CN110266478A - A kind of information processing method, electronic equipment - Google Patents
A kind of information processing method, electronic equipment Download PDFInfo
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- CN110266478A CN110266478A CN201910472125.7A CN201910472125A CN110266478A CN 110266478 A CN110266478 A CN 110266478A CN 201910472125 A CN201910472125 A CN 201910472125A CN 110266478 A CN110266478 A CN 110266478A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0863—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving passwords or one-time passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
Abstract
The embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of information processing method, electronic equipment.The information processing method includes: the key application for receiving request end and sending, and the key application carries the first median；First median is that the request end is generated based on the first key parameter；Based on first median, the second key parameter of at least two-stage is generated；Second key parameter of at least two-stage is sent to the request end；Second key parameter of at least two-stage and the first key parameter are provided commonly for generating private key for the request end.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the technical field of the communications field more particularly to a kind of information processing methods, electronic equipment.
Background technique
Public-key cryptosystem has following three kinds of schemes: the public-key cryptosystem PKI based on certificate, the public affairs based on mark at present
Key cipher system IBC and without CertPubKey cipher system CLPKC.Wherein, it needs to issue using certificate authority CA using PKI
It issues licence to establish contacting between user subject and public key, however the management of certificate (such as issue, update, cancel) is not only grasped
Make complicated, it is also necessary to consume many computing resources and storage resource.Wherein although IBC eliminates the dependence to certificate；But it uses
The public key at family is uniquely determined by user identifier, and the private key of user is generated by trusting authoritative institution.Private thus can be introduced using IBC
Key trustship problem, and user's signature does not have uniqueness and non-repudiation.It, should although wherein CLPKC does not use certificate
CLPKC be only with the framework of a key generation centre, thus existed using the program do evil because of the key generation centre or
It is broken and bring security of system problem.
Summary of the invention
The embodiment of the invention provides a kind of information processing methods, electronic equipment.
The technical scheme of the present invention is realized as follows:
A kind of information processing method, comprising:
The key application that request end is sent is received, the key application carries the first median；First median
It is generated for the request end based on the first key parameter；
Based on first median, the second key parameter of at least two-stage is generated；
Second key parameter of at least two-stage is sent to the request end；Second key of at least two-stage is joined
The several and first key parameter is provided commonly for generating private key for the request end.
It is described to be based on first median in above scheme, generate the second key parameter of at least two-stage, comprising:
If current responder is first order responder, first median is received；Based on first median, generate
Second key parameter of the first order responder；Second key parameter of the first order responder is sent to the second level to ring
Ying Duan；
If current responder is intergrade responder, the second key parameter of previous stage responder is received；Before described
Second key parameter of level-one responder generates the second key parameter of the intergrade responder；The intergrade is responded
Second key parameter at end is sent to rear stage responder；
If current responder is afterbody responder, the second key parameter of previous stage responder is received；Based on described
Second key parameter of previous stage responder generates the second key parameter of the afterbody responder.
In above scheme, second key parameter by at least two-stage is sent to the request end, comprising:
By the second key parameter of the first order responder, the second key parameter of the intergrade responder and described
Second key parameter of afterbody responder is sent to the request end.
In above scheme, second key parameter includes: public key parameter；
The method also includes:
After the common recognition verifying that the public key parameter of at least two-stage is passed through block chain, it is recorded in block chain.
In above scheme, second key parameter includes: private key parameter；
It is described to be based on first median, generate the second key parameter of at least two-stage, comprising:
The identification information that acquisition request end is sent；
Generate random number and third key parameter；
Based on first median, the identification information and the random number, cryptographic Hash is generated；
Using first function using the cryptographic Hash, the random number and the third key parameter as known quantity, calculating is obtained
Obtain private key parameter.
It is described to utilize first function with the cryptographic Hash, the random number and the third key parameter in above scheme
For known quantity, calculates and obtains private key parameter, comprising:
The cryptographic Hash is subjected to Binary Conversion, obtains 32 the first numerical value；
Obtain high 16 binary systems and low 16 binary systems of first numerical value；
High 16 binary systems are subjected to decimal system conversion, obtain the first subnumber value；
Low 16 binary systems are subjected to decimal system conversion, obtain the second subnumber value；
Product and the second subnumber value and the third key based on the first subnumber value and the random number are joined
Several products calculates and obtains private key parameter.
In above scheme, the method also includes:
If current responder is first order responder, by public key parameter in the third key parameter of the first order responder
It is sent to intergrade responder and/or afterbody responder；
If current responder is intergrade responder, by public key parameter in the third key parameter of the intergrade responder
It is sent to first order responder and/or afterbody responder；
If current responder is afterbody responder, by public key in the third key parameter of the afterbody responder
Parameter is sent to first order responder and/or intergrade responder.
The embodiment of the invention also provides a kind of information processing methods, comprising:
Based on first key parameter, the first median is obtained；
The key application for carrying first median is sent to responder；
Receive the second key parameter of at least two-stage that the responder is returned based on first median；
The second key parameter and the first key parameter based on at least two-stage generate private key.
It is described to be based on first key parameter in above scheme, obtain the first median, comprising:
Using one-way function using the first key parameter as known quantity, the first median is calculated.
It is described to receive the second close of at least two-stage that the responder is returned based on first median in above scheme
Key parameter, comprising:
Receive the second key parameter of the first order responder that the responder returns, the second key of intergrade responder
Second key parameter of parameter and afterbody responder；
Wherein, the second key parameter of the first order responder is generated based on first median；The first order
Second key parameter of responder is for being sent to second level responder；
Second key parameter of the intergrade responder is generated based on the second key parameter of previous stage responder；It is described
Second key parameter of intergrade responder is for being sent to rear stage responder；
Second key parameter of the afterbody responder is generated based on the second key parameter of previous stage responder；Institute
The second key parameter of afterbody responder is stated for being sent to request end.
In above scheme, second key parameter includes: private key parameter and public key parameter；
Second key parameter based on at least two-stage and the first key parameter generate private key, comprising:
Private key parameter and the first key parameter based on afterbody responder, determine temporary private parameter；
Verify the corresponding relationship of the public key parameter of the temporary private parameter and at least two-stage；
If being verified, determine that the temporary private parameter is private key.
In above scheme, second key parameter includes: public key parameter；
The method also includes:
Obtain the public key parameter of at least the third key parameter of two-stage and at least two-stage；
The third key parameter of public key parameter, identification information and at least two-stage based on at least two-stage generates
Public key.
In above scheme, the public key parameter of the acquisition at least two-stage, comprising:
Obtain the public key parameter for at least two-stage being recorded in block chain；The public key ginseng being recorded in block chain
Number is the public key parameter passed through after the common recognition verifying of block chain.
In above scheme, the third key parameter of the acquisition at least two-stage, comprising:
It is obtained based at least one responder in first order responder, intergrade responder and afterbody responder
Public key parameter in the third key parameter of each responder.
The embodiment of the invention also provides a kind of electronic equipment, comprising:
First receiving module, for receiving the key application of request end transmission, the key application is carried among first
Value；First median is that the request end is generated based on the first key parameter；
First generation module generates the second key parameter of at least two-stage for being based on first median；
First sending module, for the second key parameter of at least two-stage to be sent to the request end；It is described extremely
Second key parameter of few two-stage and the first key parameter are provided commonly for generating private key for the request end.
The embodiment of the invention also provides a kind of electronic equipment, comprising:
Computing module obtains the first median for being based on first key parameter；
Second sending module, for sending the key application for carrying first median to responder；
Second receiving module, for receiving the second of at least two-stage that the responder is returned based on first median
Key parameter；
Second generation module, for based on at least two-stage the second key parameter and the first key parameter, it is raw
At private key.
The information processing method of offer described in the embodiment of the present invention, responder receive the key application that request end is sent, institute
It states key application and carries the first median；First median is that the request end is raw based on the first key parameter
At；Based on first median, the second key parameter of at least two-stage is generated, and not directly generates private key, and private key
The second key parameter and first key parameter by request end based on at least two-stage is generated to generate；In this way, responder without
The private key of trustship request end is needed, also reduces leakage of the private key in trustship and transmission process without transmission private key in a network
Phenomenon reduces because of safety problem caused by revealing.
And in the embodiment of the present invention, due to can be based on the first median, the second key parameter of at least two-stage is generated,
That is the second key parameter that the generation of private key is not based on a responder generates, but based at least two ranks
Second key parameter of responder generates；Even if in this way, in the responder of at least two ranks part responder be broken or
It does evil (such as the leakage of the second key parameter of part), private key is also not easy to be cracked, to further improve the safety of private key
Property.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is a kind of flow diagram of information processing method provided in an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 2 is the block chain structure schematic diagram in one embodiment of the invention；
Fig. 3 is the flow diagram of another information processing method provided in an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 4 is a kind of information processing unit schematic diagram provided in an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 5 is another information processing unit schematic diagram provided in an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 6 is the flow diagram of another information processing method provided in an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 7 is the schematic diagram of sign test algorithm signature in one embodiment of the invention；
Fig. 8 is the hardware structural diagram of a kind of electronic equipment provided in an embodiment of the present invention.
Specific embodiment
Lower combination accompanying drawings and embodiments, the present invention will be described in further detail.It should be appreciated that tool described herein
Body embodiment is only used to explain the present invention, is not intended to limit the present invention.
Unless otherwise defined, all technical and scientific terms used herein and belong to technical field of the invention
The normally understood meaning of technical staff is identical.Term as used herein in the specification of the present invention is intended merely to description tool
The purpose of the embodiment of body, it is not intended that in the limitation present invention.Term as used herein "and/or" includes one or more phases
Any and all combinations of the listed item of pass.
As shown in Figure 1, the embodiment of the invention provides a kind of information processing methods, comprising:
Step S110: receiving the key application that request end is sent, and the key application carries the first median；Described
One median is that the request end is generated based on the first key parameter；
Step S120: being based on first median, generates the second key parameter of at least two-stage；
Step S130: the second key parameter of at least two-stage is sent to the request end；At least two-stage
Second key parameter and the first key parameter are provided commonly for generating private key for the request end.
Here, the first key parameter can be the secret value that request end generates at random；The second key parameter packet
Include but be not limited to the private key parameter and/or private key parameter of each responder.
Information processing method provided by the embodiment of the present invention is applied to responder；The responder includes at least two-stage
Responder；The responder is various types of electronic equipments；The electronic equipment includes terminal, server or communication network
Member etc..
In some embodiments, the responder includes N number of key generation centre (KGC)；The N is more than or equal to 2
Natural number.
Responder can receive key application from request end, and in embodiments of the present invention, what key application carried is in first
Between be worth；First median can be what request end was generated based on first key parameter.The responder receives in first
Between be worth after, the second key parameter is generated based on first median, rather than directly generates private key.Second key parameter is used
Private key is generated according to the first key parameter and the second key parameter in request end.In this way, responder does not have to management request
The private key at end passes through network transmission to request end without by private key, reduces private key caused by trustship and transmission private key and reveal
Phenomenon reduces because of safety problem caused by revealing.
And since the responder is the responder for including at least two-stage, the second key parameter of at least two-stage is generated；?
That is the second key parameter that the generation of private key is not based on a responder generates, but based on to less than two ranks
Second key parameter of responder generates；Even if in this way, the part responder in the responder of at least two ranks be broken or
Person does evil (such as the leakage of the second key parameter of part), and private key is also not easy to be cracked, to further improve the peace of private key
Quan Xing.
In some embodiments, the step S120, comprising:
If current responder is first order responder, first median is received；Based on first median, generate
Second key parameter of the first order responder；Second key parameter of the first order responder is sent to the second level to ring
Ying Duan；
If current responder is intergrade responder, the second key parameter of previous stage responder is received；Before described
Second key parameter of level-one responder generates the second key parameter of the intergrade responder；The intergrade is responded
Second key parameter at end is sent to rear stage responder；
If current responder is afterbody responder, the second key parameter of previous stage responder is received；Based on described
Second key parameter of previous stage responder generates the second key parameter of the afterbody responder.
For example, if the responder includes N number of key generation centre；N number of key generation centre is respectively the 1st close
Key generate center, the 2nd key generation centre ... the N-1 key generation centre, n-th key generation centre；The N
For the natural number more than or equal to 2；Then the 1st key generation centre is first order responder, in 2 keys generation
The heart ..., the N-1 key generation centre be intergrade responder；The n-th key generation centre is afterbody
Responder.
In some embodiments, second key parameter by at least two-stage is sent to the request end, comprising:
By the second key parameter of the first order responder, the second key parameter of the intergrade responder and described
Second key parameter of afterbody responder is sent to the request end.
In one embodiment, the responder includes N number of key generation centre；N number of key generation centre is respectively
1st key generation centre, the 2nd key generation centre ... the N-1 key generation centre, n-th key generate in
The heart；1st key generation centre receives the key application that request end is sent, and carries the first median in the key application
XA；And it is based on the XA, generate the second key parameter (PA of the 1st key generation centre1、z1)；2nd key
Generation center receives the (PA that the 1st key generation centre is sent1、z1)；Based on (the PA1、z1), generate the 2nd key
Second key parameter (the PA at generation center2、z2)；And (the PA by described in2、z2) it is sent to the 3rd key generation centre；Successively class
It pushes away；The N-1 key generation centre receives the (PA that the N-2 key generation centre is sentN-2、zn-2)；Based on described
(PAN-2、zn-2) generate the N-1 key generation centre the second key parameter (PAN-1、zn-1)；And (the PA by described inN-1、zn-1)
Send a n-th key generation centre；The n-th key generation centre receives the N-1 key and generates transmission
(PAN-1、zn-1)；Based on (the PAN-1、zn-1) generate the second key parameter (PA of the n-th key generation centren、zn)；
Wherein, the PA1、PA2、……PAN-1、PANFor the public key parameter in second key parameter；The z1、z2、……zn-1、
znFor the private key parameter of second key parameter；1st key generation centre, the 2nd key generation centre ...
N-1 key generation centre, n-th key generation centre are respectively by PA1、PA2、……PAN-1、PANIt is sent to the request end；
The n-th key generation centre is by the znIt is sent to the request end.
In another embodiment, the responder includes N number of key generation centre；N number of key generation centre difference
For the 1st key generation centre, the 2nd key generation centre ... the N-1 key generation centre, n-th key generate in
The heart；1st key generation centre receives the key application that request end is sent, and carries the first median in the key application
XA；And it is based on the XA, generate the second key parameter (PA of the 1st key generation centre1、z1)；2nd key
Generation center receives the (PA that the 1st key generation centre is sent1、z1)；Based on (the PA1、z1), generate the 2nd key
Second key parameter (the PA at generation center2、z2)；And (the PA by described in1、PA2、z2) it is sent to the 3rd key generation centre；Successively
Analogize；The N-1 key generation centre receives the (PA that the N-2 key generation centre is sent1、PA2、……PAN-2、zN-2)；
Based on (the PAN-2、zn-2) generate the N-1 key generation centre the second key parameter (PAN-1、zn-1)；And it will be described
(PA1、PA2、……PAN-2、PAN-1、zn-1) send a n-th key generation centre；The n-th key generation centre receives institute
It states the N-1 key and generates (the PA sent1、PA2、……PAn-2、PAN-1、zn-1)；Based on (the PAN-1、zn-1) described in generation
Second key parameter (PA of n-th key generation centreN、zn)；Wherein, the PA1、PA2、……PAN-1、PANIt is described second
Public key parameter in key parameter；The z1、z2、……zn-1、znFor the private key parameter of second key parameter；The N
A key generation centre is by (PA1、PA2、……PAN-1、PAN、zn) it is sent to the request end.
In some embodiments, the responder also receives the identification information of user, the identification information be used for it is described
Public key parameter in second key parameter is provided commonly for generating cryptographic Hash；Based on the cryptographic Hash, the second key ginseng is generated
Several private key parameters.
The embodiment of the present invention, the key for constructing a multiple response end generate system, can be generated based on multiple responders
Multiple second key parameters, and the second key parameter of the latter responder is based on previous response in plurality of responder
The cipher generating parameter at end and generate, and private key is that the second key parameter based on all responders could generate；In this way, working as
Part of responder is done evil or the second cipher generating parameter of part responder is leaked, and the private key is also not easy to be broken
Solution.In this way, generating system using the key at the multiple response end of the embodiment of the present invention, can have a certain number of responders of tolerance
The case where being broken can greatly improve the safety of private key.
In some applications, the key at the multiple response end generates system and can be applicable in block chain, can solve alliance
The excessively too fat to move problem of CA certificate system in chain.
For example, in some embodiments, second key parameter includes: public key parameter；The method also includes: by institute
After the common recognition verifying that the public key parameter for stating at least two-stage passes through block chain, it is recorded in block chain.
In embodiments of the present invention, it can be verified by common recognition, so that each of described public key gain of parameter block chain
The trust of node.And the key parameter is recorded in block chain, it can make any one node can be from block chain
The middle public key parameter for obtaining the corresponding each KGC (i.e. responder) of user；In this way, multi-party operator can be made not need respectively
The public key parameter for saving the corresponding each KGC of each user, can save storage resource；Simultaneously as being to have used reality of the present invention
The key for applying the multiple response end in example generates system instead of CA certificate system in alliance's chain, so as to solve CA in alliance's chain
The excessively too fat to move problem of certificate system.
In some embodiments, the method also includes: if current responder is first order responder, by the first order
Public key parameter is sent to intergrade responder and/or afterbody responder in the third key parameter of responder；
If current responder is intergrade responder, by public key parameter in the third key parameter of the intergrade responder
It is sent to first order responder and/or afterbody responder；
If current responder is afterbody responder, by public key in the third key parameter of the afterbody responder
Parameter is sent to first order responder and/or intergrade responder.
In embodiments of the present invention, each node in block chain can obtain the corresponding responder of other nodes (such as
KGC public key parameter) may make the public key parameter of each KGC that can share；In this way, be conducive to some node fetching portion or
Person's whole KGC encrypts, decrypts and/or the operations such as signature authentication.
In practical applications, system is generated using the key at above-mentioned multiple response end replace existing CA system.Such as Fig. 2 institute
Show, may include several tissues in alliance's chain using node as basic unit in alliance's chain, each tissue may include several
A node；Wherein, a tissue may include a KGC.It includes KGC that the key at the multiple response end, which generates system,1、KGC2With
KGC3；The KGC1, the KGC2With the KGC3It is connect respectively with multiple node Peer.Apply the multiple response in block chain
The key at end generate the information processing method of system the following steps are included:
Step S1: block catenary system initial phase；
Specifically, each tissue starts respective KGC；Share Your Majesty's key using credible means between the KGC.Each node
Main private key in identification information ID and respective third key parameter of the peer based on registration generates the second key parameter.Its
In, second key parameter includes public key parameter and private key parameter；The third key parameter includes Your Majesty's key and main private key.
In an alternative embodiment, the part public key parameter write-in wound generation block of lower node will be organized belonging to each KGC.
Step S2: endorsement link；
Specifically, node is initiated to be packaged transaction message；And signed using the private key parameter, described in acquisition
Signature result；The identity, the transaction message, the public key parameter, the signature result are sent to endorsement node.
The endorsement node executes sign test algorithm, and the simulation traded if sign test passes through executes, and implementing result is returned to described
Initiate node；If it is determined that after the initiation node receives the transaction message that enough endorsement nodes pass through, by the transaction
Ordering joint is issued in the encapsulation of message.
In an alternative embodiment, the initiation node does not send public key parameter；The endorsement node passes through block chain
Original block message obtains the public key parameter.
Step S3: sequence link；
Specifically, the ordering joint is ranked up all effective transaction in time window, goes out block；Use negative entropy algorithm
All nodes block message being broadcast in block chain.
Step S4: confirmation link.
Specifically, all node verifications, record and confirm transaction in block message, block chain is written into the transaction, and
Update account book state.
In some embodiments, second key parameter includes: private key parameter；
The step S120, comprising:
The identification information that acquisition request end is sent；
Generate random number and third key parameter；
Based on first median, the identification information and the random number, cryptographic Hash is generated；
Using first function using the cryptographic Hash, the random number and the third key parameter as known quantity, calculating is obtained
Obtain private key parameter.
Wherein, described to be based on first median, the identification information and the random number, generate one kind of cryptographic Hash
It is achieved in that: the public key parameter of the second key parameter can be generated based on first intermediate parameters and the random number；
Cryptographic Hash is generated based on the public key parameter of the identification information and second key parameter.
Here, the cryptographic Hash can concatenating for the identification information and the public key parameter of second key parameter.
For example, the ID is 1212, the public key parameter of second key parameter is 21345；Then the cryptographic Hash is 121221345.
It in embodiments of the present invention, is the public key parameter for utilizing the identification information and the second key parameter of user, it is common raw
At the private key parameter of the second key, i.e., the identification information of user can be substantially reduced together with the public key Wire Parameters
The case where public key replacement attack, personation identity attack and forgery attack, occurs.
In one embodiment, described to be joined using first function with the cryptographic Hash, the random number and the third key
Number is known quantity, calculates and obtains private key parameter, comprising:
The cryptographic Hash is subjected to Binary Conversion, obtains 32 the first numerical value；
Obtain high 16 binary systems and low 16 binary systems of first numerical value；
High 16 binary systems are subjected to decimal system conversion, obtain the first subnumber value；
Low 16 binary systems are subjected to decimal system conversion, obtain the second subnumber value；
Product and the second subnumber value and the third key based on the first subnumber value and the random number are joined
Several products calculates and obtains private key parameter.
For example, the cryptographic Hash is 220Binary Conversion is carried out, obtains 32 the first numerical value are as follows: 0000000000010
0000000000000000000；Obtain high 16 binary systems of first numerical value are as follows: 0000000000010000, Yi Jisuo
State low 16 binary systems of the first numerical value are as follows: 0000000000000000；High 16 binary systems are subjected to decimal system conversion,
Obtain the first subnumber value are as follows: 16；Low 16 binary systems are subjected to decimal system conversion, obtain the second subnumber value are as follows: 0；Here,
It is 0 since the second subnumber value is 0, then the second subnumber value and the product of the third key parameter；It is described to be based on institute
The product of the first subnumber value and the random number and the product of the second subnumber value and the third key parameter are stated, is calculated
Obtaining private key parameter is that the product based on the first subnumber value and the random number calculates acquisition private key parameter.
In the present embodiment, cryptographic Hash can be carried out to high 16 binary systems and low 16 binary fractionations, be based on
High 16 binary systems carry out the first subnumber value that decimal system conversion obtains and low 16 binary systems carry out decimal system conversion second
It is calculated；In this way, providing a kind of algorithm for obtaining private key parameter, while the algorithm comparison is simply easily realized, can simplify
The calculating of private key parameter.And due to the embodiment of the present invention be using based on the first subnumber value and the random number product and
The product of the second subnumber value and third key parameter calculates and obtains the private key parameter；And this kind of calculation and ellipse
The calculating formula of curve is related, if the acquisition of first median is that the generation member based on elliptic curve utilizes singly for known quantity
What line function obtained, then this kind of calculation matches with elliptic curve, can advanced optimize algorithm, is promoted and calculates effect
Rate.
As shown in figure 3, the embodiment of the invention provides a kind of information processing methods, comprising:
Step S210: being based on first key parameter, obtains the first median；
Step S220: the key application for carrying first median is sent to responder；
Step S230: the second key ginseng for at least two-stage that the responder is returned based on first median is received
Number；
Step S240: the second key parameter and the first key parameter based on at least two-stage generate private key.
Information processing method provided by the embodiment of the present invention is applied to request end；The request end is various types of
Electronic equipment；The electronic equipment includes terminal, server or communication network element etc..
Wherein, the first key parameter is that the request end generates random parameter, and the random parameter is secret value.
In embodiments of the present invention, request end can generate first key parameter at random, be based on the first key parameter
Obtain the first median；Make responder that can generate the second key parameter from based on first median, rather than directly generates private
Key；The private key is still to be based on first key parameter generation and the generation of the second key parameter by the request end.In this way,
Request end has absolute generation administration authority to the private key, and responder does not have to the private key of management request end, without will be private
Key, to request end, is reduced private key leakage phenomenon caused by trustship and transmission private key, reduced because of leakage by network transmission
Caused safety problem.
And in embodiments of the present invention, it due to being the second key parameter for obtaining at least two-stage that responder returns, is based on
Second key parameter of at least two-stage and the first key parameter are to generate private key；Even if in this way, at least two-stage
The second key parameter of part of the second key parameter be leaked, private key is also not easy to be cracked, to further improve private
The safety of key.
In some embodiments, the step S210, comprising:
Using one-way function using the first key parameter as known quantity, the first median is calculated.
The first median is transmitted in a network in order to prevent, after having been got by illegal end, in first
Between be worth and obtain the function of first median and voluntarily derive first key parameter, then by intercepting the second key parameter
The phenomenon that deriving the private key of request end, in the present embodiment, the first function are one-way function.
One-way function is also referred to as injective function, and one-way function has a characteristic that
For each input, functional value is all easy to calculate (polynomial time), but provides the letter of a stochastic inputs
Numerical value, calculating are originally inputted relatively difficult (can not calculate in polynomial time using deterministic Turng machine).Even if in this way,
The second key parameter and the one-way function have been taken in illegal end, derive that the difficulty of the first key parameter is also very big
, in this way, considerably increasing the difficulty that first key parameter is cracked, the risk that private key is leaked is reduced, private key is improved
Safety.
In some embodiments, the step S230, comprising:
Receive the second key parameter of the first order responder that the responder returns, the second key of intergrade responder
Second key parameter of parameter and afterbody responder；
Wherein, the second key parameter of the first order responder is generated based on first median；The first order
Second key parameter of responder is for being sent to second level responder；
Second key parameter of the intergrade responder is generated based on the second key parameter of previous stage responder；It is described
Second key parameter of intergrade responder is for being sent to rear stage responder；
Second key parameter of the afterbody responder is generated based on the second key parameter of previous stage responder；Institute
The second key parameter of afterbody responder is stated for being sent to request end.
Wherein, the second key parameter, the intergrade responder for receiving the first order responder that the responder returns
The second key parameter and one kind of last and responder the second key parameter be achieved in that: rung from the afterbody
Ying Duan receives the second key parameter of the first order responder, the second key parameter of the intergrade responder and institute
State the second key parameter of afterbody responder.
The second of second key parameter for receiving the first order responder that the responder returns, intergrade responder
The another kind of key parameter and last and responder the second key parameter is achieved in that: being responded and is terminated from the first order
The second key parameter for receiving the first order responder receives the second of the intergrade responder from the intergrade responder
Key parameter receives the second key parameter of the afterbody responder from the afterbody responder.
In embodiments of the present invention, the second key parameter of each responder is all based on the second key of previous responder
Parameter generates；Even if being also not readily available private key in this way, the second key parameter for working as part of responder is leaked, thus
The difficulty for cracking private key can be greatly improved, the safety of private key is improved.
In some embodiments, second key parameter includes: private key parameter and public key parameter；
Second key parameter based on at least two-stage and the first key parameter generate private key, comprising:
Private key parameter and the first key parameter based on afterbody responder, determine temporary private parameter；
Verify the corresponding relationship of the public key parameter of the temporary private parameter and at least two-stage；
If being verified, determine that the temporary private parameter is private key.
It after request end obtains public key parameter and private key parameter, needs to verify public key and private key, reduces request
Not the phenomenon that key pair that end and/or responder generate caused by the mistake in key generation process is not available.In this way, at this
In embodiment, the verifying relationship of the private key and public key can be verified, to obtain correct private key.
In further embodiments, the method also includes: obtain at least the third key parameter of two-stage and it is described extremely
The public key parameter of few two-stage；
The third key parameter of public key parameter, identification information and at least two-stage based on at least two-stage generates
Public key.
Here, the third key parameter includes: public key parameter and private key parameter；The public key of the third key parameter is joined
Number is Your Majesty's key of responder；The private key parameter of the third key parameter is the main private key of the responder；Your Majesty's key
Other responders or request end are disclosed；For example, Your Majesty's key is recorded in block chain in block catenary system；It is described
Main private key does not disclose other responders and request end.
In embodiments of the present invention, request end and it is indirect from responder obtain public key, but be based on the second key parameter
Public key parameter and identification information obtain；In this way, may be implemented to hide the certification to client public key, only identification information automatically
Just there is public key corresponding with the private key for the user of specific identification information.
In some embodiments, the method also includes: message is encrypted based on the public key；It obtains encrypted
Ciphertext.
In further embodiments, the method also includes: ciphertext is decrypted based on the private key；The ciphertext is
The message encrypted using the corresponding public key of the private key.
In some embodiments, the public key parameter of the acquisition at least two-stage, comprising:
Obtain the public key parameter for at least two-stage being recorded in block chain；The public key ginseng being recorded in block chain
Number is the public key parameter passed through after the common recognition verifying of block chain.
For example, being applied in block chain when the key at the multiple response end generates system, if responder is by its second key
In block chain, the request end can obtain the second of multiple response end generation from block chain for public key reference record in parameter
Public key parameter in key parameter；It so, it is possible so that system saving memory space, can simplify the behaviour for obtaining public key parameter
Make.
In some embodiments, the third key parameter of the acquisition at least two-stage, comprising:
It is obtained based at least one responder in first order responder, intergrade responder and afterbody responder
Public key parameter in the third key parameter of each responder.
In embodiments of the present invention, the public key parameter of the third key parameter of each responder be can be disclosed；Institute
It, can be by the way that each third key of shared realization between each nodal information be joined when to state responder be each node in block catenary system
Several public key parameters it is shared so that the request end can be based only upon one or several responders obtain public key parameters with
And private key parameter, to further simplify the operation for obtaining public key and private key.
As shown in figure 4, the embodiment of the invention also provides a kind of electronic equipment, comprising:
First receiving module 31, for receiving the key application of request end transmission, the key application is carried in first
Between be worth；First median is that the request end is generated based on the first key parameter；
First generation module 32 generates the second key parameter of at least two-stage for being based on first median；
First sending module 33, for the second key parameter of at least two-stage to be sent to the request end；It is described
At least the second key parameter of two-stage and the first key parameter are provided commonly for generating private key for the request end.
Electronic equipment described in the embodiment of the present invention corresponds to responder above-mentioned.
In some embodiments, first generation module 32 receives if being first order responder for current responder
First median；Based on first median, the second key parameter of the first order responder is generated；By described
Second key parameter of level-one responder is sent to second level responder；
If current responder is intergrade responder, the second key parameter of previous stage responder is received；Before described
Second key parameter of level-one responder generates the second key parameter of the intergrade responder；The intergrade is responded
Second key parameter at end is sent to rear stage responder；
If current responder is afterbody responder, the second key parameter of previous stage responder is received；Based on described
Second key parameter of previous stage responder generates the second key parameter of the afterbody responder.
In some embodiments, first sending module 33, for joining the second key of the first order responder
Second key parameter of the second key parameter of several, the described intergrade responder and the afterbody responder is sent to described
Request end.
In some embodiments, second key parameter includes: public key parameter；
The electronic equipment further include: first processing module 34, for the public key parameter of at least two-stage to be led to
It crosses after the common recognition verifying of block chain, is recorded in block chain.
In some embodiments, first sending module 33 will if being also used to current responder is first order responder
Public key parameter is sent to intergrade responder and/or afterbody response in the third key parameter of the first order responder
End；If current responder is intergrade responder, public key parameter in the third key parameter of the intergrade responder is sent
To first order responder and/or afterbody responder；If current responder is afterbody responder, by the afterbody
Public key parameter is sent to first order responder and/or intergrade responder in the third key parameter of responder.
In some embodiments, second key parameter includes: private key parameter；
First generation module 32 is also used to the identification information of acquisition request end transmission；Generate random number and third
Key parameter；Based on first median, the identification information and the random number, cryptographic Hash is generated；Utilize first function
Using the cryptographic Hash, the random number and the third key parameter as known quantity, calculates and obtain private key parameter.
In some embodiments, first generation module 32 is also used to the cryptographic Hash carrying out Binary Conversion, obtain
Obtain 32 the first numerical value；Obtain high 16 binary systems and low 16 binary systems of first numerical value；It will be described 16 high
Binary system carries out decimal system conversion, obtains the first subnumber value；Low 16 binary systems are subjected to decimal system conversion, obtain second
Subnumber value；Product and the second subnumber value and the third key based on the first subnumber value and the random number are joined
Several products calculates and obtains private key parameter.
As shown in figure 5, the embodiment of the present invention also provides a kind of electronic equipment, comprising:
Computing module 41 obtains the first median for being based on first key parameter；
Second sending module 42, for sending the key application for carrying first median to responder；
Second receiving module 43, for receiving the of at least two-stage that the responder is returned based on first median
Two key parameters；
Second generation module 44, for based on at least two-stage the second key parameter and the first key parameter,
Generate private key.
Electronic equipment described in the embodiment of the present invention corresponds to request end above-mentioned.
In some embodiments, the computing module 41, for utilizing one-way function with the first key parameter for
The first median is calculated in the amount of knowing.
In some embodiments, second receiving module, the first order responder returned for receiving the responder
The second key parameter, the second key parameter of intergrade responder and the second key parameter of afterbody responder；
Wherein, the second key parameter of the first order responder is generated based on first median；The first order
Second key parameter of responder is for being sent to second level responder；
Second key parameter of the intergrade responder is generated based on the second key parameter of previous stage responder；It is described
Second key parameter of intergrade responder is for being sent to rear stage responder；
Second key parameter of the afterbody responder is generated based on the second key parameter of previous stage responder；Institute
The second key parameter of afterbody responder is stated for being sent to request end.
In some embodiments, second key parameter includes: private key parameter and public key parameter；
Second generation module 44, for private key parameter and first key ginseng based on afterbody responder
Number, determines temporary private parameter；
Verify the corresponding relationship of the public key parameter of the temporary private parameter and at least two-stage；
If being verified, determine that the temporary private parameter is private key.
In some embodiments, second key parameter includes: public key parameter；
Second receiving module 42, for obtaining the third key parameter of at least two-stage and the institute of at least two-stage
State public key parameter；
Second generation module 44, for based on at least two-stage public key parameter, identification information and it is described at least
The third key parameter of two-stage generates public key.
In some embodiments, second receiving module 42 is also used to obtain at least two-stage being recorded in block chain
The public key parameter；The public key parameter being recorded in block chain is by the public key parameter after the common recognition verifying of block chain.
In some embodiments, second receiving module 42 is also used to based on first order responder, intergrade responder
And at least one responder in afterbody responder obtains public key parameter in the third key parameter of each responder.
A specific example is provided below in conjunction with above-mentioned any embodiment:
Three algorithms involved in this programme: system initialization algorithm, private key generating algorithm, public key generating algorithm.Such as Fig. 6
Shown, the method that this example provides may include following steps:
S21. system initialization:
(1) it is equipped with N number of KGC；N number of KGC uses unified elliptic curve parameter { E, G, n }；Wherein, the E:y2=
x3+ ax+b is finite field FqOn elliptic curve；N is prime number；G is a n rank basic point on E；h0(),h1()...hm() is
One group { 0,1 }*Hash (hash) function of → [1, n-1]；Wherein, the m is the positive integer more than or equal to 1.
(2) N number of KGC generates respective Your Majesty's key PiWith main private key si；The siIt is underground, the PiIt is open；Its
In, the i is the positive integer more than or equal to 1；N number of KGC includes: KGC1、KGC2、……、KGCN；The N be greater than or
Positive integer equal to 2.
Here, Your Majesty's key is the public key parameter of the third key parameter in above-described embodiment；The main private key is upper
State the private key parameter of the third key parameter in embodiment.
Step S22. private key generates:
(1) identification information is that the user subject A of ID generates secret value x at randomAIt (based on open parameter n), calculates oval bent
Point X on lineA=xA* G, by described ID, XAIt is sent to KGC1。
Here, the xAFor the first key parameter in above-described embodiment；The XAAmong first in above-described embodiment
Value.
(2)KGC1Receive (ID, XA) after, examine its legitimacy；If it is determined that (ID, the XA) legal, y is generated at random1；Meter
Calculate Point on Elliptic Curve PA1=XA+y1*G；Calculate abstract e1=h (ID | | PA1), by e1It splits and calculates z1=e1[0:15]*y1+
e1[16:31]*s1；By the PA1, the ID and the z1It is sent to KGC2。
Here, described " | | " indicates the concatenation of data；The e1=h (ID | | PA1) indicate to concatenate PA behind the ID1。
Here, the y1For the random number of above-described embodiment.
Here, the e1[0:15] indicates the e1After being converted to 32 binary systems, extract this 32 binary high by 16
Position binary system, the decimal number obtained based on high 16 binary systems；The e1[16:31] indicates the e1Be converted to 32
Binary system after, extract this 32 binary low 16 binary systems, the decimal number obtained based on low 16 binary systems.
Here, the PA1For the public key parameter of the second key parameter in above-described embodiment；The z1For above-described embodiment
In the second key parameter private key parameter.It is understood that the PA1It may be considered part public key；The z1It can recognize
To be part private key.
(3) KGC2Receive the PA1, the ID and the z1；And y is generated at random2；Calculate PA2=PA1+y2*G；Meter
Calculate abstract e2=h (ID | | PA2), by e2It splits and calculates z2=z1+e2[0:15]*y2+e2[16:31]*s2, and by { PA1, PA2}、
The ID and z2It is sent to subsequent KGC3。
Here, the y2For the random number of above-described embodiment.
Here, the e2[0:15] indicates the e2After being converted to 32 binary systems, extract this 32 binary high by 16
Position binary system, the decimal number obtained based on high 16 binary systems；The e2[16:31] indicates the e2Be converted to 32
Binary system after, extract this 32 binary low 16 binary systems, the decimal number obtained based on low 16 binary systems.
Here, the PA2For the public key parameter of the second key parameter in above-described embodiment；The z2For above-described embodiment
In the second key parameter private key parameter.It is understood that the PA2It may be considered part public key；The z2It can recognize
To be part private key.
(4), to the last KGCNReceive KGCN-1{ the PA sent1, PA2..., PAN-1, the ID and
The zn-1；And y is generated at randomn；Calculate PAN=PAN-1+yn*G；Calculate abstract en=h (ID | | PAN)；By enIt splits and calculates zn
=zn-1+en[0:15]*yn+en[16:31]*sn；And by { PA1, PA2..., PANAnd the znIt is sent to user subject A.
Here, the ynFor the random number of above-described embodiment.
Here, the en[0:15] indicates the enAfter being converted to 32 binary systems, extract this 32 binary high by 16
Position binary system, the decimal number obtained based on high 16 binary systems；The en[16:31] indicates the enBe converted to 32
Binary system after, extract this 32 binary low 16 binary systems, the decimal number obtained based on low 16 binary systems.
Here, the PANFor the public key parameter of the second key parameter in above-described embodiment；The znFor above-described embodiment
In the second key parameter private key parameter.It is understood that the PANIt may be considered part public key；The znIt can recognize
To be part private key.
(5) user receives { PA1, PA2..., PANAnd the znAfterwards, e is calculatedi=h (ID | | PAi), then verifyIf the formula is verified, obtain user's
Private key dA=e1[0:15]*xA+zn。
S23. public key generates:
Obtain the public key parameter { PA of N number of KGC1, PA2..., PANAnd N number of KGC Your Majesty's key { P1,
P2..., PN}；Calculate abstract ei=h (ID | | PAi)；Calculate public key:
In practical applications, can by above scheme can using in key signature.For example, user subject A uses private key dA
=e1[0:15]*xA+znIt signs to message msg, signature value sig can be obtained based on above-mentioned elliptic curve parameter；It is described
User subject A is by the sig, the ID, the msg and { PA1, PA2..., PANIt is sent to user subject B；User subject B
Receive the sig, the ID, the msg and { PA1, PA2..., PAN, calculate abstract ei=h (ID | | PAi)；Then it counts
It calculatesAnd use standard sign test proof of algorithm signature verify (sig, msg,
QA)；The standard sign test algorithm is as shown in Figure 7.
In further embodiments, above scheme can also be applied to encrypt, in decipherment algorithm.For example, user subject B is obtained
Part public key { the PA of user subject A1, PA2..., PAN}；Actual public key Q is calculated based on the part public keyA；User subject B is used
The actual public key of family entity A encrypts message sig；And the ciphertext encrypted is sent to user subject A；User subject A can be based on described
The private key d of itselfA=e1[0:15]*xA+znThe ciphertext is decrypted.
It need to be noted that: the description of following electronic equipment and storage medium is retouched with above- mentioned information processing method item
It is similar for stating, and the beneficial effect with method describes, and is not repeated them here.For undisclosed skill in electronic equipment embodiment of the present invention
Art details please refers to the description of information processing method embodiment of the present invention and understands.
As described in Figure 8, the embodiment of the invention discloses a kind of electronic equipment, the electronic equipment includes: that the electronics is set
Standby includes: processor 51, communication interface 52 and memory 53；Wherein,
The overall operation of the usual controlling terminal equipment of the processor 51 or the network equipment.
Communication interface 52 can make terminal device or the network equipment pass through network and other terminals or server communication.
Memory 53 is configured to store the instruction and application that can be performed by processor 51, can also cache device 51 to be processed with
And in terminal each module it is to be processed or processed data (for example, image data, audio data, voice communication data and view
Frequency communication data), it can be real by flash memory (FLASH) or random access storage device (Random Access Memory, RAM)
It is existing.
It is understood that processor 51 described herein may be a kind of IC chip, the processing with signal
Ability.During realization, each step of the above method can by the integrated logic circuit of the hardware in processor 51 or
The instruction of software form is completed.The storage medium is located at memory 53, and processor 51 reads the information in memory 53, in conjunction with it
Hardware completes the step of above method.
Further embodiment of this invention provides a kind of computer storage medium, which has can
Program is executed, it can be achieved that being applied to the information processing method of the electronic equipment when executable code processor executes
The step of.For example, such as one or more of Fig. 1, Fig. 3, method shown in fig. 6.
In several embodiments provided herein, it should be understood that disclosed device and method can pass through it
Its mode is realized.Apparatus embodiments described above are merely indicative, for example, the division of the unit, only
A kind of logical function partition, there may be another division manner in actual implementation, such as: multiple units or components can combine, or
It is desirably integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed.In addition, shown or discussed each composition portion
Mutual coupling or direct-coupling or communication connection is divided to can be through some interfaces, the INDIRECT COUPLING of equipment or unit
Or communication connection, it can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.
Above-mentioned unit as illustrated by the separation member, which can be or may not be, to be physically separated, aobvious as unit
The component shown can be or may not be physical unit, it can and it is in one place, it may be distributed over multiple network lists
In member；Some or all of units can be selected to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment according to the actual needs.
In addition, each functional unit in various embodiments of the present invention can be fully integrated into a processing module, it can also
To be each unit individually as a unit, can also be integrated in one unit with two or more units；It is above-mentioned
Integrated unit both can take the form of hardware realization, can also realize in the form of hardware adds SFU software functional unit.This
Field those of ordinary skill, which is understood that, realizes that all or part of the steps of above method embodiment can be by program instruction phase
The hardware of pass is completed, and program above-mentioned can be stored in a computer readable storage medium, which when being executed, holds
Row step including the steps of the foregoing method embodiments；And storage medium above-mentioned include: movable storage device, read-only memory (ROM,
Read-Only Memory), random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), magnetic or disk etc. it is various
It can store the medium of program code.
Disclosed method in several embodiments of the method provided herein, in the absence of conflict can be any group
It closes, obtains new embodiment of the method.
Disclosed feature in several product embodiments provided herein, in the absence of conflict can be any group
It closes, obtains new product embodiments.
Disclosed feature in several methods provided herein or apparatus embodiments, in the absence of conflict can be with
Any combination obtains new embodiment of the method or apparatus embodiments.
The above description is merely a specific embodiment, but scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto, any
Those familiar with the art in the technical scope disclosed by the present invention, can easily think of the change or the replacement, and should all contain
Lid is within protection scope of the present invention.Therefore, protection scope of the present invention should be based on the protection scope of the described claims.
Claims (10)
1. a kind of information processing method, comprising:
The key application that request end is sent is received, the key application carries the first median；First median is institute
Request end is stated to generate based on the first key parameter；
Based on first median, the second key parameter of at least two-stage is generated；
Second key parameter of at least two-stage is sent to the request end；Second key parameter of at least two-stage and
The first key parameter is provided commonly for generating private key for the request end.
2. generating the second key ginseng of at least two-stage according to the method described in claim 1, described be based on first median
Number, comprising:
If current responder is first order responder, first median is received；Based on first median, described in generation
Second key parameter of first order responder；Second key parameter of the first order responder is sent to second level response
End；
If current responder is intergrade responder, the second key parameter of previous stage responder is received；Based on the previous stage
Second key parameter of responder generates the second key parameter of the intergrade responder；By the intergrade responder
Second key parameter is sent to rear stage responder；
If current responder is afterbody responder, the second key parameter of previous stage responder is received；Based on described previous
Second key parameter of grade responder, generates the second key parameter of the afterbody responder.
3. according to the method described in claim 1, second key parameter includes: public key parameter；
The method also includes:
After the common recognition verifying that the public key parameter of at least two-stage is passed through block chain, it is recorded in block chain.
4. according to the method described in claim 1, second key parameter includes: private key parameter；
It is described to be based on first median, generate the second key parameter of at least two-stage, comprising:
The identification information that acquisition request end is sent；
Generate random number and third key parameter；
Based on first median, the identification information and the random number, cryptographic Hash is generated；
Using first function using the cryptographic Hash, the random number and the third key parameter as known quantity, calculates and obtain private
Key parameter.
5. according to the method described in claim 4, it is described using first function with the cryptographic Hash, the random number and described the
Three key parameters are known quantity, calculate and obtain private key parameter, comprising:
The cryptographic Hash is subjected to Binary Conversion, obtains 32 the first numerical value；
Obtain high 16 binary systems and low 16 binary systems of first numerical value；
High 16 binary systems are subjected to decimal system conversion, obtain the first subnumber value；
Low 16 binary systems are subjected to decimal system conversion, obtain the second subnumber value；
Product and the second subnumber value and the third key parameter based on the first subnumber value and the random number
Product calculates and obtains private key parameter.
6. a kind of information processing method, comprising:
Based on first key parameter, the first median is obtained；
The key application for carrying first median is sent to responder；
Receive the second key parameter of at least two-stage that the responder is returned based on first median；
The second key parameter and the first key parameter based on at least two-stage generate private key.
7. according to the method described in claim 6, the reception responder is returned at least based on first median
Second key parameter of two-stage, comprising:
Receive the second key parameter of the first order responder that the responder returns, the second key parameter of intergrade responder
And the second key parameter of afterbody responder；
Wherein, the second key parameter of the first order responder is generated based on first median；The first order response
Second key parameter at end is for being sent to second level responder；
Second key parameter of the intergrade responder is generated based on the second key parameter of previous stage responder；The centre
Second key parameter of grade responder is for being sent to rear stage responder；
Second key parameter of the afterbody responder is generated based on the second key parameter of previous stage responder；It is described most
Second key parameter of rear stage responder is for being sent to request end.
8. according to the method described in claim 6, second key parameter includes: private key parameter and public key parameter；
Second key parameter based on at least two-stage and the first key parameter generate private key, comprising:
Private key parameter and the first key parameter based on afterbody responder, determine temporary private parameter；
Verify the corresponding relationship of the public key parameter of the temporary private parameter and at least two-stage；
If being verified, determine that the temporary private parameter is private key.
9. a kind of electronic equipment, comprising:
First receiving module, for receiving the key application of request end transmission, the key application carries the first median；Institute
Stating the first median is that the request end is generated based on the first key parameter；
First generation module generates the second key parameter of at least two-stage for being based on first median；
First sending module, for the second key parameter of at least two-stage to be sent to the request end；Described at least two
Second key parameter of grade and the first key parameter are provided commonly for generating private key for the request end.
10. a kind of electronic equipment, comprising:
Computing module obtains the first median for being based on first key parameter；
Second sending module, for sending the key application for carrying first median to responder；
Second receiving module, for receiving the second key of at least two-stage that the responder is returned based on first median
Parameter；
Second generation module, for based on at least two-stage the second key parameter and the first key parameter, generate private
Key.
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| CN110995443A (en) * | 2019-12-02 | 2020-04-10 | 联想(北京)有限公司 | Data processing method and device |
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