CN106599729A - Safety verification method and system for driving program - Google Patents
Safety verification method and system for driving program Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN106599729A CN106599729A CN201611131335.2A CN201611131335A CN106599729A CN 106599729 A CN106599729 A CN 106599729A CN 201611131335 A CN201611131335 A CN 201611131335A CN 106599729 A CN106599729 A CN 106599729A
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- driver
- digital signature
- feature value
- driving program
- encrypted
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
Abstract
The application discloses a safety verification method for a driving program. The method comprises the following steps: encrypting the driving program provided by a driving program issuer and generating a digital signature; decrypting the digital signature through a public key issued by the driving program issuer when the driving program is installed and obtaining standard feature value of the driving program; calculating the decrypted driving program and obtaining verification feature value; and determining whether the standard feature value is the same as the verification feature value and passing safety verification on the driving program if so. The safety verification method for the driving program helps ensure that the driving program is an original file issued by the issuer. Meanwhile, the original file is not tampered by other programs or covered so that installation safety of the driving program is ensured. The application further provides a safety verification system for the driving program with the above beneficial effect.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to field of computer technology, more particularly to a kind of driver safe verification method, further relate to one kind
Driver security authentication systems.
Background technology
At present, some operating systems provide driver digital signature policy, such as Microsoft Windows operations system
System.Device driver and operating system file in Windows all has Microsoft digital signature.Digital signature shows
Certain special driver or file are strictly publisher's issue, it is ensured that this driver is the original text that publisher issues
Part, and by the installation process change of other programs or do not cover.Driver digital signature policy is protected to a certain extent
The safety of driver is demonstrate,proved.However, for (SuSE) Linux OS, and a collection of class UNIX operating system, then without corresponding
Driver Sign Policies.The driver of these operating systems is in the form of kernel extensions, it is considered that be operation
The publisher of system provides, and the installation process with operating system is installed to host computer system simultaneously.But for some device fabrications
Business, or system integrator, when needing to provide external equipment driving support, publish the driver on these platforms
Bag, there is safety problem.Verifier not can confirm that driver file is exactly the original document that publisher issues, while
The driver for publishing not can confirm that with the presence or absence of being tampered, it is counterfeiting.
Therefore, how to verify that driver is the original document that publisher issues, at the same do not distorted by other programs or
Person covers, and the safety in order to ensure to install driver is those skilled in the art's technical issues that need to address.
The content of the invention
It is an object of the invention to provide a kind of driver safe verification method, can effectively verify that driver is to issue
The original document of Fang Fabu, while do not distorted or covered by other programs, in order to ensure to install the safety of driver
Property.
To solve above-mentioned technical problem, the present invention provides a kind of driver safe verification method, including：
The driver that driver publisher provides is encrypted, digital signature is generated；
When the driver is installed, the public key issued by the driver publisher is entered to the digital signature
Row decryption, obtains the Standard Eigenvalue of the driver；
The driver after to decryption is calculated, and obtains calibration feature value；
Judge whether the Standard Eigenvalue is consistent with the calibration feature value, if unanimously, the driver passes through
Safety verification.
Preferably, in above-mentioned driver safe verification method, the driver that driver publisher provides is entered
Row encryption, generates digital signature, including：
The Standard Eigenvalue of the driver is extracted, and the Standard Eigenvalue is encrypted, by the institute after encryption
Standard Eigenvalue is stated as the digital signature of the driver publisher.
Preferably, in above-mentioned driver safe verification method, the Standard Eigenvalue for extracting the driver,
Including：
The image file summary of the driver is extracted by SHA-1 SHA summarization generations algorithm.
Preferably, it is described that the Standard Eigenvalue is encrypted in above-mentioned driver safe verification method, bag
Include：
Image file summary is encrypted by RSA public key encryption algorithms.
Preferably, in above-mentioned driver safe verification method, if the Standard Eigenvalue and the calibration feature value
Inconsistent, then the driver exits installation.
The present invention also provides a kind of driver security authentication systems, including：
Digital signature generation module, for being encrypted to the driver that driver publisher provides, generates numeral
Signature；
Public key, for when the driver is installed, being decrypted to the digital signature, obtains the driver
Standard Eigenvalue；
Computing module, calculates for the driver after to decryption, obtains calibration feature value；
Secure verification module, for judging whether the Standard Eigenvalue is consistent with the calibration feature value, if unanimously,
The driver passes through safety verification.
Preferably, in above-mentioned driver security authentication systems, the digital signature generation module includes：
Extraction unit, for extracting the mirror image of the driver by SHA-1 SHA summarization generations algorithm
Document.
Preferably, in above-mentioned driver security authentication systems, the digital signature generation module includes：Encryption is single
Unit, for being encrypted to image file summary by RSA public key encryption algorithms.
A kind of driver safe verification method provided by the present invention, including：The driving that driver publisher is provided
Program is encrypted, and generates digital signature；When the driver is installed, the public affairs issued by the driver publisher
Key is decrypted to the digital signature, obtains the Standard Eigenvalue of the driver；The driver after to decryption
Calculated, obtained calibration feature value；Judge whether the Standard Eigenvalue is consistent with the calibration feature value, if unanimously,
The driver passes through safety verification.
The publisher of driver to generate digital signature in the way of to driver encrypt, prevent in installation process by
Distort, driver provides the public key that can untie digital signature simultaneously, after installation, driver is solved using public key
It is close, the Standard Eigenvalue of driver is obtained, while the driver after to decryption is calculated, obtain calibration feature
Value, Standard Eigenvalue is contrasted with calibration feature value, if unanimously, the driver demonstrated in installation process does not have quilt
Distort.Ensure that driver is the original document that publisher issues, while do not distorted or covered by other programs, so as to
In the safety for ensureing to install driver.
The present invention also provides a kind of driver security authentication systems, with above-mentioned beneficial effect, will not be described here.
Description of the drawings
In order to be illustrated more clearly that the embodiment of the present invention or technical scheme of the prior art, below will be to embodiment or existing
The accompanying drawing to be used needed for having technology description is briefly described, it should be apparent that, drawings in the following description are only this
Inventive embodiment, for those of ordinary skill in the art, on the premise of not paying creative work, can be with basis
The accompanying drawing of offer obtains other accompanying drawings.
The flow chart of the driver safe verification method that Fig. 1 is provided by the embodiment of the present invention；
The driver security authentication systems structured flowchart that Fig. 2 is provided by the embodiment of the present invention.
Specific embodiment
To make purpose, technical scheme and the advantage of the embodiment of the present invention clearer, below in conjunction with the embodiment of the present invention
In accompanying drawing, the technical scheme in the embodiment of the present invention is clearly and completely described, it is clear that described embodiment is
The a part of embodiment of the present invention, rather than the embodiment of whole.Based on the embodiment in the present invention, those of ordinary skill in the art
The every other embodiment obtained under the premise of creative work is not made, belongs to the scope of protection of the invention.
Refer to Fig. 1, the flow chart of the driver safe verification method that Fig. 1 is provided by the embodiment of the present invention, the party
Method specifically can include：
The present invention provides a kind of driver safe verification method, including：
Step S1：The driver that driver publisher provides is encrypted, digital signature is generated；
Wherein, the digital signature method that driver publisher provides is digitally signed to the driving bag to be issued, drives
The Standard Eigenvalue of driver and the precalculated driver of driver publisher is included in dynamic bag.Standard Eigenvalue
After encrypted, together issue with driver package as digital signature, the digital signature before installing for driver file is tested
Card operation.
Step S2：When the driver is installed, by the public key of driver publisher issue to the number
Word signature is decrypted, and obtains the Standard Eigenvalue of the driver；
Wherein, driver publisher provides digital signature keys Core Generator, feature of this instrument according to user input
Value, generates for the public key (pub-key) and private key (pri-key) needed for public key encryption algorithm, and public key is used as can
Untie the key of digital signature.
Step S3：The driver after to decryption is calculated, and obtains calibration feature value；
The driver after decryption is calculated using SHA-1 SHAs, obtains calibration feature value, it is therefore an objective to
Whether the calibration feature value for obtaining has deviation, if having, illustrate the driver encrypted may in installation process still by
Distort or attacked, if not having, illustrate that driver passes through safety verification.
Step S4：Judge whether the Standard Eigenvalue is consistent with the calibration feature value, if unanimously, the driving journey
Sequence passes through safety verification.
The publisher of driver to generate digital signature in the way of to driver encrypt, prevent in installation process by
Distort, driver provides the public key that can untie digital signature simultaneously, after installation, driver is solved using public key
It is close, the Standard Eigenvalue of driver is obtained, while the driver after to decryption is calculated, obtain calibration feature
Value, Standard Eigenvalue is contrasted with calibration feature value, if unanimously, the driver demonstrated in installation process does not have quilt
Distort.Ensure that driver is the original document that publisher issues, while do not distorted or covered by other programs, so as to
In the safety for ensureing to install driver.
On the basis of above-mentioned driver safe verification method, the driver that driver publisher provides is carried out
Encryption, generates digital signature, including：
The Standard Eigenvalue of the driver is extracted, and the Standard Eigenvalue is encrypted, by the institute after encryption
Standard Eigenvalue is stated as the digital signature of the driver publisher.
Wherein, digital signing tool using SHA-1 algorithms either other algorithms and RSA public key encryption algorithms or
Other AESs generate digital signature.It is pointed out that including but not limited to above-mentioned algorithm, if can realize encrypting with
And the effect of decryption, in protection domain.
On the basis of above-mentioned driver safe verification method, the Standard Eigenvalue for extracting the driver,
Including：The image file summary of the driver is extracted by SHA-1 SHA summarization generations algorithm.
Wherein, SHA1 (Secure Hash Algorithm Secure Hash Algorithm) summaries AES is primarily adapted for use in number
The Digital Signature Algorithm that word signature standard the inside defines.For length is less than the message of 2^64 positions, SHA1 can produce one 160
Eap-message digest, the avalanche effect (change a message data output valve can be made significantly to change) due to SHA1 algorithms with can not
Inverse property, can be used for verification of data integrity and information authentication.
It is described that the Standard Eigenvalue is encrypted on the basis of above-mentioned driver safe verification method, including：
Image file summary is encrypted by RSA public key encryption algorithms.
Wherein, RSA is current most influential public key encryption algorithm, and it can resist up to the present known big absolutely
Most cryptographic attacks, RSA Algorithm is first and specifically can be disclosed using RSA close while be used for the algorithm of encrypted and digitally signed
Key AES refer to prior art to the process that image file summary is encrypted, and will not be described here.
On the basis of above-mentioned driver safe verification method, if the Standard Eigenvalue is with the calibration feature value not
Unanimously, then the driver exits installation.
If the Standard Eigenvalue is inconsistent with calibration feature value, the driver exits installation, illustrates to drive
Dynamic program was attacked or was tampered, therefore, release install in time, it is ensured that the safety of local host.
Driver security authentication systems provided in an embodiment of the present invention are introduced below, driving journey described below
Sequence security authentication systems can be mutually to should refer to method.
Fig. 2 is refer to, Fig. 2 is driver security authentication systems structured flowchart provided in an embodiment of the present invention.
The present invention also provides a kind of driver security authentication systems, including：
Digital signature generation module 100, for being encrypted to the driver that driver publisher provides, generates number
Word is signed；
Public key 200, for when the driver is installed, being decrypted to the digital signature, obtains the driving
The Standard Eigenvalue of program；
Computing module 300, calculates for the driver after to decryption, obtains calibration feature value；
Secure verification module 400, for judging whether the Standard Eigenvalue is consistent with the calibration feature value, if one
Cause, then the driver passes through safety verification.
Further, in above-mentioned driver security authentication systems, the digital signature generation module includes：
Extraction unit, for extracting the mirror image of the driver by SHA-1 SHA summarization generations algorithm
Document.
Further, in above-mentioned driver security authentication systems, the digital signature generation module includes：
Ciphering unit, for being encrypted to image file summary by RSA public key encryption algorithms.It is each in description
Individual embodiment is described by the way of progressive, and what each embodiment was stressed is the difference with other embodiment, respectively
Between individual embodiment identical similar portion mutually referring to.For device disclosed in embodiment, due to itself and embodiment
Disclosed method is corresponding, so description is fairly simple, related part is referring to method part illustration.
Professional further appreciates that, with reference to the unit of each example of the embodiments described herein description
And algorithm steps, can with electronic hardware, computer software or the two be implemented in combination in, in order to clearly demonstrate hardware and
The interchangeability of software, according to function has generally described the composition and step of each example in the above description.These
Function is performed with hardware or software mode actually, depending on the application-specific and design constraint of technical scheme.Specialty
Technical staff can use different methods to realize described function to each specific application, but this realization should not
Think beyond the scope of this invention.
The step of method described with reference to the embodiments described herein or algorithm, directly can be held with hardware, processor
Capable software module, or the combination of the two is implementing.Software module can be placed in random access memory (RAM), internal memory, read-only deposit
Reservoir (ROM), electrically programmable ROM, electrically erasable ROM, depositor, hard disk, moveable magnetic disc, CD-ROM or technology
In field in known any other form of storage medium.
Specific case used herein is set forth to the principle and embodiment of the present invention, and above example is said
It is bright to be only intended to help and understand the method for the present invention and its core concept.It should be pointed out that for the ordinary skill of the art
For personnel, under the premise without departing from the principles of the invention, some improvement and modification can also be carried out to the present invention, these improvement
Also fall in the protection domain of the claims in the present invention with modification.
Claims (8)
1. a kind of driver safe verification method, it is characterised in that include：
The driver that driver publisher provides is encrypted, digital signature is generated；
When the driver is installed, the public key issued by the driver publisher is solved to the digital signature
It is close, obtain the Standard Eigenvalue of the driver；
The driver after to decryption is calculated, and obtains calibration feature value；
Judge whether the Standard Eigenvalue is consistent with the calibration feature value, if unanimously, the driver is by safety
Checking.
2. driver safe verification method as claimed in claim 1, it is characterised in that driver publisher is provided
Driver is encrypted, and generates digital signature, including：
Extract the Standard Eigenvalue of the driver, and the Standard Eigenvalue be encrypted, by encryption after the mark
Digital signature of the quasi- eigenvalue as the driver publisher.
3. driver safe verification method as claimed in claim 2, it is characterised in that the extraction driver
Standard Eigenvalue, including：
The image file summary of the driver is extracted by SHA-1 SHA summarization generations algorithm.
4. driver safe verification method as claimed in claim 3, it is characterised in that described that the Standard Eigenvalue is entered
Row encryption, including：
Image file summary is encrypted by RSA public key encryption algorithms.
5. driver safe verification method as claimed in claim 4, it is characterised in that if the Standard Eigenvalue with it is described
Calibration feature value is inconsistent, then the driver exits installation.
6. a kind of driver security authentication systems, it is characterised in that include：
Digital signature generation module, for being encrypted to the driver that driver publisher provides, generates digital signature；
Public key, for when the driver is installed, being decrypted to the digital signature, obtains the mark of the driver
Quasi- eigenvalue；
Computing module, calculates for the driver after to decryption, obtains calibration feature value；
Secure verification module, it is if unanimously, described for judging whether the Standard Eigenvalue is consistent with the calibration feature value
Driver passes through safety verification.
7. driver security authentication systems as claimed in claim 6, it is characterised in that the digital signature generation module bag
Include：
Extraction unit, for extracting the image file of the driver by SHA-1 SHA summarization generations algorithm
Summary.
8. driver security authentication systems as claimed in claim 7, it is characterised in that the digital signature generation module bag
Include：
Ciphering unit, for being encrypted to image file summary by RSA public key encryption algorithms.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201611131335.2A CN106599729A (en) | 2016-12-09 | 2016-12-09 | Safety verification method and system for driving program |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201611131335.2A CN106599729A (en) | 2016-12-09 | 2016-12-09 | Safety verification method and system for driving program |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN106599729A true CN106599729A (en) | 2017-04-26 |
Family
ID=58598329
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201611131335.2A Pending CN106599729A (en) | 2016-12-09 | 2016-12-09 | Safety verification method and system for driving program |
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| CN109240713A (en) * | 2018-08-27 | 2019-01-18 | 郑州云海信息技术有限公司 | Drive the encryption method of installation procedure, the installation method and device of driver |
| CN109543397A (en) * | 2018-11-22 | 2019-03-29 | 福州符号信息科技有限公司 | A kind of encryption authorization scheme of algorithms library |
| CN110378110A (en) * | 2019-06-28 | 2019-10-25 | 北京威努特技术有限公司 | Software cryptography processing method, software verification method and device |
| WO2020019971A1 (en) * | 2018-07-25 | 2020-01-30 | 百富计算机技术（深圳）有限公司 | Active security protection method for operating system, system and terminal device |
| CN111541553A (en) * | 2020-07-08 | 2020-08-14 | 支付宝(杭州)信息技术有限公司 | Trusted starting method and device of block chain all-in-one machine |
| US11616636B2 (en) | 2020-07-08 | 2023-03-28 | Alipay (Hangzhou) Information Technology Co., Ltd. | Hash updating methods and apparatuses of blockchain integrated station |
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Application publication date: 20170426 |