Further, the method specifically comprises the following steps:
step S1: each node confirms whether there is a key generation request according to the broadcast message. Each node checks whether the node needs to generate keys with other nodes or not through the broadcast request, and confirms the source node S0And destination node Sd；
Step S2: determining a source node S0To the destination node SdA path of (a); all nodes share the loop link, so that the path can be confirmed according to the information of the source node and the destination node;
step S3: if all the relay nodes in the pathIf the point is credible, the initial shared secret key is directly processed by an exclusive or relay scheme hop by hopK 1 To the destination node SdAnd mark the request as successful; if the trusted relay and the untrusted relay coexist in the path, determining whether an untrusted relay node continuously appears, if so, failing to distribute the quantum key, and ending, otherwise, entering step S4 (the untrusted relay node does not continuously appear);
step S4: the non-trusted node is used as an MDI-QKD detector to generate a secret key for a pair of nodes connected with the node, and then the shared secret key is transmitted by an exclusive or relay method
Further, step S4 is specifically:
step S41: when the shared secret key is transferred to the non-trusted relay node SuPrevious trusted relay node S ofATime, node SAAnd node SuConnected further trusted relay node SBTransmitting photons to node S through a QKD transmitteruThe MDI-QKD receiver uses the MDI-QKD protocol to generate the security key under the condition that the detector cannot be trustedK AB ；
Step S42: by usingK AB XOR encryption shared keyK 1 To the node SBNode SBUse ofK AB Carrying out XOR decryption on the received encryption key to obtain a shared keyK 1 And further completing the key transmission from the trusted node to the untrusted node and then to the trusted node.
The same method is used when the same situation occurs again later until the initial shared secret key is usedK 1 To the destination node SdAnd marks the request as successful.
The invention also provides a quantum key distribution system of the annular QKD network, which comprises more than one node, wherein each node is positioned in an end-to-end closed annular link, and when any two nodes in the loop need to distribute the quantum key, the method steps are adopted.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following beneficial effects: the invention provides a quantum key distribution method of a ring network under a scene of coexistence of a trusted relay and an untrusted relay, provides a detailed scheme aiming at the ring quantum network, can realize the quantum key distribution of the network between any two points under the scene of coexistence of the trusted relay and the untrusted relay, improves the safety compared with a trusted relay technology, and breaks the distance limit compared with MDI-QKD.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a diagram of deployment of a ring network in a scenario in which a trusted relay and an untrusted relay coexist according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 2 is a schematic flow chart of a method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is a diagram of an embodiment of a ring network in a scenario where a trusted relay and an untrusted relay coexist according to the embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention is further explained below with reference to the drawings and the embodiments.
It should be noted that the following detailed description is exemplary and is intended to provide further explanation of the disclosure. Unless defined otherwise, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this application belongs.
It is noted that the terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of example embodiments according to the present application. As used herein, the singular forms "a", "an" and "the" are intended to include the plural forms as well, and it should be understood that when the terms "comprises" and/or "comprising" are used in this specification, they specify the presence of stated features, steps, operations, devices, components, and/or combinations thereof, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.
Each node in the ring network topology is located in a closed ring link connected end to end, and quantum key distribution of any two points in the ring can only be performed on the ring link, so that routing selection is not required, and a ring network specific deployment diagram is shown in fig. 1. When two nodes in a ring network perform quantum key distribution, if an untrusted relay node exists in a link between the nodes, secure quantum key distribution cannot be obviously achieved only by relying on the trusted relay technology. In the scenario where the trusted relay and the untrusted relay coexist, a flow chart of a quantum key distribution method for any two points in a ring network is shown in fig. 2.
As shown in fig. 2, this embodiment provides a quantum key distribution method based on a ring-shaped QKD network, in which when an untrusted relay node that appears discontinuously exists in a transmission path in the ring-shaped network, the untrusted relay node is used as an MDI-QKD detector to generate a key, and then a shared key is transferred by an exclusive-or relay method.
In this embodiment, the method specifically includes the following steps:
step S1: each node confirms whether there is a key generation request according to the broadcast message. Each node checks whether the node needs to generate keys with other nodes or not through the broadcast request, and confirms the source node S0And destination node Sd；
Step S2: determining a source node S0To the destination node SdA path of (a); all nodes share the loop link, so that the path can be confirmed according to the information of the source node and the destination node;
step S3: if all relay nodes in the path are credible, directly using the XOR relay scheme to hop the initial shared secret key one by oneK 1 To the destination node SdAnd mark the request as successful; if the trusted relay and the untrusted relay coexist in the path, determining whether an untrusted relay node continuously appears, if so, failing to distribute the quantum key, and ending, otherwise, entering step S4 (the untrusted relay node does not continuously appear);
step S4: and the untrusted node is used as an MDI-QKD detector to generate a secret key for a pair of nodes connected with the node, and the secret key is transmitted by an exclusive-or relay method.
In this embodiment, step S4 specifically includes:
step S41: when the shared secret key is transferred to the non-trusted relay node SuThe former one canSignal relay node SATime, node SAAnd node SuConnected further trusted relay node SBTransmitting photons to node S through a QKD transmitteruThe MDI-QKD receiver uses the MDI-QKD protocol to generate the security key under the condition that the detector cannot be trustedK AB ；
Step S42: by usingK AB XOR encryption shared keyK 1 To the node SBNode SBUse ofK AB Carrying out XOR decryption on the received encryption key to obtain a shared keyK 1 And further completing the key transmission from the trusted node to the untrusted node and then to the trusted node.
When node SAWhen the source node is, the node SAAnd node SBNode SuGenerating initial password by MDI-QKD protocol as third party detectorK 1 。
The same method is used when the same situation occurs again later until the initial shared secret key is usedK 1 To the destination node SdAnd marks the request as successful.
The present embodiment also provides a quantum key distribution system of a ring QKD network, including more than one node, where each node is located in an end-to-end closed ring link, and when any two nodes in the ring need to perform quantum key distribution, the method steps as described above are adopted.
Specifically, as shown in fig. 3, it is assumed that the trusted relay node in the current network is known, the node a receives the request and needs to complete quantum key distribution with the node E, and the node B, K in the current network is an untrusted relay node, and the other nodes are all trusted relay nodes.
The request is then completed according to the steps:
step 1: confirming that the request obtains a source node A and a destination node E;
step 2: determining path A → B → C → D → E;
and step 3: according to the path, an untrusted relay node B is known;
and 4, step 4: the node A and the node C use the node B as a third-party detector to generate an initial key through an MDI-QKD protocolK 0 ；
And 5: node C and node D generate shared key by BB84 protocolK 1 ；
Step 6: node C uses the secret keyK 1 XOR encryptionK 0 And sending the data to the node D;
and 7: node D uses the secret keyK 1 The received encryption key is subjected to XOR decryption to obtainK 0 ；
And 8: node D and node E generate shared key by BB84 protocolK 2 ；
And step 9: node D uses the secret keyK 2 XOR encryptionK 0 And sends it to node E;
step 10: node E uses the secret keyK 2 The received encryption key is subjected to XOR decryption to obtainK 0 Source node and destination node implementing sharing initial keyK 0 Completing the request;
as will be appreciated by one skilled in the art, embodiments of the present application may be provided as a method, system, or computer program product. Accordingly, the present application may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present application may take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, and the like) having computer-usable program code embodied therein.
The present application is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the application. It will be understood that each flow and/or block of the flow diagrams and/or block diagrams, and combinations of flows and/or blocks in the flow diagrams and/or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions may be provided to a processor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, create means for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture including instruction means which implement the function specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable apparatus to produce a computer implemented process such that the instructions which execute on the computer or other programmable apparatus provide steps for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
The foregoing is directed to preferred embodiments of the present invention, other and further embodiments of the invention may be devised without departing from the basic scope thereof, and the scope thereof is determined by the claims that follow. However, any simple modification, equivalent change and modification of the above embodiments according to the technical essence of the present invention are within the protection scope of the technical solution of the present invention.
Claims (4)
1. A quantum key distribution method based on a ring QKD network is characterized in that in the ring network, when an untrusted relay node which does not appear continuously exists in a transmission path, the untrusted relay node is used as an MDI-QKD detector to generate a key, and then the shared key is transmitted by an exclusive-or relay method.
2. The method for quantum key distribution based on ring-shaped QKD network according to claim 1, comprising the following steps:
step S1: acknowledging the Source node S0And destination node Sd；
Step S2: determining a source node S0To the destination node SdA path of (a);
step S3: if all relay nodes in the path are credible, directly using the XOR relay scheme to hop the initial shared secret key one by oneK 1 To the destination node Sd(ii) a If the trusted relay and the untrusted relay coexist in the path, judging whether an untrusted relay node continuously appears, if so, not performing quantum key distribution, and ending, otherwise, entering step S4;
step S4: and the untrusted node is used as an MDI-QKD detector to generate a secret key for a pair of nodes connected with the node, and the secret key is transmitted by an exclusive-or relay method.
3. The method for quantum key distribution based on ring QKD network according to claim 2, wherein step S4 specifically is:
step S41: when the shared secret key is transferred to the non-trusted relay node SuPrevious trusted relay node S ofATime, node SAAnd node SuConnected further trusted relay node SBTransmitting photons to node S through a QKD transmitteruThe MDI-QKD receiver uses the MDI-QKD protocol to generate the security key under the condition that the detector cannot be trustedK AB ；
Step S42: by usingK AB XOR encryption shared keyK 1 To the node SBNode SBUse ofK AB Carrying out XOR decryption on the received encryption key to obtain a shared keyK 1 And further completing the key transmission from the trusted node to the untrusted node and then to the trusted node.
4. A quantum key distribution system for a ring QKD network, comprising more than one node, each node being in an end-to-end closed ring link, wherein the method steps according to any of claims 1-3 are used when any two nodes in the ring are to perform quantum key distribution.
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