CN103713298A - Anti-deception method based on interactive distance measurement information and RNSS - Google Patents
Anti-deception method based on interactive distance measurement information and RNSS Download PDFInfo
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- CN103713298A CN103713298A CN201310713602.7A CN201310713602A CN103713298A CN 103713298 A CN103713298 A CN 103713298A CN 201310713602 A CN201310713602 A CN 201310713602A CN 103713298 A CN103713298 A CN 103713298A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
- G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
Abstract
The invention discloses an anti-deception method based on interactive distance measurement information and an RNSS. The anti-deception method is applied to a system comprising a user receiver, an interactive distance measurement platform, a measurement control center and a navigational satellite. The user receiver exchanges interactive distance measurement signals with the measurement control center through the interactive distance measurement platform; the navigational satellite sends an RNSS signal to the user receiver; the user receiver compares positioning results or distance information obtained based on the interactive distance measurement signals and the positioning results or distance information obtained based on the RNSS, and judges whether deception interference is received; and the measurement control center judges whether the user receiver is subjected to the deception interference based on the number of interactive distance measurement answering signals received from the same user receiver and the same interactive platform nodes. The anti-deception is achieved by utilizing the interactive distance measurement platform, so that analysis on signal features can be avoided, realization difficulty is reduced, and the anti-deception can be achieved.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the anti-Cheating Technology of a kind of satellite navigation, proposed a kind of anti-deception measures based on interactive ranging information and RNSS, the find range positioning result of observed quantity and receiver RNSS of interactive mode is compared, and then reach the object of anti-deception.
Background technology
Along with the generally application of Beidou satellite navigation system in China, especially, in the widespread use in military and national defense field, the security of satellite navigation has been proposed to requirements at the higher level.Satellite navigation signals is restricted because of its emissive power, signal while arriving ground will be quite faint, simultaneously because part signal system is disclosed, covert signal also has the possibility of being tracked down, even without being tracked down, also can be replicated by the mode forwarding, so satellite navigation signals is very easy to be subject to deception formula and disturbs, receiver user is used and is subject to the navigation signal that deception formula disturbs and will brings huge harm.As impact widely Iran inveigle U.S. RQ-170 " sentry " unmanned plane event be exactly together typical receiver user receives and utilizes the event of the satellite navigation signals that is subject to the interference of deception formula.
The radionavigation-satellite service of serving user location has two kinds, a kind of be now the whole world four large navigational system all at the radionavigation-satellite service of use, be RNSS, receiver user, according to the satellite navigation signals receiving, independently completes the functions such as location, navigation and time service.Another kind is radiodetermination-satellite service, i.e. RDSS.The interactive range finding of satellite refers between ground central station and user carries out information interaction via satellite, and ground central station completes pseudo range measurement, and RDSS is a kind of application that typically utilizes the interactive location of having found range of satellite.Beidou satellite navigation system not only has RNSS function, also has RDSS function simultaneously.
Satellite navigation system is faced with the electromagnetic interference environment of various complexity, be divided into having a mind to disturb and being not intended to and disturb, be not intended to disturb the interference unintentionally that mainly refers to that other telstars, ground radar and radio etc. send, have a mind to disturb mainly refer to that pressing type disturbs and the interference of deception formula.Pressing type disturbs and to refer to that the interference strength that enters receiver is greater than the intensity of useful signal, and receiver cannot normally be worked, and this interference effect is good, but power is large, and interference source is easily found and destroys.Deception formula is disturbed and can be realized by providing false navigation signal or information, can be divided into production cheating interference and deceiving jamming.Production cheating interference is the actual signal form of analog satellite, and the production that produces false navigation message is disturbed; Deceiving jamming is by making receiver user calculate wrong positional information to the forwarding of navigation signal.Deception formula jamming power is low, and interference source is difficult for being found, and interference effect is good simultaneously, will make receiver calculate wrong positional information, therefore in engineering application, is widely used, and becomes a kind of important threat that satellite navigation receiver faces.
The anti-deception algorithm research disturbing for deception formula has now become focus, existing anti-deception algorithm mainly contains: before positioning calculation, by signal characteristic method of discrimination, identified and rejected the deception formula undesired signal with obvious undesired signal feature, the features such as signal characteristic is differentiated can be when receiving power, the signal of signal and arrive, direction of arrival degree and polarizations mode are differentiated.In positioning calculation process, the deception formula undesired signal being not yet identified is carried out to filtering processing, filtering algorithm mainly comprises expanded Kalman filtration algorithm, the filtering algorithm based on matrixing etc.
But existing anti-deception algorithm all needs to carry out the identification of signal characteristic, it implements relative complex.
Summary of the invention
In view of this, the object of the invention is to disturb in order to resist satellite navigation deception formula, a kind of method that anti-deception formula of utilizing interactive ranging information and signal and in conjunction with RNSS technology, deception formula undesired signal being identified is disturbed is proposed, can avoid signal characteristic to resolve, thereby reduced, realize difficulty, can improve the performance of receiver user, realize anti-deception fast.The method and the not mutual exclusion of existing anti-deception algorithm, can independently be used also and can combine with existing algorithm.
In order to solve the problems of the technologies described above, the present invention is achieved in that
Receiver user and measurement control center all utilize interactive distance measuring signal to cheat judgement: receiver user contrasts the positioning result of the positioning result obtaining according to interactive distance measuring signal and RNSS, or the interactive platform obtained according to interactive distance measuring signal of receiver user and the positioning result of the distance between receiver and RNSS and the distance of interactive platform compare, judge whether to be subject to deception formula and disturb; Measure control center according to the quantity of the received interactive mode range finding answer signal from same receiver user and same interactive range finding platform node, judge whether receiver user is subject to deception formula and disturbs.
Wherein, the described positioning result obtaining according to interactive distance measuring signal is calculated by receiver user, or calculates and send to receiver user by interactive mode range finding platform.
Preferably, the method specifically comprises the steps:
Step 1, receiver user are resolved and are obtained local position S by RNSS signal
rNSS-1, receiver user response source is measured the interactive distance measuring signal of control center certainly, the concurrent interactive mode range finding answer signal that send;
Receiver user is according to described local position S
rNSS-1with the interactive mode range finding position of platform S obtaining from interactive distance measuring signal
1-2, the distance R of calculating receiver user and interactive range finding platform
1-Δ 12; According to interactive distance measuring signal, from interactive mode range finding platform, be delivered to the distance R of time-delay calculation receiver user with the interactive range finding platform of receiver user simultaneously
alternately-Δ 12; By distance R
1-Δ 12with distance R
alternately-Δ 12compare, if do not matched, think that being subject to deception formula disturbs;
Step 3a, measurement control center receive described interactive range finding answer signal, according to the interactive mode range finding answer signal quantity receiving, judge whether receiver user is subject to deception formula and disturbs, if be subject to deception formula, disturb, by the interactive mode platform of finding range, inform receiver user, enter step 3b;
Receiver user, according to described interactive range finding answer signal, resolves to the distance R of the interactive platform of finding range in step 3b, measurement control center
3-Δ 12; If described interactive range finding answer signal is enough to consumer positioning receiver, by positioning result S
3-1send to receiver user; If described interactive range finding answer signal is not enough to consumer positioning receiver, the distance R of the receiver user of control center's calculating to interactive range finding platform will be measured
3-Δ 12send to receiver user;
Step 4, receiver user are cheated judgement for the second time:
If receiving, step 4a receiver user measures the described positioning result S that control center sends
3-1, by this positioning result S
3-1resolve and obtain local position S from RNSS signal with step 1
rNSS-1compare, if do not matched, think that being subject to deception formula disturbs;
If receiving, step 4b receiver user measures described receiver user that control center sends to the distance R of interactive range finding platform
3-Δ 12, by this distance R
3-Δ 12the user who is calculated by receiver user with step 2 is to the distance R of interactive range finding platform
1-Δ 12compare, if do not matched, think that being subject to deception formula disturbs.
Beneficial effect:
The present invention utilizes interactive ranging information and signal and in conjunction with RNSS technology, can avoid signal characteristic to resolve, thereby reduced, realizes difficulty, can improve the performance of receiver user.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is that available technology adopting GEO satellite is as the interactive range measurement principle figure of interactive mode range finding platform.
Fig. 2 is the general frame of the anti-deception measures of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is that in the embodiment of the present invention, deception formula is disturbed scene 1.
Fig. 4 is that in the embodiment of the present invention, deception formula is disturbed scene 2.
Fig. 5 is that in the embodiment of the present invention, deception formula is disturbed scene 3.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with the accompanying drawing embodiment that develops simultaneously, describe the present invention.
First, interactive mode range finding ultimate principle is described.
Interactive range finding refers between the measurement control center 3 on ground and receiver user 1 by the interactive mode platform 2 of finding range carries out information interaction, measure control center and complete pseudo range measurement, interactive range finding platform can have multiple, can be balloon, ground repeater station, IGSO satellite, MEO satellite, GEO satellite etc. in practice.The RDSS service business of Beidou satellite navigation system based on GEO satellite be a kind of implementation of interactive range finding just,, take Big Dipper RDSS service business as the interactive range finding of example explanation ultimate principle here, and work schematic diagram as shown in Figure 1.
The course of work is: first by measuring control center, to GEO satellite, send departures interrogating signal simultaneously, through satellite, with the forms of broadcasting, be transmitted to the user in service area; User responds the interrogating signal of GEO satellite, and to measuring control center, sends check-in signal simultaneously, through GEO satellite, is transmitted to and measures control center.Measure the check-in signal that control center receives and demodulation user sends, calculate time delay according to the moment of the moment of exit signal and check-in signal, and finally obtain satellite to the pseudorange of receiver user in conjunction with satellite ephemeris, complete measurement.This process is exactly the ultimate principle of interactive range finding.RDSS service is to utilize the information of finding range more than the interactive mode of 2 above GEO satellites to position receiver user, and positioning result is sent to receiver user through GEO satellite.
The core of the anti-deception measures based on interactive ranging information and RNSS of the present invention is to utilize above-described interactive distance measurement function, its overall system block diagram, as Fig. 2, is applied to the system that comprises receiver user 1, interactive range finding platform 2, measures control center 3 and Navsat 4.Measure control center and to receiver user, forward interactive distance measuring signal by the interactive mode platform of finding range, receiver user receives the RNSS signal of Navsat and the interactive distance measuring signal that interactive range finding platform forwards simultaneously, in deception environment, receiver user also can receive curve simultaneously.Receiver user passes through at the positioning result of this locality comparison RNSS signal with according to the positioning result of interactive ranging information and signal acquisition, thereby judges whether to exist deception formula to disturb.In addition,, because some deception jammer can forward interactive range finding answer signal, therefore measuring control center can also, according to the quantity of the received range finding of the interactive mode from same receiver user answer signal, judge whether to be subject to deception formula and disturb.
In order to realize more comprehensively deception identification, the present invention combines receiver user and the deception identification of measuring control center, and receiver user all can cheat identification two stages, thereby has improved the success ratio of anti-deception.Specific implementation step is as follows:
Step 1: receiver user resolves by RNSS signal, obtains local position S
rNSS-1; Receiver user response source is measured the interactive distance measuring signal of control center certainly, the concurrent interactive mode range finding answer signal that send;
Wherein, measure control center and send interactive distance measuring signal, by interactive mode range finding platform, forward this signal, the positional information that comprises interactive range finding platform self in interactive signal, this positional information can be any type, direct or indirect positional information, as long as receiver user can identify according to this positional information the position of interactive range finding platform.In existing interactive range finding plateform system, the overwhelming majority has all realized the interpolation of position of platform information.
Step 2: receiver user is cheated judgement for the first time:
Receiver user resolves the local position S of acquisition according to RNSS
rNSS-1with the interactive mode range finding position of platform S obtaining from interactive distance measuring signal
1-2calculate the distance R that obtains receiver user and interactive range finding platform
1-Δ 12;
Receiver user is also delivered to the distance R of time-delay calculation receiver user with the interactive range finding platform of receiver user from interactive mode range finding platform according to interactive distance measuring signal
alternately-Δ 12;
By R
1-Δ 12with R
alternately-Δ 12compare, if do not matched, think that being subject to deception formula disturbs.
Wherein, in the preset range of the difference that refers to two numerical value of matching in the present embodiment, represent that these two values are quite similar.It is hereinafter all that to match are all these implications.
Step 3: measure control center and cheat judgement:
Step 3a: measure the interactive mode range finding answer signal that control center receives user, when being derived from answer signal quantity that same node point same receiver user and in interactive mode range finding platform forwards when more than one, judge that being subject to deception formula disturbs; When judgement is subject to deception formula, disturb, by the interactive mode platform of finding range, inform receiver user; Enter step 3b;
Further, measure control center and receive more than 1 answer signal, cheating interference source is positioned at take the moment of second answer signal and the time difference of first answer signal and is multiplied by the light velocity and is on the ball that radius and receiver actual position are the center of circle.
Step 3b: measure control center according to connecing interactive range finding answer signal, calculate user to the distance R of interactive range finding platform
3-Δ 12.It resolves process: measure the moment of the interactive distance measuring signal of the known transmission of control center and receive interactive mode and find range the moment of answer signal, thereby calculate signal, travel to and fro between the time delay Δ 1 of measuring between control center and receiver user; The position of known interactive mode range finding platform, measures control center and interactive time delay Δ 2 of finding range between platform thereby obtain again, utilizes Δ 1 and Δ 2 just can calculate R
3-Δ 12.
If the interactive range finding of step 3c answer signal is enough to consumer positioning receiver, by positioning result, be designated as S
3-1, send to receiver user;
If the interactive range finding of step 3d answer signal is not enough to consumer positioning receiver, the distance R of the receiver user of control center's calculating to interactive range finding platform will be measured
3-Δ 12send to receiver user.
Wherein, whether answer signal is enough to consumer positioning receiver is to have the high equipment of survey to decide according to the source of answer signal and this locality, as a rule, if answer signal is from 3 or 3 above interactive mode range finding platform nodes, can locate a locus, if there is the high equipment of survey receiver user this locality, only need the answer signal of 2 or 2 above interactive range finding platform nodes.
Step 4: receiver user is cheated judgement for the second time:
Step 4a: measure the positioning result S that control center sends if receiver user receives
3-1, by this positioning result S
3-1with the positioning result S of step 1 from RNSS signal acquisition
rNSS-1compare, if do not matched, think that being subject to deception formula disturbs.
Further, if RNSS signal relay type disturbs, the positioning result of RNSS is position of interference source, if RNSS production is disturbed, can not determine position and the interference source radius of interference source.
Step 4b: measure receiver user that control center sends to the distance R of interactive range finding platform if receiver user receives
3-Δ 12, by this distance R
3-Δ 12the user who is calculated by receiver user with step 2 is to the distance R of interactive range finding platform
1-Δ 12compare, if do not matched, think that being subject to deception formula disturbs.
Further, if the interference of RNSS signal relay type, R
3-Δ 12deduct R
1-Δ 12be the distance of cheating interference source and receiver, cheating interference source is positioned at R
3-Δ 12deduct R
1-Δ 12on radius and the receiver actual position ball that is the center of circle.If RNSS production is disturbed, can not determine the position of interference source.
Be more than the testing process of anti-cheating interference, from above process, the place that whether exists deception formula to disturb according to judgement, can be divided at receiver user and measure two kinds of situations of control center; According to the number that participates in detecting the interactive mode range finding platform node of cheating, can be divided into two kinds of situations, be respectively that interactive range finding quantity can carry out locating separately and interactive range finding lazy weight can not be located separately.By take Big Dipper RDSS and RNSS business, anti-deception measures is described as background and different typical scenes below.
Situation 1: interactive range finding quantity is enough, measures control center and can locate separately
Below minute, 3 scenes perform an analysis:
Scene 1: deception jammer forwards or produce RNSS signal;
Scene 2: deception jammer forwards or produces RNSS signal to user simultaneously, forwards RDSS exit signal to user;
Scene 3: deception jammer forwards or produce RNSS signal to user, forwards RDSS exit signal and the inbound answer signal of RDSS.
Scene 1: deception jammer forwards or produce satellite RNSS signal
Deception jammer forwards or produces RNSS signal, RDSS signal is not forwarded and is produced, and in this case, receiver user can be positioned and be resolved by RNSS signal after being cheated, but the result now calculating will be wrong.Under this scene, in receiver user side, carry out twice anti-deception judgement, respectively:
A) receiver user side self is carried out anti-deception judgement
Receiver user resolves the local position of acquisition according to RNSS and the distance that obtains receiver user and interactive range finding platform is calculated in the interactive mode range finding position of platform that obtains from interactive ranging information, this distance and the pseudorange that interactive distance measuring signal obtains are compared, judge whether to be subject to deception formula and disturb, be interfered and to measuring control center, send alarm.Be step 1, step 2.
B) receiver user is combined and is carried out anti-deception judgement with measurement control center
Measure control center by interactive pseudo range measurement, obtained the actual position of receiver user, measure control center, by interactive type communication, the actual position of receiver is transmitted to user via satellite, user passes through the relatively positioning result of two kinds of modes in this locality, whether self judgment receiver is subject to the impact that deception formula is disturbed, and is interfered and to measuring control center, sends alarm.Be step 1, step 3b, step 3c and step 4a.
Scene 2: deception jammer forwards or produces RNSS signal to user simultaneously, forwards RDSS exit signal to user
In such cases, deception jammer forwards or produces RNSS signal to user simultaneously, after receiver user is cheated, can be positioned and be resolved by RNSS signal, calculates wrong result.Receive RDSS signal and be divided into two kinds of situations, interactive distance measuring signal and user that user has only responded jammer forwarding have responded interactive distance measuring signal real and that jammer forwards.
1) user has responded interactive mode range finding RDSS exit signal real and that jammer forwards
Receiver can respond the interrogating signal that twice measurement control center is broadcast to user in succession, and is transmitted to and is measured control center by synchronous satellite, two kinds of loops respectively:------user's---satellite---measures control center to satellite to measure control center;---------user's---satellite---measures control center to deception jammer to satellite to measure control center.Measure control center and will receive that 2 times to user answer under normal circumstances, and the interval of two times of reception is exactly, and satellite broadcast is downwards forwarded the time delay that formula jammer forwards increase, now measure control center and can detect user and around exist deception formula to disturb, and send corresponding warning message to user.Measure the respective algorithms of control center by prior art simultaneously and can draw the actual position of receiver user equally, when giving a warning information to user, to user, send real co-ordinate position information.Be step 1, step 3a, step 3b and step 3c.
2) user has only responded the interactive mode range finding RDSS exit signal that jammer forwards
Measure control center and can calculate user's position, and send to user.But the position that the position solving is not interference source neither user actual position, measuring control center compares the position calculating and the position calculating by RNSS signal, receiver makes their own the judgement that is forwarded formula Disturbance and deceit, send false alarm, send alarm simultaneously and to measuring control center.Be step 1, step 3b, step 3c and step 4a.
Scene 3: deception jammer forwards or produce RNSS signal to user, forwards RDSS exit signal and the inbound answer signal of RDSS.
Deception jammer forwards or produces RNSS signal to user, forward RDSS exit signal and the inbound answer signal of RDSS, the signal circuit of interactive range finding will have 4 kinds, respectively:------user's---satellite---measures control center to satellite to measure control center;---------user's---satellite---measures control center to deception jammer to satellite to measure control center;---------deception jammer---satellite---is measured control center to user to satellite to measure control center;------------deception jammer---satellite---is measured control center to user to deception jammer to satellite to measure control center.Loop number from whole interactive ranging process is carried out respectively to anti-fraud schemes explanation below.
1) whole interactive ranging process only has a kind of loop
The first loop is not disturbed by relay type, does not need anti-deception; Any one loop of its excess-three kind is as interactive ranging process, measuring control center can not judge receiver and whether be subject to relay type and disturb, but the position that measurement control center calculates is also wrong, receiver, by comparing the positioning result of RNSS and measuring the positioning result of control center, can show that receiver has been subject to relay type interference.Because the position calculating by RNSS is the position of interference source all the time, and measure position that control center calculates, not the position that interference source neither receiver, both positions are different.Step is step 1, step 3b, step 3c and step 4a.
2) whole interactive ranging process is more than a kind of loop
Measure control center and will be subject to repeatedly the answer signal of receiver, measurement control center will detect receiver and be subject to the interference of deception formula.Measure control center simultaneously and can draw the actual position of receiver user equally by respective algorithms, when giving a warning information to user, to user, send real co-ordinate position information.Be step 1, step 3a, step 3b and step 3c.
Situation 2: interactive range finding lazy weight can not be located separately
This situation also divides above-mentioned 3 scenes to perform an analysis:
Scene 1: deception jammer forwards or produce satellite RNSS signal
The anti-fraud schemes under scene 1 is identical with situation 1 for this scene, does not repeat here:
Scene 2: deception jammer forwards or produces RNSS signal to user simultaneously, forwards RDSS exit signal to user
In such cases, deception jammer forwards or produces RNSS to user simultaneously, after receiver user is cheated, can be positioned and be resolved by RNSS signal, calculates wrong result.Receive RDSS signal and be divided into two kinds of situations, interactive distance measuring signal and user that user has only responded jammer forwarding have responded interactive distance measuring signal real and that jammer forwards.
1) user has responded interactive mode range finding RDSS exit signal real and that jammer forwards
Receiver can respond the interrogating signal that twice measurement control center is broadcast to user in succession, and is transmitted to and is measured control center by synchronous satellite, two kinds of loops respectively:------user's---satellite---measures control center to satellite to measure control center;---------user's---satellite---measures control center to deception jammer to satellite to measure control center.Measure control center and will receive that 2 times to user answer under normal circumstances, and the interval in two moment is exactly, and satellite broadcast is downwards forwarded the time delay that formula jammer forwards increase, now measure control center and can detect user and around exist deception formula to disturb, and send corresponding warning message to user.But can not obtain the actual position of receiver user.Be step 1 and step 3a.
2) user has only responded the interactive mode range finding RDSS exit signal that jammer forwards
Measure control center and can not calculate user's position, but can calculate user user's time of reception to the distance of interactive range finding platform, measure control center this distance is sent to user; Receiver user utilizes the positioning result of RNSS can calculate the distance of receiver user and interactive range finding platform simultaneously; By these two distances, compare, judge whether receiver user is subject to deception formula and disturbs, send alarm simultaneously and to measuring control center.Be step 1, step 2, step 3b, step 3d and step 4b.
Scene 3: deception jammer forwards or produce RNSS signal to user, forwards RDSS exit signal and the inbound answer signal of RDSS.
Identical with situation 1, the signal circuit of interactive range finding will have 4 kinds,
1) whole interactive ranging process only has a kind of loop
---------user's---satellite---measures control center to deception jammer to satellite to measure control center;---------deception jammer---satellite---is measured control center to user to satellite to measure control center;------------deception jammer---satellite---is measured control center to user to deception jammer to satellite to measure control center.The first loop is not disturbed by relay type, does not need anti-deception; Any one loop of its excess-three kind is as interactive ranging process, measuring control center can not judge receiver and whether be subject to relay type and disturb, but the position that measurement control center calculates is also wrong, receiver, by comparing the positioning result of RNSS and measuring the positioning result of control center, can show that receiver has been subject to relay type interference.Because the position calculating by RNSS is the position of interference source all the time, and measure position that control center calculates, not the position that interference source neither receiver, both positions are different.Step is step 1, step 3b, step 3c and step 4a.
2) whole interactive ranging process is more than a kind of loop
Measure control center and will be subject to repeatedly the answer signal of receiver, measurement control center will detect receiver and be subject to the interference of deception formula.Be step 1, step 3a.
In sum, these are only preferred embodiment of the present invention, be not intended to limit protection scope of the present invention.Within the spirit and principles in the present invention all, any modification of doing, be equal to replacement, improvement etc., within all should being included in protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (3)
1. the anti-deception measures based on interactive ranging information and RNSS, be applied to the system that comprises receiver user, interactive range finding platform, measures control center and Navsat, receiver user and measuring between control center by the interactive mode platform intercommunication interactive mode distance measuring signal of finding range, Navsat is to receiver user transmission radionavigation-satellite service RNSS signal; It is characterized in that, receiver user and measurement control center all utilize interactive distance measuring signal to cheat judgement:
Receiver user contrasts the positioning result of the positioning result obtaining according to interactive distance measuring signal and RNSS, or receiver user is by the interactive platform of obtaining according to interactive distance measuring signal and the distance between receiver, compare with the positioning result of RNSS and the distance of interactive platform, judge whether to be subject to deception formula and disturb;
Measure control center according to the quantity of the received interactive mode range finding answer signal from same receiver user and same interactive range finding platform node, judge whether receiver user is subject to deception formula and disturbs.
2. the method for claim 1, is characterized in that, the described positioning result obtaining according to interactive distance measuring signal or distance are calculated by receiver user, or calculates and send to receiver user by interactive mode range finding platform.
3. the method for claim 1, is characterized in that, the method specifically comprises the steps:
Step 1, receiver user are resolved and are obtained local position S by RNSS signal
rNSS-1, receiver user response source is measured the interactive distance measuring signal of control center certainly, the concurrent interactive mode range finding answer signal that send;
Step 2, receiver user are cheated judgement for the first time:
The local position S that receiver user calculates according to step 1
rNSS-1with the interactive mode range finding position of platform S obtaining from interactive distance measuring signal
1-2, the distance R of calculating receiver user and interactive range finding platform
1-Δ 12; According to interactive distance measuring signal, from interactive mode range finding platform, be delivered to the distance R of time-delay calculation receiver user with the interactive range finding platform of receiver user simultaneously
alternately -Δ 12; By distance R
1-Δ 12with distance R
alternately-Δ 12compare, if do not matched, think that being subject to deception formula disturbs;
Step 3, measurement control center cheat judgement:
Step 3a, measurement control center receive described interactive range finding answer signal, according to the interactive mode range finding answer signal quantity receiving, judge whether receiver user is subject to deception formula and disturbs, if be subject to deception formula, disturb, by the interactive mode platform of finding range, inform receiver user, enter step 3b;
Receiver user, according to described interactive range finding answer signal, resolves to the distance R of the interactive platform of finding range in step 3b, measurement control center
3-Δ 12; If described interactive range finding answer signal is enough to consumer positioning receiver, by positioning result S
3-1send to receiver user; If described interactive range finding answer signal is not enough to consumer positioning receiver, the distance R of the receiver user of control center's calculating to interactive range finding platform will be measured
3-Δ 12send to receiver user;
Step 4, receiver user are cheated judgement for the second time:
If receiving, step 4a receiver user measures the described positioning result S that control center sends
3-1, by this positioning result S
3-1resolve and obtain local position S from RNSS signal with step 1
rNSS-1compare, if do not matched, think that being subject to deception formula disturbs;
If receiving, step 4b receiver user measures described receiver user that control center sends to the distance R of interactive range finding platform
3-Δ 12, by this distance R
3-Δ 12the user who is calculated by receiver user with step 2 is to the distance R of interactive range finding platform
1-Δ 12compare, if do not matched, think that being subject to deception formula disturbs.
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| CN104155663A (en) * | 2014-08-19 | 2014-11-19 | 清华大学 | Anti-spoofing-attack method and system applied to satellite navigation system |
| CN104793220A (en) * | 2015-05-04 | 2015-07-22 | 中国电子科技集团公司第五十四研究所 | Deception jamming detection method based on multiple antennas |
| CN105717492A (en) * | 2016-01-27 | 2016-06-29 | 中国人民解放军国防科学技术大学 | GNSS anti-deception method based on double receivers |
| CN106970399A (en) * | 2017-02-22 | 2017-07-21 | 清华大学 | Air navigation aid, terminal, information processing centre and navigation neceiver based on frequency modulation data radio |
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| US11094202B2 (en) | 2015-03-31 | 2021-08-17 | SZ DJI Technology Co., Ltd. | Systems and methods for geo-fencing device communications |
| US11367081B2 (en) | 2015-03-31 | 2022-06-21 | SZ DJI Technology Co., Ltd. | Authentication systems and methods for generating flight regulations |
| US11120456B2 (en) | 2015-03-31 | 2021-09-14 | SZ DJI Technology Co., Ltd. | Authentication systems and methods for generating flight regulations |
| CN107615359A (en) * | 2015-03-31 | 2018-01-19 | 深圳市大疆创新科技有限公司 | For detecting the Verification System and method of unwarranted unmanned vehicle activity |
| CN104793220A (en) * | 2015-05-04 | 2015-07-22 | 中国电子科技集团公司第五十四研究所 | Deception jamming detection method based on multiple antennas |
| CN105717492B (en) * | 2016-01-27 | 2017-12-29 | 中国人民解放军国防科学技术大学 | A kind of anti-deception measures of GNSS based on double-receiver |
| CN105717492A (en) * | 2016-01-27 | 2016-06-29 | 中国人民解放军国防科学技术大学 | GNSS anti-deception method based on double receivers |
| CN107885231A (en) * | 2016-09-30 | 2018-04-06 | 成都紫瑞青云航空宇航技术有限公司 | A kind of unmanned plane capturing method and system based on visible images identification |
| CN106970399A (en) * | 2017-02-22 | 2017-07-21 | 清华大学 | Air navigation aid, terminal, information processing centre and navigation neceiver based on frequency modulation data radio |
| CN110244323A (en) * | 2019-05-24 | 2019-09-17 | 中国科学院光电研究院 | Micro-, light-duty unmanned plane GNSS anti-spoofing system and curve detection and air navigation aid |
| CN110244323B (en) * | 2019-05-24 | 2021-04-20 | 中国科学院光电研究院 | GNSS anti-spoofing system of micro and light unmanned aerial vehicle and spoofing signal detection and navigation method |
| CN112327086A (en) * | 2020-11-05 | 2021-02-05 | 中国民用航空飞行学院 | Electromagnetic environment evaluation system for civil aviation airport and aviation station |
| CN112327086B (en) * | 2020-11-05 | 2021-06-29 | 中国民用航空飞行学院 | Electromagnetic environment evaluation system for civil aviation airport and aviation station |
| CN113204032A (en) * | 2021-05-26 | 2021-08-03 | 中国电子科技集团公司第五十四研究所 | Satellite navigation deception jamming detection method based on generalized RDSS positioning |
| CN113204032B (en) * | 2021-05-26 | 2022-03-04 | 中国电子科技集团公司第五十四研究所 | Satellite navigation deception jamming detection method based on generalized RDSS positioning |
| US11961093B2 (en) | 2022-06-20 | 2024-04-16 | SZ DJI Technology Co., Ltd. | Authentication systems and methods for generating flight regulations |
| CN115840238A (en) * | 2022-12-19 | 2023-03-24 | 中山大学 | RDSS (radio data system) -assisted Beidou time service deception jamming detection method and device |
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