CN101964708B - System and method for establishing session key between nodes - Google Patents
System and method for establishing session key between nodes Download PDFInfo
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- CN101964708B CN101964708B CN 201010518626 CN201010518626A CN101964708B CN 101964708 B CN101964708 B CN 101964708B CN 201010518626 CN201010518626 CN 201010518626 CN 201010518626 A CN201010518626 A CN 201010518626A CN 101964708 B CN101964708 B CN 101964708B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
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Abstract
The invention provides a system and a method for establishing a session key between nodes. In the method, a key can be flexibly established and updated between LAN (local area network) legal nodes so as to establish secure connection therebetween. The system comprises a terminal device and a connection device, wherein the terminal device comprises an initiator terminal device and a receiver terminal device; and the connection device comprises a core connection device, an initiator connection device on a link between the initiator terminal device and the core connection device and a receiver connection device on a link between the receiver terminal device and the core connection device. The establishing process is flexible, the establishment of the session key between the nodes can be realized without configuration participation of a user, and the confidentiality of communication between subsequent nodes is guaranteed.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to network communications technology field, be specifically related to a kind of system and method for setting up for session key between nodes.
Background technology
Cable LAN is generally broadcast type network, the data that node sends, and other node can both be received.Each nodes sharing channel on the network, this has brought great potential safety hazard to network.The assailant just can catch packets all on the network as long as access network is monitored.
The local area network (LAN) LAN of existing standard GB/T/T 15629.3 (corresponding IEEE 802.3 or ISO/IEC 8802-3) definition does not provide data encryption method, so just so that the assailant steals key message easily.In the international research field, the IEEE 802.1AE standard that IEEE formulates provides data encryption protocol for the protection Ethernet, and adopts the safety measure of hop-by-hop encryption to realize that the safety of data is passed between the network node.This safety measure has been brought huge computation burden to the switching equipment in the local area network (LAN), causes easily the assailant to the attack of switching equipment; And packet also can increase from the time-delay that sending node is delivered to destination node, has reduced network transmission efficiency.
The topological structure more complicated of cable LAN, the node that relates to (here, terminal and switching equipment are collectively referred to as node) number is also many, so the data communication more complicated in the network.If for distributing static key to setting up session key between nodes between LAN node, its distribution and renewal process are very complicated.Therefore, the mode that static keys is right also is not suitable for setting up session key between nodes.
Summary of the invention
In order to solve the above-mentioned technical problem that exists in the background technology, the invention provides a kind of system and method for setting up for session key between nodes, in the method, can set up flexibly and upgrade the key between them between the legal node of local area network (LAN), connect with the safety of setting up between them.
Technical solution of the present invention is:
A kind of system that sets up of session key between nodes, this system comprises two types equipment, represents with terminal equipment and connection device respectively; Wherein, connection device is constantly cascade in network, and terminal equipment can only be connected in the network by connection device, and any equipment all can not pass through terminal equipment access network; Selected or specify a specific connection device as the core connection device in these connection devices in the connection device; All connection devices all need to set up safety with this core connection device and connect; All terminal equipments all be connected the connection device (this connection device is from the nearest connection device of terminal equipment) that links to each other and set up safety and connect; In this system, all can connect by connection device and the core connection device foundation safety between the two that directly links to each other between two any terminal equipments.
First terminal equipment STA-A, the second terminal equipment STA-B describe as example in the system, first terminal equipment STA-A directly links to each other with the first connection device SW1, the second terminal equipment STA-B directly links to each other with the second connection device SW2, and connection device SW-Center is the core connection device in this system; Then described the first connection device SW1 and the second connection device SW2 exist safety to be connected with core connection device SW-Center respectively, described the first connection device SW1 exists safety to be connected with first terminal equipment STA-A, and described the second connection device SW2 exists safety to be connected with the second terminal equipment STA-B; The foundation of session key is after sending request by first terminal equipment STA-A between first terminal equipment STA-A and the second terminal equipment STA-B, the first connection device SW1 and random number of each self-generating of the second connection device SW2, secret announcement is to the other side, and utilize these two random numbers to calculate a common key, respectively cipher key secret is announced to first terminal equipment STA-A and the second terminal equipment STA-B, guarantee that finally first terminal equipment STA-A sets up consistent shared key with the second terminal equipment STA-B, finishes safe establishment of connection.
A kind of method for building up of session key between nodes, it may further comprise the steps:
1] between first terminal equipment STA-A and the first connection device SW1, between the first connection device SW1 and the core connection device SW-Center, between core connection device SW-Center and the second connection device SW2, setting up safety between the second connection device SW2 and the second terminal equipment STA-B is connected;
2] first terminal equipment STA-A sends key request packet M1 to the first connection device SW1; Ask the first connection device SW1 to assist to set up shared key between first terminal equipment STA-A and the second terminal equipment STA-B;
3] the first connection device SW1 sends the first key negotiation request packet M2 to core connection device SW-Center after receiving key request packet M1; The first connection device SW1 inquires random number with the random number that oneself generates as the first connection device by the first key negotiation request packet M2, and secret announcement is to core connection device SW-Center;
4] core connection device SW-Center sends the second key negotiation request packet M3 to the second connection device SW2 after receiving the first key negotiation request packet M2; The first connection device inquiry random number that core connection device SW-Center will obtain by the second key negotiation request packet M3, secret announcement is to the second connection device SW2;
5] the second connection device SW2 sends key announce packet M4 to the second terminal equipment STA-B after receiving the second key negotiation request packet M3; The second connection device SW2 announces to the second terminal equipment STA-B by the cipher key secret that key announce packet M4 will utilize the second connection device inquiry random number of the first connection device inquiry random number and oneself generation to calculate;
6] the second terminal equipment STA-B sends key announce response packet M5 to the second connection device SW2 after receiving key announce packet M4, informs that the second connection device SW2 has received key information;
7] the second connection device SW2 sends the second key negotiation response packet M6 to core connection device SW-Center after receiving key announce response packet M5; The second connection device SW2 can be with secret the announcement to core connection device SW-Center of the second connection device inquiry random number that oneself generates by the second key negotiation response packet M6;
8] core connection device SW-Center sends the first key negotiation response packet M7 to the first connection device SW1 after receiving the second key negotiation response packet M6; The secret announcement to the first connection device SW1 of the second connection device inquiry random number that core connection device SW-Center will obtain by the first key negotiation response packet M7;
9] the first connection device SW1 sends key response grouping M8 to first terminal equipment STA-A after receiving the first key negotiation response packet M7; The first connection device SW1 announces to first terminal equipment STA-A by the cipher key secret that key response grouping M8 will utilize the first connection device that oneself generates to inquire that random number and the second connection device inquiry random number calculate;
10] first terminal equipment STA-A receives key response grouping M8, finish and the second terminal equipment STA-B between the foundation of session key.
The method for building up of above-mentioned session key between nodes, it specifically may further comprise the steps:
1] between first terminal equipment STA-A and the first connection device SW1, between the first connection device SW1 and the core connection device SW-Center, between core connection device SW-Center and the second connection device SW2, setting up safety between the second connection device SW2 and the second terminal equipment STA-B is connected:
1.1] set up between first terminal equipment STA-A and the first connection device SW1 and have the first shared key KEY
A-1Safety connect; Described the first connection device SW1 refers to first connection device of the packet process from first terminal equipment STA-A to the second terminal equipment STA-B;
1.2] set up between the first connection device SW1 and the core connection device SW-Center and have the second shared key KEY
1-CenterSafety connect; Described core connection device SW-Center is a specific connection device, every other connection device all need to set up and core connection device SW-Center between safety connect;
1.3] set up between the second connection device SW2 and the core connection device SW-Center and have the 3rd shared key KEY
2-CenterSafety connect; Described the second connection device SW2 refers to last connection device of the packet process from first terminal equipment STA-A to the second terminal equipment STA-B;
1.4] set up between the second connection device SW2 and the second terminal equipment STA-B and have the 4th shared key KEY
B-2Safety connect;
2] first terminal equipment STA-A sends key request packet M1 to the first connection device SW1, and described key request packet M1 comprises the ID of expression the second terminal equipment STA-B sign
STA-BField;
3] after the first connection device SW1 receives key request packet M1, generate the inquiry random number N once of the first connection device SW1
SW1, constructing the first key negotiation request packet M2 and send to core connection device SW-Center, described the first key negotiation request packet M2 comprises ID
STA-AField, ID
STA-BField, E
1(Nonce
SW1) field and Message Authentication Code MIC1 field, wherein: ID
STA-AField represents the sign of first terminal equipment STA-A; ID
STA-BField represents the sign of the second terminal equipment STA-B; E
1(Nonce
SW1) field represents to inquire data, by the first connection device SW1 utilize and core connection device SW-Center between the second shared key KEY
1-CenterInquiry random number N once to the first connection device SW1
SW1Data after the encryption; The MIC1 field represents the message integrity identifying code, the second shared key KEY between the first connection device SW1 and the core connection device SW-Center
1-CenterThe Hash Value that other outer fields of this field among this first key negotiation request packet M2 are calculated by hash function;
4] after core connection device SW-Center receives the first key negotiation request packet M2, be handled as follows:
4.1] utilize and the first connection device SW1 between the second shared key KEY
1-CenterWhether MIC1 is correct in checking, if incorrect, then abandons this grouping; Otherwise, carry out 4.2];
4.2] utilize and the first connection device SW1 between the second shared key KEY
1-CenterDeciphering E
1(Nonce
SW1) field obtains the inquiry random number N once of the first connection device SW1
SW1
4.3] structure the second key negotiation request packet M3 send to the second connection device SW2, described the second key negotiation request packet M3 comprises ID
STA-AField, ID
STA-BField, E
2(Nonce
SW1) field and Message Authentication Code MIC2 field, wherein: E
2(Nonce
SW1) field represents to inquire data, by core connection device SW-Center utilize and the second connection device SW2 between the 3rd shared key KEY
2-CenterInquiry random number N once to the first connection device SW1
SW1Data after the encryption; The MIC2 field represents the message integrity identifying code, by the 3rd shared key KEY between core connection device SW-Center utilization and the second connection device SW2
2-CenterThe Hash Value that other outer fields of this field among the second key negotiation request packet M3 are calculated by hash function;
5] after the second connection device SW2 receives the second key negotiation request packet M3, be handled as follows:
5.1] utilize and core connection device SW-Center between the 3rd shared key KEY
2-CenterWhether MIC2 is correct in checking, if incorrect, then abandons this grouping; Otherwise, carry out 5.2];
5.2] utilize and core connection device SW-Center between the 3rd shared key KEY
2-CenterDeciphering E
2(Nonce
SW1) field obtains the inquiry random number N once of the first connection device SW1
SW1
5.3] generate the inquiry random number N once of the second connection device SW2
SW2, by one-way function F (Nonce
SW1, Nonce
SW2) calculate the result as the session key KEY between first terminal equipment STA-A and the second terminal equipment STA-B
A-B
5.4] structure key announce packet M4 sends to the second terminal equipment STA-B, described key announce packet M4 comprises ID
STA-AField, E
3(KEY
A-B) field and Message Authentication Code MIC3 field, wherein: E
3(KEY
A-B) field represents the keying material data, by the second connection device SW2 utilize and the second terminal equipment STA-B between the 4th shared key KEY
B-2To session key KEY
A-BData after the encryption; The MIC3 field represents the message integrity identifying code, by the 4th shared key KEY between the second connection device SW2 utilization and the second terminal equipment STA-B
B-2The Hash Value that other outer fields of this field among the key announce packet M4 are calculated by hash function;
6] after the second terminal equipment STA-B receives key announce packet M4, be handled as follows:
6.1] utilize and the second connection device SW2 between the 4th shared key KEY
B-2Whether MIC3 is correct in checking, if incorrect, then abandons this grouping, otherwise, carry out 6.2];
6.2] utilize and the second connection device SW2 between the 4th shared key KEY
B-2Deciphering E
3(KEY
A-B) field obtains the session key KEY between the second terminal equipment STA-B and the first terminal equipment STA-A
A-B
6.3] structure key announce response packet M5 sends to the second connection device SW2, described key announce response packet M5 comprises ID
STA-AField and Message Authentication Code MIC4 field, wherein: the MIC4 field represents the message integrity identifying code, by the 4th shared key KEY between the second terminal equipment STA-B utilization and the second connection device SW2
B-2The Hash Value that other outer fields of this field among this key announce response packet M5 are calculated by hash function;
7] after the second connection device SW2 receives key announce response packet M5, be handled as follows:
7.1] ID among the authentication secret announce response packet M5
STA-AWhether the corresponding field value is consistent among the key announce packet M4 of field and before transmission, if inconsistent, then abandons this grouping; Otherwise, carry out 7.2];
7.2] utilize and the second terminal equipment STA-B between the 4th shared key KEY
B-2Whether MIC4 is correct in checking, if incorrect, then abandons this grouping, otherwise, carry out 7.3];
7.3] structure the second key negotiation response packet M6 send to core connection device SW-Center, described the second key negotiation response packet M6 comprises ID
STA-AField, ID
STA-BField, E
4(Nonce
SW2) field and Message Authentication Code MIC5 field, wherein: E
4(Nonce
SW2) field represents to inquire data, by the second connection device SW2 utilize and core connection device SW-Center between the 3rd shared key KEY
2-CenterInquiry random number N once to the second connection device SW2
SW2Data after the encryption; The MIC5 field represents the message integrity identifying code, by the 3rd shared key KEY between the second connection device SW2 utilization and the core connection device SW-Center
2-CenterThe Hash Value that other outer fields of this field among the second key negotiation response packet M6 are calculated by hash function;
8] after core connection device SW-Center receives the second key negotiation response packet M6, be handled as follows:
8.1] ID of checking among the second key negotiation response packet M6
STA-AField, ID
STA-BWhether the corresponding field value is consistent among the second key negotiation request packet M3 of field and before transmission, if all consistent, then carries out 8.2]; Otherwise, abandon this grouping;
8.2] utilize and the second connection device SW2 between the 3rd shared key KEY
2-CenterWhether MIC5 is correct in checking, if incorrect, then abandons this grouping, otherwise, carry out 8.3];
8.3] utilize and the second connection device SW2 between the 3rd shared key KEY
2-CenterDeciphering E
4(Nonce
SW2) field, can obtain the inquiry random number N once of the second connection device SW2
SW2
8.4] structure the first key negotiation response packet M7 send to the first connection device SW1, described the first key negotiation response packet M7 comprises ID
STA-AField, ID
STA-BField, E
5(Nonce
SW2) field and Message Authentication Code MIC6 field, wherein: E
5(Nonce
SW2) field represents to inquire data, by core connection device SW-Center utilize and the first connection device SW1 between the second shared key KEY
1-CenterInquiry random number N once to the second connection device SW2
SW2Data after the encryption; The MIC6 field represents the message integrity identifying code, by the second shared key KEY between core connection device SW-Center utilization and the first connection device SW1
1-CenterThe Hash Value that other outer fields of this field among the first key negotiation response packet M7 are calculated by hash function;
9] after the first connection device SW1 receives the first key negotiation response packet M7, be handled as follows:
9.1] ID of checking among the first key negotiation response packet M7
STA-AField, ID
STA-BWhether the corresponding field value is consistent among the first key negotiation request packet M2 of field and before transmission, if all consistent, then carries out 9.2]; Otherwise, abandon this grouping;
9.2] utilize and core connection device SW-Center between the second shared key KEY
1-CenterWhether MIC6 is correct in checking, if incorrect, then abandons this grouping, otherwise, carry out 9.3];
9.3] utilize and core connection device SW-Center between the second shared key KEY
1-CenterDeciphering E
5(Nonce
SW2) field obtains the inquiry random number N once of the second connection device SW2
SW2, by one-way function F (Nonce
SW1, Nonce
SW2) calculate the session key KEY can obtain between first terminal equipment STA-A and the second terminal equipment STA-B
A-B
9.4] structure key response grouping M8 sends to first terminal equipment STA-A, described key response grouping M8 comprises ID
STA-BField, E
6(KEY
A-B) field and Message Authentication Code MIC7 field, wherein: E
6(KEY
A-B) field represents the keying material data, by the first connection device SW1 utilize and first terminal equipment STA-A between the first shared key KEY
A-1To session key KEY
A-BData after the encryption; The MIC7 field represents the message integrity identifying code, by the first shared key KEY between the first connection device SW1 utilization and the first terminal equipment STA-A
A-1The Hash Value that other outer fields of this field among the key response grouping M8 are calculated by hash function;
10] after first terminal equipment STA-A receives key response grouping M8, be handled as follows:
10.1] ID among the authentication secret respond packet M8
STA-BWhether the corresponding field value is consistent among the key request packet M1 of field and before transmission, if consistent, then carries out 10.2]; Otherwise, abandon this grouping;
10.2] utilize and the first connection device SW1 between the first shared key KEY
A-1Whether MIC7 is correct in checking, if incorrect, then abandons this grouping, otherwise carries out 10.3];
10.3] utilize and the first connection device SW1 between the first shared key KEY
A-1Deciphering E
6(KEY
A-B) field obtain and the second terminal equipment STA-B between session key KEY
A-B, set up session key between first terminal equipment STA-A and the second terminal equipment STA-B.
Above-mentioned first terminal equipment STA-A generates a message freshness sign, described key request packet M1, the first key negotiation request packet M2, the second key negotiation request packet M3, key announce packet M4, key announce response packet M5, the second key negotiation response packet M6, the first key negotiation response packet M7 and key response grouping M8 include message freshness sign, after described the second connection device SW2 receives key announce response packet M5, need in this grouping of checking message freshness sign with its before whether consistent among second key negotiation request packet M3 of reception; After described core connection device SW-Center receives the second key negotiation response packet M6, need in this grouping of checking message freshness sign with its before whether consistent among first key negotiation request packet M2 of reception; After the first connection device SW1 receives the first key negotiation response packet M7, need in this grouping of checking message freshness sign with its before whether consistent among key request packet M1 of reception; After first terminal equipment STA-A receives key response grouping M8, need in this grouping of checking message freshness sign with its before no consistent among key request packet M1 of transmission.
Above-mentioned message freshness is designated clock, serial number or random number.
Above-mentioned key request packet M1, the first key negotiation request packet M2, the second key negotiation request packet M3 and key announce packet M4 generate respectively message freshness sign separately; The message freshness sign that described key announce response packet M5 carries is consistent with corresponding sign among the key announce packet M4, the message freshness sign that described the second key negotiation response packet M6 carries is consistent with corresponding sign among the second key negotiation request packet M3, the message freshness sign that described the first key negotiation response packet M7 carries is consistent with corresponding sign among the first key negotiation request packet M2, the message freshness sign that described key response grouping M8 carries is consistent with corresponding sign among the key request packet M1, after described the second connection device SW2 receives key announce response packet M5, need the ident value in this grouping of checking whether consistent with the ident value among the key announce packet M4 that sends before; After core connection device SW-Center receives the second key negotiation response packet M6, need the ident value in this grouping of checking whether consistent with the ident value among the second key negotiation request packet M3 that sends before; After described the first connection device SW1 receives the first key negotiation response packet M7, need the ident value in this grouping of checking whether consistent with the ident value among the first key negotiation request packet M2 that sends before; After described first terminal equipment STA-A receives key response grouping M8, need the ident value in this grouping of checking whether consistent with the ident value among the key request packet M1 that sends before.
Above-mentioned message freshness is designated clock, serial number or random number.
A kind of method for building up of session key between nodes, it is characterized in that: the first connection device (SW1) and the second connection device (SW2) are set up safety with core connection device (SW-Center) respectively and are connected, the first connection device (SW1) is set up safety with first terminal equipment (STA-A) and is connected, and the second connection device (SW2) is set up safety with the second terminal equipment (STA-B) and is connected; First terminal equipment (STA-A) sends the request of setting up session key between first terminal equipment (STA-A) and the second terminal equipment (STA-B), the secret announcement of random number of the first connection device (SW1) and each self-generating of the second connection device (SW2) is to the other side, and utilize this two random number to calculate consistent session key, this session key is announced to the second terminal equipment (STA-B) by the second connection device (SW2) is secret, announce to first terminal equipment (STA-A) by the first connection device (SW1) is secret, make first terminal equipment (STA-A) set up consistent session key with the second terminal equipment (STA-B), finish the foundation of session key.
Advantage of the present invention is: core connection device SW-Center only need to preserve and network in switching equipment between key, need not to set up and user terminal between key; Each switching equipment only need to preserve and adjacent switching equipment between key and and core connection device SW-Center between key; Each user terminal only need to keep and adjacent switching equipment between key.Session key between first terminal equipment STA-A and the second terminal equipment STA-B is to utilize the interim random number N once that generates of both sides by the first connection device SW1 and the second connection device SW2
SW1And Nonce
SW2Calculate, then announce to the second terminal equipment STA-B by the second connection device SW2 is secret; Announce to first terminal equipment STA-A by the first connection device SW1 is secret.It is flexible that this sets up process, need not the user and participate in disposing the foundation that can realize session key between nodes, guaranteed the confidentiality of the communication between subsequent node.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is that session key between nodes provided by the present invention is set up the process schematic diagram.
Embodiment
In network, all connection devices all with network in core connection device SW-Center between be connected by pre-distribution or the built vertical safety of other security mechanisms, namely had shared key; All terminal equipments only with between the adjacent connection device are connected by pre-distribution or the built vertical safety of other security mechanisms, have namely had shared key (will not limiting and define among the machine-processed the present invention of safe establishment of connection described herein).
Describe SW as an example of the Session key establishment between first terminal equipment STA-A and the second terminal equipment STA-B example
CenterBe the core connection device in the network, the first connection device SW1 refers to first connection device of the packet process from first terminal equipment STA-A to the second terminal equipment STA-B, and the second connection device SW2 refers to last connection device of the packet process from first terminal equipment STA-A to the second terminal equipment STA-B.Built vertical safety is connected between first terminal equipment STA-A and the first connection device SW1, and the first shared key that has is designated as KEY
A-1Built vertical safety is connected between the first connection device SW1 and the core connection device SW-Center, and the second shared key that has is designated as KEY
1-CenterBuilt vertical safety is connected between the second connection device SW2 and the core connection device SW-Center, and the 3rd shared key that has is designated as KEY
2-CenterBuilt vertical safety is connected between the second terminal equipment STA-B and the second connection device SW2, and the 4th shared key that has is designated as KEY
B-2
Fig. 1 is as follows take the concrete scheme of the step of setting up session key between first terminal equipment STA-A and the second terminal equipment STA-B method for building up for session key between nodes provided by the present invention as example illustrates:
1) first terminal equipment STA-A sends key request packet M1 to the first connection device SW1;
This key request packet M1 mainly comprises:
| ID STA-B |
Wherein:
ID
STA-BField: the sign that represents the second terminal equipment STA-B;
2) the first connection device SW1 sends the first key negotiation request packet M2 to core connection device SW-Center;
After the first connection device SW1 receives key request packet M1, be handled as follows:
2.1) generate a random number as the inquiry random number N once of oneself
SW1
2.2) structure the first key negotiation request packet M2 send to core connection device SW-Center.
This first key negotiation request packet M2 mainly comprises:
| ID STA-A | ID STA-B | E 1(Nonce SW1) | MIC1 |
Wherein:
ID
STA-AField: the sign of expression first terminal equipment STA-A;
E
1(Nonce
SW1) field: expression inquiry data, by the second shared key KEY between the first connection device SW1 utilization and the core connection device SW-Center
1-CenterTo key Nonce
SW1Data after the encryption;
MIC1 field: expression message integrity identifying code, and the second shared key KEY between the core connection device SW-Center
1-CenterThe Hash Value that other outer fields of this field among this first key negotiation request packet M2 are calculated by hash function.
3) core connection device SW-Center sends the second key negotiation request packet M3 to the second connection device SW2;
Core connection device SW-Center is handled as follows after receiving the first key negotiation request packet M2:
3.1) utilize and the first connection device SW1 between the second shared key KEY
1-CenterWhether MIC1 is correct in checking, if incorrect, then abandons this grouping; Otherwise, carry out 3.2);
3.2) utilize and the first connection device SW1 between the second shared key KEY
1-CenterDeciphering E
1(Nonce
SW1) field can obtain the inquiry random number N once of the first connection device SW1
SW1
3.3) structure the second key negotiation request packet M3 send to the second connection device SW2.
Mainly comprise among this second key negotiation request packet M3:
| ID STA-A | ID STA-B | E 2(Nonce SW1) | MIC2 |
Wherein:
E
2(Nonce
SW1) field: be the inquiry data, by the 3rd shared key KEY between core connection device SW-Center utilization and the second connection device SW2
2-CenterTo Nonce
SW1Data after the encryption;
The MIC2 field: expression message integrity identifying code, by the 3rd shared key KEY between core connection device SW-Center utilization and the second connection device SW2
2-CenterThe Hash Value that other outer fields of this field among this second key negotiation request packet M3 are calculated by hash function.
4) the second connection device SW2 sends key announce packet M4 to the second terminal equipment STA-B;
The second connection device SW2 is handled as follows after receiving the second key negotiation request packet M3:
4.1) utilize and core connection device SW-Center between the 3rd shared key KEY
2-CenterWhether MIC2 is correct in checking, if incorrect, then abandons this grouping; Otherwise, carry out 4.2);
4.2) utilize and core connection device SW-Center between the 3rd shared key KEY
2-CenterDeciphering E
2(Nonce
SW1) field can obtain the inquiry random number N once of the first connection device SW1
SW1
4.3) generate a random number as the inquiry random number N once of the second connection device SW2
SW2, by one-way function F (Nonce
SW1, Nonce
SW2) calculate the result as the session key KEY between first terminal equipment STA-A and the second terminal equipment STA-B
A-B(one-way function F used herein will not limit and define among the present invention);
4.4) structure key announce packet M4 sends to the second terminal equipment STA-B.
This key announce packet M4 mainly comprises:
| ID STA-A | E 3(KEY A-B) | MIC3 |
Wherein:
E
3(KEY
A-B) field: expression keying material data, by the 4th shared key KEY between the second connection device SW2 utilization and the second terminal equipment STA-B
B-2To session key KEY
A-BData after the encryption;
The MIC3 field: expression message integrity identifying code, by the 4th shared key KEY between the second connection device SW2 utilization and the second terminal equipment STA-B
B-2The Hash Value that other outer fields of this field among this key announce packet M4 are calculated by hash function.
5) the second terminal equipment STA-B sends key announce response packet M5 to the second connection device SW2;
After the second terminal equipment STA-B receives key announce packet M4, be handled as follows:
5.1) utilize and the second connection device SW2 between the 4th shared key KEY
B-2Whether MIC3 is correct in checking, if incorrect, then abandons this grouping, otherwise, carry out 5.2);
5.2) utilize and the second connection device SW2 between the 4th shared key KEY
B-2Deciphering E
3(KEY
A-B) field, can obtain and first terminal equipment STA-A between session key KEY
A-B
5.3) structure key announce response packet M5 sends to the second connection device SW2.
This key announce response packet M5 mainly comprises:
| ID STA-A | MIC4 |
Wherein:
The MIC4 field: expression message integrity identifying code, by the 4th shared key KEY between the second terminal equipment STA-B utilization and the second connection device SW2
B-2The Hash Value that other outer fields of this field among this key announce response packet M5 are calculated by hash function.
6) the second connection device SW2 sends the second key negotiation response packet M6 to core connection device SW-Center;
After the second connection device SW2 receives key announce response packet M5, be handled as follows:
6.1) ID in the checking grouping
STA-AWhether the corresponding field value is consistent among the key announce packet M4 of field and before transmission, if inconsistent, then abandons this grouping; Otherwise, carry out 6.2);
6.2) utilize and the second terminal equipment STA-B between the 4th shared key KEY
B-2Whether MIC4 is correct in checking, if incorrect, then abandons this grouping, otherwise, carry out 6.3);
6.3) structure the second key negotiation response packet M6 send to core connection device SW-Center.
This i second key negotiation response packet M6 mainly comprises:
| ID STA-A | ID STA-B | E 4(Nonce SW2) | MIC5 |
Wherein:
E
4(Nonce
SW2) field: expression inquiry data, by the 3rd shared key KEY between the second connection device SW2 utilization and the core connection device SW-Center
2-CenterInquiry random number N once to the second connection device SW2
SW2Data after the encryption;
The MIC5 field: expression message integrity identifying code, by the 3rd shared key KEY between the second connection device SW2 utilization and the core connection device SW-Center
2-CenterThe Hash Value that other outer fields of this field among this second key negotiation response packet M6 are calculated by hash function.
7) core connection device SW-Center sends out first and send key negotiation response packet to the first connection device SW1;
After core connection device SW-Center receives the second key negotiation response packet, be handled as follows:
7.1) ID in the checking grouping
STA-AField, ID
STA-BWhether the corresponding field value is consistent in the key negotiation request packet 2 of field and before transmission, if all consistent, then carries out 7.2); Otherwise, abandon this grouping;
7.2) utilize and the second connection device SW2 between the 3rd shared key KEY
2-CenterWhether MIC5 is correct in checking, if incorrect, then abandons this grouping, otherwise, carry out 7.3);
7.3) utilize and the second connection device SW2 between the 3rd shared key KEY
2-CenterDeciphering E
4(Nonce
SW2) field, can obtain the inquiry random number N once of the second connection device SW2
SW2
7.4) structure the first key negotiation response packet M7 send to the first connection device SW1.
This first key negotiation response packet M7 mainly comprises:
| ID STA-A | ID STA-B | E 5(Nonce SW2) | MIC6 |
Wherein:
E
5(Nonce
SW2) field: expression inquiry data, by the second shared key KEY between core connection device SW-Center utilization and the first connection device SW1
1-CenterInquiry random number N once to the second connection device SW2
SW2Data after the encryption;
The MIC6 field: expression message integrity identifying code, by the second shared key KEY between core connection device SW-Center utilization and the first connection device SW1
1-CenterThe Hash Value that other outer fields of this field among this first key negotiation response packet M7 are calculated by hash function.
8) the first connection device SW1 sends key response grouping M8 to first terminal equipment STA-A;
The first connection device SW1 is handled as follows after the first key negotiation response packet M7 such as receiving:
8.1) ID in the checking grouping
STA-AField, ID
STA-BWhether the corresponding field value is consistent among the first key negotiation request packet M2 of field and before transmission, if all consistent, then carries out 8.2); Otherwise, abandon this grouping;
8.2) utilize and core connection device SW-Center between the second shared key KEY
1-CenterWhether MIC6 is correct in checking, if incorrect, then abandons this grouping, otherwise, carry out 8.3);
8.3) utilize and core connection device SW-Center between the second shared key KEY
1-CenterDeciphering E
5(Nonce
SW2) field, can obtain the inquiry random number N once of the second connection device SW2
SW2
8.4) by one-way function F (Nonce
SW1, Nonce
SW2) calculate the session key KEY can obtain between first terminal equipment STA-A and the second terminal equipment STA-B
A-B(one-way function F used herein will not limit and define among the present invention);
8.6) structure key response grouping M8 sends to.
This key response grouping M8 mainly comprises:
| ID STA-B | E 6(KEY A-B) | MIC7 |
Wherein:
ID
STA-BField: represent the sign of the second terminal equipment STA-B, this field value is with corresponding field value among the key request packet M1 that receives before;
E
6(KEY
A-B) field: expression keying material data, by the first shared key KEY between the first connection device SW1 utilization and the first terminal equipment STA-A
A-1To session key KEY
A-BData after the encryption;
The MIC7 field: expression message integrity identifying code, by the first shared key KEY between the first connection device SW1 utilization and the first terminal equipment STA-A
A-1The Hash Value that other outer fields of this field among this key response grouping M8 are calculated by hash function.
9) first terminal equipment STA-A receives key response grouping M8.
After first terminal equipment STA-A receives key response grouping M8, be handled as follows:
9.1) ID in the checking grouping
STA-BWhether the corresponding field value is consistent among the key request packet M1 of field and before transmission, if consistent, then carries out 9.2); Otherwise, abandon this grouping;
9.2) utilize and the first connection device SW1 between the first shared key KEY
A-1Whether MIC7 is correct in checking, if incorrect, then abandons this grouping, otherwise carries out 9.3);
9.3) utilize and the first connection device SW1 between the first shared key KEY
A-1Deciphering E
6(KEY
A-B) field, can obtain and the second terminal equipment STA-B between session key KEY
A-BNamely finished the foundation of session key between first terminal equipment STA-A and the second terminal equipment STA-B.After this, can adopt this session key KEY between first terminal equipment STA-A and the second terminal equipment STA-B
A-BCarry out confidential corespondence.
When such scheme was carried out implementation, first terminal equipment STA-A also can generate a numerical value, and as the sign of this Session key establishment process, this sign can be clock, serial number or random number, and carried in each grouping.Correspondingly, after the second connection device SW2 receives key announce response packet M5, need the ident value in this grouping of checking whether consistent with the ident value among its second key negotiation request packet M3 that receives before; After core connection device SW-Center receives the second key negotiation response packet M6, need the ident value in this grouping of checking whether consistent with the ident value among its first key negotiation request packet M2 that receives before; After the first connection device SW1 receives the first key negotiation response packet M7, need the ident value in this grouping of checking whether consistent with the ident value among its key request packet M1 that receives before; After first terminal equipment STA-A receives key response grouping M8, need the ident value in this grouping of checking whether consistent with the ident value among its key request packet M1 that sends before.
When utilizing such scheme to carry out implementation, also can be by first terminal equipment STA-A, the first connection device SW1, core connection device SW-Center and the second connection device SW2 when sending key request packet M1, the first key negotiation request packet M2, the second key negotiation request packet M3 and key announce packet M4, the independent numerical value (can be clock, serial number or random number) that generates is carried at respectively in the above-mentioned grouping as message freshness sign separately; Should carry among the key announce response packet M5 that the second terminal equipment STA-B sends with key announce packet M4 in the same ident value; Should carry among the second key negotiation response packet M6 that the second connection device SW2 sends with the second key negotiation request packet M3 in the same ident value; Should carry among the first key negotiation response packet M7 that core connection device SW-Center sends with the first key negotiation request packet M2 in the same ident value; Should carry among the key response grouping M8 that the first connection device SW1 sends with key request packet M1 in the same ident value.Correspondingly, after the second connection device SW2 receives key announce response packet M5, need the ident value in this grouping of checking whether consistent with the ident value among the key announce packet M4 that sends before; After core connection device SW-Center receives the second key negotiation response packet M6, need the ident value in this grouping of checking whether consistent with the ident value among the second key negotiation request packet M3 that sends before; After the first connection device SW1 receives the first key negotiation response packet M7, need the ident value in this grouping of checking whether consistent with the ident value among the first key negotiation request packet M2 that sends before; After first terminal equipment STA-A receives key response grouping M8, need the ident value in this grouping of checking whether consistent with the ident value among the key request packet M1 that sends before.
The system that sets up that is used for session key between nodes comprises the first terminal equipment STA-A that sends the key response grouping M8 of key request packet M1, reception the first connection device SW1 transmission to the first connection device SW1; Receive key request packet M1 that first terminal equipment STA-A sends, send the first key negotiation request packet M2, receive the first key negotiation response packet M7 that core connection device SW-Center sends, send the first connection device SW1 of key response grouping M8 to first terminal equipment STA-A to core connection device SW-Center; Receive the first key negotiation request packet M2 that the first connection device SW1 sends, send the second key negotiation request packet M3, receive the second key negotiation response packet M6 that the second connection device SW2 sends, send the core connection device SW-Center of the first key negotiation response packet M7 to the first connection device SW1 to the second connection device SW2; Receive the second key negotiation request packet M3 that core connection device SW-Center sends, send key announce packet M4 to the second terminal equipment STA-B, receive the key announce response packet M5 that the second terminal equipment STA-B sends, send the second connection device SW2 of the second key negotiation response packet M6 and receive the key announce packet M4 that the second connection device SW2 sends to core connection device SW-Center, send the second terminal equipment STA-B of key announce response packet M5 to the second connection device SW2.
In the specific implementation, if the present invention is used for local area network (LAN), then the user terminal in the local area network (LAN) is as terminal equipment, and the switching equipment in the local area network (LAN) is as connection device, and one of them specific switching equipment is the core connection device; The physical layer equipments such as the hub in the local area network (LAN) are not considered as connection device or terminal equipment is processed, and can be embodied as the foundation of session key between any two user terminals by the present invention.
Advantage of the present invention is: core connection device SW-Center only need to preserve and network in switching equipment between key, need not to set up and user terminal between key; Each switching equipment only need to preserve and adjacent switching equipment between key and and core connection device SW-Center between key; Each user terminal only need to keep and adjacent switching equipment between key.Session key between first terminal equipment STA-A and the second terminal equipment STA-B is to utilize the interim random number N once that generates of both sides by the first connection device SW1 and the second connection device SW2
SW1And Nonce
SW2Calculate, then announce to the second terminal equipment STA-B by the second connection device SW2 is secret; Announce to first terminal equipment STA-A by the first connection device SW1 is secret.It is flexible that this sets up process, need not the user and participate in disposing the foundation that can realize session key between nodes, guaranteed the confidentiality of the communication between subsequent node.
Claims (8)
1. the system that sets up of a session key between nodes, it is characterized in that: this system comprises terminal equipment and connection device, described terminal equipment comprises originating end terminal equipment and receiving terminal terminal equipment, and described connection device comprises the core connection device, at the originating end connection device on the link between originating end terminal equipment and the core connection device and the receiving terminal connection device on link between receiving terminal terminal equipment and the core connection device;
After described originating end terminal equipment is used for sending the Session key establishment request, by originating end connection device and random number of each self-generating of receiving terminal connection device, the originating end connection device announces the random number secret that generates to the receiving terminal connection device, the receiving terminal connection device announces the random number secret that generates to the originating end connection device, the originating end connection device utilizes these two random numbers to calculate consistent session key with the receiving terminal connection device, this session key is announced to receiving terminal terminal equipment and originating end terminal equipment by secret, so that the originating end terminal equipment obtains consistent session key to finish the foundation of session key with the receiving terminal terminal equipment;
Described originating end connection device comprises the first connection device (SW1), described receiving terminal connection device comprises the second connection device (SW2), described originating end terminal equipment comprises first terminal equipment (STA-A), and described receiving terminal terminal equipment comprises the second terminal equipment (STA-B); Described the first connection device (SW1) and the second connection device (SW2) exist safety to be connected with core connection device (SW-Center) respectively, described the first connection device (SW1) exists safety to be connected with first terminal equipment (STA-A), and described the second connection device (SW2) exists safety to be connected with the second terminal equipment (STA-B);
After first terminal equipment (STA-A) is used for sending the Session key establishment request, the first connection device (SW1) generates the secret announcement of a random number to the second connection device (SW2), the second connection device (SW2) generates the secret announcement of a random number to the first connection device (SW1), the second connection device (SW2) utilizes these two random numbers to calculate consistent session key with the first connection device (SW1), this session key is announced to the second terminal equipment (STA-B) by the second connection device (SW2) by secret, announced to first terminal equipment (STA-A) by the first connection device (SW1), make first terminal equipment (STA-A) set up consistent session key with the second terminal equipment (STA-B), finish the foundation of session key.
2. the method for building up of a session key between nodes, it is characterized in that: it may further comprise the steps:
1] between first terminal equipment (STA-A) and the first connection device (SW1), between the first connection device (SW1) and the core connection device (SW-Center), between core connection device (SW-Center) and the second connection device (SW2), setting up safety between the second connection device (SW2) and the second terminal equipment (STA-B) is connected;
2] first terminal equipment (STA-A) sends key request packet (M1) to the first connection device (SW1); Ask the first connection device (SW1) to assist to set up shared key between first terminal equipment (STA-A) and the second terminal equipment (STA-B);
3] the first connection device (SW1) sends the first key negotiation request packet (M2) to core connection device (SW-Center) after receiving key request packet (M1); The first connection device (SW1) is inquired random number with the random number that the first connection device (SW1) generates as the first connection device by the first key negotiation request packet (M2), and secret announcement is to core connection device (SW-Center);
4] core connection device (SW-Center) sends the second key negotiation request packet (M3) to the second connection device (SW2) after receiving the first key negotiation request packet (M2); The first connection device inquiry random number that core connection device (SW-Center) will obtain by the second key negotiation request packet (M3), secret announcement is to the second connection device (SW2);
5] the second connection device (SW2) sends key announce packet (M4) to the second terminal equipment (STA-B) after receiving the second key negotiation request packet (M3); The secret announcement of session key that the second connection device inquiry random number that the second connection device (SW2) will utilize the first connection device inquiry random number and the second connection device (SW2) to generate by key announce packet (M4) calculates is to the second terminal equipment (STA-B);
6] the second terminal equipment (STA-B) is received and is sent key announce response packet (M5) after the key announce packet (M4) to the second connection device (SW2), informs that the second connection device (SW2) received session key;
7] the second connection device (SW2) sends the second key negotiation response packet (M6) to core connection device (SW-Center) after receiving key announce response packet (M5); The secret announcement to core connection device (SW-Center) of the second connection device inquiry random number that the second connection device (SW2) generates the second connection device (SW2) by the second key negotiation response packet (M6);
8] core connection device (SW-Center) sends the first key negotiation response packet (M7) to the first connection device (SW1) after receiving the second key negotiation response packet (M6); The secret announcement to the first connection device (SW1) of the second connection device inquiry random number that core connection device (SW-Center) will obtain by the first key negotiation response packet (M7);
9] the first connection device (SW1) sends key response grouping (M8) to first terminal equipment (STA-A) after receiving the first key negotiation response packet (M7); The first connection device inquiry random number and the second connection device that the first connection device (SW1) will utilize the first connection device (SW1) to generate by key response grouping (M8) are inquired secret the announcement to first terminal equipment (STA-A) of session key that random number calculates;
10] first terminal equipment (STA-A) receives key response grouping (M8), finish and the second terminal equipment (STA-B) between the foundation of session key.
3. the method for building up of session key between nodes according to claim 2, it is characterized in that: it specifically may further comprise the steps:
1] between first terminal equipment (STA-A) and the first connection device (SW1), between the first connection device (SW1) and the core connection device (SW-Center), between core connection device (SW-Center) and the second connection device (SW2), setting up safety between the second connection device (SW2) and the second terminal equipment (STA-B) is connected:
1.1] set up between first terminal equipment (STA-A) and the first connection device (SW1) and have the first shared key (KEY
A-1) safety connect; Described the first connection device (SW1) refers to first connection device of the packet process from first terminal equipment (STA-A) to the second terminal equipment (STA-B);
1.2] set up between the first connection device (SW1) and the core connection device (SW-Center) and have the second shared key (KEY
1-Center) safety connect;
1.3] set up between the second connection device (SW2) and the core connection device (SW-Center) and have the 3rd shared key (KEY
2-Center) safety connect; Described the second connection device (SW2) refers to last connection device of the packet process from first terminal equipment (STA-A) to the second terminal equipment (STA-B);
1.4] set up between the second connection device (SW2) and the second terminal equipment (STA-B) and have the 4th shared key (KEY
B-2) safety connect;
2] first terminal equipment (STA-A) sends key request packet (M1) to the first connection device (SW1), and described key request packet (M1) comprises the ID of expression the second terminal equipment (STA-B) sign
STA-BField;
3] after the first connection device (SW1) is received key request packet (M1), generate the inquiry random number N once of the first connection device (SW1)
SW1Construct the first key negotiation request packet (M2) and send to core connection device (SW-Center), described the first key negotiation request packet (M2) comprises ID
STA-AField, ID
STA-BField, E
1(NonceSW1) field and Message Authentication Code MIC1 field, wherein: ID
STA-AField represents the sign of first terminal equipment STA-A; ID
STA-BField represents the sign of the second terminal equipment (STA-B); E
1(Nonce
SW1) field represents to inquire data, by the first connection device (SW1) utilize and core connection device (SW-Center) between the second shared key (KEY
1-Center) to the inquiry random number N once of the first connection device (SW1)
SW1Data after the encryption; The MIC1 field represents the message integrity identifying code, the second shared key (KEY between the first connection device (SW1) and the core connection device (SW-Center)
1-Center) Hash Value that other outer fields of this field in this first key negotiation request packet (M2) are calculated by hash function;
4] after core connection device (SW-Center) is received the first key negotiation request packet (M2), be handled as follows:
4.1] utilize and the first connection device (SW1) between the second shared key (KEY
1-Center) whether MIC1 correct in checking, if incorrect, then abandons this grouping; Otherwise, carry out 4.2];
4.2] utilize and the first connection device (SW1) between the second shared key (KEY
1-Center) deciphering E
1(Nonce
SW1) field obtains the inquiry random number N once of the first connection device (SW1)
SW1
4.3] structure the second key negotiation request packet (M3) send to the second connection device (SW2), described the second key negotiation request packet (M3) comprises ID
STA-AField, ID
STA-BField, E
2(Nonce
SW1) field and Message Authentication Code MIC2 field, wherein: E
2(Nonce
SW1) field represents to inquire data, by core connection device (SW-Center) utilize and the second connection device (SW2) between the 3rd shared key (KEY
2-Center) to the inquiry random number (Nonce of the first connection device (SW1)
SW1) data after the encryption; The MIC2 field represents the message integrity identifying code, by the 3rd shared key (KEY between core connection device (SW-Center) utilization and the second connection device (SW2)
2-Center) Hash Value that other outer fields of this field in the second key negotiation request packet (M3) are calculated by hash function;
5] after the second connection device (SW2) is received the second key negotiation request packet (M3), be handled as follows:
5.1] utilize and core connection device (SW-Center) between the 3rd shared key (KEY
2-Center) whether MIC2 correct in checking, if incorrect, then abandons this grouping; Otherwise, carry out 5.2];
5.2] utilize and core connection device (SW-Center) between the 3rd shared key (KEY
2-Center) deciphering E
2(Nonce
SW1) field obtains the inquiry random number N once of the first connection device (SW1)
SW1
5.3] generate the inquiry random number N once of the second connection device (SW2)
SW2, by one-way function F (Nonce
SW1, Nonce
SW2) calculate the result as the session key KEY between first terminal equipment (STA-A) and the second terminal equipment (STA-B)
A-B
5.4] structure key announce packet (M4) send to the second terminal equipment (STA-B), described key announce packet (M4) comprises ID
STA-AField, E
3(KEY
A-B) field and Message Authentication Code MIC3 field, wherein: E
3(KEY
A-B) field represents the keying material data, by the second connection device (SW2) utilize and the second terminal equipment (STA-B) between the 4th shared key (KEY
B-2) to session key KEY
A-BData after the encryption; The MIC3 field represents the message integrity identifying code, by the 4th shared key (KEY between the second connection device (SW2) utilization and the second terminal equipment (STA-B)
B-2) Hash Value that other outer fields of this field in the key announce packet (M4) are calculated by hash function;
6] after the second terminal equipment (STA-B) is received key announce packet (M4), be handled as follows:
6.1] utilize and the second connection device (SW2) between the 4th shared key (KEY
B-2) whether MIC3 correct in checking, if incorrect, then abandons this grouping, otherwise, carry out 6.2];
6.2] utilize and the second connection device (SW2) between the 4th shared key (KEY
B-2) deciphering E
3(KEY
A-B) field obtains the session key KEY between the second terminal equipment (STA-B) and the first terminal equipment (STA-A)
A-B
6.3] structure key announce response packet (M5) send to the second connection device (SW2), described key announce response packet (M5) comprises ID
STA-AField and Message Authentication Code MIC4 field, wherein: the MIC4 field represents the message integrity identifying code, by the 4th shared key (KEY between the second terminal equipment (STA-B) utilization and the second connection device (SW2)
B-2) Hash Value that other outer fields of this field in this key announce response packet (M5) are calculated by hash function;
7] after the second connection device (SW2) is received key announce response packet (M5), be handled as follows:
7.1] ID in the authentication secret announce response packet (M5)
STA-AWhether field is consistent with the middle corresponding field value of the key announce packet (M4) that sends before, if inconsistent, then abandons this grouping; Otherwise, carry out 7.2];
7.2] utilize and the second terminal equipment (STA-B) between the 4th shared key (KEY
B-2) whether MIC4 correct in checking, if incorrect, then abandons this grouping, otherwise, carry out 7.3];
7.3] structure the second key negotiation response packet (M6) send to core connection device (SW-Center), described the second key negotiation response packet (M6) comprises ID
STA-AField, ID
STA-BField, E
4(Nonce
SW2) field and Message Authentication Code MIC5 field, wherein: E
4(Nonce
SW2) field represents to inquire data, by the second connection device (SW2) utilize and core connection device (SW-Center) between the 3rd shared key (KEY
2-Center) to the inquiry random number N once of the second connection device (SW2)
SW2Data after the encryption; The MIC5 field represents the message integrity identifying code, by the 3rd shared key (KEY between the second connection device (SW2) utilization and the core connection device (SW-Center)
2-Center) Hash Value that other outer fields of this field in the second key negotiation response packet (M6) are calculated by hash function;
8] after core connection device (SW-Center) is received the second key negotiation response packet (M6), be handled as follows:
8.1] ID in the checking the second key negotiation response packet (M6)
STA-AField, ID
STA-BWhether field is consistent with the middle corresponding field value of the second key negotiation request packet (M3) that sends before, if all consistent, then carries out 8.2]; Otherwise, abandon this grouping;
8.2] utilize and the second connection device (SW2) between the 3rd shared key (KEY
2-Center) whether MIC5 correct in checking, if incorrect, then abandons this grouping, otherwise, carry out 8.3];
8.3] utilize and the second connection device (SW2) between the 3rd shared key (KEY
2-Center) deciphering E
4(Nonce
SW2) field, can obtain the inquiry random number N once of the second connection device (SW2)
SW2
8.4] structure the first key negotiation response packet (M7) send to the first connection device (SW1), described the first key negotiation response packet (M7) comprises ID
STA-AField, ID
STA-BField, E
5(Nonce
SW2) field and Message Authentication Code MIC6 field, wherein: E
5(Nonce
SW2) field represents to inquire data, by core connection device (SW-Center) utilize and the first connection device (SW1) between the second shared key (KEY
1-Center) to the inquiry random number N once of the second connection device (SW2)
SW2Data after the encryption; The MIC6 field represents the message integrity identifying code, by the second shared key (KEY between core connection device (SW-Center) utilization and the first connection device (SW1)
1-Center) Hash Value that other outer fields of this field in the first key negotiation response packet (M7) are calculated by hash function;
9] after the first connection device (SW1) is received the first key negotiation response packet (M7), be handled as follows:
9.1] ID in the checking the first key negotiation response packet (M7)
STA-AField, ID
STA-BWhether field is consistent with the middle corresponding field value of the first key negotiation request packet (M2) that sends before, if all consistent, then carries out 9.2]; Otherwise, abandon this grouping;
9.2] utilize and core connection device (SW-Center) between the second shared key (KEY
1-Center) whether MIC6 correct in checking, if incorrect, then abandons this grouping, otherwise, carry out 9.3];
9.3] utilize and core connection device (SW-Center) between the second shared key (KEY
1-Center) deciphering E5 (Nonce
SW2) field obtains the inquiry random number N once of the second connection device (SW2)
SW2, by one-way function F (Nonce
SW1, Nonce
SW2) calculate the session key KEY can obtain between first terminal equipment (STA-A) and the second terminal equipment (STA-B)
A-B
9.4] structure key response grouping (M8) send to first terminal equipment (STA-A), described key response grouping (M8) comprises ID
STA-BField, E
6(KEY
A-B) field and Message Authentication Code MIC7 field, wherein: E
6(KEY
A-B) field represents the keying material data, by the first connection device (SW1) utilize and first terminal equipment (STA-A) between the first shared key (KEY
A-1) to session key KEY
A-BData after the encryption; The MIC7 field represents the message integrity identifying code, by the first shared key (KEY between the first connection device (SW1) utilization and the first terminal equipment (STA-A)
A-1) Hash Value that other outer fields of this field in the key response grouping (M8) are calculated by hash function;
10] after first terminal equipment (STA-A) is received key response grouping (M8), be handled as follows:
10.1] ID in the authentication secret respond packet (M8)
STA-BWhether field is consistent with the middle corresponding field value of the key request packet (M1) that sends before, if consistent, then carries out 10.2]; Otherwise, abandon this grouping;
10.2] utilize and the first connection device (SW1) between the first shared key (KEY
A-1) whether MIC7 correct in checking, if incorrect, then abandon this grouping, otherwise carry out 10.3];
10.3] utilize and the first connection device (SW1) between the first shared key (KEY
A-1) deciphering E
6(KEY
A-B) field obtain and the second terminal equipment (STA-B) between session key KEY
A-B, set up session key between first terminal equipment (STA-A) and the second terminal equipment (STA-B).
4. it is characterized in that according to claim 2 or the method for building up of 3 described session key between nodes:
Described first terminal equipment (STA-A) generates a message freshness sign, described key request packet (M1), the first key negotiation request packet (M2), the second key negotiation request packet (M3), key announce packet (M4), key announce response packet (M5), the second key negotiation response packet (M6), the first key negotiation response packet (M7) and key response grouping (M8) include message freshness sign, after described the second connection device (SW2) is received key announce response packet (M5), need in this grouping of checking message freshness sign with its before whether consistent in second key negotiation request packet (M3) of reception; After described core connection device (SW-Center) is received the second key negotiation response packet (M6), need in this grouping of checking message freshness sign with its before whether consistent in first key negotiation request packet (M2) of reception; After the first connection device (SW1) is received the first key negotiation response packet (M7), need in this grouping of checking message freshness sign with its before whether consistent in key request packet (M1) of reception; After first terminal equipment (STA-A) is received key response grouping (M8), need in this grouping of checking message freshness sign with its before no consistent in key request packet (M1) of transmission.
5. the method for building up of session key between nodes according to claim 4, it is characterized in that: described message freshness is designated clock, serial number or random number.
6. it is characterized in that according to claim 2 or the method for building up of 3 described session key between nodes: described key request packet (M1), the first key negotiation request packet (M2), the second key negotiation request packet (M3) and key announce packet (M4) generate respectively message freshness sign separately; The message freshness sign that described key announce response packet (M5) is carried is consistent with corresponding sign in the key announce packet (M4), the message freshness sign that described the second key negotiation response packet (M6) is carried is consistent with corresponding sign in the second key negotiation request packet (M3), the message freshness sign that described the first key negotiation response packet (M7) is carried is consistent with corresponding sign in the first key negotiation request packet (M2), the message freshness sign that described key response grouping (M8) is carried is consistent with corresponding sign in the key request packet (M1), after described the second connection device (SW2) is received key announce response packet (M5), need the ident value in this grouping of checking whether consistent with the ident value in the key announce packet (M4) that sends before; After core connection device (SW-Center) is received the second key negotiation response packet (M6), need the ident value in this grouping of checking whether consistent with the ident value in the second key negotiation request packet (M3) that sends before; After described the first connection device (SW1) is received the first key negotiation response packet (M7), need the ident value in this grouping of checking whether consistent with the ident value in the first key negotiation request packet (M2) that sends before; After described first terminal equipment (STA-A) is received key response grouping (M8), need the ident value in this grouping of checking whether consistent with the ident value in the key request packet (M1) that sends before.
7. the method for building up of session key between nodes according to claim 6, it is characterized in that: described message freshness is designated clock, serial number or random number.
8. the method for building up of a session key between nodes, it is characterized in that: the first connection device (SW1) and the second connection device (SW2) are set up safety with core connection device (SW-Center) respectively and are connected, the first connection device (SW1) is set up safety with first terminal equipment (STA-A) and is connected, and the second connection device (SW2) is set up safety with the second terminal equipment (STA-B) and is connected; First terminal equipment (STA-A) sends the request of setting up session key between first terminal equipment (STA-A) and the second terminal equipment (STA-B), the secret announcement of random number of the first connection device (SW1) and each self-generating of the second connection device (SW2) is to the other side, and utilize this two random number to calculate consistent session key, this session key is announced to the second terminal equipment (STA-B) by the second connection device (SW2) is secret, announce to first terminal equipment (STA-A) by the first connection device (SW1) is secret, make first terminal equipment (STA-A) set up consistent session key with the second terminal equipment (STA-B), finish the foundation of session key;
Wherein, after first terminal equipment (STA-A) sends the Session key establishment request, the first connection device (SW1) generates the secret announcement of a random number to the second connection device (SW2), the second connection device (SW2) generates the secret announcement of a random number to the first connection device (SW1), the second connection device (SW2) utilizes these two random numbers to calculate consistent session key with the first connection device (SW1), this session key is announced to the second terminal equipment (STA-B) by the second connection device (SW2) by secret, announced to first terminal equipment (STA-A) by the first connection device (SW1), make first terminal equipment (STA-A) set up consistent session key with the second terminal equipment (STA-B), finish the foundation of session key.
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| CN 201010518626 CN101964708B (en) | 2010-10-25 | 2010-10-25 | System and method for establishing session key between nodes |
| PCT/CN2011/070017 WO2012055173A1 (en) | 2010-10-25 | 2011-01-04 | System, method and apparatus for establishing session key between nodes |
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| CN 201010518626 CN101964708B (en) | 2010-10-25 | 2010-10-25 | System and method for establishing session key between nodes |
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| CN101964708B true CN101964708B (en) | 2013-01-16 |
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| CN105873039B (en) * | 2015-01-19 | 2019-05-07 | 普天信息技术有限公司 | A kind of mobile self-grouping network session key generation method and terminal |
| CN106357403A (en) * | 2016-11-23 | 2017-01-25 | 神州融安科技（北京）有限公司 | Device and method for encryption protection of link communication and safety message processing system |
| CN113746801B (en) * | 2021-07-30 | 2023-07-11 | 佛山市青松科技股份有限公司 | Communication method, sending terminal, receiving terminal and system based on temporary secret key |
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| CN100359845C (en) * | 2004-03-26 | 2008-01-02 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Self arranged net mode shared key authentication and conversation key consulant method of radio LAN |
| CN101702804A (en) * | 2009-11-23 | 2010-05-05 | 西安电子科技大学 | Two-party key agreement method based on self-certified public key |
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| CN101204065A (en) * | 2005-04-29 | 2008-06-18 | 诺基亚公司 | Establishment of a secure communication |
| WO2007106620A2 (en) * | 2006-03-10 | 2007-09-20 | Motorola, Inc. | Method for authenticating a mobile node in a communication network |
| CN101364866B (en) * | 2008-09-24 | 2010-11-10 | 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司 | Entity secret talk establishing system based on multiple key distribution centers and method therefor |
| CN101540671B (en) * | 2009-04-21 | 2011-05-25 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Method for establishing security association among WAPI websites under self-organizing network |
| CN101719825A (en) * | 2009-04-30 | 2010-06-02 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Method and system for realizing safe bifurcation call session in IP multimedia subsystem |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN100359845C (en) * | 2004-03-26 | 2008-01-02 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Self arranged net mode shared key authentication and conversation key consulant method of radio LAN |
| CN201515456U (en) * | 2009-09-23 | 2010-06-23 | 北京视博数字电视科技有限公司 | Safe device, set-top box and receiving terminal for digital television receiving terminals |
| CN101702804A (en) * | 2009-11-23 | 2010-05-05 | 西安电子科技大学 | Two-party key agreement method based on self-certified public key |
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| WO2012055173A1 (en) | 2012-05-03 |
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