CN101820619B - Efficient and energy-saving link safety method in wireless sensor network - Google Patents

Efficient and energy-saving link safety method in wireless sensor network Download PDF

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CN101820619B
CN101820619B CN201010034175A CN201010034175A CN101820619B CN 101820619 B CN101820619 B CN 101820619B CN 201010034175 A CN201010034175 A CN 201010034175A CN 201010034175 A CN201010034175 A CN 201010034175A CN 101820619 B CN101820619 B CN 101820619B
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node
nodes
information
neighbor list
neighbor
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CN101820619A (en
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何泾沙
孙旭光
张兴
韦潜
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北京工业大学
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    • YGENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02DCLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THIR OWN ENERGY USE
    • Y02D70/00Techniques for reducing energy consumption in wireless communication networks
    • Y02D70/10Techniques for reducing energy consumption in wireless communication networks according to the Radio Access Technology [RAT]
    • YGENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02DCLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THIR OWN ENERGY USE
    • Y02D70/00Techniques for reducing energy consumption in wireless communication networks
    • Y02D70/10Techniques for reducing energy consumption in wireless communication networks according to the Radio Access Technology [RAT]
    • Y02D70/14Techniques for reducing energy consumption in wireless communication networks according to the Radio Access Technology [RAT] in Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers [IEEE] networks

Abstract

The invention relates to an efficient and energy-saving link safety method in a wireless sensor network, belonging to the cross technical field of a wireless sensor network and information safety. The invention establishes a neighbor list in which parameters used by the link safety method are stored. The invention adopts a method of encrypting sequence number fields at the header of a data frame, frame check sequence fields and a network grouping part together, can prevent malicious nodes from intercepting and analyzing flow of data of the wireless sensor network, and can confront active attacks of replay, denial of service, and the like initiated by the malicious nodes. The invention carries out link encryption under the condition of not changing the IEEE 802.15.4 general-purpose data frame structure, thus being simple and easy in use. The whole scheme comprises three stages of establishing the neighbor list, forwarding data and maintaining the neighbor list. Because the neighbor list has ingenious design, the three stages ensure that the sensor nodes have low expenses on computation, communication and storage, thus the invention is very suitable for the wireless sensor network with limited resources.

Description

无线传感器网络中高效节能的链路安全方法 Energy-efficient wireless sensor networks security method link

技术领域 FIELD

[0001] 本发明是利用单跳节点之间建立的邻居列表实现链路安全的ー种方法,用于防止恶意节点对无线传感器网络数据的窃听和流量分析,以及对抗恶意节点发起的主动攻击,属于无线传感器网络和信息安全交叉技术应用领域。 [0001] The present invention utilizes a list of neighbor nodes is established between the one-hop link security method to achieve ー for preventing eavesdropping and malicious nodes of the wireless sensor network data flow analysis, and against active attacks launched by malicious nodes, belonging to the wireless sensor network and information security applications cross-technology.

背景技术 Background technique

[0002] 传感器节点可用于探测周围环境的温湿度、光照、压カ等信息,由多个传感器节点和基站组成的无线传感网络通常布置于森林、农田、民用建筑等环境中收集人们感兴趣的信息。 [0002] Sensor nodes can be used to detect the ambient temperature and humidity, light, pressure and other information ka, wireless sensor network consists of a plurality of sensor nodes and base stations are typically arranged to collect those interested in the forest, agricultural, civil construction environment Information. 由于无线传感网络使用无线链路进行数据传输,而且传感器节点本身的资源非常有限,不能使用复杂的安全机制,因此无线传感网络面临许多的安全威胁,容易受到恶意节点的攻击。 As the wireless sensor network using a wireless link for data transmission and very limited resources sensor node itself, you can not use sophisticated security mechanisms, so the wireless sensor networks face many security threats, vulnerable to attacks by malicious nodes. 目前的解决方案倾向于构造应用层协议的安全策略,比如在应用层广泛使用的端到端加密、随机数以及消息验证码等技术。 Current solutions tend to construct a security policy application layer protocols, such as application-layer encryption end to end widespread use of a random number, and a message authentication code technology. 这种应用层的安全策略只能保证端到端的安全, 而中间节点仍然会遭受到多种攻击的威胁,如重放攻击、DoS拒绝服务攻击等,从而造成网络中传输的是已经被篡改的消息,而直到消息被基站接收后,通过消息验证码验证、随机数比较等才能发现错误,致使网络资源的利用率大大降低。 This application layer security policy can only guarantee the end to end security, while the intermediate node will still be threatened by a variety of attacks, such as replay attacks, DoS denial of service attacks, resulting in the transmission network that has been tampered with message, and after the base station until a message is received, authentication by a message authentication code, comparing the random number to find errors and the like, resulting in greatly reduced usage of network resources.

发明内容 SUMMARY

[0003] 无线传感器网络操作系统TinyOS中使用的基本链路安全方案只加密网络分组部分,即通过隐藏网络分组首部的源、目地址及数据总长度等字段,达到防止流量分析的目的。 [0003] The basic link security scheme TinyOS wireless sensor network operating system used to encrypt only part of the packet network, i.e., the source packet header portion by hiding the network destination address and the total data length field, the purpose of preventing traffic analysis.

[0004] 本发明与传统链路加密方法的不同之处在于要将数据帧首部的序列号字段和帧校验序列字段与网络分组部分ー块加密。 [0004] is different from the conventional link encryption method of the invention is to place the data frame sequence number field and a frame check sequence field of the header portion of the packet network ー block encryption. 加密序列号字段能够确保网络数据的新鮮性,防止重放攻击和拒绝服务攻击,以提高网络的可用性。 Encryption sequence number field to ensure the freshness of the data network, to prevent replay attacks and denial of service attacks, in order to improve the availability of the network. 加密帧校验序列字段,能够确保单跳节点之间数据传输的完整性,并作为应用层端到端的消息验证码验证的简单且实用的补充,以提高网络的利用率。 Encrypted frame check sequence field, to ensure the integrity of data transfer between a single hop, the application layer and end to end as a message authentication code verification simple and practical supplement to improve the utilization of the network. 加密采用对称加密算法来减轻传感器节点的计算负载,如在无线传感网络中广泛使用的RC5和RC6算法。 Encrypted using a symmetric encryption algorithm to reduce the computational load sensor nodes, RC5 and RC6 algorithm as widely used in a wireless sensor network. 本发明的优点在于可以在不改变IEEE 802. 15. 4通用数据帧结构的情况下实施链路加密,做到简单易用。 Advantage of the invention is that it can be implemented in the case of link encryption Generic data frame without changing the configuration IEEE 802. 15. 4, be simple to use. 并且充分考虑到传感器节点的资源有限性,采用了简单而有效的链路安全方法。 And fully take into account the limited resources of sensor nodes, using a simple and effective method of link security.

[0005] 整个方案包括邻居列表建立、数据转发和邻居列表维护三个阶段。 [0005] the entire program, including the establishment of a list of neighbor, the neighbor list data forwarding and maintain three stages. 在无线传感网络部署完成之后,就进入到邻居列表建立阶段。 After the completion of the deployment of wireless sensor networks, to enter the neighbor list establishment phase. 在网络运行期间,如果有新节点的加入,它也要与周围的旧节点建立邻居关系;如果有ー些节点被撤销,那么它们的邻居节点将从邻居列表中删除相关的数据。 During the operation of the network, if you have added a new node, it must establish a relationship with an old neighbor nodes around; if there ー those nodes is revoked, the associated data to their neighbors neighbor to delete from the list.

[0006] I.邻居列表建立阶段 [0006] I. neighbor list building phase

[0007] 邻居列表建立阶段主要包括邻居节点之间会话密钥的建立和序列号的协商。 [0007] The neighbor list establishment phase includes the establishment of consultation and serial number of the session key between neighbors. 如图I所示,各节点通过网络初始化时的路由请求信息建立邻居关系。 I shown in FIG., Each node when the route request information by establishing a neighbor relationship network initialization. 当一个节点第一次接收到路由请求信息,则将源节点的ID写入到邻居列表的第一行,同时也广播一条路由请求信息;如果又收到其它节点广播的路由请求信息,则只需将新信息的源ID写入到邻居列表即可;根据这些路由广播信息,一个节点要记录它所有邻居的初始序列号,用于计算会话密钥和共享的序列号。 When a first node receiving a route request information, the source node ID will be written to the first row of the neighbor list, but also broadcasts a route request message; if the other routing nodes and receives the broadcast request information only need to write information to the new source ID to the list of neighbor; the broadcast information based on these routes, node a sequence number to its initial record all neighbors, and for calculating a session key shared sequence number. 图I中,设定BS为收集网络节点感应信息的基站。 FIG. I, the set sensing network node BS to collect base station information. 网络部署后,首先由基站BS开始广播路由请求信息,信息类型用requet表示。 After the network deployment, the first request information from the base station BS starts broadcasting the route, the type of information represented by requet. 节点D和G在接收到路由请求信息后,也要分别广播一条路由请求信息。 Nodes D and G in the received route request message, respectively, also broadcasts a routing request message.

[0008] 设定D和G为任意相邻节点,以下同。 [0008] D and G are set to any adjacent node, hereinafter the same. 以这两个节点为例来说明无线传感器网络中相邻节点之间会话密钥和序列号的协商过程,其余的相邻节点之间会话密钥和序列号的协商过程与D和G的协商过程是一致的: In these two nodes will be described as an example negotiation and session key sequence numbers between adjacent nodes in wireless sensor networks, the process of negotiation of the session key and sequence number among the remaining neighbor nodes D and G the process is the same:

Figure CN101820619BD00061

[0013] *表示向所有邻居广播;Il为连接符;SNd和SNg分别为节点D和G的初始序列号,一个节点必须要记录它所有邻居的初始序列号;SNdg为节点D和G之间共享的序列号,它们被用于对抗重放攻击,且不同于OSI參考模型中传输层首部的标识数据流的序列号;energy为节点当前的能量值;Kd和Kg为节点D和G的个体密钥,而Kdg为两个相邻节点D和G之间共享的会话密钥;C(Kd, [IDd Il SNd Il energyj)表示用节点D的个体密钥Kd计算D所发送信息的验证码,用于验证此广播信息的完整性ば0为由两个參数组成的伪随机函数,函数值与第一个參数等长,而第二个參数的长度为固定值;㊉为异或运算A1是网络初始化密钥,由网络部署者随机生成ば0和K1在网络部署之前被预先分配给每个节点,通过它们一个节点能够计算网络内其它任意节点的个体密钥,Kd = f (K1, IDd),Kg = f (K1, IDg)。 [0013] * indicates a broadcast to all neighbors; Il is a connector; snd and SNg are nodes D and G of the initial sequence number, a node must be recorded initial sequence number all its neighbors; SNDG between nodes D and G shared sequence number, which are used against replay attacks, and is different from the sequence number identifying the data stream header transport layer in the OSI reference model; energy energy value of the current node; Kd of Kg and nodes D and G of the individual key, while Kdg between two adjacent nodes D and G shared session key; C (Kd, [IDd Il sNd Il energyj) shows a calculation codes D information transmitted by the individual key Kd node D , pseudo-random function is used to verify the integrity of this ba broadcast information by the two parameters are 0, the function value as long as the first parameter, the second parameter is the length of a fixed value; ㊉ iso or A1 is a network initialization operation key, randomly generated by a network deployer ba 0 and K1 is assigned in advance to each node in the network prior to deployment, a node can be calculated any other individual key nodes within the network through their, Kd = f (K1, IDd), Kg = f (K1, IDg). 在利用发送节点的个体密钥验证接收到的路由请求分组无误后,相邻节点就能获得相同的会话密钥和序列号,=f(Kd㊉Kg,SNd㊉SN8),SNdg = f (SNd, SNg)。 After the individual key authentication using the sending node receives the route request packet is correct, neighboring nodes can obtain the same session key and serial number, = f (Kd㊉Kg, SNd㊉SN8), SNdg = f (SNd, SNg). ー个节点将它计算得到的会话密钥和序列号按照对应的邻居节点ID存入邻居列表,节点能量字段对应此节点路由请求信息中energy的值,密钥生命周期由网络统一規定,邻居列表的结构如下所示:ー node it calculated the session key and the serial number stored in the neighbor list according to the corresponding neighbor node ID, the node corresponding to this node routing field energy value in the energy request information, key lifetime is defined by a unified network, the neighbor list the structure is as follows:

[0014] [0014]

邻居节点ID 会话密钥密钥生命周期~序列号能量 Neighbor Node ID key lifetime session key to SEQ ID NO energy

[0015] 表中的能量字段能够帮助ー个节点在路由表中选择能量最充足的节点作为信息传递的下一跳,从而延长了整个无线传感器网络的生命周期。 [0015] The energy field in a table to help select the most adequate nodes ー energy transfer node as the next hop information in the routing table, extending the life cycle of the entire wireless sensor network. 在邻居列表建立阶段,相邻节点在仅分别广播了一个路由请求信息的情况下就完成了会话密钥和序列号的协商,因此网络的通信负载被大大降低。 In the case where the neighbor list setup phase, each neighboring node only broadcasts a route request message is completed negotiated session key and serial number, the communication load of the network is greatly reduced. 邻居列表建立之后,每个节点都要删除它所有邻居的初始序列号,否则,入侵者可以利用被捕获节点计算出网络内所有节点的会话密钥。 After the establishment of neighbor lists, each node must delete all its neighbors initial sequence number, otherwise, the intruder can calculate the session key to all nodes in the network are captured using the node.

[0016] 2.数据转发阶段 [0016] 2. The data transfer phase

[0017] 邻居列表建成后,各节点就要根据邻居列表来转发数据。 After the [0017] neighbor list is completed, each node is necessary to forward data based on the neighbor list. 有了邻居列表,中间节点在作为路由器转发数据包时,就能确保这些数据包的来源准确,从而減少网络流量,并增加数据传输的安全性。 With the neighbor list, an intermediate node when forwarding the packet as a router, you can ensure that the source of these packets accurately, thereby reducing network traffic and increasing the security of data transmission.

[0018] 如图I和图2所示,监视区域的节点在得到兴趣信息后,要汇聚这些信息到基站。 [0018] As shown in FIG. I and 2, the node monitoring area after obtaining the interest information, to the information aggregation to the base station. 当节点G获得了兴趣信息,根据路由表,它要传送信息给基站必须要通过节点D。 When the node G interest information is obtained, according to the routing table, which information to be transmitted to the base station through the node must D. D在得到G传送的信息后,根据邻居列表和路由表选择节点A作为下ー跳,以此类推,直至将信息传送到基站BS。 After obtaining the information G D transmitted neighbor list according to the selection and routing table of node A as the next hop ー, and so on, until the transmit information to the base station BS. 中间节点D将源节点G发送来的数据分组转发给节点A的过程(包括它们的确认帧)如下: The intermediate node D to the source node G transmits data packets to the node A process (including their acknowledgment frame) as follows:

[0019] (I)G — D :E(Kdg, [SNdg II NPDU Il FCS1]) [0019] (I) G - D: E (Kdg, [SNdg II NPDU Il FCS1])

[0020] (2) D — G :E (Kdg, [ (SNdg+n) || FCS2]) [0020] (2) D - G: E (Kdg, [(SNdg + n) || FCS2])

[0021 ] (3) D — A :E (Kda,[SNda Il NPDU Il FCS3]) [0022] (4) A — D :E (Kda,[ (SNda+n) || FCS4]) [0021] (3) D - A: E (Kda, [SNda Il NPDU Il FCS3]) [0022] (4) A - D: E (Kda, [(SNda + n) || FCS4])

[0023] 步骤⑴中,节点G用它和节点D之间共享的会话密钥Kdg加密兴趣信息,其中SNdg是它们之间共享的序列号;Il为连接符;NPDU为网络分组,即数据帧的数据^CS1*该数据帧的校验序列,由硬件CRC方法实现。 [0023] Step ⑴, the node G between it and the node D with the shared session key encrypted Kdg interest information, which are shared among SNdg their serial numbers; Il to a connector; the NPDU of the network packet, i.e. the data frame ^ CS1 * data of the data frame check sequence, the method implemented by hardware CRC.

[0024] 在下面的三个步骤中,节点D根据图3所示的中间节点利用邻居列表转发数据帧算法来完成此次转发过程。 [0024] In the following three steps, using a neighbor node list node D shown in FIG. 3 the intermediate frame forwarding data forwarding algorithm to complete this process.

[0025] 步骤(2)中,节点D首先判断接收到的数据帧首部的源ID是否在自己的邻居列表当中,若ID不在表中则直接丢弃此数据帧,从而在不解密此数据帧的情况下就防止了外部恶意节点向网络内注入大量数据包的拒绝服务攻击,因此不但減少了节点本身的计算开销,而且还节省了其它合法节点的能量。 [0025] Step (2), the node D first judgment data received source ID of the frame header is in its neighbor list which, if the ID is not in the table directly discards the data frame, so that not decrypt the data frame the case of external malicious node prevents denial of service attacks inject large amounts of data packets into the network, so not only reduces the computational overhead of node itself, but also save energy other legitimate nodes. 看到节点G的ID在邻居列表之中,D就用它和G共享的会话密钥Kdg解密此数据帧,得到此帧中包含的SN' dg、NPDU'和FCS' i。 See the ID of the node G in the neighbor list, D and G use it Kdg shared session key to decrypt the data frame, the frame obtained contained SN 'dg, NPDU' and FCS 'i. 用得到的SN' dg与邻居列表中的SNdg相比较,如果不同则证明这是恶意节点利用合法节点ID发起的伪造攻击,要丢弃此数据帧;如果两个SN相同,则要重新计算此数据帧的校验序列FCS115若FCS1与FCS':不同,则证明这是恶意节点在已知合法节点SN的情况下发起的信息篡改攻击,要丢弃此数据帧。 Obtained with SN 'dg compared with the neighbor list SNDG, if different proved to be a malicious node using the node ID legitimate forgery attack launched, the data frame to be discarded; if the SN two identical, the data will have to recalculate If the frame check sequence FCS115 FCS1 and FCS ': different, it proves that the information is initiated by a malicious node in the case of known legitimate node SN tampering attacks, to discard the data frame. 若两个FCS也相同,则要判断NPDU首部的目的ID和源ID是否在节点D在路由表中。 If the two are the same FCS, will have to determine whether the destination ID of the NPDU header and source ID are in the node D in the routing table. 在正常情况下节点的路由表中只存在到基站的路由,但有些特殊情况下网络内的两个节点需要直接通信,这时某些相关节点存在基站为这两个节点指定的路由。 In the node's routing table is present under normal circumstances, only the route to the base station, but the two nodes in a network. In some cases the need for direct communication, the base station presence at this time the two nodes specified for certain relevant routing node. 图I中,只要节点D中存在到基站BS的路由,D就要根据路由表中对应的下一跳地址,查询它的邻居列表,找出能量最多的节点作为新数据帧的目的节点。 FIG. I, as long as a route to node D in the presence of the base station BS, D is necessary according to the next hop address corresponding table, query its neighbor list, find the most energy of the new node as the destination node of the data frame. 根据图I所示,D选择A节点作为下ー跳。 The I shown in FIG, D A selected node as the next jump ー. 然后,D修改邻居节点列表中的对应节点G的序列号SNdg为SNdg+n,再向它的上一跳节点G发送确认帧,即E(Kdg,[ (SNdg+n) II FCS2]),n为自然数,由网络统一规定其数值,用于对抗重放攻击,FCS2为计算得到的该确认帧的校验序列。 Then, D SNDG modifying sequence number corresponding to the node G neighbor node list is SNdg + n, again on its hop node G transmits an acknowledgment frame, i.e., E (Kdg, [(SNdg + n) II FCS2]), n is a natural number which is predetermined by the network uniform value for use against replay attacks, as FCS2 the acknowledgment frame check sequence calculated. 点对点路由还可以利用NPDU首部的源路由选择字段,虽然节点的路由表中不存在某个分组的目的路由,但分组首部存在源路由选择字段,中间节点就可按照该字段中指定的路由转发分组。 Peer routing may also use source routing NPDU header selection fields, while the purpose of routing a packet node's routing table does not exist, but a packet header exists source routing field, the intermediate node can follow this field specifies routing and forwarding packets . 为了加强安全,源路由选择字段要用基站的私钥进行签名。 For added security, source routing field to use private base station sign. 光有源路由选择字段还不够,中间节点还要看源路由选择字段指定的下一跳是否在它的邻居列表中,若不在则丢弃该数据帧,若存在则转到步骤⑶。 Optically active routing field is not enough, but also the intermediate node of the source routing field specifies whether the next hop in its neighbor list, if in the data frame is discarded, if present, go to step ⑶.

[0026] 步骤(3)中,节点D要找出该分组的下一跳节点A所对应的会话密钥Kda和序列号SNda,并计算新数据帧的校验序列,用Kda将SNda、NPDU、FCS3 一块加密,然后转发出去,即E(Kda, [SNda Il NPDU Il FCS3]),FCS3 为该帧的校验序列。 [0026] Step (3), to find the next hop node D to node A of the packet corresponding to the sequence number and the session key SNDA Kda, and calculates the frame check sequence the new data, with the Kda SNda, NPDU , FCS3 an encrypted, and then forwards, i.e. E (Kda, [SNda Il NPDU Il FCS3]), FCS3 for the frame check sequence.

[0027] 步骤⑷中,在接收到下一跳节点A发送的确认帧E(Kda,[(SNda+n) || FCS4])之后,节点D要验证该确认帧的完整性、保密性和新鮮性,即确认帧的源地址IDa必须在D的邻居列表中,序列号必须是SNda+n,解密后得到的帧校验序列FCS' 4必须和重新计算得到的帧校验序列FCS4—致。 [0027] Step ⑷, upon receiving the next hop node A sends an acknowledgment frame E (Kda, [(SNda + n) || FCS4]) after node D to verify the integrity of the acknowledgment frame, and confidentiality freshness, i.e., the source address of the acknowledgment frame must IDa neighbor list D, the serial number must be SNda + n, the decrypted frame check sequence FCS '4, and a frame check sequence must be re-calculated actuation FCS4- . 另外,因为是确认帧,所以并不涉及路由问题。 In addition, because it is an acknowledgment frame, it does not involve routing problems. 验证通过后,节点D要修改邻居列表中节点A对应的序列号SNda为SNda+n。 After the verification, the node D to node A in the neighbor list edit sequence number corresponding to SNDA SNda + n.

[0028] 当信息传到基站时,基站只需向信息的上一跳节点发送ー个确认帧,并修改与信息的上一跳节点共享的序列号。 [0028] When the information to the base station, the base station simply sends a hop node information ー acknowledgment frame, and modifying sequence number shared with the previous hop node information. 如果节点D的父节点就是基站,D转发数据的过程与D的父节点是普通节点时一致。 If the same parent node is the parent node of the base station D, the process of forwarding data D and D is a common node.

[0029] 在数据转发的过程中,网络节点通过使用会话密钥保护网络分组的内容和防止流量分析,通过序列号保证传输数据的新鮮性,通过使用帧校验序列确保数据的完整性。 [0029] During data transfer, the network node protected content using a session key and to prevent packet network traffic analysis, by sequence numbers to ensure the freshness of the data transmission to ensure data integrity by using a frame check sequence. 另夕卜,会话密钥和序列号也能起到认证对方身份的作用。 Bu the other evening, a session key and serial number can also play a role in the authentication of the identity of the other party. 在数据链路层将序列号SN与数据分组NPDU —块加密,也能起到CBC加密方式的效果,即使是同样的数据,得到的密文也不一样。 The data link layer sequence number SN of the data packet NPDU - block cipher, the effect can also play CBC encryption mode, even if the same data is not the same ciphertext obtained.

[0030] 3.邻居列表维护阶段 [0030] 3. The neighbor list maintenance phase

[0031] 在路由维护过程中,邻居列表中节点的能量值相应地进行更新。 [0031] In the process route maintenance, energy values ​​of nodes in the neighbor list updated accordingly. 在会话密钥生命周期达到预设的门限后,相邻节点之间要完成会话密钥和序列号的更新。 After the session key life cycle reaches a preset threshold, between adjacent nodes to complete the update session key and serial number. 更新只能由一方发起,即或者由节点D发起,或者由节点G发起,但不能由双方发起。 Updates can only be initiated by one party or that is initiated by node D, or initiated by node G, but can not be initiated by both parties. 假定由ID小的一方发起,节点D和G的邻居列表更新如下: Assuming initiated by a small party ID, neighbor nodes D and G list updated as follows:

[0032] If IDd < IDg Then [0032] If IDd <IDg Then

[0033] D — G:update Il IDdII IDgII E(Kdg,[K' dg || IDd || IDg || SNdg || SN' dg]) [0033] D - G: update Il IDdII IDgII E (Kdg, [K 'dg || IDd || IDg || SNdg || SN' dg])

[0034] G —D:IDg Il IDd Il E(K' dg,[IDg || IDd || SN' dg+n]) [0034] G -D: IDg Il IDd Il E (K 'dg, [IDg || IDd || SN' dg + n])

[0035] 其中,update表示信息的类型;K' dg和SN' dg分别为新的会话密钥和序列号。 [0035] wherein, update information indicating a type; K 'dg and SN' dg respectively, a new session key and serial number. 若D的ID号小于G的ID号,则由节点D向G发起会话密钥和序列号的更新过程。 If D is less than the ID number of the ID number of G, node D by initiating a session key updating process and the sequence number G. D将它新生成的会话密钥K' dg和序列号SN' dg用旧会话密钥Kdg加密后发往G,确保它们不会因被窃听而泄漏给攻击者,同时加密的IDd Il IDg Il SNdg能够检测出此信息是否被恶意篡改或重放。 D it generates a new session key K 'dg and sequence number SN' dg After sent to the old session key encrypted Kdg G, to ensure that they will not be leaked to the attacker eavesdropping while encrypted IDd Il IDg Il SNdg possible to detect whether the information is malicious tampering or replay. 在接收到D发送的更新分组之后,G用新会话密钥K' dg加密确认分组来表示此次协商的成功,同时加密的IDg Il IDd Il SN' dg+n能够保证确认分组的完整性和新鲜性。 After receiving the update transmission packet D, G, with a new session key K 'dg encrypted acknowledgment packet to indicate the success of the negotiation, while the encrypted IDg Il IDd Il SN' dg + n can ensure packet integrity validation and freshness.

[0036] D、G两节点在更新会话密钥和序列号之后,分别将更新后的数据保存在它们的邻居列表当中。 [0036] D, G after two nodes update sequence number and the session key, the updated data are stored in the neighbor list among them. 对于故障或能量耗尽的节点,在向它们发送数据失败后,如果多次重传仍收不到它们的确认帧,即重传次数达到预设的门限,则认为它们不可达。 For node failure or energy depletion, failed after sending data to them, if multiple retransmissions still have not received their acknowledgment frame, that is, the number of retransmissions reaches a preset threshold, they are considered unreachable. 在通过入侵检测机制发现变节节点之后,由基站负责将相关的信息通知给变节节点的邻居。 After the discovery node by renegade intrusion detection mechanism, the base station is responsible to notify the relevant information to the renegade neighbor nodes. 而对于故障或能量耗尽的节点以及变节节点的处理,邻居节点只需从它们的邻居列表中将相关的数据删除即可。 For a node failure or run out of energy and renegade node processing, neighbors only relevant data will be deleted from the list of their neighbors.

[0037] 会话密钥和序列号的定期更新,能够有效防止入侵者的密码分析,从而使会话密钥和序列号得到有效的保护。 [0037] The session key sequence number and regularly updated, can effectively prevent intruders cryptanalysis, so that the session key and serial number are effectively protected. 从邻居列表中删除无效节点的相关信息后,节点就不会再向这些节点发送信息,从而能够有效地减少节点的计算和通信负载。 After you remove the invalid information from a neighbor node list, the node will no longer send information about these nodes, which can effectively reduce the load of computing and communication nodes. 将变节节点的信息从邻居列表中删除后,该恶意节点将被孤立,路由也将绕过该节点,从而该恶意节点所发起的任何攻击就不再会起作用。 After the defection of information nodes removed from the neighbor list, the malicious node will be isolated, the route will bypass the node, so that any attack launched by the malicious node will no longer work.

附图说明 BRIEF DESCRIPTION

[0038] 图I (a)邻居关系请求 [0038] FIG I (a) request the neighbor relationship

[0039] 图I (b)邻居关系确立[0040] 图2数据转发阶段示意图 [0039] a schematic view [0040] FIG 2 data forwarding stage of FIG. I (b) establishing a neighbor relationship

[0041] 图3数据转发阶段中间节点利用邻居列表转发数据帧的算法流程图 A flowchart of the algorithm [0041] FIG. 3 the data forwarding node using an intermediate stage of the neighbor list for forwarding data frames

[0042] 图4 (a)邻居关系发现 [0042] FIG. 4 (a) neighbor relationship found

[0043] 图4(b)邻居关系反馈[0044] 图4(c)路由表传播 [0043] FIG. 4 (b) the neighbor relationship feedback [0044] FIG. 4 (c) propagating the routing table

[0045] 图4(d)路由表建立 [0045] FIG. 4 (d) establishing a routing table

[0046] 图5 (a)恶意节点窃听网络数据和分析网络流量 [0046] FIG. 5 (a) and malicious nodes eavesdropping network analysis of network traffic data

[0047] 图5 (b)恶意节点发起重放攻击 [0047] FIG. 5 (b) the malicious node initiates a replay attack

[0048] 图5(c)恶意节点发起拒绝服务攻击 [0048] FIG. 5 (c) malicious nodes denial of service attack

[0049] 图5(d)恶意节点发起篡改攻击 [0049] FIG. 5 (d) node initiates a malicious tampering attacks

[0050] 图6 (a)会话密钥生命周期到期的处理 Processing [0050] FIG. 6 (a) is a session key lifetimes expire

[0051] 图6(b)故障或能量耗尽的节点的处理 [0051] The processing of FIG. 6 (b) energy depletion or failure of a node

[0052] 图6 (C)变节节点的处理 Processing [0052] FIG. 6 (C) defection node

具体实施方式 Detailed ways

[0053] 本实施例中的无线传感网络(网络拓扑图如图4所示)由美国Crossbow公司的8个MICAz传感器节点和I个基站(基站由I个MICAz处理器/射频板与I个MIB520USBPC网关连接而成)共同组成,采用安装有MoteView客户端监控软件的IBM PC机汇聚由传感器节点所采集的数据,其中包括温度(単位:摄氏度)、相対湿度(単位:% )、光照(单位:每平方米流明)数据。 [0053] In this embodiment of the wireless sensor network (network topology shown in Figure 4) by the United States company Crossbow eight sensor nodes and I MICAz base stations (base stations of the I MICAz processor / radio board and the I MIB520USBPC gateway connected to each other) composed, using attached MoteView client monitoring software IBM PC machine data gathered by the sensor node collected, including a temperature (unit: degrees), phase Dui humidity (unit:%), light (unit : lumens per square meter) data. 实施例中使用的加密算法为RC5算法。 The encryption algorithm used in the examples is of RC5.

[0054] I.邻居列表建立阶段 [0054] I. neighbor list building phase

[0055] 在网络的初始化阶段,各节点需要形成到基站的路由,在形成路由的过程中各节点也相应地确立邻居关系,并建立邻居列表。 [0055] In the initialization stage of the network, each node requires a route to the base station is formed, each node establishes neighbor relations accordingly during the formation of a route and to establish a neighbor list. 本实施例采用图4所示的方法获取路由,同时建立邻居列表。 The method of the present embodiment uses the acquisition route shown in FIG. 4, while building a neighbor list.

[0056] I)邻居关系发现 [0056] I) neighbor relationship discovery

[0057] 如图4(a)所示,基站BS向整个网络广播邻居发现分组,如果一个节点第一次接收到邻居发现分组,则将分组的源地址写入到邻居列表的第一行,同时继续广播邻居发现分组;如果已接收过邻居发现分组,则只需将分组的源地址写入到邻居列表即可。 [0057] FIG. 4 (a), the base station BS broadcast to the entire network discovery packets neighbors if a first node receives a neighbor discovery packet, the source address of the packet is written into the first row of the neighbor list, while continuing to broadcast a neighbor discovery packets; if received through the neighbor discovery packet, you can simply write the source address of the packet to the neighbor list can be.

[0058] 实验中,节点H的邻居节点为D和E,但H首先从D处获得了邻居发现分组,因此节点D是它的父节点。 [0058] In the experiment, node H neighbor nodes D and E, but H D first obtained from the neighbor discovery packet, the node D as its parent node. 节点C的邻居节点为E和F,而节点E是它的父节点。 Neighbor node C, E and F, and node E is its parent. 一个节点的邻居列表的第一行记录的就是该节点的父节点的相关信息,也就是说在下ー阶段,节点要将它的邻居信息通过这个节点反馈给基站。 Related information node is the parent node of the first rows of a node neighbor list, which means that the next ー stage, its neighbor nodes you want the information to the base station through this node. ー个节点在获悉它的邻居之后,利用前面发明内容中给出的方法计算出与邻居共享的会话密钥和序列号,并完成邻居列表的创建。ー node upon learning of its neighbors, and neighbors to calculate the shared session key and the serial number using the method given in the foregoing Summary of the Invention, and create a complete neighbor list.

[0059] 2)邻居关系反馈 [0059] 2) neighbor relationships feedback

[0060] 经过邻居发现阶段之后,整个网络形成了以基站为根的反馈树,如图4(b)所示。 [0060] After a neighbor discovery phase, the entire base station network forms a feedback rooted tree, as shown in FIG 4 (b) shown in FIG. 每个网络节点都有唯一的路径通往基站,如H — D — A — BS,C — E — B — BS。 Each node has a unique network path to the base station, such as H - D - A - BS, C - E - B - BS. 每个节点均将它的邻居信息通过反馈路径发往基站,这个反馈分组是单播包,仅仅包含一个节点的所有邻居的ID号,并不包含邻居列表中的其它信息。 Each node to its neighbor information sent to the base station the feedback path, the feedback packet is a unicast packet, only includes one node ID numbers of all the neighbors, do not contain other information in the neighbor list. 而且每个节点所发的反馈包要用它与基站唯一共享的主密钥加密,以确保其邻居关系的安全性。 And each node to use the feedback packet issued by its unique encrypted master key shared with the base station, in order to ensure the safety of their neighbor relationship. [0061] 3)路由表传播 [0061] 3) Routing table spread

[0062] 如图4(c)所示,当基站收到网络中所有节点的路由反馈包后,它就获得了整个网络的节点相邻情況,如下表所示。 [0062] FIG. 4 (c), when the base station receives a network routing all nodes feedback packet, it is obtained a node of the whole network of adjacent case, as shown in the following table.

[0063] [0063]

Figure CN101820619BD00101

[0064] [0064]

[0065] 基站BS利用上表计算得出整个网络的拓扑图,井根据Dijkstra算法为网络中的甸个节点计算到达基站的路由表,甸个节点可以抑有多条到达基站的路径,实现负载均衡和入侵容忍。 [0065] The base station BS is calculated by using the table obtained topology of the entire network, as well Austin network node calculates the route to the base station table according to the Dijkstra algorithm, Austin nodes can be suppressed under multipath reach the base station, load balancing and intrusion tolerance. 然后基站将每个节点的路由表分别单播给它们,路由表单播包中的数据与包头的SN字段要用每个节点与基站唯一共享的主密钥进行加密,以保证路由信息的安全性。 The base station then each node's routing table to them are unicast, multicast packet data routing form in the SN field of the header of each node and the base station use the shared unique master key encrypted to ensure the security of routing information .

[0066] 2.数据转发阶段 [0066] 2. The data transfer phase

[0067] 在数据转发阶段,如图4(d)所示,各传感器节点采集所处环境的温度、相対湿度和光照数据发往基站BS,这些信息通过安装在IBM PC机上的MoteView软件进行汇聚、分祈。 [0067] In the data forwarding phase, 4 (d), the sensor nodes collect temperature of the environment, humidity and light Dui phase data to the base station the BS, information on an IBM PC by installing the machine to be aggregated FIG software MoteView , sub-Chi. 各节点之间利用刚建立的邻居列表中的信息,将数据帧首部的SN、FCS字段与网络数据报部分一块加密,以保护网络分组的内容和防止流量分析,并达到保证传输数据的新鮮性、完整性和可认证性的目的。 Use between the node information neighbor list newly created in the header of the data frame SN, FCS fields network datagram section an encrypted to protect the content of the network packet and to prevent traffic analysis, and to achieve the guaranteed data transmission freshness , integrity and authentication of the object can be. 邻居列表中的能量字段能够帮助ー个节点在路由表中选择能量最充足的节点作为信息传递的下一跳,从而延长了整个无线传感器网络的生命周期。 Energy field in the neighbor list to help select the most adequate nodes ー energy transfer node as the next hop information in the routing table, extending the life cycle of the entire wireless sensor network. 实施例中选择的邻居列表的每项长度为14字节,结构如下所示: Each of the neighbor list according to the length selected embodiment is 14 bytes, the structure shown below:

[0068] 2字节 8字节 I字节 2字节I字节 [0068] 8 bytes 2 bytes 2 bytes byte I byte I

[0069] [0069]

Figure CN101820619BD00102

[0070] 现在,我们在网络中放置ー个恶意节点(同为MICAz节点),如图5所示,用于发动各种恶意攻击,以检验我们的安全机制所起的作用。 [0070] Now, we place ー malicious nodes in the network (the same as MICAz node), as shown in Figure 5, is used to launch malicious attacks, to test our security role.

[0071] I)恶意节点发起被动攻击 [0071] I) passive node initiates a malicious attack

[0072] 如图5(a)所示,将恶意节点M置于网络中基站BS及节点A、B的传播范围之内,用来窃听它们发送或接收的数据流。 [0072] FIG. 5 (a), the malicious node M is placed in the base station BS and the network nodes A, B, of the propagation range, for which tapping stream sent or received. 设置窃听的时间为10分钟,然后分析M所窃听到的数据。 Eavesdropping set time of 10 minutes, and then analyzed by tapping into M data. 在收集到的所有数据帧中,M只能看到数据帧的源、目地址,即节点的ID号,而帧中的网络数据报是一堆乱码,无法分析出其内容,甚至得不到网络数据报的源、目地址,无法进行流量分析。 All collected data frames, M is only see the source, destination address of the data frame, ID, i.e. a node number, the network data packet frame is garbled, its contents can not be analyzed, not even source network of the datagram destination address, traffic analysis can not be performed. 虽然大量数据均是发往BS的,但由于M得不到数据报的目的地址,因此无法确定BS的身份。 Although large amounts of data are sent to the BS, but due to lack of M destination address of the datagram, it can not determine the identity of the BS.

[0073] 2)恶意节点发起重放攻击 [0073] 2) malicious node initiates a replay attack

[0074] 如图5(b)所示,将恶意节点M置于节点B、C、E、F的传播范围之内。 [0074] FIG. 5 (b), the malicious node M disposed within the propagation range of Node B, C, E, F of the. 首先,M窃听这四个节点之间的数据流,然后重放给接收节点。 First, a data stream M eavesdropping between these four nodes, and the reproduction to the receiving node. 如M将F发给B的数据帧重放给B,B收到数据帧,发现是F发送给它的,因此在邻居列表中找到节点F对应的会话密钥Kbf和序列号SNbf。 F M as the data sent to the reproducing frame B B, B receives the data frame F is sent to find it, so finding the node F and the corresponding session key Kbf SNbf sequence number in the neighbor list. B首先用会话密钥Kbf解密相关信息,得到序列号SN' bf,发现SN' bf与邻居列表中的序列号SNbf并不一致,因此B将这个重复的数据包丢弃。 B is first decrypted with the session key Kbf information, obtain the sequence number SN 'bf, we found SN' SEQ ID SNbf bf neighbor list are not consistent, and therefore this B discarding duplicate packets.

[0075] 3)恶意节点发起拒绝服务攻击 [0075] 3) node initiates a malicious denial of service attack

[0076] 如图5(c)所示,将恶意节点M置于节点A、B、D、E、H的传播范围之内,准备向它们发动拒绝服务攻击。 [0076] FIG. 5 (c), the node M is placed malicious node A, B, within the propagation range D, E, H of the ready to launch denial of service attacks them. 首先,M窃听这几个节点之间的数据通信,获得数据帧首部的源、目地址,然后根据这些字段伪造大量它们之间通信的数据包,井向它们连续发送。 First, the data communication between the M eavesdropping these nodes, to obtain the source, destination address of the data frame header, and then forge a large packet communication between them in accordance with these fields, they are continuously transmitted to the wells. 接收节点按照图3所示算法验证这些数据包,虽然这些包的源、目地址在它们的邻居列表当中,但利用会话密钥解密相关信息后,发现数据帧中的序列号与邻居列表并不一致,因而不再继续检验,直接将这些数据包丢弃。 The receiving node according to the algorithm shown in FIG. 3 verify these data packets, while the packet's source, destination address in the neighbor list among them, but the use of the session key to decrypt information, find the sequence number in the data frame is not consistent with the neighbor list thus no further testing, discard the packets directly.

[0077] 4)恶意节点发起篡改攻击 [0077] 4) a malicious node initiates tampering attacks

[0078] 恶意节点采用类似无线局域网中隐藏站问题的方法进行攻击。 [0078] malicious nodes using similar wireless LAN hidden station problem methods of attack. 如图5(d)所示,M和A同处在D的传输范围之内,D将采集数据发往A,M在接收D发送数据的同时使用定向天线向A发送干扰信号,致使A无法正常接收D发送的数据,而M却在D未发现信号冲突的情况下完整地获得了D的数据。 FIG. 5 (d) as shown, M and A are in the transmission range of the D, D the collected data to the A, interference signal is transmitted using a directional antenna to A M D while receiving the transmitted data, so that A can not D is normally received data transmitted, and M was not found in the case of signal collision D complete data D is obtained. 然后,M篡改这个数据再发给A。 Then, M tamper with this data and then distributed to A. A利用邻居列表解密此数据帧,按照图3所示算法,序列号一致,然后计算FCS,发现与此帧中的FCS,并不一致,因此将此数据帧丢弃,从而解决了恶意篡改攻击的问题。 A neighbor list using decrypt the data frame, the algorithm, a consensus sequence numbers shown in Figure 3, and then calculates FCS, found that this frame is not consistent with the FCS, so this data frame dropping, thereby solving the problem of malicious tampering attacks .

[0079] 3.邻居列表维护阶段 [0079] 3. The neighbor list maintenance phase

[0080] 在此阶段的实验中,我们设置三个场景来检验邻居列表的维护情况,如图6所示。 [0080] In this phase of the experiment, we set up three scenarios to test maintain a neighbor list, as shown in Figure 6.

[0081] I)对于会话密钥生命周期到期的处理 [0081] I) for the treatment of a session key lifetimes expire

[0082] 在会话密钥生命周期达到预设的门限后,相邻节点之间要完成会话密钥和序列号的更新。 [0082] After the session key life cycle reaches a preset threshold, between adjacent nodes to complete the update session key and serial number. 如图6(a)所示,我们设置会话密钥生命周期为50次,节点上传所采集数据的时间间隔为10秒。 FIG 6 (a) shows, we set the key lifetime of the session 50, the node upload the data acquisition time interval is 10 seconds. 4分钟后,B、E两节点间首先进行了会话密钥的更新,然后,各节点间相继更新了会话密钥。 After 4 minutes, B, E between two nodes updated first session key, and then, successively updated between nodes session key.

[0083] 2)对于故障或能量耗尽的节点的处理 [0083] 2) For a node failure or treatment of energy depletion

[0084] 我们设置到不可达节点重传次数的门限为10次。 [0084] we set the number of retransmissions to unreachable nodes threshold of 10 times. 如图6(b)所示,我们将节点E关闭,节点H和C在向E发送数据失败后,10次重传仍收不到E的确认帧,相继认为E不可达。 FIG 6 (b), the node E will be off, and node H E C after a failure to send data, 10 still have not received acknowledgment retransmission frame is not E, E successively considered unreachable. H只能将数据传给D,而C只能将数据传给F,H和C将邻居列表中和E相关的信息删除。 H only the data to the D, but C can pass data to F, H and C will delete E neighbor list and related information.

[0085] 3)对于变节节点的处理 [0085] 3) Processing for defection node

[0086] 如图6 (C)所示,我们设置D为变节节点,基站BS将相关信息通知给A和H,但无法通知节点G,则G变成孤立节点,仍将数据发给D。 [0086] FIG. 6 (C), the node we set D is defected, the base station BS-related information to the A and H, but failed to notify the node G, the node G becomes isolated, still data to the D. 节点A和H在接收到BS发送的信息后,分别将节点D的信息从它们的邻居列表中删除。 The nodes A and H, after receiving the message transmitted by the BS, information of the node D are deleted from the list of their neighbors. 这时,无论D发送任何信息,A和H均不予理睬。 At this time, regardless of any information transmitted D, A, and H are ignored.

[0087] 实验表明,本发明完全能够防止恶意节点对网络数据的窃听和流量分析,能够有效地对抗恶意节点发起各种主动攻击以及在此基础之上的Sybil攻击、node replication攻击、Wormhole攻击和rushing攻击,从而确保无线传感网络中数据的保密性、内容完整性、来源可鉴别性和资源可用性。 [0087] Experiments show that the present invention is fully possible to prevent eavesdropping and malicious nodes on network data traffic analysis can be effective against a variety of malicious nodes to initiate active attacks, and Sybil attack is on this basis, node replication attack, attack and Wormhole rushing attack, so as to ensure the confidentiality of data in the wireless sensor network, content integrity, and can identify the source of resource availability.

Claims (1)

1.无线传感器网络中高效节能的链路安全方法,其特征在于,包括邻居列表建立、数据转发和邻居列表维护三个阶段;在无线传感器网络部署完成之后,就进入到邻居列表建立阶段;在网络运行期间,如果有新节点的加入,它也要与周围的旧节点建立邻居关系;如果有一些节点被撤销,那么它们的邻居节点将从邻居列表中删除相关的数据; 1)邻居列表建立阶段邻居列表建立阶段包括邻居节点之间会话密钥的建立和序列号的协商;各节点通过网络初始化时的路由请求信息建立邻居关系;当ー个节点第一次接收到路由请求信息,则将源节点的ID写入到邻居列表的第一行,同时也广播一条路由请求信息;如果又收到其它节点广播的路由请求信息,则只需将新信息的源ID写入到邻居列表即可;根据这些路由请求信息,一个节点要记录它所有邻居的初始序列号 1. The energy-efficient wireless sensor network link security method, comprising establishing a neighbor list, the neighbor list maintenance data forwarding and three stages; Once deployed in a wireless sensor network, the neighbor list proceeds to establishment stage; in during the operation of the network, if you have added a new node, it must establish a relationship with an old neighbor nodes around; if you have some nodes is revoked, the associated data to their neighbors neighbor to delete from the list; 1) the establishment of a list of neighbor establishing a neighbor list negotiation stage comprises establishing a session key and serial number between neighboring nodes; each node when the route request information by establishing a neighbor relationship network initialization; ー node when the first received route request information, the source node ID written to the first row of the neighbor list, but also broadcasts a route request message; if they receive a routing information request to other nodes broadcast, simply writes new information to the source ID list of the neighbor can be ; these routing request message, a node sequence number to its initial record all neighbors 用于计算会话密钥和共享的序列号;设定BS为收集网络节点感应信息的基站;网络部署后,首先由基站BS开始广播路由请求信息,信息类型用requet表示;设定D和G为任意相邻节点,以下同;节点D和G在接收到路由请求信息后,也要分别广播一条路由请求信息; 以D和G这两个节点为例来说明无线传感器网络中相邻节点之间会话密钥和序列号的协商过程,其余的相邻节点之间会话密钥和序列号的协商过程与D和G的协商过程是一致的: D — * :request | IDd SNd | energyd | | C (Kd, [IDd | SNd | energyj) G — * :request | IDg SNg | energyg | | C (kg, [IDg | SNg | energyj) Kdg =f(Kd ㊉ Kg, SNd ㊉ SNg) SNdg = f(SNd, SNg) *表示向所有邻居广播;II为连接符;SNd和SNg分别为节点D和G的初始序列号,一个节点必须要记录它所有邻居的初始序列号;SNdg为节点D和G之间共享的序列号;energy为节点当前的能量 And for calculating a session key shared sequence number; set base station BS to the network node collecting the sensing information; the network deployment, the first request information from the base station BS starts broadcasting the route, the type of information represented by requet; set D and G any adjacent node, with the following; nodes D and G after receiving the routing request message, respectively, also broadcasts a route request message; and D to G will be explained as an example the two nodes between adjacent nodes in the wireless sensor network session key negotiation process and sequence number, and session key negotiation process between the serial number and the remaining neighbor nodes D and G of the negotiation process is the same: D - *: request | IDd sNd | energyd | | C (Kd, [IDd | sNd | energyj) G - *: request | IDg SNg | energyg | | C (kg, [IDg | SNg | energyj) Kdg = f (Kd ㊉ kg, sNd ㊉ SNg) SNdg = f (sNd , SNg) * denotes a broadcast to all neighbors; II is a connector; snd and SNG are nodes D and G of the initial sequence number, a node must be recorded initial sequence number all its neighbors; SNDG between nodes D and G shared sequence number; energy energy current node ;kd和kg为节点D和G的个体密钥,而Kdg为两个相邻节点D和G之间共享的会话密钥;C(Kd,[IDd| I SNd I energyj)表示用节点D的个体密钥Kd计算D所发送信息的验证码,用于验证此广播信息的完整性ばO是伪随机函数;㊉为异或运算A1是网络初始化密钥,由网络部署者随机生成ばO和K1在网络部署之前被预先分配给每个节点,ー个节点通过f()和K1能够计算网络内其它任意节点的个体密钥;在利用发送节点的个体密钥验证接收到的路由请求信息无误后,相邻节点D和G就能获得相同的会话密钥和序列号,Kdg= f (Kd® Kg, SNd® SN8), = SNg); 一个节点将它计算得到的会话密钥和序列号按照对应的邻居节点ID存入邻居列表,邻居列表由邻居节点ID、会话密钥、密钥生命周期、序列号和能量五个字段组成;邻居列表中节点的能量值通过路由请求信息中energy字段的值获得; 2)数据转发阶段 ; Kd and Kdg kg and shared between two adjacent nodes D and G session key for the nodes D and G of the individual key,; C (Kd, [IDd | I SNd I energyj) represented by the node D D is calculated Kd individual key codes transmitted information, the broadcast information is used to verify the integrity of ba O is a pseudo random function; ㊉ exclusive oR operation A1 network initialization key, randomly generated by the network and deployer ba O K1 before network deployment is previously assigned to each node, ー by f () can be calculated and the individual key K1 any other nodes within the network node; in an individual sending node using authentication key received route request information is correct after neighboring nodes D and G can obtain the same session key and serial number, Kdg = f (Kd® Kg, SNd® SN8), = SNg); session key and a node sequence number it calculated stored in a corresponding neighbor node ID of the neighbor list, the neighbor list from the neighboring node ID, session key, key lifetime, sequence number and energy of five fields; neighbor list of nodes in the energy value by the energy field in the routing information request the values ​​obtained; 2) data forwarding phase 居列表建成后,中间节点就要根据邻居列表来转发数据; 监视区域的节点在得到兴趣信息后,要汇聚这些信息到基站BS ;节点G和D,D和A分别为相邻节点,以它们为例来说明数据转发过程;当节点G获得了兴趣信息,根据邻居列表,它要传送信息给基站必须要通过节点D ;D在得到G传送的信息后,根据邻居列表和路由表选择节点D的父节点A作为下ー跳;以此类推,直至将信息传送到基站BS ;节点D将源节点、G发送来的数据分组转发给节点A的过程如下: (1)GD :E(Kdg, [SNdgI INPDU| |FCS1]) (2)DG:E(Kdg, [ (SNdg+n) | FCS2]) (3) D — A :E (Kda, [SNda I INPDU | | FCS3]) (4)A —D :E(Kda,[ (SNda+n) | FCS4]) 步骤⑴中,节点G用它和节点D之间共享的会话密钥Kdg加密兴趣信息,其中SNdg是它们之间共享的序列号;II为连接符;NPDU为网络分组,即数据帧的数据;FCSi为该数据帧的校验序列; 步骤(2) After the ranking list is completed, the intermediate node will be forwarded according to a neighbor list data; node after obtaining the monitoring area of ​​interest information, to the base station information to the BS converge; node G and D, D and A are adjacent nodes to which an example to illustrate the process of data forwarding; node G when the interest information is obtained, according to the neighbor list information to be transmitted to the base station it must pass through the node D; G D after obtaining the information transmitted, in accordance with neighbor list and a routing table to select the node D a parent node as the next jump ー; and so on, until the base station to transmit information to the BS; source node forwarding node D, G data packets transmitted to the node a as follows: (1) GD: E (Kdg, [SNdgI INPDU | | FCS1]) (2) DG: E (Kdg, [(SNdg + n) | FCS2]) (3) D - A: E (Kda, [SNda I INPDU | | FCS3]) (4) a -D: E (Kda, [(SNda + n) | FCS4]) ⑴ step, the node G between it and the node D with the shared session key encrypted Kdg interest information, which is shared between them SNdg sequences number; II as a connector; the NPDU of the network packet, i.e. the data frame; FCSI check sequence for the data frames; step (2) 中,节点D首先判断接收到的数据帧首部的源ID是否在自己的邻居列表当中,若ID不在表中则直接丢弃此数据帧;看到节点G的ID在邻居列表之中,D就用它和G共享的会话密钥Kdg解密此数据帧,得到此帧中包含的SN' dg、NPDU和FCS':;用得到的SN' dg与邻居列表中的SNdg相比较,如果不同则证明这是恶意节点利用合法节点ID发起的伪造攻击,要丢弃此数据帧;如果两个SN相同,则要重新计算此数据帧的校验序列FCS1 ;若FCS1与FCS':不同,则证明这是恶意节点在已知合法节点SN的情况下发起的信息篡改攻击,要丢弃此数据帧;若两个FCS也相同,则要判断NPDU首部的目的ID和源ID是否在节点D在路由表中,若在则要根据路由表中对应的下一跳地址,查询邻居节点列表,找出能量最多的节点作为新数据帧的目的节点;然后,D修改邻居列表中对应上一跳节点G的序列号SNdg为SNdg+n, , The node D first determines source ID received data frame header if their neighbors in the list, if the table ID is not in the data frame is discarded directly; see the ID of the node G in the neighbor list, to use D it G shared session key to decrypt the data frame Kdg give SN 'dg, NPDU and FCS' :; contained in this frame with SN 'dg compared with the neighbor list SNdg obtained, if different prove is a malicious node using the node ID legitimate forgery attack launched, the data frame to be discarded; if the SN two identical, will have to recalculate the data frame check sequence FCS1; if FCS1 with FCS ': different, it proved to be malicious originating node information in the case of known legitimate node SN tampering attacks, to discard the data frame; FCS if both are the same, they have determined NPDU header destination ID and source ID are in the node D in the routing table, if will have a next hop in the routing table corresponding to the query neighbor node list, find the most energy of the node as the destination node of the new data frame; then, D corresponding to modify the sequence number in the neighbor list SNdg hop node G is SNdg + n, 向节点G发送确认帧,即E (Kdg, [ (SNdg+n) | FCS2]),n为自然数;FCS2为通过计算得到的该确认帧的校验序列; 步骤(3)中,节点D要找出该分组的下一跳节点A所对应的会话密钥Kda和序列号SNda,并计算新数据帧的校验序列,用Kda将SNda、NPDU、FCS3 一块加密,然后转发出去,即E(Kda,[SNdJ NPDU FCS3]),FCS3为该帧的校验序列; 步骤⑷中,在接收到下一跳节点A发送的确认帧E(Kda,[(SNda+n) | |FCSj)之后,节点D也要验证该确认帧的完整性、保密性和新鲜性,即确认帧的源地址IDa必须在D的邻居列表中,序列号必须是SNda+n,解密后得到的帧校验序列FCS' 4必须和重新计算得到的帧校验序列FCS4 —致;验证通过后,节点D要修改邻居列表中节点A对应的序列号SNda为SNda+n ; 当信息传到基站时,基站只需向信息的上一跳节点发送ー个确认帧,并修改与信息的上一跳节点共享的序列号;如 To node G transmits an acknowledgment frame, i.e., E (Kdg, [(SNdg + n) | FCS2]), n is a natural number; FCS2 through check sequence of the acknowledgment frame is calculated; in step (3), the node D to a find the next hop node of the packet corresponding to the sequence number and the session key SNDA Kda, and calculates the frame check sequence the new data, with the Kda SNda, NPDU, FCS3 an encrypted, and then forwards, i.e., E ( kda, [SNdJ NPDU FCS3]), FCS3 for frame check sequence; ⑷ step, upon receiving the acknowledgment frame E (kda, [(SNda + n) of the next hop node a sends | | after FCSj), node D also verify the integrity, confidentiality and freshness of the acknowledgment frame, i.e., the source address of the acknowledgment frame must IDa neighbor list D, the serial number must be SNda + n, a frame check sequence FCS of the decrypted '4 and a frame check sequence must be recalculated FCS4 - induced; after the verification, the node D to node a in the neighbor list edit sequence number corresponding to SNDA SNda + n; when information is transmitted to the base station, only to hop node information transmitted on ー acknowledgment frame, and modify the shared node with the hop sequence number information; such as 节点D的父节点就是基站,转发过程与D的父节点是普通节点时一致; .3)邻居列表维护阶段在路由维护过程中,邻居列表中节点的能量值相应地进行更新;在会话密钥生命周期达到预设的门限后,相邻节点之间要完成会话密钥和序列号的更新;更新只能由一方发起,即或者由节点D发起,或者由节点G发起,但不能由双方发起;假定由ID小的一方发起,节点D和G的邻居列表更新如下: If IDd < IDg Then D —G:update| |lDd| |lDg| |E(Kdg,[K' dg| | IDd| | IDg| | SNdg| | SN' dg]) GD :IDg| |lDd| |E (K/ dg, [IDg| |lDd| |SN/ dg+n]) 其中,update表示信息的类型为邻居列表更新;K' dg和SN' dg分别为新的会话密钥和序列号;若D的ID号小于G的ID号,则由节点D向G发起会话密钥和序列号的更新过程;D将它新生成的会话密钥K' dg和序列号SN' dg用旧会话密钥Kdg加密后发往G,确保它们不会因被窃听而泄漏给 Parent of the node is the parent node of the base station D, D with the forwarding process is the same when the common node; .3) a neighbor list in the route maintenance phase during maintenance, energy values ​​of nodes in the neighbor list updated accordingly; session key after the life cycle reaches a preset threshold, between adjacent nodes to complete the update session key and serial number; updates can only be initiated by one party or that is initiated by node D, or initiated by node G, but can not be initiated by the parties ; assumed by the party initiating smaller ID, neighbor nodes D and G list updated as follows: If IDd <IDg Then D -G: update | | lDd | | lDg | | E (Kdg, [K 'dg | | IDd | | IDg | | SNdg | | SN 'dg]) GD: IDg | | lDd | | E (K / dg, [IDg | | lDd | | SN / dg + n]) where, update type information indicating updates the neighbor list ; K 'dg and SN' dg respectively, a new session key and serial number; if D is less than the ID number of the ID number of G, node D by initiating a session key updating process and the sequence number to G; D it newly generated session key K 'dg and sequence number SN' dg sent to the G old Kdg encrypted session key, to ensure that they will not be leaked to eavesdropping 击者,同时加密的IDd| IlDgI SNdg能够检测出此信息是否被恶意篡改或重放;在接收到D发送的更新分组之后,G用新会话密钥SN' dg加密确认分组来表示此次协商的成功,同时加密的IDg II IDd II SN' dg+n能够保证确认分组的完整性和新鲜性; D、G两节点在更新会话密钥和序列号之后,分别将更新后的数据保存在它们的邻居列表当中;对于故障或能量耗尽的节点,在向它们发送数据失败后,如果多次重传仍收不到它们的确认帧,即重传次数达到预设的门限,则认为它们不可达;在通过入侵检测机制发现变节节点之后,由基站负责将相关的信息通知给变节节点的邻居;而对于故障或能量耗尽的节点以及变节节点的处理,邻居节点只需从它们的邻居列表中将相关的数据删除即可。 Were hit, while the encrypted IDd | IlDgI SNdg possible to detect whether the information is reproduced or tampering; after receiving an update packet transmitted D, G session key with a new SN 'dg encrypted negotiation acknowledgment packet to indicate the success, while the encrypted IDg II IDd II SN 'dg + n can guarantee the integrity and freshness acknowledgment packet; D, G after two nodes update the session key, and serial number, the updated data are stored in their the neighbor list them; for node failure or energy depletion, failed after sending data to them, if multiple retransmissions still have not received their acknowledgment frame, that is, the number of retransmissions reaches a preset threshold, they are considered not up; after the discovery node by renegade intrusion detection mechanism, the base station is responsible to notify the relevant information to the renegade neighbor nodes; and for malfunction or run out of energy nodes and node processing renegade, just from their neighbors neighbor list relevant data will be deleted.
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