CN103297400A - Security alliance management method and system based on bidirectional forwarding detection protocol - Google Patents

Security alliance management method and system based on bidirectional forwarding detection protocol Download PDF

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CN103297400A
CN103297400A CN2012100512176A CN201210051217A CN103297400A CN 103297400 A CN103297400 A CN 103297400A CN 2012100512176 A CN2012100512176 A CN 2012100512176A CN 201210051217 A CN201210051217 A CN 201210051217A CN 103297400 A CN103297400 A CN 103297400A
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router
key
field
sa
message
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CN2012100512176A
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韦银星
苗忠明
万长胜
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中兴通讯股份有限公司
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Abstract

The invention discloses a security alliance management method based on a bidirectional forwarding detection protocol. A Type field, a Nonce field and a keyidentifier field are arranged in interactive control messages between a first router and a second router, and the first router and the second router complete creation and renewal of a security alliance according to the control messages. The invention further discloses a security alliance management system based on the bidirectional forwarding detection protocol. Through the renewal of the security alliance at fixed period, when a serial number repeatedly emerges, due to the fact that the security alliance has been renewed, penetrated authentication data also differ. Accordingly, if an attacker uses data packages in the same overdue serial number to carry out replay attack, a receiver can recognize replayed data packages. Therefore, an effect of replay attack prevention is achieved, and system security is improved.

Description

基于双向转发检测协议的安全联盟管理方法及系统 Based on management method and system security alliance Bidirectional Forwarding Detection protocol

技术领域 FIELD

[0001] 本发明涉及通信网络中的路由安全技术,尤其涉及一种基于双向转发检测(Bidirectional Forwarding Detection, BFD)协议的安全联盟(security association,SA)管理方法及系统。 [0001] The present invention relates to routing security technologies in a communication network, to a bidirectional forwarding detection (Bidirectional Forwarding Detection, BFD) protocol-based security association (security association, SA) management method and system in particular.

背景技术 Background technique

[0002] BFD协议是为了解决现有检测机制的不足而产生的,它是一套全网统一的检测机制,用于快速检测、监控网络中链路或者IP路由的转发连通状况,保证邻居之间能够快速检测到通信故障,从而快速建立起备用通道恢复通信。 [0002] BFD protocol to solve the shortage of existing detection mechanism generated, it is a unified detection mechanism for the rapid detection, monitoring network links or connectivity of IP routing to ensure that the neighbors between a communication failure can be detected quickly, to quickly establish a backup channel to resume the communication. BFD提供了一个通用的、标准化的、介质无关、协议无关的快速故障检测机制,可以为各上层协议如路由协议、MPLS等统一地快速检测两台路由器间双向转发路径的故障。 BFD provides a general-purpose, media-independent standardized protocol independent fast failure detection mechanism can for protocols such as routing protocols, MPLS uniformly and quickly detect bidirectional forwarding paths between two routers fault. BFD本身并没有发现机制,而是靠被服务的上层协议通知其该与谁建立会话,会话建立后如果在检测时间内没有收到对端的BFD控制报文则认为发生故障,通知被服务的上层协议,上层协议进行相应的处理。 BFD itself does not discovery mechanism, but by upper-layer protocols being served notice that the session is established and who, after the session is established if not received within the detection time of BFD control packets is considered the upper end of the fault, notify service protocol, corresponding to the upper layer protocol processing.

[0003] BFD协议安全的基本需求是完整性和抗重放攻击。 [0003] basic needs BFD protocol security is integrity and anti-replay attack. 攻击者拦截并伪造/篡改BFD消息,路由器一旦接受这种错误的BFD消息,将向上层协议提供错误的状况通知。 Attacker to intercept and forged / tampered with BFD message, the router accepting this erroneous BFD messages, will provide an error condition notifies the upper layer protocol. 为解决这一问题,必须为BFD协议提供完整性保护机制,以防止攻击者伪造/篡改消息。 To solve this problem, it must provide integrity protection mechanism for the BFD protocol to prevent an attacker to forge / falsify messages. 攻击者还可能重放一个过时的BFD消息,也将影响BFD协议的正常工作。 An attacker could also replay a message obsolete BFD, BFD will also affect the normal operation of the agreement.

[0004] BFD协议制定的保护数据完整性和抗重放攻击的标准(现有的安全机制)中: [0004] BFD protocol developed standards to protect data integrity and anti-replay attacks (existing security mechanisms) in:

[0005] BFD协议不包含一个用来创建或者管理BFD SA的带内(in-band)机制。 [0005] BFD protocol does not include the in-band (in-band) mechanism to create or manage the BFD SA. 一个BFDSA包含一系列由两个合法的BFD路由器共享的参数。 BFDSA contains a series of two legal BFD routers shared parameters. BFD协议使用这一安全联盟来计算完整性保护对象中的值,从而达到完整性保护的目的。 BFD protocol uses the security alliance to calculate the value of protecting the integrity of the object, so as to achieve integrity protection. BFD的规范包含了五种不同类型的认证方案:简单密码,Keyed MD5, MeticulousKeyed MD5, Keyed SHA-1 和Meticulous SHA-1,其中,在Keyed MD5和Meticulous Keyed MD5中,BFD路由器共享一个秘密的密钥,这个密钥被用来为每个包生成keyed MD5摘要,并且一个单调增的序号机制用来防止重放攻击。 BFD specification contains five different types of authentication schemes: simple password, Keyed MD5, MeticulousKeyed MD5, Keyed SHA-1 and Meticulous SHA-1, wherein, in the Keyed MD5 and the Meticulous Keyed MD5, BFD routers share a secret cipher key, this key is used to generate a keyed MD5 digest each packet, and a monotonically increasing sequence number mechanism is used to prevent replay attacks. 在Keyed SHA-1和Meticulous SHA-1中,BFD路由器共享一个秘密密钥,这个密钥被用来为每个包生成keyed SHA-1摘要,并且一个单调增的序号机制用来防止重放攻击。 A shared secret key Keyed SHA-1 and the Meticulous SHA-1, the BFD router, this key is used to generate a packet for each keyed SHA-1 digest, and a monotonically increasing sequence number mechanism is used to prevent replay attacks .

[0006] 另外,BFD SA关联的参数包括: [0006] Further, the parameters associated with BFD SA comprises:

[0007] Authentication Key Identifier (Key ID)认证密钥标识-两个8位字节的无符号整数用来唯一标识BFD SA,由网络操作员手动地设置(或者未来有可能是IETF定义的一些密钥管理协议设置)。 [0007] Authentication Key Identifier (Key ID) authentication key identifier - two 8-bit unsigned integer that uniquely identifies the BFD SA, the network operator manually set (or in future may be some cipher defined by IETF key management protocol set). Key ID字段是SA的索引字段:接收者通过观察收到数据包的该字段找到对应的SA,并使用该SA验证收到的数据包的完整性,发送者根据Key ID值找到对应的SA,并使用该SA生成认证数据(authentication data)。 Key ID field is an index field SA: find the recipient through the observation field of received packets corresponding to the SA, the SA and used to verify the integrity of the received data packet, the sender finds the corresponding SA according to the Key ID value, SA generated using the authentication data (authentication data). 使用Key ID使维持协议操作时改变密钥变得方便。 Key ID sustain protocol used to change the key operation becomes easy. 每个Key ID规定了两个独立的部分,认证协议和认证密钥。 Each Key ID defines two separate parts, the authentication protocol and an authentication key. 通常一个执行过程允许网络操作者在一个密钥链中设置一系列的密钥,链中的每个密钥有固定的寿命。 Performing a process generally allows the network operator to set a series of keys in a key chain, the chain has a fixed lifetime of each key. 注意到每个Key ID能够指明不同的认证协议的密钥。 Each note can be specified key Key ID different authentication protocols. 这就允许在不同的时间使用多个认证机制而不中断BFD会话,包含对新的认证机制的介绍。 This allows the use of multiple authentication mechanisms at different times without interrupting the BFD session, includes the introduction of new authentication mechanisms. [0008] Authentication Algorithm认证算法-表明BFD SA使用的认证算法。 [0008] Authentication Algorithm Authentication Algorithm - Authentication Algorithm show BFD SA use. 以下的值可用:Keyed MD5, Keyed SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384 andHMAC-SHA-512。 The following values ​​are available: Keyed MD5, Keyed SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384 andHMAC-SHA-512.

[0009] Authentication Key认证密钥-表示与该BFD SA关联的加密密钥。 [0009] Authentication Key Authentication Key - indicates the encryption key is associated with the BFD SA. 密钥的长度可变且由BFD SA指定的认证算法决定。 Variable-length keys and authentication algorithm specified by the BFD SA decision. 操作者必须保证密钥不会通过任何协议以明文在网络上传输。 Operator must ensure that the key is not transmitted in the clear over the network via any protocol. 而且必须保证选择的密钥是不可预测的,同时避免任意使用算法已知的弱密钥。 And must ensure that the selected key is unpredictable, while avoiding the use of any method known weak keys.

[0010] BFD认证部分格式如图1所示,其中: [0010] BFD authentication section format shown in Figure 1, wherein:

[0011] Auth Type:认证类型,为6 (密码认证)或7 (Meticulous密码认证)。 [0011] Auth Type: Authentication Type, 6 (password authentication), or 7 (Meticulous password authentication).

[0012] Auth Len:认证字段的长度。 [0012] Auth Len: length authentication field.

[0013] Auth Key ID:认证密钥标识。 [0013] Auth Key ID: authentication key identifier. 允许多个密钥同时活跃。 It allows multiple keys simultaneously active.

[0014] Sequence Number:该包的序号。 [0014] Sequence Number: number of the packet. 对密码认证,该值有时增加。 Password authentication, this value may increase. 对Meticulous密码认证,该值在每次会话成功地传输包时增加。 This value increased Meticulous password authentication for each session successfully transmitted packet.

[0015] Authentication Data:该字段携带了密码认证算法计算的摘要。 [0015] Authentication Data: This field carries the digest password authentication algorithm calculation.

[0016] BFD的这种安全机制可以一定程度地解决完整性保护和抗重放攻击的问题。 [0016] BFD This safety mechanism can solve the problem to protect the integrity and anti-replay attacks to some extent. 然而,仅仅定义安全联盟和认证对象是不够的。 However, just define the security alliance and the authentication object is not enough.

[0017] BFD安全机制还存在如下问题: [0017] BFD security mechanism has the following problems:

[0018] 在简单密码的认证机制中,密码在网络中以明文形式交换,任何物理接入到网络中的人都能获得密码并危及BFD域的安全; [0018] In a simple password authentication mechanism, the key exchange in the network in clear text, any physical access to the network and people can get the password to compromise BFD domain;

[0019] 完整性保护中使用的两种加密算法(MD5和SHA-1)都被证明常遭受碰撞攻击; Two encryption algorithms [0019] integrity protection used (MD5 and SHA-1) have been shown to often suffer collision attack;

[0020] 同一会话过程内。 [0020] within the same session. 两个路由器在通信时,会先建立链接,并初始化该链接的一些参数,有时候由于一些特殊原因,如路由器重启后,路由器需要重新建立链接,BFD提供了一个不完全的intra-session(指没有重新建立链接前的时期)重放攻击保护,而且没有inter-session (指重新建立链接前后的两段时期)重放攻击保护。 Two routers in communication, will first establish the link, and initialization parameters of the link, sometimes due to some special reasons, such as a router after the restart, the router needs to re-establish the link, BFD offers an incomplete intra-session (refer to no time to re-establish the link before) replay attack protection, and there is no inter-session (refer to re-establish the two periods before and after the link) replay attack protection. 当密码认证机制被BFD采用时,一个非减的32比特长序号被使用。 When the password authentication mechanism is adopted BFD, a non-reducing 32 bit long sequence number is used. 在Keyed MD5和Keyed SHA-1机制中,序号不被要求为每个包增加。 In Keyed MD5 and Keyed SHA-1 scheme, the numbers are not required to be increased for each packet. 因此一个攻击者可以一直用最新的序号重放包,直到序号被更新。 Therefore, an attacker can always use the latest numbers replay packets until the serial number is updated. 这个问题在Meticulous Keyed MD5 和Meticulous Keyed SHA-1 机制中被消除; This problem is eliminated Meticulous Keyed MD5 and Meticulous Keyed SHA-1 mechanism;

[0021] 序号可能到达其最大值并且在会话中被翻转。 [0021] Reference may reach its maximum value and is inverted in the session. 通常BFD的包在微秒和毫秒的间隔内被发送。 BFD packets are normally transmitted within the interval of microseconds and milliseconds. 而密码的序列号空间只有32比特,不用多久序列空间就会达到极限并且溢出。 The serial number of the password space of only 32 bits, it will not be long sequence space limit is reached and the overflow. 在这种情况下,没有自动密钥管理机制的支持,BFD会话将易受到重放攻击,通过发送序号翻转前的包; In this case, it does not support automatic key management mechanism therefore, BFD sessions vulnerable to replay attacks by sending a packet sequence number before the inversion;

[0022] 当恶意的包在短时间内被发送,由于认证位的设置,会带来拒绝服务攻击。 [0022] As the malicious packets are sent in a short time, since the certification bit, will bring a denial of service attack. 因为BFD规范考虑到认证状态的改变基于收到的包的状态。 Because BFD specification allows a change in the state of the authentication based on the received status packet. 比如,一个攻击者可以重放一个序号比目前的大很多的包来使节点确信很大数目的包丢失了,造成受害人转换自己的状态至down ; For example, an attacker can replay a number much larger than the current node package to make sure that a large number of packets lost, causing the victim to their new status to down;

[0023] 密钥更新功能有限。 Limited [0023] key update function. 在每一个认证的BFD控制包中都有一个Key ID,标识对包进行散列变换所采用的key。 In each of the authentication BFD control packet has a Key ID, an identification of packets hashing key used. 没有为BFD路由器提供一种平滑的key转换方法,从一个key移动到另一个; Does not provide a smooth conversion method is BFD router key, from one key to another;

[0024] 在BFD会话中,每个节点需要选择一个32比特的鉴别器来识别它本身。 [0024] In the BFD session, each node needs to select a 32-bit discriminator to identify itself. 因此,一个BFD会话由两个鉴别器识别。 Accordingly, a BFD session identified by two discriminator. 如果一个节点给一个新的会话随机地选择一个新的鉴别器,并且使用认证机制来保护控制包,inter-session重放攻击可以在一定程度上被减轻。 If a node for a new session randomly select a new authenticator, and an authentication mechanism used to protect the control packet, inter-session replay attacks can be mitigated to some extent. 然而,在现有的BFD解复用机制中,新的BFD会话使用的鉴别器可能是可推断的。 However, the existing mechanisms demultiplexing with BFD, BFD session using the new discriminator may be deducible. 这个问题可以被攻击者利用来进行重放攻击。 This problem may be exploited by attackers to replay attacks. 如果两个并行的BFD会话采用同一个鉴别器对并且使用相同的密钥来保护控制包的安全,一个恶意的认证包可以被用来实现内部连接重放攻击; If two parallel BFD session using the same discriminator to and the same key to secure control packet, a malicious authentication packet may be used to implement an internal connection replay attack;

[0025] 任何在BFD echo模式下的安全问题将直接影响BFD协议和会话状态,并且因此影响网络的稳定性。 [0025] In any security issues BFD echo mode will directly affect the BFD session and session status, and thus affect the stability of the network. 比如,任何重放攻击无法被测试的路由器与正常的转发区分。 For example, any router replay attacks can not be tested with normal forwarding distinction. 一个攻击还会导致一个有问题的连接被信任为是好的。 An attacker can also cause a problem to be trusted connection is good. 然而,如果echo包是可猜测的,可以从外部源哄骗,并且使BFD相信一个单向链接是双向的。 However, if the echo packet is speculation, it can be coaxed from an external source, and the BFD believe that a one-way link is bidirectional. 结果包含随机内容的echo包在接收后也被检测了。 The results echo packet contains a random content after receiving the also detected.

[0026] 总而言之,现有BFD SA的管理机制容易受到重放攻击,系统安全性较差。 [0026] In summary, the management mechanism of the existing BFD SA is vulnerable to replay attacks, system security is poor.

发明内容 SUMMARY

[0027] 有鉴于此,本发明的主要目的在于提供一种基于双向转发检测协议的安全联盟管理方法及系统,能够避免受到重放攻击,提高系统安全性。 [0027] In view of this, the main object of the present invention to provide a method and system based on the security association management BFD protocol, replay attacks can be prevented by, to improve system security.

[0028] 为达到上述目的,本发明的技术方案是这样实现的: [0028] To achieve the above object, the technical solution of the present invention is implemented as follows:

[0029] 一种基于双向转发检测协议的安全联盟管理方法,在第一路由器和第二路由器之间交互的控制报文中设置Type字段、Nonce字段和key identifier字段,该方法包括: [0029] A, the Type field is provided in the control message interaction between the first router and the second router-based security association management BFD protocol, a Nonce field and a key identifier field, the method comprising:

[0030] 第一路由器和第二路由器根据所述控制报文完成安全联盟的创建及更新。 [0030] The first router and the second router based on the control packet of creating and updating the security alliance.

[0031] 所述第一路由器和第二路由器根据所述控制报文完成安全联盟的创建为: [0031] The first router and the second router based on the control packet of creating SA to:

[0032] 第一路由器从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,并生成一随机数noncel ; [0032] The first router acquires the second router from the local record corresponding to the key table, and generates a random number noncel;

[0033] 第一路由器根据所述第二路由器对应的记录以及noncel,生成并存储安全联盟; [0033] The first router to the second router and the corresponding recording noncel, generates and stores security association;

[0034] 第一路由器根据所述安全联盟向第二路由器发送第一控制报文,其中,所述第一控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述noncel, Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce创建安全联盟的请求消息; [0034] The first router transmits a first control message to the router according to the second security association, which, key identifier field of the first message authentication control part is filled in the content recording LocalKeyID field corresponding to a second router, the Nonce field is filled noncel, Type field indicates that the message creation request message to the individual based on the SA Nonce;

[0035] 第二路由器根据所述第一控制报文中的key identifier字段在本地密钥表中找到对应的记录,则根据所述对应的记录以及noncel生成并存储对应的安全联盟,根据所述安全联盟验证第一控制报文完整后,根据所述安全联盟向第一路由器发送第二控制报文,其中,所述第二控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段和Nonce字段与第一控制报文相同,Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce创建安全联盟的应答消息; [0035] The second router records corresponding to the first key identifier field of the control packet is found in the local key table, according to the corresponding recording and noncel generating and storing the corresponding SA according to the after the first authentication SA complete control packet, transmitting a second control packet to the first router based on the security association, wherein, key identifier field and a Nonce field of the second message authentication control part of the first control packet the same article, Type field indicates that the message creation response message SA to individuals based Nonce;

[0036] 第一路由器根据所述第二控制报文判定第二路由器认可了自己生成的安全联盟,则安全联盟创建成功。 [0036] The first router to the second control message router determines whether the second Union endorsed the safety of his own generation according to the security alliance created successfully.

[0037] 所述第一路由器或第二路由器生成安全联盟时,根据下式确定K和AuthKey ID: [0037] The first or the second router when the router generates SA, is determined according to the formula K and AuthKey ID:

[0038] K = trancate(prf(Key, LocalKeyID, interface, noncel)), [0038] K = trancate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, noncel)),

[0039] Auth Key ID = trancate-16(prf(Key, LocalKeyID, interface, noncel)), [0039] Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, noncel)),

[0040] 其中,Key为所述从本地key table中获取的记录中的key,LocalKeyID为所述从本地key table中获取的记录中的字段,trancate-16表示从prf函数生成的结果中截取前面的16位。 [0040] wherein, Key record is acquired from the key table in the local key, LocalKeyID record acquired from a local key table in the fields, trancate-16 taken from the front, showing the results of the generated function prf of 16. 生成K时的trancate表示根据安全联盟中算法需要截取相应长度的密钥。 K indicates the time of generation trancate The SA algorithm requires a key corresponding length taken. [0041] 所述第一路由器和第二路由器根据所述控制报文完成安全联盟的创建为: [0041] The first router and the second router based on the control packet of creating SA to:

[0042] 第一路由器从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,并生成一随机数nonce2 ; [0042] The first router acquires the second router from the local record corresponding to the key table, and generates a random number the nonce2;

[0043] 第一路由器根据所述第二路由器对应的记录以及nonce2,生成并存储安全联盟; [0043] The first router to the second router and the corresponding recording nonce2, generates and stores security association;

[0044] 第一路由器根据所述安全联盟向第二路由器发送第三控制报文,其中,所述第三控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述nonce2, Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce创建安全联盟的请求消息; [0044] The first router sends a packet to the third control router according to the second security association, which, key identifier field of the third control part of the message authentication LocalKeyID filling contents in the fields of the second record corresponding to the router, the Nonce field is filled nonce2, Type field indicates that the message creation request message Nonce both SA is based;

[0045] 第二路由器根据所述第三控制报文中的key identifier字段从本地密钥表找到对应的记录,则根据所述对应的记录以及nonce2生成并存储对应的安全联盟,根据所述安全联盟验证第三控制报文完整后,生成一随机数nonce3,并根据所述对应的记录、nonce2和nonce3修改本地存储的安全联盟; [0045] The second router in the third control message corresponding to the key identifier field of the record found in the local key table is generated and stored in the corresponding SA according to the corresponding recording and the nonce2, according to the security after verification of the third Union complete control message, it generates a random number nonce3, and according to the corresponding record, and the nonce2 nonce3 stored locally modify the security association;

[0046] 第二路由器根据所述修改后的安全联盟向第一路由器发送第四控制报文,其中,所述第四控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段与第三控制报文相同,Nonce字段填充为nonCe3,Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce创建安全联盟的应答消息; [0046] The second router sends the modified security association of the first router to a fourth control packet, wherein, key identifier field of the fourth message authentication control part of the third control messages the same, a Nonce field filled nonCe3, Type field indicates that the message Nonce both sides to create an answer message security alliance is based;

[0047] 第一路由器根据所述第四控制报文判定第二路由器认可了自己生成的安全联盟,则根据本地密钥表中第二路由器对应的记录、nonce2和nonce3修改本地存储的安全联盟,安全联盟创建成功。 [0047] The first router to the fourth control message router determines whether the second recognized SA generated by itself, the key table according to a local record corresponding to the second router, and the nonce2 nonce3 modify locally stored security association, security alliance created.

[0048] 所述第一路由器或第二路由器根据本地的记录以及nonce2生成安全联盟时,根据下式确定Auth Key ID和K: [0048] The first or second router according to the local router when the recording and generating nonce2 SA, determined according Auth Key ID and K:

[0049] K = trancate(prf(Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce2)), [0049] K = trancate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce2)),

[0050] Auth Key ID = trancate-16(prf(Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce2)); [0050] Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce2));

[0051] 所述第一路由器或第二路由器根据本地的记录、nonce2和nonce3修改本地存储的安全联盟时,根据下式确定Auth Key ID和K: [0051] When the first or the second router a router according to the local recording, the nonce2 nonce3 modifications and locally stored security association, the Auth Key ID is determined according to the formula and K:

[0052] K = trancate (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce2, nonce3)), [0052] K = trancate (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce2, nonce3)),

[0053] Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce2,nonce3)); [0053] Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce2, nonce3));

[0054] 其中,Key为所述从本地key table中获取的记录中的key, PeerKeyID为从本地key table中获取的记录中的字段。 [0054] wherein, Key record is acquired from the key table in the local key, PeerKeyID field is acquired from the local record in the key table. trancate-16表示从prf函数生成的结果中截取前面的16位。 trancate-16 represented by the foregoing taken from the 16-bit results generated prf function. 生成K时的trancate表示根据BFD SA中算法的需要截取相应长度的密钥。 When generating the key K trancate respective length represents taken as required in the BFD SA algorithm.

[0055] 所述第一路由器和第二路由器根据所述控制报文完成安全联盟的更新为: [0055] The first router and the second router the packet is completed according to the SA control is updated:

[0056] 第一路由器从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,并生成一随机数nonce4 ; [0056] obtaining a second router a first router from the local record corresponding to the key table, and generates a random number the nonce4;

[0057] 第一路由器根据所述第二路由器对应的记录以及nonce4,生成新的安全联盟; [0057] The first router to the second router and the corresponding recording nonce4, generating a new security association;

[0058] 第一路由器根据原来的安全联盟向第二路由器发送第五控制报文,其中,所述第五控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述nonce4, Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce更新安全联盟的请求消息; [0058] The first router transmits a control message to the fifth router according to the original second security association, which, key identifier field of the fifth control message authentication in the content recording portion filled LocalKeyID field corresponding to the second router, the Nonce field is filled nonce4, Type field indicates that the message is a request message based on the updated personal Nonce SA;

[0059] 第二路由器根据现有的安全联盟验证第五控制报文完整,且根据第五控制报文中的key identifier字段在本地密钥表中找到对应的记录,则根据所述对应的记录以及nonce4生成对应的安全联盟,之后根据所述生成的安全联盟向第一路由器发送第六控制报文,其中,所述第六控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段和Nonce字段与第一控制报文相同,Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce更新安全联盟的应答消息; [0059] The second router authentication fifth control message based on the existing complete data SA, and the corresponding records according to a fifth control packet in the key identifier field to locate the local key table, the corresponding record in accordance with the nonce4 and generating a corresponding SA, after transmitting a first packet to sixth control router according to the security association generated, wherein, key identifier field and a Nonce field of the sixth control message authentication section with the first control packet the same article, Type field indicates that the message is a reply message based on personal security update Nonce Union;

[0060] 第一路由器根据所述第二控制报文判定第二路由器认可了自己生成的安全联盟,则将安全联盟更新为所述生成的安全联盟,安全联盟更新成功。 [0060] The first router to the second control message router determines whether the second Union endorsed the safety of their own generation, then the security update for the security alliance the alliance generated according to Alliance security update was successful.

[0061] 所述第一路由器或第二路由器生成安全联盟时,根据下式确定K和AuthKey ID: [0061] The first or the second router when the router generates SA, is determined according to the formula K and AuthKey ID:

[0062] K = trancate(prf(Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce4)), [0062] K = trancate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce4)),

[0063] Auth Key ID = trancate-16(prf(Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce4)), [0063] Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce4)),

[0064] 其中,Key为所述从本地key table中获取的记录中的key,LocalKeyID为所述从本地key table中获取的记录中的字段,trancate-16表示从prf函数生成的结果中截取前面的16位。 [0064] wherein, Key record is acquired from the key table in the local key, LocalKeyID record acquired from a local key table in the fields, trancate-16 taken from the front, showing the results of the generated function prf of 16. 生成K时的trancate表示根据安全联盟中算法需要截取相应长度的密钥。 K indicates the time of generation trancate The SA algorithm requires a key corresponding length taken.

[0065] 所述第一路由器和第二路由器根据所述控制报文完成安全联盟的创建为: [0065] The first router and the second router based on the control packet of creating SA to:

[0066] 第一路由器从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,并生成一随机数nonce5 ; [0066] obtaining a second router a first router from the local record corresponding to the key table, and generates a random number nonce5;

[0067] 第一路由器根据现有的安全联盟向第二路由器发送第七控制报文,其中,所述第七控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述nonce5, Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce更新安全联盟的请求消息; [0067] The first router transmits a second message to the seventh control router according to existing security association, wherein, key identifier field of the message authentication seventh control portion filled in LocalKeyID content recording field corresponding to a second router , the Nonce field is populated nonce5, Type field indicates both Nonce-based update request message to the SA message;

[0068] 第二路由器根据现有的安全联盟验证第七控制报文完整,且根据所述第七控制报文中的key identifier字段从本地密钥表找到对应的记录,则生成一随机数nonce6,并根据所述对应的记录、nonce5以及nonce6更新本地存储的安全联盟; [0068] The second router authentication seventh complete control packet based on the existing security association, and the corresponding records according to the seventh control packet from the key identifier field to locate a local key table, then generates a random number nonce6 and according to the corresponding recording, nonce5 SA nonce6 and updates the locally stored;

[0069] 第二路由器根据更新后的安全联盟向第一路由器发送第八控制报文,其中,所述第八控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段与第七控制报文相同,Nonce字段填充为nonce6, Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce更新安全联盟的应答消息; [0069] The second router transmits a control packet according to the eighth to the updated SA first router, wherein the key identifier field of the message authentication eighth control portion of the seventh control packet the same, a Nonce field is filled nonce6, Type field indicates that the message is a reply message based on both the security update Nonce Union;

[0070] 第一路由器根据所述第八控制报文判定第二路由器认可了自己更新安全联盟的方法,则根据本地密钥表中第二路由器对应的记录、nonce5和nonce6更新本地存储的安全联盟,安全联盟更新成功。 [0070] The first router eighth control message router determines whether the second recognition method according to their updated SA, according to the local key table record corresponding to the second router, nonce5 nonce6 and updating the locally stored SA , update the security alliance success.

[0071] 所述第一路由器或第二路由器根据本地的记录、nonce5以及nonce6更新本地存储的安全联盟时,根据下式确定Auth Key ID和K: [0071] The router according to the first or second local router records, nonce5 nonce6 and when updating the locally stored security association, determined according Auth Key ID and K:

[0072] K = trancate (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce5, nonce6)), [0072] K = trancate (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce5, nonce6)),

[0073] Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce5,nonce6)); [0073] Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce5, nonce6));

[0074] 其中,Key为所述从本地key table中获取的记录中的key, PeerKeyID为从本地key table中获取的记录中的字段。 [0074] wherein, Key record is acquired from the key table in the local key, PeerKeyID field is acquired from the local record in the key table. trancate-16表示从prf函数生成的结果中截取前面的16位。 trancate-16 represented by the foregoing taken from the 16-bit results generated prf function. 生成K时的trancate表示根据BFD SA中算法的需要截取相应长度的密钥。 When generating the key K trancate respective length represents taken as required in the BFD SA algorithm.

[0075] 所述第一路由器判定第二路由器是否认可自己生成的安全联盟为:检查收到的控制报文中的Nonce字段和key identifier字段是否与自己发送的控制报文中的相应字段—致。 [0075] The first router determines whether said second router recognized as self-generated SA: the corresponding fields in the control message whether the Nonce field of the control packet and checks the received key identifier sent with their fields - Induced .

[0076] 所述第一路由器判定第二路由器是否认可自己生成的安全联盟为:检查收到的控制报文中的key identifier字段是否与自己发送的控制报文中的相应字段一致。 [0076] The first router determines whether said second router recognized as self-generated SA: consistent with the corresponding field in the control message whether the key identifier field of the control packet checking the received transmission with the own.

[0077] 该方法还包括:第二路由器未在本地密钥表中找到对应的记录,则将返回的控制报文中的key identifier字段和Nonce字段置为O。 [0077] The method further comprising: a second router is not found in the local record corresponding to the key table, key identifier field of the control message will be returned and the Nonce field is set to O.

[0078] —种基于双向转发检测协议的安全联盟管理系统,包括:第一路由器和第二路由器,所述第一路由器和第二路由器之间交互的控制报文中设置Type字段、Nonce字段和keyidentifier字段,所述第一路由器和第二路由器根据所述控制报文完成安全联盟的创建及更新。 [0078] - security association management system based species BFD protocol, comprising: a control message interaction between a first router and a second router, the first router and second router Type field is provided, and a Nonce field keyidentifier field, the first router and the second router based on the control packet of creating and updating the security alliance.

[0079] 所述第一路由器,具体用于从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,并生成一随机数noncel ;根据所述第二路由器对应的记录以及noncel,生成并存储安全联盟;以及根据所述安全联盟向第二路由器发送第一控制报文,其中,所述第一控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述noncel, Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce创建安全联盟的请求消息;以及根据所述第二控制报文判断第二路由器是否认可自己生成的安全联盟; [0079] The first router is configured to obtain from a local key table record corresponding to the second router, and generates a random number noncel; corresponding router according to the second recording and noncel, generates and stores security association; the SA and the first control transmits a second message to the router, wherein, key identifier field of the first message authentication control part is filled in the content recording LocalKeyID field corresponding to a second router, the Nonce field is filled noncel, Type field indicates that the message creation request message SA to the individual based on a Nonce; and whether the recognized self-generated security association based on the second control message determines a second router;

[0080] 所述第二路由器,具体用于根据所述第一控制报文中的key identifier字段在本地密钥表中找到对应的记录,并根据所述对应的记录以及noncel生成并存储对应的安全联盟,根据所述安全联盟验证第一控制报文完整后,根据所述安全联盟向第一路由器发送第二控制报文,其中,所述第二控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段和Nonce字段与第一控制报文相同,Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce创建安全联盟的应答消息。 [0080] The second router, particularly for the first control packet according to the key identifier field of the corresponding record is found in the local key table, and according to the corresponding recording and generating and storing a corresponding noncel after SA, according to the first authentication SA complete control packet, transmitting a second control packet to the first router based on the security association, wherein, key identifier field of the second control packet and the authentication portion Nonce the first control field and the same message, Type field indicates that the message creation response message SA to individuals based Nonce.

[0081] 所述第一路由器,具体用于从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,并生成一随机数n0nCe2,根据所述第二路由器对应的记录以及nonce2,生成并存储安全联盟,之后根据所述安全联盟向第二路由器发送第三控制报文,其中,所述第三控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述nonce2,Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce创建安全联盟的请求消息;以及在根据第四控制报文判定第二路由器认可了自己生成的安全联盟后,根据本地密钥表中第二路由器对应的记录、nonce2和nonce3修改本地存储的安全联盟; [0081] The first router is configured to obtain from a local key table record corresponding to the second router, and generates a random number n0nCe2, according to the second router records corresponding to the nonce2 and, generating and storing the security association, after transmitting the SA according to the third router to the second control message, wherein, key identifier field of the third control message authentication in the content recording portion filled LocalKeyID field corresponding to a second router, the Nonce field is filled nonce2, Type field indicates that the message the two sides to create a request message Nonce security alliance is based; and in the fourth control message router determines whether the second Union endorsed the safety of his own generation according to the corresponding local key table according to the second router record, nonce2 and nonce3 modify security alliance stored locally;

[0082] 所述第二路由器,具体用于根据所述第三控制报文中的key identifier字段从本地密钥表找到对应的记录,并根据所述对应的记录以及nonce2生成并存储对应的安全联盟,根据所述安全联盟验证第三控制报文完整后,生成一随机数nonce3,并根据所述对应的记录、nonce2和nonce3修改本地存储的安全联盟;之后根据所述修改后的安全联盟向第一路由器发送第四控制报文,其中,所述第四控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段与第三控制报文相同,Nonce字段填充为nonce3, Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce创建安全联盟的应答消息。 [0082] The second router, particularly according to the third control message corresponding to the key identifier field of the key record is found from the local table, and generates and stores corresponding security according to the corresponding recording and nonce2 after Union, according to the third authentication SA complete control message, it generates a random number nonce3, and according to the corresponding record, and the nonce2 nonce3 modify locally stored security association; after SA according to the modified a first router sends a fourth control packet, wherein, key identifier field of the fourth message authentication control part of the third control message same, Nonce field is filled nonce3, Type field indicates that the message is based on both create security Nonce reply message Alliance.

[0083] 所述第一路由器,具体用于从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,生成一随机数nonce4,并根据所述第二路由器对应的记录以及nonce4,生成新的安全联盟;之后根据原来的安全联盟向第二路由器发送第五控制报文,其中,所述第五控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述nonce4, Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce更新安全联盟的请求消息;以及在根据所述第二控制报文判定第二路由器认可了自己生成的安全联盟后,将安全联盟更新为所述生成的安全联盟; [0083] The first router is configured to obtain from a local key table record corresponding to the second router, the nonce4 generates a random number, and the router according to the second record corresponding to the nonce4 and generates a new security association; after transmitting the SA according to the original router to the fifth second control packet, wherein, key identifier field of the fifth control message authentication in the content recording portion filled LocalKeyID field corresponding to a second router, the Nonce field is filled nonce4, Type field indicates that the message is an updated security association based on personal Nonce request message; and after the second control packet router determining a second security association recognized according to their generation, will update the security association generated security Alliance;

[0084] 所述第二路由器,具体用于在根据现有的安全联盟验证第五控制报文完整,且根据第五控制报文中的key identifier字段在本地密钥表中找到对应的记录时,根据所述对应的记录以及n0nCe4生成对应的安全联盟,之后根据所述生成的安全联盟向第一路由器发送第六控制报文,其中,所述第六控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段和Nonce字段与第一控制报文相同,Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce更新安全联盟的应答消肩、O [0084] The second router, in particular for verifying the fifth control message based on the existing complete data SA, and the corresponding records according to a fifth control packet in the key identifier field to locate the local key table the record corresponding to the generated n0nCe4 SA and corresponding sixth control after sending the packet to the first router according to the security association generated, wherein said sixth control portion of the message authentication key identifier field and Nonce field with the same first control packet, Type field indicates that this message is based on personal security update Nonce Union response elimination shoulder, O

[0085] 所述第一路由器,具体用于从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,并生成一随机数nonces ;之后根据现有的安全联盟向第二路由器发送第七控制报文,其中,所述第七控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述nonce5, Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce更新安全联盟的请求消息;以及在根据所述第八控制报文判定第二路由器认可了自己更新安全联盟的方法时,根据本地密钥表中第二路由器对应的记录、nonce5和nonce6更新本地存储的安全联盟; [0085] The first router, the router is configured to acquire a second key corresponding to the record from the local table, and generates a random number nonces; After sending a seventh message to the second router control according to the existing security association, wherein, key identifier field of the seventh control packet authentication part to fill a record corresponding to the second router LocalKeyID field, the Nonce field is filled nonce5, Type field indicates that the message is a request message based on the security association update both Nonce ; and when the packet according to the eighth control method determines whether the second router updates itself recognized SA, according to the record in the local key table corresponding to the second router, nonce5 nonce6 and updating the locally stored security association;

[0086] 所述第二路由器,具体用于在根据现有的安全联盟验证第七控制报文完整,且根据所述第七控制报文中的key identifier字段从本地密钥表找到对应的记录后,生成一随机数nonce6,并根据所述对应的记录、nonce5以及nonce6更新本地存储的安全联盟;以及根据更新后的安全联盟向第一路由器发送第八控制报文,其中,所述第八控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段与第七控制报文相同,Nonce字段填充为nonce6,Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce更新安全联盟的应答消息。 [0086] The second router, particularly for verification in accordance with a seventh conventional SA complete control packet, and the corresponding records according to the seventh control packet from the key identifier field to locate a local key table after generating a random number nonce6, and according to the corresponding recording, nonce5 and updating the locally stored security association nonce6; and transmitting a first packet to an eighth control router according to the updated security association, wherein the eighth key identifier field of the control message authentication part of the seventh control packets the same, Nonce field filled nonce6, Type field indicates a reply message based security alliance of parties Nonce update the message.

[0087] 本发明基于双向转发检测协议的安全联盟管理方法及系统,在第一路由器和第二路由器之间交互的控制报文中设置Type字段、Nonce字段和key identifier字段,第一路由器和第二路由器根据所述控制报文完成安全联盟的创建及更新。 [0087] The present invention is based on the security association management method and system of the Bidirectional Forwarding Detection protocol, the Type field is provided in the control message interaction between a first router and a second router, a Nonce field and a key identifier field, a first router and two routers according to the control packet of creating and updating the security alliance. 本发明通过定期对安全联盟进行更新,当序列号重复出现时,由于安全联盟已经得到了更新,所生成的认证数据(authentication data)也不相同。 The present invention will be periodically updated security association, when the serial number is repeated, since the security association has been updated, the generated authentication data (authentication data) is not the same. 因此,攻击者如果使用一个过期的同一序列号的数据包进行重放攻击,接收者将能识别该重放的数据包,从而达到抗重放攻击的效果,提高系统安全性。 Accordingly, if the attacker uses the same sequence number of a packet expired replay attack, the receiver will be able to recognize the reproduced data packet, so as to achieve the anti-replay attack, to improve system security.

附图说明 BRIEF DESCRIPTION

[0088] 图1为现有技术中BFD认证部分格式示意图; [0088] FIG. 1 is a partial schematic format BFD authentication prior art;

[0089] 图2为现有技术中BFD控制报文格式不意图; [0089] FIG. 2 is a prior art BFD control packet format is not intended;

[0090] 图3为本发明中BFD认证部分格式示意图; [0090] FIG. 3 BFD authentication section view showing the format of the present invention;

[0091] 图4为本发明实施例1中创建SA的方法流程示意图; The method of flow [0091] FIG 4 SA created in Example 1 is a schematic view of the present invention;

[0092] 图5为本发明实施例2中创建SA的方法流程示意图; [0092] FIG. 5 is a schematic SA created in process according to an Example 2 of the present invention;

[0093] 图6为本发明实施例3中创建SA的方法流程示意图; [0093] FIG. 6 is a schematic SA created in process according to an embodiment 3 of the present invention;

[0094] 图7为本发明实施例4中创建SA的方法流程示意图。 [0094] FIG. 7 is a schematic process flow of 4 SA created embodiment of the present invention.

具体实施方式 Detailed ways

[0095] 本发明的基本思想是:在第一路由器和第二路由器之间交互的控制报文中设置Type字段、Nonce字段和key identifier字段,第一路由器和第二路由器根据所述控制报文完成安全联盟的创建及更新。 [0095] The basic idea of ​​the invention is: setting the Type field in the control message interaction between a first router and a second router, a Nonce field and a key identifier field, a first router and a second router according to the control message Finish to create and update security alliance.

[0096] 需要说明的是,key table是BFD的长期密钥表。 [0096] It should be noted, key table BFD is a long-term key table. 安全联盟管理机制必须根据keytable来进行密钥的更新处理。 Security Association management mechanism must be updated to deal with the key according to keytable. 然而key table定义了固定的长期密钥,安全联盟管理机制则需要更新密钥。 However, key table defines the long-term fixed key security alliance management mechanism will need to update the key. 因此,必须定义BFD的Nonce字段来实现密钥更新。 Therefore, we must define the BFD Nonce field to achieve key update.

[0097] 本发明的安全联盟创建和动态更新机制的核心思想是:路由器在创建和更新安全联盟时,交互Nonce值。 [0097] The present invention security alliance and create a dynamic updating mechanism is the core idea: a router when you create and update security alliance, interactive Nonce value. 然后,双方根据Nonce值和key table中定义的父密钥生成子密钥,该子密钥是BFD安全联盟中使用的密钥。 Then, the two sides based on the parent key and key table Nonce value defined in sub-key generated, the sub-key is a key used in BFD security alliance. 同时,本发明还提供了如何从key table中的字段生成BFD SA中其它字段的机制,从而使得路由器之间只需要交互Nonce值,就能完成安全联盟的创建和动态更新(周期更新)的过程。 Meanwhile, the present invention also provides a mechanism how to generate a BFD SA field from the other fields in the key table, so that the process requires only the interaction between routers Nonce value, can be done to create the security association and dynamic updates (update period) of .

[0098] 在创建安全联盟时,如何保护第一条消息的安全是关键。 [0098] When creating a security alliance, how to secure the first message is the key. 虽然可以直接使用keytable来保护第一条消息的安全。 Although you can directly use keytable to secure the first message. 然而,key table中存放的都是长期密钥,这些长期密钥一般都是强密钥。 However, key table is stored in long-term key, these keys are generally strong long-term key. 加解密开销大,会影响路由协议的性能,因此最好使用短期密钥来进行加解密。 Encryption and decryption overhead large, will affect the performance of the routing protocol, it is best to use short-term key for encryption and decryption. 本发明将提出一种新的第一条消息保护机制。 The present invention proposes a new first message protection.

[0099] 在更新安全联盟时,对应的key ID也需要更新,本发明将提供一种BFD内部的密钥更新协商机制。 [0099] When updating security association, the corresponding key ID need to be updated, the present invention is to provide an internal key update negotiation mechanism of BFD.

[0100] 本发明提出一种新的基于双向转发检测协议的安全联盟管理方法及系统,主要涉及安全联盟创建及动态更新。 [0100] The present invention provides a novel method and system security management based Alliance bidirectional forwarding detection protocols, mainly related to the security alliance created and updated dynamically.

[0101] 需要说明的是,BFD控制报文封装在UDP报文中传送,对于单跳检测其UDP目的端口号为3784,对于多跳检测其UDP目的端口号为4784(也可配置为3784,具体参见配置任务)。 [0101] Incidentally, the BFD control packets are encapsulated in UDP packets, for single hop detect its UDP destination port number is 3784, for the multi-hop detect its UDP destination port number is 4784 (may also be configured to 3784, see specific configuration tasks).

[0102] BFD echo报文与BFD控制报文格式类似(区别在于字段Desired Min TXInterval和Required Min RX Interval为空),其UDP目的端口号为3785。 [0102] BFD echo packet to the BFD control packet format similar (except that the field Desired Min TXInterval and Required Min RX Interval is empty), which is the UDP destination port number 3785. BFD控制报文格式如图2所示,报文中各字段说明如下: BFD control packet format shown in Figure 2, message fields are as follows:

[0103] Vers:协议的版本号,协议版本为I。 [0103] Vers: the version number of the protocol, the protocol version is I.

[0104] Diag:本地会话最后一次从up状态转换到其他状态的原因。 [0104] Diag: local session last transition from the up state to another state reasons.

[0105] State (Sta):BFD会话当前状态,取值为:0代表AdminDown, I代表Down, 2代表Init, 3 代表Up。 [0105] State (Sta): BFD session current status values: 0 for AdminDown, I representatives Down, 2 representative of Init, 3 Representative Up.

[0106] Poll(P):设置为1,表示发送方请求进行连接确认,或者发送请求参数改变的确认;设置为0,表示发送方不请求确认。 [0106] Poll (P): set to 1, the sender of the connection request acknowledgment, acknowledgment, or transmits a request to change a parameter; is set to 0, the sender of the request is not confirmed.

[0107] Final (F):设置为1,表示发送方响应一个接收到P比特为I的BFD控制报文;设置为O,表示发送方不响应一个接收到P比特为I的BFD控制报文。 [0107] Final (F): set to 1 to indicate the sender in response to a received P bits I of the BFD control packet; setting is O, by the sender does not respond to a received P bits I of the BFD control packet .

[0108] Control Plane Independent (C):设置为I,表示发送方的BFD实现不依赖于它的控制平面(即,BFD报文在转发平面传输,即使控制平面失效,BFD仍然能够起作用);设置为O,表不BFD报文在控制平面传输。 [0108] Control Plane Independent (C): set to I, the sender of the BFD, it does not depend on the control plane (i.e., forwarding plane BFD packet in transmission, even if the control plane fails, BFD still able to function); set is O, no table BFD packet transmission control plane.

[0109] Authentication Present (A):如果设置为I,则表示控制报文包含认证字段,并且会话是被认证的。 [0109] Authentication Present (A): If set to I, it indicates that the control packet contains the authentication field, and the session is authenticated.

[0110] Demand(D):设置为1,表示发送方希望操作在查询模式;设置为0,表示发送方不区分是否操作在查询模式,或者表示发送方不能操作在查询模式。 [0110] Demand (D): set to 1, indicating that the sender wishes to operate in a query mode; set to 0, the sender of the query does not distinguish whether the operation mode, or the sender of the query mode can not be operated.

[0111] Reserved(R):在发送时设置为0,在接收时忽略。 [0111] Reserved (R): set to 0 when the transmission is ignored upon receipt.

[0112] Detect Mult:检测时间倍数。 [0112] Detect Mult: detection time multiplier. 即接收方允许发送方发送报文的最大连续丢包数,用来检测链路是否正常。 I.e., the maximum allowable number of consecutive receiver loss of packets sent by the sender, to check whether the link is normal. [0113] Length:BFD控制报文的长度,单位字节。 [0113] Length: BFD control packet length, in bytes.

[0114] My Discriminator:发送方产生的一个唯一的、非O鉴别值,用来区分两个协议之间的多个BFD会话。 [0114] My Discriminator: a unique, non-O sender authentication value generated is used to distinguish multiple BFD sessions between the two protocols.

[0115] Your Discriminator:接收方收到的鉴别值“My Discriminator”,如果没有收到这个值就返回O。 [0115] Your Discriminator: the receiver receives the identification value "My Discriminator", if this value is not received returns O.

[0116] Desired Min Tx Interval:发送方发送BFD控制报文时想要采用的最小间隔,单 [0116] Desired Min Tx Interval: Minimum interval used when you want to send BFD control packet sender, Single

位毫秒。 Bit ms.

[0117] Required Min Rx Interval:发送方能够支持的接收两个BFD控制报文之间的间 Spacing between the two receiving BFD control packet sender can be supported: [0117] Required Min Rx Interval

隔,单位毫秒。 Compartment milliseconds.

[0118] Required Min Echo Rx Interval:发送方能够支持的接收两个BFD回声报文之间的间隔,单位毫秒。 [0118] Required Min Echo Rx Interval: the sender is capable of supporting two BFD receiving interval in milliseconds between the echo packets. 如果这个值设置为0,则发送不支持接收BFD回声报文。 If this value is 0, then the received transmission does not support BFD echo packet.

[0119] Auth Type:BFD控制报文使用的认证类型。 [0119] Auth Type: BFD control packet authentication type used.

[0120] Auth Len:认证字段的长度,包括认证类型与认证长度字段。 [0120] Auth Len: length authentication field, including the type of authentication and the authentication length field.

[0121] 如图3所示,本发明在BFD认证部分增加了三个字段:Type字段、Nonce字段与keyidentifier字段,其中,所述Type字段指示消息类型,所述Nonce字段指示一随机数,所述key identifier字段指示密钥标识。 [0121] As shown, the present invention increases the authentication section 3 BFD three fields: Type field, a Nonce field and keyidentifier field, wherein the Type field indicates the type of message, the Nonce field indicates a random number, the said key identifier indicates the key identification field.

[0122] 本发明中,路由器之间根据所述控制报文完成安全联盟的创建及更新。 [0122] In the present invention, between the router according to the control message of creating and updating the SA.

[0123] 可选的,所述第一路由器和第二路由器根据所述控制报文完成安全联盟的创建为: [0123] Optionally, the first router and a second router based on the control packet is completed SAs created:

[0124] 第一路由器从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,并生成一随机数noncel ; [0124] acquiring the second router a first router from the local record corresponding to the key table, and generates a random number noncel;

[0125] 第一路由器根据所述第二路由器对应的记录以及noncel,生成并存储安全联盟; [0125] The first router to the second router and the corresponding recording noncel, generates and stores security association;

[0126] 第一路由器根据所述安全联盟向第二路由器发送第一控制报文,其中,所述第一控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述noncel, Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce创建安全联盟的请求消息; [0126] The first router sends a first control message to the router according to the second security association, which, key identifier field of the first message authentication control part is filled in the content recording LocalKeyID field corresponding to a second router, the Nonce field is filled noncel, Type field indicates that the message creation request message to the individual based on the SA Nonce;

[0127] 第二路由器根据所述第一控制报文中的key identifier字段在本地密钥表中找到对应的记录,则根据所述对应的记录以及noncel生成并存储对应的安全联盟,根据所述安全联盟验证第一控制报文完整后,根据所述安全联盟向第一路由器发送第二控制报文,其中,所述第二控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段和Nonce字段与第一控制报文相同,Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce创建安全联盟的应答消息; [0127] The second router records corresponding to the first key identifier field of the control packet is found in the local key table, according to the corresponding recording and noncel generating and storing the corresponding SA according to the after the first authentication SA complete control packet, transmitting a second control packet to the first router based on the security association, wherein, key identifier field and a Nonce field of the second message authentication control part of the first control packet the same article, Type field indicates that the message creation response message SA to individuals based Nonce;

[0128] 第一路由器根据所述第二控制报文判定第二路由器认可了自己生成的安全联盟,则安全联盟创建成功。 [0128] The first router to the second control message router determines whether the second Union endorsed the safety of his own generation according to the security alliance created successfully.

[0129] 所述第一路由器或第二路由器生成安全联盟时,根据下式确定K和AuthKey ID: [0129] The first or the second router when the router generates SA, is determined according to the formula K and AuthKey ID:

[0130] K = trancate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, noncel)), [0130] K = trancate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, noncel)),

[0131] Auth Key ID = trancate-16(prf(Key, LocalKeyID, interface, noncel)), [0131] Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, noncel)),

[0132] 其中,Key为所述从本地key table中获取的记录中的key,LocalKeyID为所述从本地key table中获取的记录中的字段,trancate-16表示从prf函数生成的结果中截取前面的16位。 [0132] wherein, Key record is acquired from the key table in the local key, LocalKeyID record acquired from a local key table in the fields, trancate-16 taken from the front, showing the results of the generated function prf of 16. 生成K时的trancate表示根据安全联盟中算法需要截取相应长度的密钥。 K indicates the time of generation trancate The SA algorithm requires a key corresponding length taken.

[0133] 所述第一路由器判定第二路由器是否认可自己生成的安全联盟为:检查收到的控制报文中的Nonce字段和key identifier字段是否与自己发送的控制报文中的相应字段—致。 [0133] The first router determines whether said second router recognized as self-generated SA: the corresponding fields in the control message whether the Nonce field of the control packet and checks the received key identifier sent with their fields - Induced .

[0134] 可选的,所述第一路由器和第二路由器根据所述控制报文完成安全联盟的创建为: [0134] Optionally, the first router and a second router based on the control packet is completed SAs created:

[0135] 第一路由器从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,并生成一随机数nonce2 ; [0135] acquiring the second router a first router from the local record corresponding to the key table, and generates a random number the nonce2;

[0136] 第一路由器根据所述第二路由器对应的记录以及nonce2,生成并存储安全联盟; [0136] The first router to the second router and the corresponding recording nonce2, generates and stores security association;

[0137] 第一路由器根据所述安全联盟向第二路由器发送第三控制报文,其中,所述第三控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述nonce2, Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce创建安全联盟的请求消息; [0137] The first router sends a packet to the third control router according to the second security association, which, key identifier field of the third control part of the message authentication LocalKeyID filling contents in the fields of the second record corresponding to the router, the Nonce field is filled nonce2, Type field indicates that the message creation request message Nonce both SA is based;

[0138] 第二路由器根据所述第三控制报文中的key identifier字段从本地密钥表找到对应的记录,则根据所述对应的记录以及nonce2生成并存储对应的安全联盟,根据所述安全联盟验证第三控制报文完整后,生成一随机数nonce3,并根据所述对应的记录、nonce2和nonce3修改本地存储的安全联盟; [0138] The second router in the third control message corresponding to the key identifier field of the record found in the local key table is generated and stored in the corresponding SA according to the corresponding recording and the nonce2, according to the security after verification of the third Union complete control message, it generates a random number nonce3, and according to the corresponding record, and the nonce2 nonce3 stored locally modify the security association;

[0139] 第二路由器根据所述修改后的安全联盟向第一路由器发送第四控制报文,其中,所述第四控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段与第三控制报文相同,Nonce字段填充为nonCe3,Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce创建安全联盟的应答消息; [0139] The second router sends the modified security association of the first router to a fourth control packet, wherein, key identifier field of the fourth message authentication control part of the third control messages the same, a Nonce field filled nonCe3, Type field indicates that the message Nonce both sides to create an answer message security alliance is based;

[0140] 第一路由器根据所述第四控制报文判定第二路由器认可了自己生成的安全联盟,则根据本地密钥表中第二路由器对应的记录、nonce2和nonce3修改本地存储的安全联盟,安全联盟创建成功。 [0140] The first router to the fourth control message router determines whether the second recognized SA generated by itself, the key table according to a local record corresponding to the second router, and the nonce2 nonce3 modify locally stored security association, security alliance created.

[0141] 所述第一路由器或第二路由器根据本地的记录以及nonce2生成安全联盟时,根据下式确定Auth Key ID和K: [0141] The first or second router according to the local router when the recording and generating nonce2 SA, determined according Auth Key ID and K:

[0142] K = trancate(prf(Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce2)), [0142] K = trancate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce2)),

[0143] Auth Key ID = trancate-16(prf(Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce2)); [0143] Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce2));

[0144] 所述第一路由器或第二路由器根据本地的记录、nonce2和nonce3修改本地存储的安全联盟时,根据下式确定Auth Key ID和K: [0144] When the first or the second router a router according to the local recording, the nonce2 nonce3 modifications and locally stored security association, the Auth Key ID is determined according to the formula and K:

[0145] K = trancate (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce2, nonce3)), [0145] K = trancate (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce2, nonce3)),

[0146] Auth Key ID = trancate-16(prf(Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce2,nonce3)); [0146] Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce2, nonce3));

[0147] 其中,Key为所述从本地key table中获取的记录中的key, PeerKeyID为从本地key table中获取的记录中的字段。 [0147] wherein, Key record is acquired from the key table in the local key, PeerKeyID field is acquired from the local record in the key table. trancate-16表示从prf函数生成的结果中截取前面的16位。 trancate-16 represented by the foregoing taken from the 16-bit results generated prf function. 生成K时的trancate表示根据BFD SA中算法的需要截取相应长度的密钥。 When generating the key K trancate respective length represents taken as required in the BFD SA algorithm.

[0148] 所述第一路由器判定第二路由器是否认可自己生成的安全联盟为:检查收到的控制报文中的key identifier字段是否与自己发送的控制报文中的相应字段一致。 [0148] The first router determines whether the self-generated second router recognized as SA: consistent field controls whether the packet corresponding key identifier field of the control packet checking the received transmission with the own.

[0149] 可选的,所述第一路由器和第二路由器根据所述控制报文完成安全联盟的更新为: [0149] Optionally, the first router and a second router based on the control packet is updated to complete the SA:

[0150] 第一路由器从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,并生成一随机数nonce4 ; [0150] acquiring the second router a first router from the local record corresponding to the key table, and generates a random number the nonce4;

[0151] 第一路由器根据所述第二路由器对应的记录以及nonce4,生成新的安全联盟; [0151] The first router to the second router and the corresponding recording nonce4, generating a new security association;

[0152] 第一路由器根据原来的安全联盟向第二路由器发送第五控制报文,其中,所述第五控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述nonce4, Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce更新安全联盟的请求消息; [0152] The first router transmits a control message to the fifth router according to the original second security association, which, key identifier field of the fifth control message authentication in the content recording portion filled LocalKeyID field corresponding to the second router, the Nonce field is filled nonce4, Type field indicates that the message is a request message based on the updated personal Nonce SA;

[0153] 第二路由器根据现有的安全联盟验证第五控制报文完整,且根据第五控制报文中的key identifier字段在本地密钥表中找到对应的记录,则根据所述对应的记录以及nonce4生成对应的安全联盟,之后根据所述生成的安全联盟向第一路由器发送第六控制报文,其中,所述第六控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段和Nonce字段与第一控制报文相同,Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce更新安全联盟的应答消息; [0153] The second router authentication fifth control message based on the existing complete data SA, and the corresponding records according to a fifth control packet in the key identifier field to locate the local key table, the corresponding record in accordance with the nonce4 and generating a corresponding SA, after transmitting a first packet to sixth control router according to the security association generated, wherein, key identifier field and a Nonce field of the sixth control message authentication section with the first control packet the same article, Type field indicates that the message is a reply message based on personal security update Nonce Union;

[0154] 第一路由器根据所述第二控制报文判定第二路由器认可了自己生成的安全联盟,则将安全联盟更新为所述生成的安全联盟,安全联盟更新成功。 [0154] The first router to the second control message router determines whether the second Union endorsed the safety of their own generation, then the security update for the security alliance the alliance generated according to Alliance security update was successful.

[0155] 所述第一路由器或第二路由器生成安全联盟时,根据下式确定K和AuthKey ID: [0155] The first or the second router when the router generates SA, is determined according to the formula K and AuthKey ID:

[0156] K = trancate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce4)), [0156] K = trancate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce4)),

[0157] Auth Key ID = trancate-16(prf(Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce4)), [0157] Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce4)),

[0158] 其中,Key为所述从本地key table中获取的记录中的key, LocalKeyID为所述从本地key table中获取的记录中的字段,trancate-16表示从prf函数生成的结果中截取前面的16位。 [0158] wherein, Key record is acquired from the key table in the local key, LocalKeyID record acquired from a local key table in the fields, trancate-16 taken from the front, showing the results of the generated function prf of 16. 生成K时的trancate表示根据安全联盟中算法需要截取相应长度的密钥。 K indicates the time of generation trancate The SA algorithm requires a key corresponding length taken.

[0159] 所述第一路由器判定第二路由器是否认可自己生成的安全联盟为:检查收到的控制报文中的Nonce字段和key identifier字段是否与自己发送的控制报文中的相应字段—致。 [0159] The first router determines whether the self-generated second router recognized as SA: the corresponding fields in the control message whether the Nonce field of the control packet and checks the received key identifier sent with their fields - Induced .

[0160] 可选的,所述第一路由器和第二路由器根据所述控制报文完成安全联盟的创建为: [0160] Optionally, the first router and a second router based on the control packet is completed SAs created:

[0161] 第一路由器从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,并生成一随机数nonce5 ; [0161] acquiring the second router a first router from the local record corresponding to the key table, and generates a random number nonce5;

[0162] 第一路由器根据现有的安全联盟向第二路由器发送第七控制报文,其中,所述第七控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述nonce5, Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce更新安全联盟的请求消息; [0162] The first router transmits a second message to the seventh control router according to existing security association, wherein, key identifier field of the message authentication seventh control portion filled in LocalKeyID content recording field corresponding to a second router , the Nonce field is populated nonce5, Type field indicates both Nonce-based update request message to the SA message;

[0163] 第二路由器根据现有的安全联盟验证第七控制报文完整,且根据所述第七控制报文中的key identifier字段从本地密钥表找到对应的记录,则生成一随机数nonce6,并根据所述对应的记录、nonce5以及nonce6更新本地存储的安全联盟; [0163] The second router authentication seventh complete control packet based on the existing security association, and the corresponding records according to the seventh control packet from the key identifier field to locate a local key table, then generates a random number nonce6 and according to the corresponding recording, nonce5 SA nonce6 and updates the locally stored;

[0164] 第二路由器根据更新后的安全联盟向第一路由器发送第八控制报文,其中,所述第八控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段与第七控制报文相同,Nonce字段填充为nonce6, Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce更新安全联盟的应答消息; [0164] The second router transmits a control packet according to the eighth to the updated SA first router, wherein the key identifier field of the message authentication eighth control portion of the seventh control packet the same, a Nonce field is filled nonce6, Type field indicates that the message is a reply message based on both the security update Nonce Union;

[0165] 第一路由器根据所述第八控制报文判定第二路由器认可了自己更新安全联盟的方法,则根据本地密钥表中第二路由器对应的记录、nonce5和nonce6更新本地存储的安全联盟,安全联盟更新成功。 [0165] The first router eighth control message router determines whether the second recognition method according to their updated SA, according to the local key table record corresponding to the second router, nonce5 nonce6 and updating the locally stored SA , update the security alliance success.

[0166] 所述第一路由器或第二路由器根据本地的记录、nonce5以及nonce6更新本地存储的安全联盟时,根据下式确定Auth Key ID和K: [0166] The router according to the first or second local router records, nonce5 nonce6 and when updating the locally stored security association, determined according Auth Key ID and K:

[0167] K = trancate(prf(Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce5,nonce6)), [0167] K = trancate (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce5, nonce6)),

[0168] Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce5,nonce6)); [0168] Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce5, nonce6));

[0169] 其中,Key为所述从本地key table中获取的记录中的key, PeerKeyID为从本地key table中获取的记录中的字段。 [0169] wherein, Key record is acquired from the key table in the local key, PeerKeyID field is acquired from the local record in the key table. trancate-16表示从prf函数生成的结果中截取前面的16位。 trancate-16 represented by the foregoing taken from the 16-bit results generated prf function. 生成K时的trancate表示根据BFD SA中算法的需要截取相应长度的密钥。 When generating the key K trancate respective length represents taken as required in the BFD SA algorithm.

[0170] 所述第一路由器判定第二路由器是否认可自己生成的安全联盟为:检查收到的控制报文中的key identifier字段是否与自己发送的控制报文中的相应字段一致。 [0170] The first router determines whether the self-generated second router recognized as SA: consistent field controls whether the packet corresponding key identifier field of the control packet checking the received transmission with the own.

[0171] 需要说明的是,该方法还包括:第二路由器未在本地密钥表中找到对应的记录,则将返回的控制报文中的key identifier字段和Nonce字段置为O。 [0171] Incidentally, the method further comprising: a second router is not found in the local record corresponding to the key table, key identifier field of the control message will be returned and the Nonce field is set to O.

[0172] 本发明还相应地公开了一种基于双向转发检测协议的安全联盟管理系统,包括:第一路由器和第二路由器,所述第一路由器和第二路由器之间交互的控制报文中设置Type字段、Nonce字段和key identifier字段,所述第一路由器和第二路由器根据所述控制报文完成安全联盟的创建及更新。 [0172] Accordingly, the present invention also discloses a security association based on bidirectional forwarding detection system management protocol, comprising: a control packet exchange between the first router and a second router, the first router and second router set Type field, Nonce field and a key identifier field, the first router and the second router based on the control packet of creating and updating the security alliance.

[0173] 可选的,所述第一路由器,具体用于从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,并生成一随机数noncel ;根据所述第二路由器对应的记录以及noncel,生成并存储安全联盟;以及根据所述安全联盟向第二路由器发送第一控制报文,其中,所述第一控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述noncel,Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce创建安全联盟的请求消息;以及根据所述第二控制报文判断第二路由器是否认可自己生成的安全联盟; [0173] Optionally, the first router, the router is configured to acquire a second key corresponding to the record from the local table, and generates a random number noncel; corresponding router according to the second recording and noncel, generates and SA memory; and a first transmission according to the SA control packet to the second router, wherein, key identifier field of the first message authentication control section filled LocalKeyID record fields corresponding to the content of the second router, a Nonce the field is filled noncel, Type field indicates that the message creation request message SA to the individual based on a Nonce; and whether the recognized self-generated security association based on the second control message determines a second router;

[0174] 所述第二路由器,具体用于根据所述第一控制报文中的key identifier字段在本地密钥表中找到对应的记录,并根据所述对应的记录以及noncel生成并存储对应的安全联盟,根据所述安全联盟验证第一控制报文完整后,根据所述安全联盟向第一路由器发送第二控制报文,其中,所述第二控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段和Nonce字段与第一控制报文相同,Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce创建安全联盟的应答消息。 [0174] The second router, particularly for the first control packet according to the key identifier field of the corresponding record is found in the local key table, and according to the corresponding recording and generating and storing a corresponding noncel after SA, according to the first authentication SA complete control packet, transmitting a second control packet to the first router based on the security association, wherein, key identifier field of the second control packet and the authentication portion Nonce the first control field and the same message, Type field indicates that the message creation response message SA to individuals based Nonce.

[0175] 可选的,所述第一路由器,具体用于从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,并生成一随机数n0nCe2,根据所述第二路由器对应的记录以及nonce2,生成并存储安全联盟,之后根据所述安全联盟向第二路由器发送第三控制报文,其中,所述第三控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述nonCe2,Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce创建安全联盟的请求消息;以及在根据第四控制报文判定第二路由器认可了自己生成的安全联盟后,根据本地密钥表中第二路由器对应的记录、nonce2和nonce3修改本地存储的安全联盟; [0175] Optionally, the first router is configured to obtain from a local key table record corresponding to the second router, and generates a random number n0nCe2, according to the record corresponding to the second router and the nonce2, generates and storing security association, SA after transmission according to the second router to a third control packet, wherein, key identifier field of the third control message authentication in the content recording portion filled LocalKeyID field corresponding to a second router, a Nonce the field is filled nonCe2, Type field indicates that the message creation request message Nonce both SA based on; and in the fourth control message router determines that the second security association recognized according to their generation, according to the first local key table two routers corresponding record, nonce2 and nonce3 modify security alliance stored locally;

[0176] 所述第二路由器,具体用于根据所述第三控制报文中的key identifier字段从本地密钥表找到对应的记录,并根据所述对应的记录以及nonce2生成并存储对应的安全联盟,根据所述安全联盟验证第三控制报文完整后,生成一随机数nonce3,并根据所述对应的记录、nonce2和nonce3修改本地存储的安全联盟;之后根据所述修改后的安全联盟向第一路由器发送第四控制报文,其中,所述第四控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段与第三控制报文相同,Nonce字段填充为nonce3, Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce创建安全联盟的应答消息。 [0176] The second router, particularly according to the third control message corresponding to the key identifier field of the key record is found from the local table, and generates and stores corresponding security according to the corresponding recording and nonce2 after Union, according to the third authentication SA complete control message, it generates a random number nonce3, and according to the corresponding record, and the nonce2 nonce3 modify locally stored security association; after SA according to the modified a first router sends a fourth control packet, wherein, key identifier field of the fourth message authentication control part of the third control message same, Nonce field is filled nonce3, Type field indicates that the message is based on both create security Nonce reply message Alliance.

[0177] 可选的,所述第一路由器,具体用于从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,生成一随机数noncel并根据所述第二路由器对应的记录以及nonce4,生成新的安全联盟;之后根据原来的安全联盟向第二路由器发送第五控制报文,其中,所述第五控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述nonce4,Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce更新安全联盟的请求消息;以及在根据所述第二控制报文判定第二路由器认可了自己生成的安全联盟后,将安全联盟更新为所述生成的安全联盟; [0177] Optionally, the first router is configured to obtain from a local key table record corresponding to the second router, and generating a random number according to the second router noncel corresponding records and the nonce4, generating a new SA; after transmitting the original according to the second router SA fifth control message, wherein, key identifier field of the fifth control message authentication in the content recording portion filled LocalKeyID field corresponding to a second router, a Nonce field filling the nonce4, Type field indicates that the message is an update request message based on personal security association Nonce; and after the second control packet router determining a second security association recognized according to their generation, will update the SA said security alliance generated;

[0178] 所述第二路由器,具体用于在根据现有的安全联盟验证第五控制报文完整,且根据第五控制报文中的key identifier字段在本地密钥表中找到对应的记录时,根据所述对应的记录以及n0nCe4生成对应的安全联盟,之后根据所述生成的安全联盟向第一路由器发送第六控制报文,其中,所述第六控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段和Nonce字段与第一控制报文相同,Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce更新安全联盟的应答消肩、O [0178] The second router, in particular for verifying the fifth control message based on the existing complete data SA, and the corresponding records according to a fifth control packet in the key identifier field to locate the local key table the record corresponding to the generated n0nCe4 SA and corresponding sixth control after sending the packet to the first router according to the security association generated, wherein said sixth control portion of the message authentication key identifier field and Nonce field with the same first control packet, Type field indicates that this message is based on personal security update Nonce Union response elimination shoulder, O

[0179] 可选的,所述第一路由器,具体用于从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,并生成一随机数n0nCe5;之后根据现有的安全联盟向第二路由器发送第七控制报文,其中,所述第七控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述nonce5, Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce更新安全联盟的请求消息;以及在根据所述第八控制报文判定第二路由器认可了自己更新安全联盟的方法时,根据本地密钥表中第二路由器对应的记录、nonce5和nonce6更新本地存储的安全联盟; [0179] Optionally, the first router, the router is configured to acquire a second key corresponding to the record from the local table, and generates a random number n0nCe5; after transmitting the second router according to a seventh conventional SA LocalKeyID fields contained in the record control packets, wherein, key identifier field of the control message authentication seventh portions corresponding to the filling of the second router, the Nonce field is filled nonce5, Type field indicates that the message is based on both the security update Nonce Union request message; and when the eighth control message router determines whether the second recognition method according to their updated SA, according to the local key table record corresponding to the second router, nonce5 nonce6 and updating the locally stored security alliance;

[0180] 所述第二路由器,具体用于在根据现有的安全联盟验证第七控制报文完整,且根据所述第七控制报文中的key identifier字段从本地密钥表找到对应的记录后,生成一随机数nonce6,并根据所述对应的记录、nonce5以及nonce6更新本地存储的安全联盟;以及根据更新后的安全联盟向第一路由器发送第八控制报文,其中,所述第八控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段与第七控制报文相同,Nonce字段填充为nonce6,Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce更新安全联盟的应答消息。 [0180] The second router, particularly for verification in accordance with a seventh conventional SA complete control packet, and the corresponding records according to the seventh control packet from the key identifier field to locate a local key table after generating a random number nonce6, and according to the corresponding recording, nonce5 and updating the locally stored security association nonce6; and transmitting a first packet to an eighth control router according to the updated security association, wherein the eighth key identifier field of the control message authentication part of the seventh control packets the same, Nonce field filled nonce6, Type field indicates a reply message based security alliance of parties Nonce update the message.

[0181] 下面结合具体实施例对本发明的技术方案作进一步详细说明。 [0181] The following specific examples in conjunction with the technical solutions of the present invention will be further described in detail.

[0182] 下述实施例中,Type字段的定义如下: [0182] In the following examples, the Type field is defined as follows:

[0183] Type = I表示用于基于个人Nonce创建SA的请求消息。 [0183] Type = I denotes a SA request message created based on the individual Nonce.

[0184] Type = 2表示用于基于个人Nonce创建SA的应答消息。 [0184] Type = 2 indicates a reply message based on the personal creation of SA Nonce.

[0185] Type = 3表示用于基于双方Nonce创建SA的请求消息。 [0185] Type = 3 indicates a request message based on the two sides Nonce create SA.

[0186] Type = 4表示用于基于双方Nonce创建SA的应答消息。 [0186] Type = 4 represents a response message based on the two sides Nonce create SA.

[0187] Type = 5表示用于基于个人Nonce更新SA的请求消息。 [0187] Type = 5 denotes an update request message based on personal Nonce SA.

[0188] Type = 6表示用于基于个人Nonce更新SA的应答消息。 [0188] Type = 6 indicates Nonce updated based on individual response SA message.

[0189] Type = 7表示用于基于双方Nonce更新SA的请求消息。 [0189] Type = 7 indicates a request message based on both Nonce updated SA.

[0190] Type = 8表示用于基于双方Nonce更新SA的应答消息。 [0190] Type = 8 indicates a reply message based on the two sides Nonce update SA.

[0191] Nonce字段的定义如下: [0191] Nonce field is defined as follows:

[0192] 64-bit的Nonce字段,用于交互Nonce值,以生成BFD SA的密钥。 [0192] 64-bit field of Nonce, for interacting Nonce value, to generate the key of the BFD SA.

[0193] key identifier字段的定义如下: [0193] key identifier field is defined as follows:

[0194] 16-bit的key identifier字段用于交互key table中的记录项。 [0194] 16-bit key identifier field is used to record the entry of interactive key table.

[0195] 实施例1[0196] BFD是一个简单的“Hello”协议,在很多方面,它与那些著名的路由协议的邻居检测部分相似。 [0195] Example 1 [0196] BFD is a simple "Hello" protocol, in many respects, it is similar to those known routing protocol neighbor detection section. 一对系统在它们之间的所建立会话的通道上周期性的发送检测报文,如果某个系统在足够长的时间内没有收到对端的检测报文,则认为在这条到相邻系统的双向通道的某个部分发生了故障。 One pair of the system periodically send BFD packets on the channel of the session established between them, if the system does not receive a detection packet to the end for a sufficient period of time, it is considered in this system to an adjacent a portion of the two-way channel has failed. 在某些条件下,为了减少负荷,系统之间的发送和接收速率需要协商。 Under certain conditions, in order to reduce the load, the rate between the transmitting and receiving systems need to be negotiated.

[0197] 在路由器A向路由器B发送第一个BFD控制包时,双方只配置了key table中的共享项,却没有建立安全联盟。 [0197] When the first router A sends a BFD control packet to the router B, the two sides shared only configuration items in the key table, but did not establish a security alliance. 本实施例研究在这种情况下,如何基于个人Nonce创建SA的方法。 In this case study, the method of how individual Nonce SA created based on this embodiment.

[0198] 本实施例以BFD的控制包为例,介绍路由器A和路由器B之间如何在BFD控制包中创建SA的方法。 [0198] In this embodiment, the BFD control packet for example, describes a method how to create a SA in the BFD control packet between Router A and Router B.

[0199] 在BFD控制包中基于个人Nonce创建SA的方法如图4所示,其中,在发送消息112之前,路由器A需要完成如下步骤: [0199] FIG BFD control packet in a method based on the individual Nonce created SA 4, wherein, before sending the message 112, router A needs to complete the following steps:

[0200] (I)路由器A首先从key table中找到路由器B对应的记录r。 [0200] (I) to find the first router A router B corresponding to the record r from the key table.

[0201] (2)然后随机生成一个64-bit的Nonce值,记为nonce。 [0201] (2) and then randomly generates a 64-bit value of Nonce, denoted nonce.

[0202] (3)将记录r中的LocalKeyID字段的内容作为认证部分的key identifier字段,并将上述步骤(2)中生成的nonce作为认证部分的Nonce字段。 [0202] (3) Content of r LocalKeyID field will be recorded as part of the authentication key identifier field, and the above step (2) is generated as a nonce portion Nonce field of authentication. 其中认证部分的Type字段值为I。 Wherein the authentication section of the Type field value I.

[0203] (4)使用伪随机函数prf生成草案draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth-03中定义的BFD 的Auth Key ID 字段和密钥K。 [0203] (4) generated using a pseudo-random function prf BFD draft defined in 03 draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth-Auth Key ID field and the key K. 生成方法如下:K = trancate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID,interface, nonce)), Auth Key ID = trancate-16(prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface,nonce)), prf函数的输入字段解释如下:Key为key table中记录r中的key, LocalKeyID为r中的字段,nonce由步骤(2)生成。 Generating method is as follows: K = trancate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce)), Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce)), the input field prf function is explained as follows: Key to r in the key key table recorded, LocalKeyID the fields of r, nonce (2) generated by the step. Trancate-16表示从prf函数生成的结果中截取前面的16位。 Trancate-16 represented by the foregoing taken from the 16-bit results generated prf function. 生成K时的trancate表示根据BFD SA中算法的需要截取相应长度的密钥。 When generating the key K trancate respective length represents taken as required in the BFD SA algorithm.

[0204] (5)将生成的Auth Key ID、K等信息写入本地BFD SA库,完成本地SA的创建过程。 [0204] (5) The resulting Auth Key ID, K and other information into the local repository the BFD SA, the process of creating a local SA. 在创建SA的过程中,还需要生成SA其它字段。 In the process of creating an SA, the SA also need to generate other fields. 这些字段中,BFD SA的认证算法由keytable中对应的algorithm字段定义。 In these fields, BFD SA authentication algorithm corresponding to the algorithm defined by the fields in keytable. 初始sequencenumber随机生成,其它字段的管理方法同草案draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth-03。 Sequencenumber initial random generation, management of other fields with draft draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth-03.

[0205] (6)在创建了SA后,根据该SA计算认证数据,并按照RFC5880中的内容填充完整的BFD控制包。 [0205] (6) After creating the SA, SA is calculated based on the authentication data, and the complete filling of the BFD control packet in accordance with the contents RFC5880.

[0206] 路由器B在收到消息112之后,检查到控制报文的Type类型值为1,就知道路由器A希望与自己使用基于个人Nonce的方法创建SA。 [0206] After receiving the message router B 112, checks the control packet type is the Type 1, router A wishes to know with their individual Nonce used to create a method based on the SA. 路由器B于是执行如下步骤处理消息112: Router B then processing message 112 to perform the steps:

[0207] (I)路由器B从控制报文中获取LocalKeyID字段,该LocalKeyID字段对应路由器B本地key table数据库中的PeerKeyID字段。 [0207] (I) LocalKeyID field from router B acquires control packet, the router LocalKeyID field corresponding to field B PeerKeyID local key table in the database. 所以,路由器B根据该字段就可以找到与路由器A上相同的记录r。 Therefore, router B can be found on the same record r A router according to the field. 然后,使用与上面路由器A相同的方法计算BFD SA的Auth KeyID字段和密钥K (其中的LocalKeyID对应本地的PeerKeyID),并生成对应的SA。 Then, using the calculated BFD SA in the same above method Auth KeyID router A key field and K (which correspond to local LocalKeyID PeerKeyID), and generate the corresponding SA. 这样,路由器B也生成对应的SA。 Thus, router B may also generate the corresponding SA.

[0208] (2)路由器B使用该SA来验证消息112的完整性。 [0208] (2) using the SA router B to verify the integrity of the message 112.

[0209] (3)路由器B把收到的控制报文中的Type字段值改为2,生成控制报文。 [0209] (3) the router B Type field value of the received control packet 2 was changed to generate the control packet. [0210] 在处理完消息112之后,路由器B就可以把上述步骤(3)生成的控制报文(消息114)发送给路由器A 了。 [0210] After processing the message 112, router B can be the above-described step (3) the generated control message (message 114) sent to the router A.

[0211] 路由器A检查收到的控制报文中Nonce字段和key identifier字段是否与自己发送的一致,来确认路由器B是否认可了自己创建的SA。 [0211] A check control message router received the text Nonce field and a key identifier field is consistent with their own sent to confirm whether the router B SA approved the creation of its own.

[0212] 经过消息112和消息114之后,路由器A和B就建立了安全联盟SA。 [0212] After the message 112 and message 114, routers A and B is established security association SA.

[0213] 路由器B也可能不认可路由器A的这种SA创建方法,同时路由器B上也可能不存在对应的key table记录,此时,路由器B在返回的控制报文的认证字段中,将Nonce字段与key identifier字段设置为O。 [0213] router B may not recognize this method creates SA router A, router B while also recording a corresponding key table may not exist at this time, router B in the authentication field of the control packet is returned, the Nonce field and key identifier field is set to O.

[0214] 这一实施例使得路由器A和B在不存在BFD SA的情况下,利用key table创建SA0 [0214] This embodiment enables routers A and B in the absence of BFD SA, using the key table created SA0

[0215] 实施例2 [0215] Example 2

[0216] BFD是一个简单的“Hello”协议,在很多方面,它与那些著名的路由协议的邻居检测部分相似。 [0216] BFD is a simple "Hello" protocol, in many ways, it is similar to those of well-known neighbor routing protocol detection section. 一对系统在它们之间的所建立会话的通道上周期性的发送检测报文,如果某个系统在足够长的时间内没有收到对端的检测报文,则认为在这条到相邻系统的双向通道的某个部分发生了故障。 One pair of the system periodically send BFD packets on the channel of the session established between them, if the system does not receive a detection packet to the end for a sufficient period of time, it is considered in this system to an adjacent a portion of the two-way channel has failed. 在某些条件下,为了减少负荷,系统之间的发送和接收速率需要协商。 Under certain conditions, in order to reduce the load, the rate between the transmitting and receiving systems need to be negotiated.

[0217] 在路由器A向路由器B发送第一个BFD控制包时,双方只配置了key table中的共享项,却没有建立安全联盟。 [0217] When the first router A sends a BFD control packet to the router B, the two sides shared only configuration items in the key table, but did not establish a security alliance. 本实施例研究在这种情况下,如何基于个人Nonce创建SA的方法。 In this case study, the method of how individual Nonce SA created based on this embodiment.

[0218] 本实施例以BFD的控制包为例,介绍路由器A和路由器B之间如何在BFD控制包中创建SA的方法。 [0218] In this embodiment, the BFD control packet for example, describes a method how to create a SA in the BFD control packet between Router A and Router B.

[0219] 在控制报文中基于双方Nonce创建SA的方法如图5所示,其中,在发送消息116之前,路由器A需要完成如下步骤: [0219] As shown in the control packet to create a mutually SA based Nonce 5, wherein, before sending the message 116, router A needs to complete the following steps:

[0220] (I)路由器A首先从key table中找到路由器B对应的记录r。 [0220] (I) to find the first router A router B corresponding to the record r from the key table.

[0221] (2)然后随机生成一个64-bit的Nonce值,记为noncel。 [0221] (2) and then randomly generates a 64-bit value of Nonce, denoted noncel.

[0222] (3)将记录r中的LocalKeyID字段的内容作为认证部分的key identifier字段,并将上述步骤(2)中生成的noncel值作为认证部分的Nonce字段。 [0222] (3) Content of r LocalKeyID field will be recorded as part of the authentication key identifier field, and the above step (2) generated noncel Nonce field value as the authentication portion. 其中Type字段值为3。 3 wherein the Type field value.

[0223] (4)使用伪随机函数prf生成草案draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth_03中定义的BFD 的Auth Key ID 字段和密钥K。 [0223] (4) using the BFD draft generated pseudo-random function prf draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth_03 defined in Auth Key ID field and the key K. 生成方法如下:K = trancate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID,interface, noncel)), Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf(Key, LocalKeyID, interface,noncel)) ,prf函数的输入字段解释如下:Key为key table中记录r中的key,LocalKeyID为r中的字段,noncel由步骤(2)生成。 Generating method is as follows: K = trancate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, noncel)), Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, noncel)), the input field prf function is explained as follows: Key to r in the key key table recorded, LocalKeyID the fields of r, noncel (2) generated by the step. trancate-16表示从prf函数生成的结果中截取前面的16位。 trancate-16 represented by the foregoing taken from the 16-bit results generated prf function. 生成K时的trancate表示根据BFD SA中算法的需要截取相应长度的密钥。 When generating the key K trancate respective length represents taken as required in the BFD SA algorithm.

[0224] (5)将生成的Auth Key ID,K等信息写入本地BFD SA库,完成本地SA的创建过程。 [0224] (5) The resulting Auth Key ID, K and other information into the local repository the BFD SA, the process of creating a local SA. 在创建SA的过程中,还需要生成SA其它字段。 In the process of creating an SA, the SA also need to generate other fields. 这些字段中,BFD SA的认证算法由keytable中对应的algorithm字段定义。 In these fields, BFD SA authentication algorithm corresponding to the algorithm defined by the fields in keytable. 初始sequencenumber随机生成,其它字段的管理方法同草案draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth-03。 Sequencenumber initial random generation, management of other fields with draft draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth-03.

[0225] (6)在创建了SA后,根据该SA计算认证数据,并按照RFC5880中的内容填充完整的BFD控制包。 [0225] (6) After creating the SA, SA is calculated based on the authentication data, and the complete filling of the BFD control packet in accordance with the contents RFC5880. [0226] 路由器B在收到消息116之后,检查到控制报文的Type类型值为3,就知道路由器A希望与自己使用基于双方Nonce的方法创建SA。 [0226] After receiving the message router B 116, check to control the message type is Type 3, we know that the router A wants to use their own methods to create both the SA Nonce based. 路由器B于是执行如下步骤处理消息116: Router B then processing message 116 to perform the steps:

[0227] (I)路由器B从控制报文中获取LocalKeyID字段,该LocalKeyID字段对应路由器B本地key table数据库中的PeerKeyID字段。 [0227] (I) LocalKeyID field from router B acquires control packet, the router LocalKeyID field corresponding to field B PeerKeyID local key table in the database. 所以,路由器B根据该字段就可以找到与路由器A上相同的记录r。 Therefore, router B can be found on the same record r A router according to the field. 然后,使用与上面路由器A相同的方法计算BFD SA的Auth KeyID字段和密钥K,并生成对应的SA。 Then, using the calculated BFD SA in the same above method Auth KeyID router A and the key field K, and generate the corresponding SA. 这样,路由器B也生成对应的SA。 Thus, router B may also generate the corresponding SA.

[0228] (2)路由器B使用该SA来验证消息116的完整性。 [0228] (2) using the SA router B to verify the integrity of the message 116.

[0229] (3)路由器B随机生成一个64-bit的nonce2值。 [0229] (3) nonce2 router B randomly generates a 64-bit value of.

[0230] (4)路由器B 使用伪随机函数prf 生成草案draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth_03中定义的BFD的Auth Key ID字段和密钥K。 [0230] (4) router B using BFD draft generated pseudo-random function prf draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth_03 defined in Auth Key ID field and the key K. 生成方法如下:K = trancate (prf (Key,PeerKeyID, interface, noncel, nonce2)), Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key,PeerKeyID, interface, noncel, nonce2)), prf 函数的输入字段解释如下:Key 为keytable中记录r中的key,PeerKeyID为r中的字段。 Generating method is as follows: K = trancate (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, noncel, nonce2)), Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, noncel, nonce2)) input field, prf function explanations as follows: Key is the key keytable r recording, PeerKeyID is r in the field. trancate-16表示从prf函数生成的结果中截取前面的16位。 trancate-16 represented by the foregoing taken from the 16-bit results generated prf function. 生成K时的trancate表示根据BFD SA中算法的需要截取相应长度的密钥。 When generating the key K trancate respective length represents taken as required in the BFD SA algorithm. 然后修改本地BFD SA中对应的K和Auth Key ID字段的值。 Then modify the values ​​of K and Auth Key ID field in the corresponding local BFD SA.

[0231] (5)路由器B把收到的认证部分的Type字段值改为4,将其中的Nonce值改为自己生成的nonce2的值,生成控制报文。 [0231] (5) The router B Type field value of the received authentication section to 4, wherein the Nonce value to the value of self-generated nonce2 generates control packets.

[0232] 在处理完消息116之后,路由器B就可以把上述步骤(5)生成的控制报文(消息118)发送给路由器A 了。 [0232] After processing the message 116, router B can be the above-described step (5) the generated control message (message 118) sent to the router A.

[0233] 路由器A检查收到的控制报文中的key identifier字段是否与自己发送的一致,来确认路由器B是否认可了自己创建的SA。 [0233] key identifier field of the control messages received router A check whether the agreement sent by itself, to confirm whether the router B SA approved the creation of its own. 然后,路由器A从认证部分获取路由器B提供的nonce2,并使用伪随机函数prf 生成草案draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth_03 Then, router A router B nonce2 acquired from the provided authentication section, and the draft generated using a pseudorandom function prf draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth_03

[0234] 定义的BFD的Auth Key ID字段和密钥K。 [0234] defined in the BFD Auth Key ID field and the key K. 生成方法如下:K = trancate (prf (Key,PeerKeyID, interface, noncel, nonce2)), Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key,PeerKeyID, interface, noncel, nonce2))。 Generating method is as follows: K = trancate (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, noncel, nonce2)), Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, noncel, nonce2)). 然后修改本地BFD SA 中对应的K 和AuthKeyID字段的值。 Then modify the value of the local BFD SA AuthKeyID and K corresponding fields.

[0235] 经过消息116和消息118之后,路由器A和B就建立了安全联盟SA。 [0235] After the message through the message 116 and 118, routers A and B is established security association SA.

[0236] 路由器B也可能不认可路由器A的这种SA创建方法,同时路由器B上也可能不存在对应的key table记录,此时,路由器B在返回的控制报文中,将Nonce与key identifier设置为O。 [0236] router B may not recognize this method creates SA router A, router B while also recording a corresponding key table may not exist at this time, the control packet router B returned, with the key identifier Nonce set to O.

[0237] 这一实施例使得路由器A和B在不存在BFD SA的情况下,利用key table创建SA0 [0237] This embodiment enables routers A and B in the absence of BFD SA, using the key table created SA0

[0238] 实施例1和2的区别在于,实施例1由路由器A单方面决定BFD SA,而实施例2由路由器A和B共同决定BFDSA。 [0238] 1 and 2 embodiment differs from that in Example 1 by a unilateral decision of the BFD SA router A, and Example 2 A joint decision BFDSA by routers and B. 因此,其交互的消息看上去类似,但消息处理流程差别很大。 Therefore, its interactive messages look similar, but the big difference in message handling process.

[0239] 实施例3 [0239] Example 3

[0240] 在路由器A向路由器B发起SA更新消息时,双方存在一个SA。 When the [0240] SA launched an update message to the router B in the router A, the two sides there is a SA. 本实施例研究在这种情况下,如何基于个人Nonce更新SA的方法。 In this case study, the method of how the individual Nonce updated SA based embodiment according to the present embodiment.

[0241] 在控制报文中基于个人Nonce更新SA的方法如图6所示,其中,在发送消息120之前,路由器A需要完成如下步骤: [0241] In the illustrated control packet SA update method based on the individual Nonce 6, wherein, before sending the message 120, router A needs to complete the following steps:

[0242] (I)路由器A首先从key table中找到路由器B对应的记录r。 [0242] (I) to find the first router A router B corresponding to the record r from the key table.

[0243] (2)然后随机生成一个64-bit的Nonce值,记为nonce。 [0243] (2) and then randomly generates a 64-bit value of Nonce, denoted nonce.

[0244] (3)将记录r中的LocalKeyID字段的内容作为认证部分的key Identifier字段,并将上述步骤(2)中生成的nonce作为认证部分的Nonce字段。 [0244] (3) Content of r LocalKeyID field will be recorded as part of the authentication key Identifier field, and generates the above-described step (2) as an authentication nonce portion Nonce field. Type字段值为5。 Type field value is 5.

[0245] (4)使用伪随机函数prf生成草案draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth_03中定义的BFD 的Auth Key ID 字段和密钥K。 [0245] (4) using the BFD draft generated pseudo-random function prf draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth_03 defined in Auth Key ID field and the key K. 生成方法如下:K = trancate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID,interface, nonce)), Auth Key ID = trancate-16(prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface,nonce)), prf函数的输入字段解释如下:Key为key table中记录r中的key, LocalKeyID为r中的字段,nonce由步骤(2)生成。 Generating method is as follows: K = trancate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce)), Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce)), the input field prf function is explained as follows: Key to r in the key key table recorded, LocalKeyID the fields of r, nonce (2) generated by the step. Trancate-16表示从prf函数生成的结果中截取前面的16位。 Trancate-16 represented by the foregoing taken from the 16-bit results generated prf function. 生成K时的trancate表示根据BFD SA中算法的需要截取相应长度的密钥。 When generating the key K trancate respective length represents taken as required in the BFD SA algorithm. 注意,此时路由器A并不用新的K和Auth Key ID取代旧的SA中的字段。 Notice that the old router A does not replace the SA field with the new K and Auth Key ID.

[0246] (5)在创建了SA后,根据原来的SA计算认证数据,并按照RFC5880中的内容填充完整的BFD控制包。 [0246] (5) After creating the SA, SA is calculated in accordance with the original authentication data, and the complete filling of the BFD control packet in accordance with the contents RFC5880.

[0247] 路由器B在收到消息120之后,检查到控制报文的Type类型值为5,就知道路由器A希望与自己使用基于个人Nonce的方法更新SA。 [0247] After receiving the message router B 120, checks the control packet type is the Type 5, router A wishes to know with their individual method using the updated SA based Nonce. 路由器B于是执行如下步骤处理消息120: Router B then processing message 120 to perform the steps:

[0248] (I)路由器B使用现有SA来验证消息120的完整性。 [0248] (I) using conventional router B SA 120 to verify the integrity of the message.

[0249] (2)路由器B从认证部分获取LocalKeyID字段,该LocalKeyID字段对应路由器B本地key table数据库中的PeerKeyID字段。 [0249] (2) from the router B acquires authentication section LocalKeyID field, the field corresponding to PeerKeyID LocalKeyID router B field in the local key table database. 所以,路由器B根据该字段就可以找到与路由器A上相同的记录r。 Therefore, router B can be found on the same record r A router according to the field. 然后,使用与上面路由器A相同的方法计算BFD SA的Auth KeyID字段和密钥K(其中的LocalKeyID对应本地的PeerKeyID),并生成对应的SA。 Then, using the calculated BFD SA in the same above method Auth KeyID router A key field and K (which correspond to local LocalKeyID PeerKeyID), and generate the corresponding SA. 这样,路由器B也生成对应的SA。 Thus, router B may also generate the corresponding SA.

[0250] (3)路由器B把收到的控制报文的Type字段值改为6,使用新的SA生成控制报文。 [0250] (3) the router B Type field value of the received control packet to 6, using the new SA generates the control message.

[0251] 在处理完消息120之后,路由器B就可以把上述步骤(3)生成的控制报文(消息122)发送给路由器A 了。 [0251] After the processed message 120, router B can be the above-described step (3) the generated control message (message 122) sent to the router A.

[0252] 路由器A检查收到的认证部分Nonce和key identifier字段是否与自己发送的一致,来确认路由器B是否认可了自己更新的SA。 Whether [0252] A router checks received certification part Nonce and key identifier field consistent with their own sent to confirm whether the router B SA recognized its own update. 如果认可了自己更新的SA,则路由器A将生成的Auth Key ID,K等信息写入本地BFD SA库,完成本地SA的更新过程。 If you approved the SA own update, the router A generated Auth Key ID, K BFD SA and other information written to the local library to complete the update process locally SA. 在更新SA的过程中,还需要生成SA其它字段。 In the process of updating the SA, the SA also need to generate other fields. 这些字段中,BFD SA的认证算法由key table中对应的algorithm字段定义。 In these fields, BFD SA authentication algorithm corresponding to the key table in the algorithm field definitions. 初始sequence number随机生成,其它字段的管理方法同草案draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth-030 Generating a random initial sequence number, with other fields management draft draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth-030

[0253] 经过消息120和消息122之后,路由器A和B就更新了安全联盟SA。 [0253] After the message 120 and message 122, router A and B, the updated security association SA.

[0254] 路由器B也可能不认可路由器A的这种SA更新方法,同时路由器B上也可能不存在对应的key table记录,此时,路由器B在返回的控制报文中,将Nonce与key identifier设置为O。 [0254] Router B SA may not recognize this method of updating router A, router B while also recording a corresponding key table may not exist at this time, the control packet router B returned, with the key identifier Nonce set to O. 路由器A收到该消息后,将不更新SA。 A router after receiving the message will not be updated SA.

[0255] 这一实施例使得路由器A和B利用key table更新SA。 [0255] This embodiment enables routers A and B using the key table update SA.

[0256] 实施例4 [0256] Example 4

[0257] 在路由器A向路由器B发起SA更新消息时,双方存在一个SA。 When the [0257] SA launched an update message to the router B in the router A, the two sides there is a SA. 本实施例研究在这种情况下,如何基于双方Nonce更新SA的方法。 In this case study, the method of how the two sides Nonce update SA based on the present embodiment.

[0258] 在控制报文中基于双方Nonce更新SA的方法如图7所示,其中,在发送消息124之前,路由器A需要完成如下步骤: [0258] A method for updating both Nonce SA 7 based on the control packet, in which, prior to sending the message 124, router A needs to complete the following steps:

[0259] (I)路由器A首先从key table中找到路由器B对应的记录r。 [0259] (I) to find the first router A router B corresponding to the record r from the key table.

[0260] (2)然后随机生成一个64-bit的noncel值。 [0260] (2) and then randomly generates a 64-bit value noncel of.

[0261] (3)将记录r中的LocalKeyID字段的内容作为认证部分的key identifier字段,并将上述步骤(2)中生成的noncel值作为认证部分的Nonce字段。 [0261] (3) Content of r LocalKeyID field will be recorded as part of the authentication key identifier field, and the above step (2) generated noncel Nonce field value as the authentication portion. Type字段值为7。 7 Type field value.

[0262] (4)根据原来的SA计算认证数据,并按照RFC5880中的内容填充完整的BFD控制包。 [0262] (4) The calculation of the original authentication data SA, and the complete filling of the BFD control packet in accordance with the contents RFC5880.

[0263] 路由器B在收到消息124之后,检查到控制报文的Type类型值为7,就知道路由器A希望与自己使用基于双方Nonce的方法更新SA。 [0263] After receiving the message router B 124, checks the control message type is Type 7, and want to know their router A method of using the updated SA based on both Nonce. 路由器B于是执行如下步骤处理消息124: Router B then processing message 124 to perform the steps:

[0264] (I)路由器B使用当前SA来验证消息124的完整性。 [0264] (I) using the current router B SA 124 to verify the integrity of the message.

[0265] (2)路由器B从控制报文中获取LocalKeyID字段,该LocalKeyID字段对应路由器B本地key table数据库中的PeerKeyID字段。 [0265] (2) from the router B acquires LocalKeyID field control packet, the router LocalKeyID field corresponding to field B PeerKeyID local key table in the database. 所以,路由器B根据该字段就可以找到与路由器A上相同的记录r。 Therefore, router B can be found on the same record r A router according to the field.

[0266] (3)路由器B随机生成一个64-bit的nonce2值。 [0266] (3) nonce2 router B randomly generates a 64-bit value of.

[0267] (4)路由器B 使用伪随机函数prf 生成草案draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth_03中定义的BFD的Auth Key ID字段和密钥K。 [0267] (4) router B using BFD draft generated pseudo-random function prf draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth_03 defined in Auth Key ID field and the key K. 生成方法如下:K = trancate (prf (Key,PeerKeyID, interface, noncel, nonce2)), Auth Key ID = trancate-16(prf(Key,PeerKeyID, interface, noncel, nonce2)), prf 函数的输入字段解释如下:Key 为keytable中记录r中的key,PeerKeyID为r中的字段。 Generating method is as follows: K = trancate (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, noncel, nonce2)), Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, noncel, nonce2)) input field, prf function explanations as follows: Key is the key keytable r recording, PeerKeyID is r in the field. Trancate-16表示从prf函数生成的结果中截取前面的16位。 Trancate-16 represented by the foregoing taken from the 16-bit results generated prf function. 生成K时的trancate表示根据BFD SA中算法的需要截取相应长度的密钥。 When generating the key K trancate respective length represents taken as required in the BFD SA algorithm. 然后修改本地BFD SA中对应的K和Auth Key ID字段的值。 Then modify the values ​​of K and Auth Key ID field in the corresponding local BFD SA.

[0268] (5)路由器B把收到的控制报文中的Type字段值改为8,将Nonce值改为自己生成的nonce2的值,再使用新的SA生成控制报文。 [0268] (5) The router B Type field value of the received control packet was changed to 8, the value of the Nonce value to its own generated nonce2, and then using the new SA generates the control message.

[0269] 在处理完消息124之后,路由器B就可以把上述步骤(5)生成的控制报文(消息126)发送给路由器A 了。 [0269] After processing the message 124, router B can be the above-described step (5) the generated control message (message 126) sent to the router A.

[0270] 路由器A检查收到的控制报文中的key identifier字段是否与自己发送的一致,来确认路由器B是否认可了自己的更新SA的方法。 Whether the key identifier field of control packets [0270] A router checks received and sent by itself is consistent, router B to verify whether a method approved its own update SA. 然后,路由器A从控制报文中获取路由器B提供的nonce2,并使用伪随机函数prf生成生成草案draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth_03中定义的BFD的Auth Key ID字段和密钥K。 Then, router A nonce2 acquired router B supplied from the control packet, and generates a pseudo-random function prf Auth Key ID field and the key draft draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth_03 defined BFD generating K. 生成方法如下:K = trancate (prf (Key,PeerKeyID, interface, noncel, nonce2)), Auth KeyID = trancate-16 (prf (Key,PeerKeyID, interface, noncel, nonce2))。 Generating method is as follows: K = trancate (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, noncel, nonce2)), Auth KeyID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, noncel, nonce2)). 然后更新本地BFD SA 中对应的K 和Auth KeyID字段的值。 Then updates the values ​​of K and Auth KeyID fields corresponding local BFD SA. 注意,本发明并不需要更新sequence number字段。 Note that the present invention does not require update sequence number field.

[0271] 经过消息124和消息126之后,路由器A和B就更新了安全联盟SA。 [0271] After 124 messages and 126 messages, routers A and B will update the security alliance SA.

[0272] 路由器B也可能不认可路由器A的这种SA更新方法,同时路由器B上也可能不存在对应的key table记录,此时,路由器B在返回的控制报文中,将Nonce与key identifier设置为O。 [0272] Router B SA may not recognize this method of updating router A, router B while also recording a corresponding key table may not exist at this time, the control packet router B returned, with the key identifier Nonce set to O. [0273] 这一实施例使得路由器A和B能够利用key table更新SA。 [0273] This embodiment enables routers A and B using the key table can be updated SA.

[0274] 上述实施例中,关于BFD SA中其它字段的创建和更新机制说明如下: [0274] In the embodiment described above, mechanisms for creating and updating BFD SA in other fields as follows:

[0275] Key Table 是手动配置的一个表(draft-1etf-karp-crypto-key-table),在公用网络的所有合法路由中共享。 [0275] Key Table is a table (draft-1etf-karp-crypto-key-table) manual configuration, all legal routes shared in a public network. 在初始化SA和密钥更新时需要用到,以下为KeyTable中的主要字段如下: SA will need at initialization and key updates, the following KeyTable major fields are as follows:

[0276] -LocalKeyID:16位整数,作为本地路由节点的一个标识。 [0276] -LocalKeyID: 16-bit integer, as a local routing node identifier.

[0277] -PeerKeyID:16位整数,作为对端路由节点的一个标识。 [0277] -PeerKeyID: 16-bit integer, identifies the peer as a routing node.

[0278] -Peers:记录拥有相同父密钥(Key)的对端IP地址。 [0278] -Peers: recording with the same parent key (Key) in the peer IP address.

[0279] -1nterfaces:记录拥有相同父密钥(Key)的对端物理地址。 [0279] -1nterfaces: recording of the physical address with the same parent key (Key) is.

[0280] -Protocol:使用此表中父密钥的路由协议,本发明中为BFD协议 [0280] -Protocol: this routing table of the master key, the present invention is a BFD protocol

[0281] -KDF:密钥生成函数,本发明中使用伪随机函数(Pseudo-Random Function, PRF) [0281] -KDF: key generating function, according to the present invention using a pseudo random function (Pseudo-Random Function, PRF)

[0282] -AlgID:认证算法,表明安全协议为指定节点使用的密码算法。 [0282] -AlgID: authentication algorithms, cryptographic algorithms show that the security protocol used for the specified node. 该算法可以是一个加密算法和模式(如AES-128-CBC),一个认证算法(如HMAC-SHA1-96或AES-128-CMAC),或者安全协议需要的任意其他对称密码算法。 The algorithm may be an encryption algorithm and a mode (e.g., AES-128-CBC), an authentication algorithm (e.g., HMAC-SHA1-96 or AES-128-CMAC), or any other symmetric cryptographic algorithms required security protocols. 如果KDF字段为“none”,那么长期密钥被该算法直接使用,否则算法使用生成的短期密钥。 If KDF field is "none", then the long-term key is to use the algorithm directly, otherwise use the short-term key generation algorithm. 当长期密钥用来生成一系列安全协议使用的短期密钥时,AlgID字段标识一个密码套件而不是一个单独的密码算法。 When the long-term key is used to generate a series of short-term key security protocol used, AlgID field identifies a cipher suite instead of a separate password algorithm.

[0283] -Key:父密钥,也叫长期密钥。 [0283] -Key: master key, also known as long-term key.

[0284]草案 draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth-03 定义的BFD SA 中主要字段如下: [0284] BFD SA field in the main draft draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth-03 is defined as follows:

[0285] Authentication Key Identifier (Key ID)认证密钥标识-两个8位字节的无符号整数用来唯一标识BFD SA,由网络操作员手动地设置(或者未来有可能是IETF定义的一些密钥管理协议设置)。 [0285] Authentication Key Identifier (Key ID) authentication key identifier - two 8-bit unsigned integer that uniquely identifies the BFD SA, the network operator manually set (or in future may be some cipher defined by IETF key management protocol set). 接收者通过观察受到数据包的该部分来决定活跃的SA。 Recipient to determine the active part by SA by observing the packet. 发送者根据活跃的配置给BFD包赋予Key ID的值。 BFD packet sent by imparting to Key ID values ​​according to the active configuration. 使用KeyID使维持协议操作时改变密钥变得方便。 Using the protocol change key KeyID sustain operation becomes easy. 每个key ID规定了两个独立的部分,认证协议和认证密钥。 Each key ID specified two separate parts, the authentication protocol and an authentication key. 通常一个执行过程允许网络操作者在一个密钥链中设置一系列的密钥,链中的每个密钥有固定的寿命。 Performing a process generally allows the network operator to set a series of keys in a key chain, the chain has a fixed lifetime of each key.

[0286] Authentication Algorithm认证算法-表明BFD SA使用的认证算法。 [0286] Authentication Algorithm Authentication Algorithm - Authentication Algorithm show BFD SA use. 以下的值可用:Keyed MD5, Keyed SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384 andHMAC-SHA-512。 The following values ​​are available: Keyed MD5, Keyed SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384 andHMAC-SHA-512.

[0287] Authentication Key认证密钥-表示与该BFD SA关联的加密密钥。 [0287] Authentication Key Authentication Key - indicates the encryption key is associated with the BFD SA. 密钥的长度可变且由BFD SA指定的认证算法决定。 Variable-length keys and authentication algorithm specified by the BFD SA decision. 操作者必须保证密钥不会通过任何协议以明文在网络上传输。 Operator must ensure that the key is not transmitted in the clear over the network via any protocol. 而且必须保证选择的密钥是不可预测的,同时避免任意对使用的算法已知的弱密钥。 And must ensure that the selected key is unpredictable, while avoiding the use of any algorithm known weak keys.

[0288] 从Key table中的字段生成BFD中对应字段的对应关系如下所述: The following [0288] generating a correspondence relationship corresponding BFD Key table field from the fields:

[0289] -Authentication Key Identifier字段:生成方法由实施例二三四五定义。 [0289] -Authentication Key Identifier field: generating method defined by two thousand three hundred forty-five embodiment.

[0290] -Authentication Algorithm 字段:由key table 中的AlgID 字段定义。 [0290] -Authentication Algorithm field: key table is defined by the AlgID field. 在创建和更新BFD SA时,直接从key table中的AlgID字段拷贝过来即可。 When you create and update BFD SA, copy directly from the key table can come in AlgID field.

[0291] -Authentication Key字段:由key table中的key字段根据KDF函数生成。 [0291] -Authentication Key fields: generating a key table key field according to the KDF function. 本发明实施例1、2、3、4定义了生成方法。 1,2,3,4 embodiment of the present invention defines a method of generating.

[0292] 可以看出,实施例1(3)和2(4)的区别在于,实施例1 (3)由路由器A单方面决定BFD SA,而实施例2 (4)由路由器A和B共同决定BFD SA0因此,其交互的消息看上去类似,但消息处理流程差别很大。 [0292] As can be seen, the difference between Example 1 (3) and 2 (4) in that, Example 1 (3) BFD SA unilaterally decided by the router A, and Example 2 (4) together by routers A and B decided BFD SA0 therefore, its interactive messages look similar, but the big difference in message handling process.

[0293] 实施例3、4和实施例1、2的区别在于:实施例3、4使用旧的SA来保护协商过程,而实施例1、2使用新创建的SA来保护协商过程。 Difference [0293] Example 4 and Examples 1 and 2 are: Examples 3 and 4 used to protect old SA negotiation process, while Examples 1 and 2 using the newly created protected SA negotiation. 前者要求在密钥过期前,或者sequencenumber重复前启动SA更新机制。 The former requires before the key expires, or start the update mechanism before sequencenumber SA repeat. 后者则在不存在SA时创建SA。 The latter is created in the SA SA does not exist. 其交互的消息类似,但是消息的处理流程和SA的创建时间不同。 Its interactive message that is similar, but the processing flow of messages and create different time SA.

[0294] 以上所述,仅为本发明的较佳实施例而已,并非用于限定本发明的保护范围。 [0294] The above are only preferred embodiments of the present invention but are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention.

Claims (17)

1.一种基于双向转发检测协议的安全联盟管理方法,其特征在于,在第一路由器和第二路由器之间交互的控制报文中设置Type字段、Nonce字段和keyidentifier字段,该方法包括: 第一路由器和第二路由器根据所述控制报文完成安全联盟的创建及更新。 CLAIMS 1. A method for managing security association based on bidirectional forwarding detection protocol, wherein the Type field is provided between the first router and the second router the interactive control packet, a Nonce field and keyidentifier field, the method comprising: a first a router and a second router packet of creating and updating the security alliance based on the control.
2.根据权利要求1所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一路由器和第二路由器根据所述控制报文完成安全联盟的创建为:第一路由器从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,并生成一随机数noncel ;第一路由器根据所述第二路由器对应的记录以及noncel,生成并存储安全联盟;第一路由器根据所述安全联盟向第二路由器发送第一控制报文,其中,所述第一控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述noncel, Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce创建安全联盟的请求消息; 第二路由器根据所述第一控制报文中的key identifier字段在本地密钥表中找到对应的记录,则根据所述对应的记录以及noncel生成并存储对应的安全联盟,根据所述安全联盟验证第一控制报文完整后,根据所述安全联盟向第一路由器发送第二 2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the first router and a second router to create the packet is completed according to the SA control: obtaining a second router corresponding to the first router from the local key table records, and generates a random number noncel; according to the second router a first router and the corresponding recording noncel, generates and stores SA; a first router to transmit a first control packet router according to the second security association, wherein, key identifier field of the first control packet authentication part to fill a record corresponding to the second router LocalKeyID field, filling the noncel, Type field Nonce field indicates that the message is a creation request message based on personal Nonce SA ; the second router records corresponding to the first key identifier field of the control packet is found in the local key table is generated and stored in the corresponding SA according to the corresponding recording and noncel, according to the SA after verifying that the first control message complete, transmitting to the first router based on the second security association 制报文,其中,所述第二控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段和Nonce字段与第一控制报文相同,Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce创建安全联盟的应答消息; 第一路由器根据所述第二控制报文判定第二路由器认可了自己生成的安全联盟,则安全联盟创建成功。 Packet system, wherein, key identifier field and a Nonce field of the second message authentication control part of the first control packet the same, Type field indicates that the message is a response message created based on personal Nonce SA; according to a first router the second control message router determines whether the second Union endorsed the safety of his own generation, the security alliance created successfully.
3.根据权利要求2所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一路由器或第二路由器生成安全联盟时,根据下式确定K和Auth Key ID: K = trancate(prf(Key, LocalKeyID, interface,noncel)), Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, noncel)), 其中,Key为所述从本地key table中获取的记录中的key,LocalKeyID为所述从本地key table中获取的记录中的字段,trancate-16表示从prf函数生成的结果中截取前面的16位。 3. The method according to claim 2, wherein the first router and second router to generate SA, and K is determined according to Auth Key ID: K = trancate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface , noncel)), Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, noncel)), wherein, Key record is acquired from the key table in the local key, LocalKeyID from said local key table records acquired in the field, trancate-16 represented by the foregoing taken from the 16-bit results generated prf function. 生成K时的trancate表示根据安全联盟中算法需要截取相应长度的密钥。 K indicates the time of generation trancate The SA algorithm requires a key corresponding length taken.
4.根据权利要求1所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一路由器和第二路由器根据所述控制报文完成安全联盟的创建为:第一路由器从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,并生成一随机数nonce2 ;第一路由器根据所述第二路由器对应的记录以及nonce2,生成并存储安全联盟;第一路由器根据所述安全联盟向第二路由器发送第三控制报文,其中,所述第三控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述nonce2, Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce创建安全联盟的请求消息; 第二路由器根据所述第三控制报文中的key identifier字段从本地密钥表找到对应的记录,则根据所述对应的记录以及nonce2生成并存储对应的安全联盟,根据所述安全联盟验证第三控制报文完整后,生成一随机数nonce3,并根据所述对应的记录 4. The method according to claim 1, wherein the first router and a second router to create the packet is completed according to the SA control: obtaining a second router corresponding to the first router from the local key table recording, generates a random number and the nonce2; according to the second router a first router records corresponding to the nonce2 and, generating and storing SA; router sends a first message to the third control router according to the second security association, wherein the third control message authentication key identifier field in a second portion of the filling contents corresponding router LocalKeyID record field, the Nonce field is filled nonce2, Type field indicates that the message is created based on both Nonce request message SA ; second router according to the third control message corresponding to the key identifier field of the key record is found from the local table is generated and stored in the corresponding SA according to the corresponding recording and the nonce2, according to the authentication SA after the third control message complete, the nonce3 generates a random number, and according to the corresponding recording nonce2和nonce3修改本地存储的安全联盟; 第二路由器根据所述修改后的安全联盟向第一路由器发送第四控制报文,其中,所述第四控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段与第三控制报文相同,Nonce字段填充为nonce3, Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce创建安全联盟的应答消息; 第一路由器根据所述第四控制报文判定第二路由器认可了自己生成的安全联盟,则根据本地密钥表中第二路由器对应的记录、nonce2和nonce3修改本地存储的安全联盟,安全联盟创建成功。 nonce2 nonce3 modifications and locally stored security association; second router to send a fourth message to the first router control according to the modified security association, wherein, key identifier field of the fourth message authentication control part of the third the same control packets, Nonce field filled nonce3, Type field indicates that the message Nonce both sides to create an answer message security alliance is based; the first router recognized the security alliance of their own to generate the fourth control packet is determined according to the second router, according to the local key corresponding to the second router table records, nonce2 and nonce3 modify security alliance of local storage, security alliance created.
5.根据权利要求4所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一路由器或第二路由器根据本地的记录以及nonce2生成安全联盟时,根据下式确定Auth Key ID和K: K = trancate(prf(Key, LocalKeyID, interface,nonce2)), Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce2)); 所述第一路由器或第二路由器根据本地的记录、nonce2和nonce3修改本地存储的安全联盟时,根据下式确定Auth Key ID和K: K = trancate(prf(Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce2, nonce3)), Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce2, nonce3));其中,Key为所述从本地key table中获取的记录中的key, PeerKeyID为从本地keytable中获取的记录中的字段。 5. The method of claim 4, wherein the first router and second router according to the local time and recording generated nonce2 SA, is determined according to the formula Auth Key ID and K: K = trancate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce2)), Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce2)); the first router and second router according to the local recording, nonce2 and modify the local nonce3 when the security association stored, determined according Auth Key ID and K: K = trancate (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce2, nonce3)), Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce2, nonce3)); wherein, Key record is acquired from the key table in the local key, PeerKeyID record acquired from a local keytable in the fields. trancate-16表示从prf函数生成的结果中截取前面的16位。 trancate-16 represented by the foregoing taken from the 16-bit results generated prf function. 生成K时的trancate表示根据BFD SA中算法的需要截取相应长度的密钥。 When generating the key K trancate respective length represents taken as required in the BFD SA algorithm.
6.权利要求1所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一路由器和第二路由器根据所述控制报文完成安全联盟的更新为: 第一路由器从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,并生成一随机数nonce4 ; 第一路由器根据所述第二路由器对应的记录以及nonce4,生成新的安全联盟; 第一路由器根据原来的安全联盟向第二路由器发送第五控制报文,其中,所述第五控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述nonce4, Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce更新安全联盟的请求消息; 第二路由器根据现有的安全联盟验证第五控制报文完整,且根据第五控制报文中的key identifier字段在本地密钥表中找到对应的记录,则根据所述对应的记录以及nonce4生成对应的安全联盟,之后根据所述生成的安全联盟向第一路由器发送第六控 6. The method according to claim 1, wherein the first router and the second router updates the packet is completed according to the SA control: obtaining a second router corresponding to the first router from the local key table record, and generates a random number the nonce4; according to the second router a first router and the nonce4 corresponding record, generating a new security association; router sends a first control message to the fifth router according to the original second security association, wherein , the contents of fields in the record LocalKeyID the fifth control message authentication key identifier field is populated portion corresponding to the second router, the Nonce field is filled nonce4, Type field indicates that the message is a request message based on the updated personal Nonce SA; the second router authentication fifth control message based on the existing complete data SA, and the corresponding records according to a fifth control packet in the key identifier field to locate the local key table, according to the corresponding recording and generating nonce4 corresponding SA, after sending a first router according to a sixth control the security association generated 制报文,其中,所述第六控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段和Nonce字段与第一控制报文相同,Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce更新安全联盟的应答消息; 第一路由器根据所述第二控制报文判定第二路由器认可了自己生成的安全联盟,则将安全联盟更新为所述生成的安全联盟,安全联盟更新成功。 Packet system, wherein, key identifier field and a Nonce field of the message authentication sixth control portion and the same of the first control packet, Type field indicates that the message is an update based on personal Nonce SA response message; a first router according to the second control message router determines whether the second Union endorsed the safety of their own generation, then the security update for the security alliance the alliance generated, the update was successful security alliance.
7.根据权利要求6所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一路由器或第二路由器生成安全联盟时,根据下式确定K和Auth Key ID: K = trancate(prf(Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce4)), Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce4)), 其中,Key为所述从本地key table中获取的记录中的key,LocalKeyID为所述从本地key table中获取的记录中的字段,trancate-16表示从prf函数生成的结果中截取前面的16位。 7. The method according to claim 6, wherein the first router and second router to generate SA, and K is determined according to Auth Key ID: K = trancate (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface , nonce4)), Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, LocalKeyID, interface, nonce4)), wherein, Key record is acquired from the key table in the local key, LocalKeyID from said local key table records acquired in the field, trancate-16 represented by the foregoing taken from the 16-bit results generated prf function. 生成K时的trancate表示根据安全联盟中算法需要截取相应长度的密钥。 K indicates the time of generation trancate The SA algorithm requires a key corresponding length taken.
8.根据权利要求1所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一路由器和第二路由器根据所述控制报文完成安全联盟的创建为: 第一路由器从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,并生成一随机数nonce5 ; 第一路由器根据现有的安全联盟向第二路由器发送第七控制报文,其中,所述第七控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述nonce5, Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce更新安全联盟的请求消息; 第二路由器根据现有的安全联盟验证第七控制报文完整,且根据所述第七控制报文中的key identifier字段从本地密钥表找到对应的记录,则生成一随机数nonce6,并根据所述对应的记录、nonce5以及nonce6更新本地存储的安全联盟; 第二路由器根据更新后的安全联盟向第一路由器发送第八控制报文,其中,所述第八控制 8. The method according to claim 1, wherein the first router and a second router to create the packet is completed according to the SA control: obtaining a second router corresponding to the first router from the local key table records, and generates a random number nonce5; a first router sends packets to the seventh control router according to the second conventional SA, wherein said seventh control packet authentication key identifier field corresponding to the portion filled with the second router LocalKeyID content recording field, filling the nonce5, Type field Nonce field indicates that the message is an updated security association based on both Nonce request message; and a second control packet router seventh complete verification based on the existing security association, and according to seventh key identifier field of the control packet from the local record corresponding to the key table to find a random number is generated nonce6, and according to the corresponding recording, nonce5 nonce6 and updating the locally stored security association; second router the transmitting the updated SA eighth control packet to the first router, wherein said eighth control 文认证部分的key identifier字段与第七控制报文相同,Nonce字段填充为nonce6, Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce更新安全联盟的应答消息; 第一路由器根据所述第八控制报文判定第二路由器认可了自己更新安全联盟的方法,则根据本地密钥表中第二路由器对应的记录、nonce5和nonce6更新本地存储的安全联盟,安全联盟更新成功。 text authentication key identifier field portion of the seventh control packet the same, Nonce field is filled nonce6, Type field indicates that the message is updated based on both Nonce SA response message; a first router determines that the first packet according to the eighth control two routers recognized method to update their own security alliance, according to the local key table corresponding to the second router records, nonce5 and nonce6 update locally stored security alliance, the security update League success.
9.根据权利要求8所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一路由器或第二路由器根据本地的记录、nonce5以及nonce6更新本地存储的安全联盟时,根据下式确定Auth Key ID和K: K = trancate (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce5, nonce6)), Auth Key ID = trancate-16(prf(Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce5,nonce6)); 其中,Key为所述从本地key table中获取的记录中的key, PeerKeyID为从本地keytable中获取的记录中的字段。 9. The method according to claim 8, wherein the first router and second router The local recording, nonce5 nonce6 SA and updating the locally stored, is determined according to the following formula Auth Key ID and K: K = trancate (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce5, nonce6)), Auth Key ID = trancate-16 (prf (Key, PeerKeyID, interface, nonce5, nonce6)); wherein, Key is the key table from the local recording the acquired key, PeerKeyID record acquired from a local keytable in the fields. trancate-16表示从prf函数生成的结果中截取前面的16位。 trancate-16 represented by the foregoing taken from the 16-bit results generated prf function. 生成K时的trancate表示根据BFD SA中算法的需要截取相应长度的密钥。 When generating the key K trancate respective length represents taken as required in the BFD SA algorithm.
10.根据权利要求2、3、6或7所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一路由器判定第二路由器是否认可自己生成的安全联盟为:检查收到的控制报文中的Nonce字段和keyidentifier字段是否与自己发送的控制报文中的相应字段一致。 2,3,6 or 10. The method according to claim 7, wherein said first router determines whether the self-generated second router recognized as SA: Nonce field in the received control packet checking in and the corresponding field controls whether the packet is sent keyidentifier field is consistent with their own.
11.根据权利要求4、5、8或9所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一路由器判定第二路由器是否认可自己生成的安全联盟为:检查收到的控制报文中的key identifier字段是否与自己发送的控制报文中的相应字段一致。 4,5,8 or 11. The method according to claim 9, wherein said first router determines whether the self-generated second router recognized as SA: key identifier received control packet checking in whether the field is consistent with the corresponding field of the control messages sent by their own.
12.根据权利要求1至9任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,该方法还包括:第二路由器未在本地密钥表中找到对应的记录,则将返回的控制报文中的keyidentifier字段和Nonce字段置为O。 1 to 12. The method according to any one of claim 9, wherein the method further comprises: a second router is not found in the local record corresponding to the key table, the control packet is returned in keyidentifier field and a Nonce field is set to O.
13.—种基于双向转发检测协议的安全联盟管理系统,其特征在于,该系统包括:第一路由器和第二路由器,所述第一路由器和第二路由器之间交互的控制报文中设置Type字段、Nonce字段和key identifier字段,所述第一路由器和第二路由器根据所述控制报文完成安全联盟的创建及更新。 13.- species based security association management BFD protocol, characterized in that the system comprising: a control message interaction between a first router and a second router, the first router and second router disposed Type field, Nonce field and a key identifier field, the first router and the second router based on the control packet of creating and updating the security alliance.
14.根据权利要求13所述的系统,其特征在于, 所述第一路由器,具体用于从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,并生成一随机数noncel ;根据所述第二路由器对应的记录以及noncel,生成并存储安全联盟;以及根据所述安全联盟向第二路由器发送第一控制报文,其中,所述第一控制报文认证部分的keyidentifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述noncel, Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce创建安全联盟的请求消息;以及根据所述第二控制报文判断第二路由器是否认可自己生成的安全联盟; 所述第二路由器,具体用于根据所述第一控制报文中的key identifier字段在本地密钥表中找到对应的记录,并根据所述对应的记录以及noncel生成并存储对应的安全联盟,根据所述安全联盟验证第一控制报文完整后,根据所述安全联盟向第一 14. The system according to claim 13, wherein said first router, the router is configured to acquire a second key corresponding to the record from the local table, and generates a random number noncel; according to the second router and the corresponding recording noncel, generates and stores security association; and transmitting a first control message to the router according to the second security association, which, KeyIdentifier first field of the control packet is filled a second router authentication section corresponding to the recording LocalKeyID content field, Nonce field is filled the noncel, Type field indicates that the message creation request message SA to the individual based on a Nonce; and whether the recognized self-generated security association based on the second control message determines a second router; the second router, particularly for the first control packet according to the key identifier field of the corresponding record is found in the local key table, and generates and stores the corresponding SA according to the corresponding recording and noncel, the post-authentication SA to the first control packet complete, according to the first SA 由器发送第二控制报文,其中,所述第二控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段和Nonce字段与第一控制报文相同,Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce创建安全联盟的应答消息。 Transmitting a second control packet by the device, wherein, key identifier field and a Nonce field of the second message authentication control part of the first control packet the same, Type field indicates that the message is a response message created based on personal Nonce SA .
15.根据权利要求13所述的系统,其特征在于, 所述第一路由器,具体用于从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,并生成一随机数nonce2,根据所述第二路由器对应的记录以及nonce2,生成并存储安全联盟,之后根据所述安全联盟向第二路由器发送第三控制报文,其中,所述第三控制报文认证部分的keyidentifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述nonce2,Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce创建安全联盟的请求消息;以及在根据第四控制报文判定第二路由器认可了自己生成的安全联盟后,根据本地密钥表中第二路由器对应的记录、nonce2和nonce3修改本地存储的安全联盟; 所述第二路由器,具体用于根据所述第三控制报文中的key identifier字段从本地密钥表找到对应的记录,并根据所述对应的记录以及nonce2生成并存储对应的安 15. The system according to claim 13, wherein said first router, the router is configured to acquire a second key corresponding to the record from the local table, the nonce2 and generates a random number, according to the second router corresponding to the recording and the nonce2, generating and storing security association, after transmitting a third control message to the router according to the second security association, wherein the third control packet authentication part is filled keyidentifier field corresponding to the recording of the second router LocalKeyID content field, the Nonce field is filled nonce2, Type field indicates that the message creation request message Nonce both SA based on; and in the fourth control message router determines that the second security association recognized according to their generation, the local key table record corresponding to the second router, and the nonce2 nonce3 stored locally modify the security association; the second router, particularly according to the third control message from the key identifier field of the local key table find the corresponding record, and generating and storing a corresponding security according to the corresponding recording and nonce2 联盟,根据所述安全联盟验证第三控制报文完整后,生成一随机数nonce3,并根据所述对应的记录、nonce2和nonce3修改本地存储的安全联盟;之后根据所述修改后的安全联盟向第一路由器发送第四控制报文,其中,所述第四控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段与第三控制报文相同,Nonce字段填充为nonce3, Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce创建安全联盟的应答消息。 After Union, according to the third authentication SA complete control message, it generates a random number nonce3, and according to the corresponding record, and the nonce2 nonce3 modify locally stored security association; after SA according to the modified a first router sends a fourth control packet, wherein, key identifier field of the fourth message authentication control part of the third control message same, Nonce field is filled nonce3, Type field indicates that the message is based on both create security Nonce reply message Alliance.
16.根据权利要求13所述的系统,其特征在于, 所述第一路由器,具体用于从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,生成一随机数nonce4,并根据所述第二路由器对应的记录以及nonce4,生成新的安全联盟;之后根据原来的安全联盟向第二路由器发送第五控制报文,其中,所述第五控制报文认证部分的keyidentifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述nonce4,Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce更新安全联盟的请求消息;以及在根据所述第二控制报文判定第二路由器认可了自己生成的安全联盟后,将安全联盟更新为所述生成的安全联盟; 所述第二路由器,具体用于在根据现有的安全联盟验证第五控制报文完整,且根据第五控制报文中的key identifier字段在本地密钥表中找到对应的记录时,根据所述对应的记录以及nonCe4生成对应的安 16. The system according to claim 13, wherein said first router, the router is configured to acquire a second key corresponding to the record from the local table, the nonce4 generates a random number, and according to the second router and the nonce4 corresponding record, generating a new security association; after transmitting the fifth packet to the second router control according to the original security association, wherein the fifth control message field is filled keyidentifier authentication portion corresponding to the second router records LocalKeyID content field, the Nonce field is filled nonce4, Type field indicates that the message is an updated security association based on personal Nonce request message; and a self-generated security association recognized in accordance with said second control packet router determining a second after the SA update the security association generated; a second router, particularly for verification in the fifth control message based on the existing complete SA, according to a fifth and a control packet key identifier field when the corresponding record is found in the local key table according to the corresponding recording and generate the corresponding security nonCe4 全联盟,之后根据所述生成的安全联盟向第一路由器发送第六控制报文,其中,所述第六控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段和Nonce字段与第一控制报文相同,Type字段指示该消息为基于个人Nonce更新安全联盟的应答消息。 League, after sending the security association generated according to a first router sixth control packet, wherein, key identifier field and a Nonce field of the message authentication sixth control portion and the same of the first control packet, Type field It indicates that the message is a reply message based on personal Nonce update security alliance.
17.根据权利要求13所述的系统,其特征在于, 所述第一路由器,具体用于从本地密钥表获取第二路由器对应的记录,并生成一随机数nonce5 ;之后根据现有的安全联盟向第二路由器发送第七控制报文,其中,所述第七控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段填充第二路由器对应的记录中LocalKeyID字段的内容,Nonce字段填充所述nonce5, Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce更新安全联盟的请求消息;以及在根据所述第八控制报文判定第二路由器认可了自己更新安全联盟的方法时,根据本地密钥表中第二路由器对应的记录、nonce5和nonce6更新本地存储的安全联盟; 所述第二路由器,具体用于在根据现有的安全联盟验证第七控制报文完整,且根据所述第七控制报文中的key identifier字段从本地密钥表找到对应的记录后,生成一随机数nonce6,并根据所述对应的记录、nonce5以及nonce 17. The system according to claim 13, wherein said first router, the router is configured to acquire a second key corresponding to the record from the local table, and generates a random number nonce5; The existing safety after Union second router transmits a seventh control packet, wherein, key identifier field of the message authentication seventh control portion filled in LocalKeyID content recording field corresponding to a second router, a Nonce field is filled the nonce5, Type field indicates the Nonce update message based on both the security association request message; and when the control packet according to the eighth router determines that the second recognition method for updating its own security association, according to the local key table record corresponding to the second router, nonce5 nonce6 and updating the locally stored security association; the second router, particularly for verification in the conventional SA seventh complete control packet, and according to the seventh key identifier field of the control packet in accordance with the local after the key table to find a corresponding record, generates a random number nonce6, and according to the corresponding recording, nonce5 and nonce 6更新本地存储的安全联盟;以及根据更新后的安全联盟向第一路由器发送第八控制报文,其中,所述第八控制报文认证部分的key identifier字段与第七控制报文相同,Nonce字段填充为nonce6, Type字段指示该消息为基于双方Nonce更新`安全联盟的应答消息。 6 updates the locally stored security association; SA and accordance with the updated transmission eighth control packet to the first router, wherein, key identifier field of the message authentication eighth control portion of the seventh control packet the same, a Nonce field filled nonce6, Type field indicates the update is based on both sides' security alliance Nonce reply message to the message.
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