CN104601334B - It is a kind of to resist the stolen RFID mutual authentication methods of identification table - Google Patents

It is a kind of to resist the stolen RFID mutual authentication methods of identification table Download PDF

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Publication number
CN104601334B
CN104601334B CN201510091035.5A CN201510091035A CN104601334B CN 104601334 B CN104601334 B CN 104601334B CN 201510091035 A CN201510091035 A CN 201510091035A CN 104601334 B CN104601334 B CN 104601334B
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China
Prior art keywords
label
rfid
rfid tag
end data
reader
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CN201510091035.5A
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Chinese (zh)
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CN104601334A (en
Inventor
黎彤亮
黄世中
王怀瑞
周彦萍
王鹏
司晓琨
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Zhejiang Liangjing Network Technology Co.,Ltd.
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Institute Of Applied Mathematics Hebei Academy Of Sciences
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Abstract

It is a kind of to resist the stolen RFID mutual authentication methods of identification table, it is executed at one and RFID system is divided into RFID tag, RFID reader and back-end data base in logic, RFID tag preserves its unique identifier when initialIDAnd keyT;Back-end data base removes the unique identifier that label is preserved using a symmetric cryptography function encryptingID' and keyT', makeID≠ID',T≠T', the information that label corresponds to identification object is additionally preserved, is constituted to the identification table of label, when reader read write tag, needs to receive parameterKu, pass through this parameter and functionE() realizes the two-way authentication to label.Present invention effectively prevents because of the stolen potential security risk generated to system of identification table.

Description

It is a kind of to resist the stolen RFID mutual authentication methods of identification table
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of secure two-way authentication methods for RFID automatic recognition systems, and identification table can be prevented stolen To huge security risk caused by system, belong to field of communication technology.
Background technology
Radio frequency identification (Radio Frequency Identification-RFID) is a kind of utilization radiofrequency signal and space (inductance or electromagnetic coupling) transmission characteristic is coupled, contactless automatic identification target object is realized and obtains the skill of related data Art.RFID technique can improve the efficiency of management of product, reduce management cost, but the application designs of RFID initially are complete openings , which is flexibly exposed to the information wirelessly transmitted also is made while convenience to system data acquisition offer In public, this significant threat for being undoubtedly information security.
One RFID system generally comprises three major parts:RFID tag, RFID reader and back-end data base.RFID Label include unique identifier --- ID, key and some parameters, the information of the usually in store label of back-end data base and The information of label institute marker.Attacker's attacking system is not the ID for obtaining label, the information such as key merely, it is often more important that Remove the correspondence of acquisition label and marker.Therefore it is the important content to ensure information security to protect this correspondence.
Currently, the settlement mechanism of RFID system information security can be divided into two major class:One kind is Physics Security Tragedy, this Kind security mechanism relies primarily on additional equipment or hardware capability solves the safety problem of RFID system, as electrostatic screen, active are dry It disturbs, clip tag etc.;Second class is cipher mechanism, mainly solves RFID system peace by the security protocol based on cryptographic technique Full problem.
Compared with the hardware security mechanism based on physical method, realize that Encryption Algorithm is more flexible and convenient in circuit, and And advantage of lower cost, therefore the software safety mechanism based on cryptographic technique receives people and more favors, it is many both at home and abroad Scholar has done many work on using the security protocol based on cryptographic technique, it is proposed that many schemes, but existing scheme is more Focus on protection is the message between label and reader, and less to the protection of back-end server data concern, once rear end Server preserved to identify that the identification table of label is lost, the whole label tapes that will be grasped to system carry out risk, this A risk is globality.It reads while write device and has functioned only as the bridge beam action communicated between back-end server and label, to reading The use control for writing device lacks necessary measure.Therefore, existing agreement cannot eliminate the label letter that back-end server is preserved Risk caused by the information of breath and label institute marker is stolen, it is also necessary to further research and improvement.
Invention content
It is an object of the invention to be directed to the drawback of the prior art, a kind of RFID that resistance identification table is stolen is provided and two-way is recognized Card method, to solve the information security issue of RFID system.
Problem of the present invention is realized with following technical proposals:
A kind of to resist the stolen RFID mutual authentication methods of identification table, the method executes in logic at one by RFID systems System is divided into RFID tag, RFID reader and back-end data base and runs in such a system, and RFID tag preserves its mark when initial Know symbol ID and cipher key T;Back-end data base removes the identifier EID and key that label is preserved using a symmetric cryptography function encrypting ET makes ID ≠ EID, T ≠ ET;The information that label corresponds to identification object is additionally preserved, the identification table to label is constituted, it is described symmetrical Cipher function E () meets:Ku is the parameter that user holds, reader read-write mark It when label, needs to receive parameter Ku, the two-way authentication to label is realized by this parameter and function E ();Concrete operations are by following Step carries out:
A. it initializes
The label data that Back end data library storage is managed<EIDi,ETi,EToldi,Infoi>, i=1,2 ... after n, n are The label number that client database is managed, ETold, it is data used in the RFID tag last time, Info is marked by RFID tag Know the information of article;
It is stored in label i<IDi,Ti>,i∈{1,2,…n}
IDi,TiWith EIDi,ETiRelationship be:
ETi=E (Ti),Ti=E-1(ETi)
Wherein E () is a kind of Encryption Algorithm, E-1() is decipherment algorithm, and used key is dk;Ku is what user held One parameter;For exclusive or (XOR) operation;
The identification of b.RFID labels
1. user's input parameter Ku is to RFID reader;
2. RFID reader generates a random number Rr, and this random number is sent to RFID tag;
3. after RFID tag to the read-write requests of RFID reader, oneself generates a random number Rt, press later Formula calculates response message M1、M2And it sends them out:
Wherein, f () is another symmetric cryptography function;
4. after RFID reader receives the response message of RFID tag, using the old owner or current owner, the seller Parameter Ku to M2Do following operation:
Later by M1,M2Together with RrBack-end data base is sent to be judged;
5. back-end data base does following calculating for each label information stored:
ID'=E-1(EID)
T'=E-1(ET)
Verification:
It is whether true;
It is calculated if invalid:
T'old=E-1(ETold)
Verification:
It is whether true;
If (1a) is invalid with (1b), RFID tag is terminated not over certification, verification process;
It is set up if there is (1a) or (1b), then finds the information of mark Echo Tag, prepare a message M later3
Subsequent back-end data base executes update operation and is updated if (1a) is set up:
ETold=ET
No matter (1a) set up or (1b) set up, all update:
ETnew=E (Tnew)
Wherein Tnew、ETnewFor data used in label next time certification;
Then back-end data base is by M3It is sent to reader;
6. reader calculates
By M3It is sent to RFID tag;
7. label Verification
If set up, then update;
And complete certification;
Otherwise certification terminates.
The present invention is provided with double shielding to identification table, first, identification table is encrypted;Second is that being cut by arrange parameter The direct correspondence of the data and label stored data that are preserved in disconnected identification table, thus effectively prevents because of identification table The stolen huge potential security risk that system is generated.
Description of the drawings
The invention will be further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.
Fig. 1 is the flow chart of data processing figure of the present invention.
Each symbol is in figure:M1, M2, M3For message,For believable message,For incredible message,It is different Or operation.
Each symbol is in text:Ku is the parameter that user holds, and ID is the unique identifier of RFID tag, and ET is RFID tag Key, IDiFor the unique identifier of i-th of RFID tag, TiFor the key of i-th of RFID tag, Info is identified by label The information of article, E () are a kind of Encryption Algorithm, E-1() is decipherment algorithm, and key dk is protected safely in back-end server It deposits and uses, RrFor the number for initiating to inquire to label that RFID reader generates, RtOne is generated for RFID tag at random Number, f () are a symmetric cryptography function.
Specific implementation mode
The present invention proposes the mutual authentication method between a kind of RFID tag and reader, relative to other methods, we Method can prevent because the information for the label information and label institute marker that back-end server is kept it is stolen caused by risk.
Specific steps include:
1. initialization
The label data that Back end data library storage is managed<EIDi,ETi,EToldi,Infoi>, i=1,2 ... after n, n are The label number that client database is managed, ETold, it is data used in the label last time, Info is label institute marking articles Information.
It is stored in label i<IDi,Ti>,i∈{1,2,…n}
IDi,TiAnd EIDi,ETiRelationship is:
ETi=E (Ti),Ti=E-1(ETi)
Reader needs to carry out the work such as safety certification when connecting back-end server, sets up the peace of believable message transmission Full tunnel.
2. identification
Step 0:Prepare before operation.User's input parameter Ku is to reader.
Step 1:RFID reader is by an arbitrary number RrIt is sent to RFID tag.
Step 2:After label receives the read-write requests of reader, oneself generates a random number Rt, response is calculated later Message M1,M2And it sends them out:
Step 3:After reader receives the message of the response of label, using parameter Ku to M2Do following operation:
Later by M1,M2Together with RrBack-end data base is sent to be judged.
Step 4:Back-end data base does following calculating for each label information stored:
EID=E-1(EID)
T'=E-1(ET)
Verification:
It is whether true.
It is calculated if invalid:
T'old=E-1(ETold)
Verification:
It is whether true.
If (1a) is invalid with (1b), RFID tag is terminated not over certification, verification process;
It is set up if there is (1a) or (1b), then indicates that back-end data base finds the information of mark Echo Tag, Zhi Houzhun A standby message M3
Subsequent back-end data base executes update operation and is then updated if (1a) is set up:
ETold=ET
No matter (1a) set up or (1b) set up, all update:
ETnew=E (Tnew)
Then back-end data base is by M3It is sent to reader.
Step 5:Reader calculates
By M3It is sent to label.
Step 6:Label Verification
If set up, then update
And complete process;Else process terminates.

Claims (1)

1. a kind of resisting the stolen RFID mutual authentication methods of identification table, characterized in that the method executes in logic at one RFID system is divided into RFID tag, RFID reader and back-end data base and is run in such a system, RFID tag when initial Preserve its identifier ID and cipher key T;Back-end data base removes the identifier EID that label is preserved using a symmetric cryptography function encrypting With key ET, make ID ≠ EID, T ≠ ET;The information that label corresponds to identification object is additionally preserved, the identification table to label, institute are constituted State symmetric cryptography function E () satisfactions:ET=E (T), Ku are the parameter that user holds, reader read-write It when label, needs to receive parameter Ku, the two-way authentication to label is realized by this parameter and function E ();Concrete operations press with Lower step carries out:
A. it initializes
The label data that Back end data library storage is managed<EIDi,ETi,EToldi,Infoi>, i=1,2 ... n, n are Back end data The label number that library is managed, ETold, it is data used in the RFID tag last time, Info is RFID tag institute marking articles Information;
It is stored in label i<IDi,Ti>,i∈{1,2,…n}
IDi,TiWith EIDi,ETiRelationship be:
ETi=E (Ti),Ti=E-1(ETi)
Wherein E () is a kind of Encryption Algorithm, E-1() is decipherment algorithm, and used key is dk;Ku is one that user holds Parameter;For exclusive or (XOR) operation;
The identification of b.RFID labels
1. user's input parameter Ku is to RFID reader;
2. RFID reader generates a random number Rr, and this random number is sent to RFID tag;
3. after RFID tag to the read-write requests of RFID reader, oneself generates a random number Rt, it is calculated as follows later Response message M1、M2And it sends them out:
Wherein, f () is another symmetric cryptography function;
4. after RFID reader receives the response message of RFID tag, using the ginseng of the old owner or current owner, the seller Number Ku is to M2Do following operation:
Later by M1,M2Together with RrBack-end data base is sent to be judged;
5. back-end data base does following calculating for each label information stored:
ID'=E-1(EID)
T'=E-1(ET)
Verification:
It is whether true;
It is calculated if invalid:
T'old=E-1(ETold)
Verification:
It is whether true;
If (1a) is invalid with (1b), RFID tag is terminated not over certification, verification process;
It is set up if there is (1a) or (1b), then finds the information of mark Echo Tag, prepare a message M later3
Subsequent back-end data base executes update operation and is updated if (1a) is set up:
ETold=ET
No matter (1a) set up or (1b) set up, all update:
ETnew=E (Tnew)
Wherein Tnew、ETnewFor data used in label next time certification;
Then back-end data base is by M3It is sent to reader;
6. reader calculates
By M3It is sent to RFID tag;
7. label Verification
If set up, then update;
And complete certification;
Otherwise certification terminates.
CN201510091035.5A 2015-03-01 2015-03-01 It is a kind of to resist the stolen RFID mutual authentication methods of identification table Active CN104601334B (en)

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* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN106485292B (en) * 2015-08-28 2020-01-14 重庆品胜科技有限公司 Method and system for verifying authenticity of carbon ribbon cartridge on thermal transfer printing equipment

Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2001054083A1 (en) * 2000-01-18 2001-07-26 Infineon Technologies Ag Microprocessor system with encoding
CN102111758A (en) * 2009-12-28 2011-06-29 北京安码科技有限公司 Method for solving end-to-end problem in mobile communication based on encryption system
CN102737260A (en) * 2011-04-15 2012-10-17 深联致远(北京)科技有限公司 Method and apparatus for identifying and verifying RFID privacy protection

Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2001054083A1 (en) * 2000-01-18 2001-07-26 Infineon Technologies Ag Microprocessor system with encoding
CN102111758A (en) * 2009-12-28 2011-06-29 北京安码科技有限公司 Method for solving end-to-end problem in mobile communication based on encryption system
CN102737260A (en) * 2011-04-15 2012-10-17 深联致远(北京)科技有限公司 Method and apparatus for identifying and verifying RFID privacy protection

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Patentee before: INSTITUTE OF APPLIED MATHEMATICS, HEBEI ACADEMY OF SCIENCES