CN107428247A - For the framework with the automatic drive assist system of sub conditione - Google Patents
For the framework with the automatic drive assist system of sub conditione Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN107428247A CN107428247A CN201680004930.1A CN201680004930A CN107428247A CN 107428247 A CN107428247 A CN 107428247A CN 201680004930 A CN201680004930 A CN 201680004930A CN 107428247 A CN107428247 A CN 107428247A
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- computer
- framework
- redundant
- sensor
- brakes
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 16
- 238000011144 upstream manufacturing Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 16
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 7
- 238000003384 imaging method Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 101000908580 Homo sapiens Spliceosome RNA helicase DDX39B Proteins 0.000 description 2
- 102100024690 Spliceosome RNA helicase DDX39B Human genes 0.000 description 2
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000005611 electricity Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000007613 environmental effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 101001068634 Homo sapiens Protein PRRC2A Proteins 0.000 description 1
- 102100033954 Protein PRRC2A Human genes 0.000 description 1
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000015556 catabolic process Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000009977 dual effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000011156 evaluation Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000003993 interaction Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000000465 moulding Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000000007 visual effect Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
- G05D—SYSTEMS FOR CONTROLLING OR REGULATING NON-ELECTRIC VARIABLES
- G05D1/00—Control of position, course or altitude of land, water, air, or space vehicles, e.g. automatic pilot
- G05D1/0055—Control of position, course or altitude of land, water, air, or space vehicles, e.g. automatic pilot with safety arrangements
- G05D1/0077—Control of position, course or altitude of land, water, air, or space vehicles, e.g. automatic pilot with safety arrangements using redundant signals or controls
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60K—ARRANGEMENT OR MOUNTING OF PROPULSION UNITS OR OF TRANSMISSIONS IN VEHICLES; ARRANGEMENT OR MOUNTING OF PLURAL DIVERSE PRIME-MOVERS IN VEHICLES; AUXILIARY DRIVES FOR VEHICLES; INSTRUMENTATION OR DASHBOARDS FOR VEHICLES; ARRANGEMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH COOLING, AIR INTAKE, GAS EXHAUST OR FUEL SUPPLY OF PROPULSION UNITS IN VEHICLES
- B60K28/00—Safety devices for propulsion-unit control, specially adapted for, or arranged in, vehicles, e.g. preventing fuel supply or ignition in the event of potentially dangerous conditions
- B60K28/10—Safety devices for propulsion-unit control, specially adapted for, or arranged in, vehicles, e.g. preventing fuel supply or ignition in the event of potentially dangerous conditions responsive to conditions relating to the vehicle
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- B60R16/00—Electric or fluid circuits specially adapted for vehicles and not otherwise provided for; Arrangement of elements of electric or fluid circuits specially adapted for vehicles and not otherwise provided for
- B60R16/02—Electric or fluid circuits specially adapted for vehicles and not otherwise provided for; Arrangement of elements of electric or fluid circuits specially adapted for vehicles and not otherwise provided for electric constitutive elements
- B60R16/023—Electric or fluid circuits specially adapted for vehicles and not otherwise provided for; Arrangement of elements of electric or fluid circuits specially adapted for vehicles and not otherwise provided for electric constitutive elements for transmission of signals between vehicle parts or subsystems
- B60R16/0231—Circuits relating to the driving or the functioning of the vehicle
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W10/00—Conjoint control of vehicle sub-units of different type or different function
- B60W10/04—Conjoint control of vehicle sub-units of different type or different function including control of propulsion units
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W10/00—Conjoint control of vehicle sub-units of different type or different function
- B60W10/18—Conjoint control of vehicle sub-units of different type or different function including control of braking systems
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W10/00—Conjoint control of vehicle sub-units of different type or different function
- B60W10/18—Conjoint control of vehicle sub-units of different type or different function including control of braking systems
- B60W10/184—Conjoint control of vehicle sub-units of different type or different function including control of braking systems with wheel brakes
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W10/00—Conjoint control of vehicle sub-units of different type or different function
- B60W10/20—Conjoint control of vehicle sub-units of different type or different function including control of steering systems
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W50/00—Details of control systems for road vehicle drive control not related to the control of a particular sub-unit, e.g. process diagnostic or vehicle driver interfaces
- B60W50/02—Ensuring safety in case of control system failures, e.g. by diagnosing, circumventing or fixing failures
- B60W50/023—Avoiding failures by using redundant parts
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W60/00—Drive control systems specially adapted for autonomous road vehicles
- B60W60/005—Handover processes
- B60W60/0053—Handover processes from vehicle to occupant
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W60/00—Drive control systems specially adapted for autonomous road vehicles
- B60W60/005—Handover processes
- B60W60/0061—Aborting handover process
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W60/00—Drive control systems specially adapted for autonomous road vehicles
- B60W60/007—Emergency override
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
- G05D—SYSTEMS FOR CONTROLLING OR REGULATING NON-ELECTRIC VARIABLES
- G05D1/00—Control of position, course or altitude of land, water, air, or space vehicles, e.g. automatic pilot
- G05D1/0055—Control of position, course or altitude of land, water, air, or space vehicles, e.g. automatic pilot with safety arrangements
- G05D1/0061—Control of position, course or altitude of land, water, air, or space vehicles, e.g. automatic pilot with safety arrangements for transition from automatic pilot to manual pilot and vice versa
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
- G05D—SYSTEMS FOR CONTROLLING OR REGULATING NON-ELECTRIC VARIABLES
- G05D1/00—Control of position, course or altitude of land, water, air, or space vehicles, e.g. automatic pilot
- G05D1/02—Control of position or course in two dimensions
- G05D1/021—Control of position or course in two dimensions specially adapted to land vehicles
- G05D1/0231—Control of position or course in two dimensions specially adapted to land vehicles using optical position detecting means
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
- G05D—SYSTEMS FOR CONTROLLING OR REGULATING NON-ELECTRIC VARIABLES
- G05D1/00—Control of position, course or altitude of land, water, air, or space vehicles, e.g. automatic pilot
- G05D1/02—Control of position or course in two dimensions
- G05D1/021—Control of position or course in two dimensions specially adapted to land vehicles
- G05D1/0257—Control of position or course in two dimensions specially adapted to land vehicles using a radar
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/07—Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
- G06F11/0796—Safety measures, i.e. ensuring safe condition in the event of error, e.g. for controlling element
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/07—Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
- G06F11/16—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware
- G06F11/20—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using active fault-masking, e.g. by switching out faulty elements or by switching in spare elements
- G06F11/2015—Redundant power supplies
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/07—Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
- G06F11/16—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware
- G06F11/20—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using active fault-masking, e.g. by switching out faulty elements or by switching in spare elements
- G06F11/202—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using active fault-masking, e.g. by switching out faulty elements or by switching in spare elements where processing functionality is redundant
- G06F11/2048—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using active fault-masking, e.g. by switching out faulty elements or by switching in spare elements where processing functionality is redundant where the redundant components share neither address space nor persistent storage
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L12/40169—Flexible bus arrangements
- H04L12/40176—Flexible bus arrangements involving redundancy
- H04L12/40195—Flexible bus arrangements involving redundancy by using a plurality of nodes
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W50/00—Details of control systems for road vehicle drive control not related to the control of a particular sub-unit, e.g. process diagnostic or vehicle driver interfaces
- B60W2050/0001—Details of the control system
- B60W2050/0002—Automatic control, details of type of controller or control system architecture
- B60W2050/0004—In digital systems, e.g. discrete-time systems involving sampling
- B60W2050/0005—Processor details or data handling, e.g. memory registers or chip architecture
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W50/00—Details of control systems for road vehicle drive control not related to the control of a particular sub-unit, e.g. process diagnostic or vehicle driver interfaces
- B60W2050/0001—Details of the control system
- B60W2050/0002—Automatic control, details of type of controller or control system architecture
- B60W2050/0004—In digital systems, e.g. discrete-time systems involving sampling
- B60W2050/0006—Digital architecture hierarchy
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W50/00—Details of control systems for road vehicle drive control not related to the control of a particular sub-unit, e.g. process diagnostic or vehicle driver interfaces
- B60W2050/0001—Details of the control system
- B60W2050/0043—Signal treatments, identification of variables or parameters, parameter estimation or state estimation
- B60W2050/0044—In digital systems
- B60W2050/0045—In digital systems using databus protocols
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W50/00—Details of control systems for road vehicle drive control not related to the control of a particular sub-unit, e.g. process diagnostic or vehicle driver interfaces
- B60W50/02—Ensuring safety in case of control system failures, e.g. by diagnosing, circumventing or fixing failures
- B60W50/0205—Diagnosing or detecting failures; Failure detection models
- B60W2050/0215—Sensor drifts or sensor failures
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W2420/00—Indexing codes relating to the type of sensors based on the principle of their operation
- B60W2420/40—Photo or light sensitive means, e.g. infrared sensors
- B60W2420/403—Image sensing, e.g. optical camera
-
- B60W2420/408—
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2201/00—Indexing scheme relating to error detection, to error correction, and to monitoring
- G06F2201/805—Real-time
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L2012/40208—Bus networks characterized by the use of a particular bus standard
- H04L2012/40215—Controller Area Network CAN
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L2012/40267—Bus for use in transportation systems
- H04L2012/40273—Bus for use in transportation systems the transportation system being a vehicle
Abstract
It is used for the framework with the automatic drive assist system of sub conditione the present invention relates to a kind of, it can control the automatic emergency of vehicle to stop, including:The group (2) of the sensor of at least three kinds different technologies, for observing the region of vehicle front;Master computer (10), it can be via the first upstream data traffic network from the sensor group (2) receive information, and transmits commands to via the first downstream communication network the first computer (3), the second computer (4) to brakes and the 3rd computer (5) to steering control system of engine control system;Redundant computer (11), can be via the second upstream data traffic network from the sensor group receive information;Main power source, link to each computer;And stand-by power supply.The framework includes the second downstream communication network, redundant computer (11) is only connected to the second computer (4) of brakes by it, ordered for transmitting, and stand-by power supply is only connected to master computer (10), the second computer (4) to redundant computer (11) and to brakes.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates generally to the motor vehicles equipped with automatic Pilot accessory system, and more accurately, is related to so-called
" sub conditione is automatic " system.
Background technology
Driving is advanced automatically, and to solve a large amount of problems, such as safe, mobility, environmental protection drive and to owner
Driving accessibility.Now, there can be full-automatic unmanned driving's vehicle in specific regions.For having with automatic road vehicle
The project of pass is not that so, before automatic road vehicle sale is seen, such vehicle has many problems to need to solve, special
It is not in legal field and security fields.Especially, in the case where the automatic road vehicle of driver be present, Vienna Convention
Require that driver must can always control his vehicle in the 8.5th article.
The automatic road vehicle standard committees of SAE (initial of Society of automotive engineers) disclose new report recently,
The classification (" classification on the term of road vehicle automated driving system on January 16 in 2014 of automatic Pilot grade is provided
And definition ", standard J3016), driven for being shared between each classification grade, including driver and one or more automatic systems
Sail the rule of supervision and management.More accurately, this report defines six grades, does not have the grade 0 of any automatic system from vehicle
To the completely automatic class 5 of vehicle, therebetween by different automaticities, wherein, the share increase automated every time, drive
The share of member's responsibility reduces.Thus:
- grade 1 corresponds to drive assist system, its only relate to vehicle it is longitudinally controlled (for example, by initial ACC or
System known to " auto-cruising control "), or the crosswise joint of vehicle is only related to (for example, for aiding in the path in track
The system of holding, or the system of the auxiliary lane change for being used in the case where process condition is stopped or avoided after overtaking other vehicles or overtaking other vehicles);
- grade 2 corresponds to so-called " part is automatic " grade, wherein, car can be combined in one or more drive assist systems
Horizontal and vertical control;
- grade 3 corresponds to so-called " sub conditione is automatic " grade, wherein, driver on the time span being determined and
It is allowed to not be absorbed in driving on particular type road (such as high speed).Automatic system associated therewith then supervises the transverse direction of vehicle
And/or it is longitudinally controlled, but must concede responsibility to driver problematic when.
- class 4 corresponds to the fully automated of vehicle, but driver drives with appointing under any circumstance and wished at him
When return his possibility, this is independently of duration and any specific region;
- class 5 corresponds to fully automated vehicle, and driver is without the possibility of interaction.
U.S. federal agencies the NHTSA (" national highways of responsible road safety are corresponded essentially to according to SAE grade 0 to 5
Transportation Security Administration ") grade 0 to 4.
Due to the aforesaid clause of Vienna Convention, there are currently no allowed by law for the vehicle in grade 3 to 5.Grade 0 to
2 another aspects are allowed to, because driver is actually still unique regulator of driving.
Concern after this is according to the project of the following automotive vehicle of the grade 3 of SAE or NHTSA standards, and it is equipped
There is sub conditione automatic system.The receiving of the modification --- it applies permanent driver's responsibility now --- of Vienna Convention is as most
It is low to require to implement a number of safe operation program and allow driver to return to supervision state in thrashing
Strategy.
Especially important strategy is related to returns to safe condition in the case where driver can not recapture control.In the situation
Under, and be especially sufficient that when vehicle is being advanced on highway with relatively low speed for system, on its travel lane
Carry out the stopping of vehicle.The each stage generally implemented in the tactful application schematically shows in Fig. 1, and it shows this
Act the result to the function as the time of car speed.
In the Fig. 1, td represents that this requires that driver recaptures control in theory at the time of detecting of serious failure.From this
Moment, sub conditione automatic system admittedly must concede control to driver, but must be sure that in short time span (typical case
Ground five to ten seconds) function, to allow driver veritably to recapture the control of driving.The stage is in figure by the table of stage _ 1
Show, and show that the speed of vehicle keeps constant.If driver does not react when completing at this stage _ 1, system starts to relax
Brake (being in Fig. 1 stage _ 2, and five to ten seconds) in ground.Finally, if driver does not still have when completing at this stage _ 2
Reaction, the then bigger braking of system instruction, until vehicle stops completely.The stage is represented by stage _ 3 in Fig. 1.
From the visual angle of function, in order to ensure returning to safe condition, sub conditione automatic system allows for checking before vehicle
Fang Fasheng what, brakes and engine control system can be controlled to regulate the speed as a result, and electricity can be controlled
Sub- steering control system, to be maintained in same driving lane.
These requirements in terms of safe operation are directed to use with the framework with big redundancy, and thus significantly affecting these is
The cost of system.Thus, according to international standard ISO 26262 --- it is according to referred to as " ASIL A, ASIL B, ASIL C and ASIL
D " (initial for representing automotive safety integrity level) four grades especially define failure Critical Classification, (the attached bar of grade 3
Part is automatic) must be ASIL D, thus especially propose that vehicle has the regulation of the sensor of at least three different technologies, to see
Examine the same region of vehicle environmental.Therefore ensure that the performance evaluation of good detection, it is sufficient to matched with ASIL D Security Targets, and
External disturbance emitter prevents the sensor of three types while failed.
In addition, in known framework, the computer of system, (typically via CAN) allow one side sensor
Other computers (brakings being related to the computer with the computer of another aspect system and for returning to the strategy of safe condition
Component computer, engine control computer and course changing control computer) between exchange connection and these computers behaviour
Power supply is generally double necessary to work, to ensure operation peace in the case of on the computer failure of sub conditione security system
Entirely.
The content of the invention
It is used for that to there is the payable of the automatic drive assist system of the sub conditione of grade -3 the purpose of the present invention is to propose to a kind of
The framework of cost.
Thus, subject of the present invention is a kind of framework for being used to have the automatic drive assist system of sub conditione, and it can
The automatic emergency of vehicle is controlled to stop, including:
The group of the sensor of-at least three kinds different technologies, for observing the region of vehicle front;
- master computer, it can be by the first upstream data traffic network from the sensor group receive information, and passes through
First downstream communication network transmits commands to the first computer of engine control system, the second computer to brakes
With the 3rd computer to steering control system;
- redundant computer, it can be by the second upstream data traffic network from the sensor group receive information;
- main power source, link to each computer;With
- stand-by power supply;
Characterized in that, it includes the second downstream communication network, it only links to redundant computer the institute of brakes
Second computer is stated, orders, and is for transmitting, stand-by power supply is simply linked to master computer, to redundant computer and to making
The second computer of dynamic system.
According to other possible features of the framework:
- the first and second upstream and downstream data communication networks are serial data bus networks, it is therefore preferable to CAN network;
- redundant computer is identical with master computer, and in this case, both of which has identical failure critical level,
Preferably ASIL D grades;
- variant is used as, redundant computer can only have the failure critical level lower than master computer, e.g. ASIL B etc.
Level, if master computer is ASIL D;
- the sensor group is for example including at least one imaging sensor, a radar sensor and a laser sensor;
- redundant computer can link to master computer, and be controlled as so as to only feelings in the failure on master computer
Under condition, by the second upstream data traffic network from the sensor group receive information;
- variant is used as, redundant computer is for good and all received by the second upstream data traffic network from the sensor group
Information, or even in the case of not on the failure of master computer.
Brief description of the drawings
The following description of refer to the attached drawing, the present invention and its advantage brought are better understood with, in the accompanying drawings:
Fig. 1, have been described above, it is schematically shown by being returned with the automatic drive assist system of sub conditione
The stage implemented to the known strategy of safe condition;
Fig. 2 schematically shows a kind of exemplary architecture according to the present invention, for automatically driving auxiliary with sub conditione
System.
Embodiment
Through this specification, the drive assist system of any grade 3 (SAE/NHTSA) is referred to as " having sub conditione automatic
Drive assist system ".
A kind of to be used for the framework with the automatic drive assist system of sub conditione with reference to figure 2, it can control oneself of vehicle
Move emergent stopping and the scene according to Fig. 1 ensures to return to safe condition, generally include kernel control module 1, the core control
Molding block includes:
- on the one hand, master computer 10, its can by the first upstream data traffic network from the receive information of sensor group 2,
The sensor group 2 can observe the region of front part of vehicle;
- on the other hand, redundant computer 11, master computer 10 is linked to, and the second upstream data traffic net can be passed through
Network is from the receive information of sensor group 2.
There is the system ASIL D to fail critical level, hence for group 2, be arranged to different be used to sense using three kinds
The technology of device.Thus, as non-limitative example, the group 2 may include at least one 20, radar sensors of laser sensor
21 and an imaging sensor 22.No matter using the combination of which kind of different technologies (or type), principle of the invention is all to answer
.
In fig. 2, the first upstream network is included between sensor 20 to 22 and master computer 10 solid line such as and schematically shown
Three connections gone out, and the second upstream network is included between these sensors 20 to 22 and redundant computer 10 dotted line such as and illustrated
Property shown in three connection.
The effect of master computer 10 is information of the processing from sensor 20 to 22, and especially, if necessary, should
With the strategy for returning to safe condition, as described in reference to fig. 1.Thus, the computer 10 can transmit appropriate order and extremely exist
The each computer for the vehicle being related in the strategy, is especially transmitted separately to:
First computer 3 of-engine control system,
The second computer 4 of-brakes;With
3rd computer 5 of-steering control system.
The transmission of order is performed by the first downstream communication network, and it passes through master computer 10 and three computers 3,4 and 5
Between solid line connection represent.
All above computer are powered by main power source, such as the battery (+BAT1 in Fig. 2).
The effect of redundant computer 11 is that its own is replaced by into master computer in the case where master computer 10 fails.
According to the present invention, instead of turning over for the downstream communication network between the computer of the system and three computers 3,4 and 5
Times, it is arranged to herein, there is provided redundant computer 11 is simply linked to the second downstream communication net of the second computer 4 of brakes
Network, the transmission for order.The second downstream communication network uses dotted line table between redundant computer 11 and brake calculation machine 4
Show.
The control of the type is enough the steering for also controlling vehicle, particularly low speed.In fact, the computer of brakes shows
It is being so-called ESP computers (initial for representing ESP) entirely, it can order each wheel in a different manner
On braking, and thus accomplish that vehicle is maintained in its track, until its stopping.
In addition, in order to alleviate main power source+BAT1 possible breakdown, the stand-by power supply (+BAT2 in Fig. 2) --- it is, for example, electricity
Pond --- it is set in the architecture.Herein again, by the way that the stand-by power supply is arranged to only by master computer 10, standby meter
Calculation machine 11 and the computer of brakes 4 are used alone, and the framework, which is simplified to, only remains necessary degree.
In other words, component computer downstream is included in so that being only used for the calculating of brakes according to the framework of the present invention
The communication network and dual power supply of machine 4 form redundancy.
This causes cost to reduce, and it is never limited in the guarantor that safe condition is returned in the case where driver can not recapture control
Card.
In Fig. 2 framework, have been contemplated that, redundant computer 11 is linked to master computer 10, so as to which it is only in host computer
Machine operates in the case of failing in reception and transmitting.
But in the case of without departing from the scope of the present invention, two computers 10 and 11 can not be linked.In the feelings
Under condition, two for good and all parallel work-flows of computer 10 and 11, and in the case where master computer fails, the computer 3,4 in downstream
Standby mode is switched to 5.This is then " hot redundancy ".The program allows to reconstruct faster but consume more energy.
Claims (9)
1. a kind of be used for the framework with the automatic drive assist system of sub conditione, it can control the automatic emergency of vehicle to stop
Only, including:
The group (2) of the sensor of-at least three kinds different technologies, for observing the region of vehicle front;
- master computer (10), its can by the first upstream data traffic network from the sensor group (2) receive information, and
The first computer (3) of engine control system is transmitted commands to by the first downstream communication network, transmitted to brakes
Second computer (4) and transmit to the 3rd computer (5) of steering control system;
- redundant computer (11), it can be by the second upstream data traffic network from the sensor group receive information;
- main power source, link to each computer;With
- stand-by power supply;
Characterized in that, it includes the second downstream communication network, redundant computer (11) is only linked to the brakes by it
Second computer (4), order for transmitting, and be characterised by, stand-by power supply is simply linked to master computer (10), to standby meter
Calculation machine (11) and the second computer (4) to brakes.
2. framework as claimed in claim 1, it is characterised in that the first and second upstream and downstream data communication networks are serial
Data bus network.
3. framework as claimed in claim 2, it is characterised in that the first and second upstream and downstream data communication networks are CAN
Network.
4. the framework as described in any one of preceding claims, it is characterised in that redundant computer (11) and master computer
(10) it is identical.
5. the framework as described in any one of Claims 1-4, it is characterised in that redundant computer (11) has than analytic accounting
The low failure critical level of calculation machine (10).
6. framework as claimed in claim 5, it is characterised in that the failure critical level of master computer (10) is ASIL D, standby
Failure critical level with computer (11) is ASIL B.
7. the framework as described in any one of preceding claims, it is characterised in that the sensor group (2) includes at least one
Individual imaging sensor, a radar sensor and a laser sensor.
8. the framework as described in any one of preceding claims, it is characterised in that redundant computer (11) links to analytic accounting
Calculation machine (10), and be controlled such that and only lead in the case of the failure on master computer (10), by the second upstream data
Communication network is from the sensor group receive information.
9. the framework as described in any one of claim 1 to 7, it is characterised in that redundant computer (11) is by second
Data communication network is swum from the sensor group for good and all receive information, or even in the not failure on master computer (10)
In the case of.
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
FR1500005A FR3031406B1 (en) | 2015-01-05 | 2015-01-05 | ARCHITECTURE FOR CONDITIONAL AUTOMATION DRIVING ASSISTANCE SYSTEM |
FR1500005 | 2015-01-05 | ||
PCT/EP2016/050025 WO2016110464A1 (en) | 2015-01-05 | 2016-01-04 | Architecture for a driving assistance system with conditional automation |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
CN107428247A true CN107428247A (en) | 2017-12-01 |
CN107428247B CN107428247B (en) | 2020-04-21 |
Family
ID=52737289
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
CN201680004930.1A Active CN107428247B (en) | 2015-01-05 | 2016-01-04 | Architecture for a driving assistance system with conditional automation |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US20180267535A1 (en) |
EP (1) | EP3242823B1 (en) |
JP (1) | JP6655624B2 (en) |
CN (1) | CN107428247B (en) |
FR (1) | FR3031406B1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2016110464A1 (en) |
Cited By (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN107908186A (en) * | 2017-11-07 | 2018-04-13 | 驭势科技(北京)有限公司 | For the method and system for controlling automatic driving vehicle to run |
CN108089579A (en) * | 2017-12-13 | 2018-05-29 | 南京多伦科技股份有限公司 | A kind of intelligent robot automated driving system |
CN111661062A (en) * | 2019-03-05 | 2020-09-15 | 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司 | Automatic driving control method, device and system |
CN112356846A (en) * | 2020-11-19 | 2021-02-12 | 中国第一汽车股份有限公司 | Automatic driving control system and method and vehicle |
CN113093618A (en) * | 2021-04-06 | 2021-07-09 | 北京航空航天大学 | Brake controller hardware architecture and control method |
Families Citing this family (19)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE102017207483A1 (en) * | 2016-12-15 | 2018-06-21 | Continental Teves Ag & Co. Ohg | CONTROL DEVICE FOR A VEHICLE, BRAKE CONTROL DEVICE AND METHOD FOR CONTROLLING A VEHICLE |
EP3376249A1 (en) * | 2017-03-17 | 2018-09-19 | Veoneer Sweden AB | Enhanced object position detection |
FR3071800B1 (en) * | 2017-09-29 | 2021-04-02 | Psa Automobiles Sa | DRIVING ASSISTANCE PROCESS OF A VEHICLE IN THE EVENT OF A FAILURE OF A NETWORK AND ASSOCIATED SYSTEM |
DE102017217856A1 (en) | 2017-10-06 | 2019-04-11 | Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft | Brake system for a motor vehicle and method for operating a brake system |
DE102017218898A1 (en) | 2017-10-23 | 2019-04-25 | Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft | Control system for a battery system |
DE102017010716A1 (en) * | 2017-11-10 | 2019-05-16 | Knorr-Bremse Systeme für Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH | System for at least partially autonomous operation of a motor vehicle with double redundancy |
GB201720266D0 (en) * | 2017-12-05 | 2018-01-17 | Trw Ltd | Controlling the operation of a vehicle |
US10678243B2 (en) | 2018-02-13 | 2020-06-09 | Chongqing Jinkang New Energy Vehicle Co., Ltd. | Systems and methods for scalable electrical engineering (EE) architecture in vehicular environments |
FR3080073B1 (en) * | 2018-04-12 | 2020-12-18 | Psa Automobiles Sa | AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY FOR VEHICLE |
JP7215315B2 (en) * | 2019-04-26 | 2023-01-31 | トヨタ自動車株式会社 | vehicle system |
EP3778309B1 (en) * | 2019-08-15 | 2022-04-13 | Apollo Intelligent Driving Technology (Beijing) Co., Ltd. | Autonomous vehicle and system for autonomous vehicle |
CN112634371B (en) | 2019-09-24 | 2023-12-15 | 阿波罗智联(北京)科技有限公司 | Method and device for outputting information and calibrating camera |
WO2021076888A1 (en) * | 2019-10-16 | 2021-04-22 | Lhp, Inc. | Safety supervisor system for vehicles |
CN112298208B (en) * | 2020-10-21 | 2022-05-17 | 长城汽车股份有限公司 | Automatic driving transverse auxiliary control method and transverse auxiliary system |
CA3197021A1 (en) * | 2020-10-30 | 2022-05-05 | Hongchao RUAN | Information transmission method, control apparatus, electromagnetic signal transceiver apparatus, and signal processing device |
US11807259B2 (en) * | 2020-11-30 | 2023-11-07 | Nuro, Inc. | Hardware systems for an autonomous vehicle |
WO2022118459A1 (en) | 2020-12-04 | 2022-06-09 | 日産自動車株式会社 | Redundant system |
US20220324434A1 (en) * | 2021-04-09 | 2022-10-13 | Steering Solutions Ip Holding Corporation | System and method to determine second ecu state using shared sensor in a dual ecu system |
CN113359759B (en) * | 2021-06-24 | 2023-05-09 | 中国第一汽车股份有限公司 | Automatic driving-based parking control method, system, vehicle and storage medium |
Citations (10)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US6856045B1 (en) * | 2002-01-29 | 2005-02-15 | Hamilton Sundstrand Corporation | Power distribution assembly with redundant architecture |
DE102005014736A1 (en) * | 2004-04-13 | 2005-11-17 | General Motors Corp. (N.D.Ges.D. Staates Delaware), Detroit | Vehicle control system and method |
WO2006094991A1 (en) * | 2005-03-10 | 2006-09-14 | Continental Teves Ag & Co. Ohg | System for electronically controlling a motor vehicle brakes |
US20100063672A1 (en) * | 2008-09-11 | 2010-03-11 | Noel Wayne Anderson | Vehicle with high integrity perception system |
EP2587330A2 (en) * | 2011-10-27 | 2013-05-01 | Diehl BGT Defence GmbH & Co.KG | Control device for at least partially autonomous operation of a vehicle and vehicle with such a control device |
WO2013150244A1 (en) * | 2012-04-05 | 2013-10-10 | Renault S.A.S. | Autonomous mode vehicle control system and vehicle comprising such a control system |
DE102012210106A1 (en) * | 2012-06-15 | 2013-12-19 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Sensor arrangement for an electrical / electronic architecture and associated electrical / electronic architecture for a vehicle |
DE102013020177A1 (en) * | 2013-11-30 | 2014-06-18 | Daimler Ag | Motor car, has sensor systems actuated by main control unit in nominal operating mode, and replacement control unit controlling sensor systems if mistake arises in main control unit in emergency operation state |
WO2014138764A1 (en) * | 2013-03-14 | 2014-09-18 | Fts Computertechnik Gmbh | Method for limiting the risk of errors in a redundant, safety-related control system for a motor vehicle |
CN104249623A (en) * | 2013-06-28 | 2014-12-31 | 卡特彼勒公司 | Retarding system for electric drive machine |
Family Cites Families (18)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US4654846A (en) * | 1983-12-20 | 1987-03-31 | Rca Corporation | Spacecraft autonomous redundancy control |
DE10052261A1 (en) * | 2000-10-19 | 2002-05-02 | Deere & Co | Control device for the parking lock of a motor vehicle |
US6527348B2 (en) * | 2001-05-22 | 2003-03-04 | Caterpillar Inc | Braking system for a construction machine |
JP3866536B2 (en) * | 2001-06-27 | 2007-01-10 | 株式会社デンソー | Vehicle automatic driving system |
US6885927B2 (en) * | 2002-04-17 | 2005-04-26 | Honda Giken Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha | Apparatus for controlling an electric power steering system |
US7117390B1 (en) * | 2002-05-20 | 2006-10-03 | Sandia Corporation | Practical, redundant, failure-tolerant, self-reconfiguring embedded system architecture |
JP4848027B2 (en) * | 2004-01-30 | 2011-12-28 | 日立オートモティブシステムズ株式会社 | Vehicle control device |
JP4345547B2 (en) * | 2004-03-31 | 2009-10-14 | トヨタ自動車株式会社 | Hybrid vehicle control system |
JP2008149807A (en) * | 2006-12-15 | 2008-07-03 | Hitachi Ltd | Vehicle load control device |
RU2585262C2 (en) * | 2010-03-23 | 2016-05-27 | Континенталь Тевес Аг Унд Ко. Охг | Control computer system, method of controlling control computer system and use of control computer system |
ES2392390T3 (en) * | 2010-05-25 | 2012-12-10 | Fiat Group Automobiles S.P.A. | Operation management of the electrical system of a car while driving in neutral and / or when the engine is stopped |
DE102012203673A1 (en) * | 2011-03-09 | 2012-10-04 | Continental Teves Ag & Co. Ohg | Safety device for a motor vehicle and method for operating a motor vehicle |
DE102011108292A1 (en) * | 2011-07-21 | 2012-04-05 | Daimler Ag | Method for operating driver assistance device of vehicle, involves determining scenario-dependent sensor variances or sensor variances depending on driver assistance device in context of error propagation determination |
JP2014180941A (en) * | 2013-03-19 | 2014-09-29 | Denso Corp | Vehicle passenger protection device |
JP2015013541A (en) * | 2013-07-04 | 2015-01-22 | 株式会社ジェイテクト | Electric power steering device |
US9266518B2 (en) * | 2013-11-08 | 2016-02-23 | GM Global Technology Operations LLC | Component control system for a vehicle |
JP5867495B2 (en) * | 2013-12-20 | 2016-02-24 | 株式会社デンソー | Electronic control unit |
US9563590B2 (en) * | 2014-03-17 | 2017-02-07 | Nxp Usa, Inc. | Devices with arbitrated interface busses, and methods of their operation |
-
2015
- 2015-01-05 FR FR1500005A patent/FR3031406B1/en active Active
-
2016
- 2016-01-04 CN CN201680004930.1A patent/CN107428247B/en active Active
- 2016-01-04 WO PCT/EP2016/050025 patent/WO2016110464A1/en active Application Filing
- 2016-01-04 US US15/537,600 patent/US20180267535A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2016-01-04 JP JP2017535764A patent/JP6655624B2/en active Active
- 2016-01-04 EP EP16700031.4A patent/EP3242823B1/en active Active
Patent Citations (11)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US6856045B1 (en) * | 2002-01-29 | 2005-02-15 | Hamilton Sundstrand Corporation | Power distribution assembly with redundant architecture |
DE102005014736A1 (en) * | 2004-04-13 | 2005-11-17 | General Motors Corp. (N.D.Ges.D. Staates Delaware), Detroit | Vehicle control system and method |
WO2006094991A1 (en) * | 2005-03-10 | 2006-09-14 | Continental Teves Ag & Co. Ohg | System for electronically controlling a motor vehicle brakes |
US20100063672A1 (en) * | 2008-09-11 | 2010-03-11 | Noel Wayne Anderson | Vehicle with high integrity perception system |
EP2587330A2 (en) * | 2011-10-27 | 2013-05-01 | Diehl BGT Defence GmbH & Co.KG | Control device for at least partially autonomous operation of a vehicle and vehicle with such a control device |
WO2013150244A1 (en) * | 2012-04-05 | 2013-10-10 | Renault S.A.S. | Autonomous mode vehicle control system and vehicle comprising such a control system |
DE102012210106A1 (en) * | 2012-06-15 | 2013-12-19 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Sensor arrangement for an electrical / electronic architecture and associated electrical / electronic architecture for a vehicle |
US20150151694A1 (en) * | 2012-06-15 | 2015-06-04 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Sensor system for an electric/electronic architecture and associated electric/electronic architecture for a vehicle |
WO2014138764A1 (en) * | 2013-03-14 | 2014-09-18 | Fts Computertechnik Gmbh | Method for limiting the risk of errors in a redundant, safety-related control system for a motor vehicle |
CN104249623A (en) * | 2013-06-28 | 2014-12-31 | 卡特彼勒公司 | Retarding system for electric drive machine |
DE102013020177A1 (en) * | 2013-11-30 | 2014-06-18 | Daimler Ag | Motor car, has sensor systems actuated by main control unit in nominal operating mode, and replacement control unit controlling sensor systems if mistake arises in main control unit in emergency operation state |
Cited By (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN107908186A (en) * | 2017-11-07 | 2018-04-13 | 驭势科技(北京)有限公司 | For the method and system for controlling automatic driving vehicle to run |
CN108089579A (en) * | 2017-12-13 | 2018-05-29 | 南京多伦科技股份有限公司 | A kind of intelligent robot automated driving system |
CN111661062A (en) * | 2019-03-05 | 2020-09-15 | 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司 | Automatic driving control method, device and system |
CN112356846A (en) * | 2020-11-19 | 2021-02-12 | 中国第一汽车股份有限公司 | Automatic driving control system and method and vehicle |
CN113093618A (en) * | 2021-04-06 | 2021-07-09 | 北京航空航天大学 | Brake controller hardware architecture and control method |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US20180267535A1 (en) | 2018-09-20 |
EP3242823B1 (en) | 2018-10-03 |
CN107428247B (en) | 2020-04-21 |
JP2018504309A (en) | 2018-02-15 |
FR3031406A1 (en) | 2016-07-08 |
WO2016110464A1 (en) | 2016-07-14 |
EP3242823A1 (en) | 2017-11-15 |
FR3031406B1 (en) | 2017-07-28 |
JP6655624B2 (en) | 2020-02-26 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
CN107428247A (en) | For the framework with the automatic drive assist system of sub conditione | |
CN110254512B (en) | Design method for functional safety architecture of steering system of distributed intelligent electric vehicle | |
DE102017209721B4 (en) | Device for controlling a safety-relevant process, method for testing the functionality of the device, and motor vehicle with the device | |
CN103072575B (en) | A kind of Initiative anti-collision method of vehicle | |
US8185288B2 (en) | Brake system for a vehicle and a method for operating a brake system for a vehicle | |
US10994709B2 (en) | System for driverless operation of utility vehicles | |
CN104176052A (en) | Apparatus and method for preventing collision with vehicle | |
US9421960B2 (en) | Braking installation for a railway train including a plurality of wagons for transporting goods | |
CN109249873A (en) | A kind of automatic driving vehicle chassis system and Standby control method | |
CN110712677B (en) | Redundant electric power steering system of automatic driving vehicle and control method thereof | |
EP3385934B1 (en) | Device for controlling a safety-relevant process, method for testing the functionality of the device, and motor vehicle using the device | |
CN112542053A (en) | Method and device for performing a function of a motor vehicle | |
EP3805037B1 (en) | Method and system to control at least two electric motors driving a vehicle | |
CN104071111A (en) | Full trailer train instability prevention real-time monitoring and early warning system | |
CN102756669B (en) | Multiplex control system, transport device with multiplex control system and control method | |
Yu et al. | Fallback strategy for level 4+ automated driving system | |
Sari et al. | Fail-operational safety architecture for ADAS systems considering domain ECUs | |
CN105313880B (en) | Motor vehicle with at least two drive actuators and increased fail safety | |
DE102021120719A1 (en) | Tertiary control system for steering, braking, and motion control systems in autonomous vehicles | |
CN116668992A (en) | Vehicle accident handling method, computer readable storage medium and vehicle | |
DE102019124321A1 (en) | PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT FAILURE IN VEHICLES | |
CN109305173A (en) | A kind of pilotless automobile chassis control system backup method | |
CN103253274B (en) | First driver expects the method and control system of the credibility Analysis of sensor | |
CN109435875A (en) | A kind of pilotless automobile chassis power supply system backup method | |
Matsuoka | Development and future outlook of steering systems |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
PB01 | Publication | ||
PB01 | Publication | ||
SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
GR01 | Patent grant | ||
GR01 | Patent grant |