CN108959973A - A kind of guard method and system refreshed for BMC firmware - Google Patents
A kind of guard method and system refreshed for BMC firmware Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN108959973A CN108959973A CN201810681480.0A CN201810681480A CN108959973A CN 108959973 A CN108959973 A CN 108959973A CN 201810681480 A CN201810681480 A CN 201810681480A CN 108959973 A CN108959973 A CN 108959973A
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- firmware
- bmc
- image file
- write
- flash chip
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- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
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Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/75—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information by inhibiting the analysis of circuitry or operation
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F8/00—Arrangements for software engineering
- G06F8/60—Software deployment
- G06F8/61—Installation
- G06F8/63—Image based installation; Cloning; Build to order
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F8/00—Arrangements for software engineering
- G06F8/60—Software deployment
- G06F8/65—Updates
Abstract
The present invention provides a kind of guard methods and system refreshed for BMC firmware, comprising the following steps: S1, verifying account password, if account password mistake, firmware refreshes authorization failure；If password is correct, perform the next step；S2, importing/downloading firmware image file, and signature verification is carried out to firmware image file, if authentication failed, refuse to execute firmware refresh operation；If be proved to be successful, perform the next step；S3, the write-protect switch that the flash chip for storing firmware image file is controlled using control circuit are closed, and firmware refreshing is carried out；After the completion of S4, firmware refresh, the write-protect switch default reset of flash chip is open state, refusal modification operation.The present invention solves the problems, such as that prior art BMC firmware refreshes protection mechanism and is unable to full protection threat attack, realizes that firmware from the comprehensive protection of operation is flushed to, has greatly taken precautions against the risk that server management software BMC firmware faces.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to firmware refresh protection technique field, it is especially a kind of for BMC firmware refresh guard method with
System.
Background technique
BMC (Baseboard Management Controller, baseboard management controller) is one independently of system
Management software, the IPMI specification based on professional standard, for some to server for remote management, firmware upgrade, system monitoring etc.
Operation.
As BMC technology is higher and higher in the status of server industries, go out not for the attack layer of server B MC system
Thoroughly, there are the network layer attacks for refresh control；There is the attack for the firmware storage areas BMC domain；Also have for BMC firmware update
The attack of image file will cause the collapse of server management system when BMC is attacked by above-mentioned threat, or cause to take
Business device management system is controlled by attacker, carries out malicious operation control to server.Therefore, safe BMC firmware flush mechanism
It allows for taking precautions against above-mentioned malicious attack, prevents attacker from arbitrarily carrying out BMC firmware refresh operation；Prevent attacker to BMC
The modification in firmware storage areas domain；Prevent attacker from refreshing using the BMC firmware of insertion malicious code.
There are some pairs of BMC firmwares to refresh the mechanism protected at present, as manufacturer before firmware factory to consolidating
Part image file is digitally signed, and when refreshing carries out signature verification, guarantees the integrality and legitimacy of firmware image file；Or
Firmware is stored in the flash chip for having write-protect technology by person；But these protection mechanisms cannot be in protection in all directions
Threat attack is stated, can not prevent attacker from carrying out indiscriminate brush operation to BMC.
Summary of the invention
The object of the present invention is to provide a kind of guard methods and system refreshed for BMC firmware, it is intended to solve existing skill
Art BMC firmware refreshing protection mechanism is unable to the problem of full protection threatens attack, and it is comprehensive to realize that firmware flushes to operation progress
Protection, the risk that prevention BMC firmware faces.
It is including following the present invention provides a kind of guard method refreshed for BMC firmware to reach above-mentioned technical purpose
Step:
S1, verifying account password, if account password mistake, firmware refreshes authorization failure；If password is correct, hold
Row is in next step；
S2, importing/downloading firmware image file, and signature verification is carried out to firmware image file, if authentication failed,
Refusal executes firmware refresh operation；If be proved to be successful, perform the next step；
S3, the write-protect switch that the flash chip for storing firmware image file is controlled using control circuit are closed, consolidate
Part refreshes；
After the completion of S4, firmware refresh, the write-protect switch default reset of flash chip is open state, refusal modification behaviour
Make.
It is preferably, described that signature verification concrete operations are carried out to firmware image file are as follows:
In the public key of BMC mainboard insertion BMC firmware digital signature；
Signature verification is carried out to firmware image file using public key.
Preferably, the write-protect switch of the flash chip that storage firmware image file is controlled using control circuit is closed
Close concrete operations are as follows:
The pin of control circuit is connect with the flash chip write-protect pin of storage firmware image file；
It obtains and executes permission；
The write-protect switch of control flash chip is set to off.
Preferably, the account is the administrator's account for having BMC firmware and refreshing permission.
The present invention also provides it is a kind of for BMC firmware refresh protection system, the system comprises:
Account password authentication module, for verifying account password；
Firmware signature authentication module for importing/downloading firmware image file, and carries out signature to firmware image file and tests
Card；
Firmware refresh module, the write-protect for the flash chip using control circuit control storage firmware image file
Switch is closed, and firmware refreshing is carried out；
Write-protect module, after the completion of refreshing for firmware, the write-protect switch default reset of flash chip is opening state
State, refusal modification operation.
Preferably, the firmware signature authentication module includes:
Public key embedded unit, for obtaining the public key for being embedded in the BMC firmware digital signature of mainboard；
Authentication unit, for carrying out signature verification to firmware image file using public key.
Preferably, the firmware refresh module includes:
Pin connection unit, for by the pin of control circuit and storage firmware image file flash chip write-protect
Pin connection；
Authority acquiring unit executes permission for obtaining；
Write-protect closing unit, the write-protect switch for controlling flash chip are set to off；
Refresh unit, for carrying out firmware refreshing.
Preferably, the account is the administrator's account for having BMC firmware and refreshing permission.
The effect provided in summary of the invention is only the effect of embodiment, rather than invents all whole effects, above-mentioned
A technical solution in technical solution have the following advantages that or the utility model has the advantages that
Compared with prior art, the present invention by verifying account password, to firmware image file carry out signature verification and
The closing of the storage chip write-protect switch of control storage firmware image file, prevents attacker to realize in firmware refresh process
Indiscriminate brush operation and BMC firmware file are carried out in the process of running not by malicious modification by the legal account of phishing, will be used
Family least privilege technology, digital signature technology and flash chip write-protect technology combine, and apply to BMC firmware and refresh
Cheng Zhong realizes triple protection of the firmware from refreshing end to operation end.Solving prior art BMC firmware refreshing protection mechanism cannot
Full protection threatens the problem of attack, realizes that firmware from the comprehensive protection of operation is flushed to, has greatly taken precautions against server pipe
The risk that reason software BMC firmware faces.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is a kind of guard method flow chart refreshed for BMC firmware provided in the embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 2 is a kind of protection system structure diagram refreshed for BMC firmware provided in the embodiment of the present invention.
Specific embodiment
In order to clearly illustrate the technical characterstic of this programme, below by specific embodiment, and its attached drawing is combined, to this
Invention is described in detail.Following disclosure provides many different embodiments or example is used to realize different knots of the invention
Structure.In order to simplify disclosure of the invention, hereinafter the component of specific examples and setting are described.In addition, the present invention can be with
Repeat reference numerals and/or letter in different examples.This repetition is that for purposes of simplicity and clarity, itself is not indicated
Relationship between various embodiments and/or setting is discussed.It should be noted that illustrated component is not necessarily to scale in the accompanying drawings
It draws.Present invention omits the descriptions to known assemblies and treatment technology and process to avoid the present invention is unnecessarily limiting.
It is provided for the embodiments of the invention a kind of guard method and system refreshed for BMC firmware with reference to the accompanying drawing
It is described in detail.
As shown in Figure 1, the embodiment of the invention discloses a kind of guard method refreshed for BMC firmware, including following step
It is rapid:
S1, verifying account password, if account password mistake, firmware refreshes authorization failure；If password is correct, hold
Row is in next step；
S2, importing/downloading firmware image file, and signature verification is carried out to firmware image file, if authentication failed,
Refusal executes firmware refresh operation；If be proved to be successful, perform the next step；
S3, the write-protect switch that the flash chip for storing firmware image file is controlled using control circuit are closed, consolidate
Part refreshes；
After the completion of S4, firmware refresh, the write-protect switch default reset of flash chip is open state, refusal modification behaviour
Make.
The administrator's account for refreshing permission due in firmware refresh operation, only having BMC firmware could initiate firmware brush
New request, ordinary user can not carry out the operation, before confirmation carries out the refreshing of BMC firmware, need to test account password
Card, only after account password is verified, BMC firmware, which refreshes, just can get legal authorization.If account password mistake,
BMC firmware refreshes authorization failure, and system will be refused to execute firmware refreshing；If password is correct, perform the next step.
Aforesaid operations are the first heavy protection mechanisms refreshed for BMC firmware.By above-mentioned protection mechanism, can effectively prevent
Only attacker carries out indiscriminate brush operation by the legal account of phishing.
Importing/downloading image file.BMC mainboard is just embedded in the public key of BMC firmware digital signature, firmware mirror before factory
As after file importing/downloading, system will carry out signature verification operations to firmware image file with the public key of insertion, judge firmware mirror
As the integrality and legitimacy of file.If signature verification fails, system will be refused to execute firmware refresh operation, if signature
It is proved to be successful, then will execute operation and transfer control circuit to.
Aforesaid operations are the second heavy protection mechanisms refreshed for BMC firmware.By above-mentioned protection mechanism, firmware ensure that
The integrality and legitimacy of image file.
BMC firmware image file is stored in flash chip, by the pin of the control circuit and storage BMC firmware
The flash chip write-protect pin of file is connected, and after control circuit obtains execution permission, just controls the write-protect of flash chip
Switch is set to off, to modify BMC firmware file.When the flash chip write-protect switch of storage BMC firmware file is closed
Afterwards, BMC firmware starts to carry out refresh operation, after successfully completing firmware refreshing, the write-protect switch default reset of flash chip
For open state, and refuse all modification operation.
The third weight protection mechanism refreshed when aforesaid operations for BMC firmware.Pass through above-mentioned protection mechanism, it is ensured that
BMC firmware file is not in the process of running by malicious modification.
The embodiment of the present invention is solid by verifying account password, signature verification is carried out to firmware image file and controlling storage
The closing of the storage chip write-protect switch of part image file prevents attacker imitative by network to realize in firmware refresh process
It emits legal account and carries out indiscriminate brush operation and BMC firmware file in the process of running not by malicious modification, by user's least privilege
Technology, digital signature technology and flash chip write-protect technology combine, and apply in BMC firmware refresh process, realize solid
Triple protection of the part from refreshing end to operation end.It solves prior art BMC firmware refreshing protection mechanism and is unable to full protection prestige
The problem of side of body attack, realizes that from the comprehensive protection of operation is flushed to, it is solid greatly to have taken precautions against server management software BMC for firmware
The risk that part faces.
As shown in Fig. 2, the embodiment of the invention also discloses a kind of protection system refreshed for BMC firmware, the system
Include:
Account password authentication module, for verifying account password；
Firmware signature authentication module for importing/downloading firmware image file, and carries out signature to firmware image file and tests
Card；
Firmware refresh module, the write-protect for the flash chip using control circuit control storage firmware image file
Switch is closed, and firmware refreshing is carried out；
Write-protect module, after the completion of refreshing for firmware, the write-protect switch default reset of flash chip is opening state
State, refusal modification operation.
The account is the administrator's account for having BMC firmware and refreshing permission, and ordinary user can not carry out the operation, true
Recognize before carrying out the refreshing of BMC firmware, needs to verify account password, only after account password is verified, BMC firmware
Refresh and just can get legal authorization.
The firmware signature authentication module includes:
Public key embedded unit, for obtaining the public key for being embedded in the BMC firmware digital signature of mainboard；
Authentication unit, for carrying out signature verification to firmware image file using public key.
BMC mainboard is just embedded in the public key of BMC firmware digital signature before factory, after firmware image file importing/downloading,
System will carry out signature verification operations to firmware image file with the public key of insertion, judge the integrality and conjunction of firmware image file
Method.
The firmware refresh module includes:
Pin connection unit, for by the pin of control circuit and storage firmware image file flash chip write-protect
Pin connection；
Authority acquiring unit executes permission for obtaining；
Write-protect closing unit, the write-protect switch for controlling flash chip are set to off；
Refresh unit, for carrying out firmware refreshing.
BMC firmware image file is stored in flash chip, by the pin of the control circuit and storage BMC firmware
The flash chip write-protect pin of file is connected, and after control circuit obtains execution permission, just controls the write-protect of flash chip
Switch is set to off, to modify BMC firmware file.When the flash chip write-protect switch of storage BMC firmware file is closed
Afterwards, BMC firmware starts to carry out refresh operation, after successfully completing firmware refreshing, the write-protect switch default reset of flash chip
For open state, and refuse all modification operation.
The foregoing is merely illustrative of the preferred embodiments of the present invention, is not intended to limit the invention, all in essence of the invention
Made any modifications, equivalent replacements, and improvements etc., should all be included in the protection scope of the present invention within mind and principle.
Claims (8)
1. a kind of guard method refreshed for BMC firmware, which comprises the following steps:
S1, verifying account password, if account password mistake, firmware refreshes authorization failure；If password is correct, under executing
One step；
S2, importing/downloading firmware image file, and signature verification is carried out to firmware image file and is refused if authentication failed
Execute firmware refresh operation；If be proved to be successful, perform the next step；
S3, the write-protect switch that the flash chip for storing firmware image file is controlled using control circuit are closed, and firmware brush is carried out
Newly；
After the completion of S4, firmware refresh, the write-protect switch default reset of flash chip is open state, refusal modification operation.
2. a kind of guard method refreshed for BMC firmware according to claim 1, which is characterized in that described to firmware
Image file carries out signature verification concrete operations are as follows:
In the public key of BMC mainboard insertion BMC firmware digital signature；
Signature verification is carried out to firmware image file using public key.
3. a kind of guard method refreshed for BMC firmware according to claim 1, which is characterized in that described to utilize control
The write-protect switch of the flash chip of circuit control storage firmware image file processed closes concrete operations are as follows:
The pin of control circuit is connect with the flash chip write-protect pin of storage firmware image file；
It obtains and executes permission；
The write-protect switch of control flash chip is set to off.
4. a kind of guard method refreshed for BMC firmware according to claim 1 to 3, which is characterized in that
The account is the administrator's account for having BMC firmware and refreshing permission.
5. a kind of protection system refreshed for BMC firmware, which is characterized in that the system comprises:
Account password authentication module, for verifying account password；
Firmware signature authentication module carries out signature verification for importing/downloading firmware image file, and to firmware image file；
Firmware refresh module, the write-protect switch for the flash chip using control circuit control storage firmware image file
It closes, carries out firmware refreshing；
Write-protect module, after the completion of refreshing for firmware, the write-protect switch default reset of flash chip is open state, is refused
Modification operation absolutely.
6. a kind of protection system refreshed for BMC firmware according to claim 5, which is characterized in that the firmware label
Name authentication module include:
Public key embedded unit, for obtaining the public key for being embedded in the BMC firmware digital signature of mainboard；
Authentication unit, for carrying out signature verification to firmware image file using public key.
7. a kind of protection system refreshed for BMC firmware according to claim 5, which is characterized in that the firmware brush
New module includes:
Pin connection unit, for by the pin of control circuit and storage firmware image file flash chip write-protect pin
Connection；
Authority acquiring unit executes permission for obtaining；
Write-protect closing unit, the write-protect switch for controlling flash chip are set to off；
Refresh unit, for carrying out firmware refreshing.
8. a kind of protection system refreshed for BMC firmware according to claim 5-7 any one, which is characterized in that
The account is the administrator's account for having BMC firmware and refreshing permission.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201810681480.0A CN108959973A (en) | 2018-06-27 | 2018-06-27 | A kind of guard method and system refreshed for BMC firmware |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201810681480.0A CN108959973A (en) | 2018-06-27 | 2018-06-27 | A kind of guard method and system refreshed for BMC firmware |
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| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN108959973A true CN108959973A (en) | 2018-12-07 |
Family
ID=64487438
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|---|---|---|---|
| CN201810681480.0A Pending CN108959973A (en) | 2018-06-27 | 2018-06-27 | A kind of guard method and system refreshed for BMC firmware |
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Cited By (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN109977664A (en) * | 2019-03-26 | 2019-07-05 | 联想(北京)有限公司 | System refresh method and electronic equipment |
| CN111142912A (en) * | 2019-12-29 | 2020-05-12 | 山东英信计算机技术有限公司 | BIOS refreshing method, device and equipment |
| CN113239363A (en) * | 2021-06-01 | 2021-08-10 | 长江存储科技有限责任公司 | Firmware updating method, device, equipment, readable storage medium and memory system |
| CN114444083A (en) * | 2022-01-07 | 2022-05-06 | 苏州浪潮智能科技有限公司 | BMC-based server BIOS full life cycle safety protection system |
| CN117574352A (en) * | 2024-01-16 | 2024-02-20 | 苏州元脑智能科技有限公司 | Software and hardware combined anti-counterfeiting method, system, equipment and storage medium |
| CN117574352B (en) * | 2024-01-16 | 2024-04-05 | 苏州元脑智能科技有限公司 | Software and hardware combined anti-counterfeiting method, system, equipment and storage medium |
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| CN117574352A (en) * | 2024-01-16 | 2024-02-20 | 苏州元脑智能科技有限公司 | Software and hardware combined anti-counterfeiting method, system, equipment and storage medium |
| CN117574352B (en) * | 2024-01-16 | 2024-04-05 | 苏州元脑智能科技有限公司 | Software and hardware combined anti-counterfeiting method, system, equipment and storage medium |
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Application publication date: 20181207 |