WO2008033786A1 - Security language translations with logic resolution - Google Patents
Security language translations with logic resolution Download PDFInfo
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- WO2008033786A1 WO2008033786A1 PCT/US2007/078081 US2007078081W WO2008033786A1 WO 2008033786 A1 WO2008033786 A1 WO 2008033786A1 US 2007078081 W US2007078081 W US 2007078081W WO 2008033786 A1 WO2008033786 A1 WO 2008033786A1
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F9/00—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F15/00—Digital computers in general; Data processing equipment in general
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F17/00—Digital computing or data processing equipment or methods, specially adapted for specific functions
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
- G06F21/36—User authentication by graphic or iconic representation
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
- G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
- G06F21/6236—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database between heterogeneous systems
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F3/00—Input arrangements for transferring data to be processed into a form capable of being handled by the computer; Output arrangements for transferring data from processing unit to output unit, e.g. interface arrangements
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/2141—Access rights, e.g. capability lists, access control lists, access tables, access matrices
Definitions
- Electronic security paradigms can keep professional information confidential and personal information private. Electronic security paradigms may involve some level of encryption and/or protection against malware, such as viruses, worms, and spyware. Both encryption of information and protection from malware have historically received significant attention, especially in the last few years.
- Access control has been a common feature of shared computers and application servers since the early time-shared systems. There are a number of different approaches that have been used to control access to information. They share a common foundation in combining authentication of the entity requesting access to some resource with a mechanism of authorizing the allowed access. Authentication mechanisms include passwords, Kerberos, and x.5O9 certificates. Their purpose is to allow a resource-controlling entity to positively identify the requesting entity or information about the entity that it requires.
- Authorization examples include access control lists (ACLs) and policy-based mechanisms such as the extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) or the PrivilEge and Role Management Infrastructure (PERMIS). These mechanisms define what entities may access a given resource, such as files in a file system, hardware devices, database information, and so forth. They perform this authorization by providing a mapping between authenticated information about a requestor and the allowed access to a resource.
- ACLs access control lists
- XACML extensible Access Control Markup Language
- PERMIS PrivilEge and Role Management Infrastructure
- Security language constructs may be translated into logic language constructs and vice versa.
- Logic resolution may be effected using, for example, the logic language constructs.
- translation of a security language assertion into at least one logic language rule is described.
- translation of a proof graph reflecting a logic language into a proof graph reflecting a security language is described.
- evaluation of a logic language program using a deterministic algorithm is described.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating an example general environment in which an example security scheme may be implemented.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating an example security environment having two devices and a number of example security-related components.
- FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating the example security environment of FIG. 2 in which example security-related data is exchanged among the security-related components.
- FIG. 4 is a block diagram of an example device that may be used for security-related implementations as described herein.
- FIG. 5 is a block diagram illustrating an example assertion format for a general security scheme.
- FIG. 6 is a block diagram illustrating an example security scheme having a security language that enables flexible specification and enforcement of decentralized authorization polices.
- FIG. 7 is a flow diagram that illustrates an example of a method for checking the safety of a security language to guarantee authorization query evaluations complete efficiently.
- FIG. 8 is a flow diagram that illustrates an example of a method for translating a security language to a logic language.
- FIG. 9 is a block diagram illustrating an example deterministic evaluation algorithm with tabling.
- FIG. 10 is a block diagram of an example logic language proof graph that is produced during an evaluation algorithm and that includes graph fragments.
- FIG. 11 is a flow diagram that illustrates an example of a method for translating a logic language proof graph to a security language proof graph.
- FIGS. 12A and 12B are block diagrams of example proof fragments for a logic language and a corresponding security language, respectively, for a conditional semantics rule.
- FIGS. 13A and 13B are block diagrams of example proof fragments for a logic language and a corresponding security language, respectively, for a delegation semantics rule.
- FIGS. 14A and 14B are block diagrams of example proof fragments for a logic language and a corresponding security language, respectively, for an alias semantics rule.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating an example general environment in which an example security scheme 100 may be implemented.
- Security scheme 100 represents an integrated approach to security.
- security scheme 100 includes a number of security concepts: security tokens 100(A), security policies 100(B), and an evaluation engine 100(C).
- security tokens 100(A) and security policies 100(B) jointly provide inputs to evaluation engine 100(C).
- Evaluation engine 100(C) accepts the inputs and produces an authorization output that indicates if access to some resource should be permitted or denied.
- security scheme 100 can be overlaid and/or integrated with one or more devices 102, which can be comprised of hardware, software, firmware, some combination thereof, and so forth.
- devices 102 can be comprised of hardware, software, firmware, some combination thereof, and so forth.
- “d” devices are interconnected over one or more networks 104. More specifically, device 102(1), device 102(2), device 102(3) ... device 102(d) are capable of communicating over network 104.
- Each device 102 may be any device that is capable of implementing at least a part of security scheme 100.
- Examples of such devices include, but are not limited to, computers (e.g., a client computer, a server computer, a personal computer, a workstation, a desktop, a laptop, a palm-top, etc.), game machines (e.g., a console, a portable game device, etc.), set-top boxes, televisions, consumer electronics (e.g., DVD player/recorders, camcorders, digital video recorders (DVRs), etc.), personal digital assistants (PDAs), mobile phones, portable media players, some combination thereof, and so forth.
- An example electronic device is described herein below with particular reference to FIG. 4.
- Network 104 may be formed from any one or more networks that are linked together and/or overlaid on top of each other.
- networks 104 include, but are not limited to, an internet, a telephone network, an Ethernet, a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN), a cable network, a fibre network, a digital subscriber line (DSL) network, a cellular network, a Wi-Fi ® network, a WiMAX ® network, a virtual private network (VPN), some combination thereof, and so forth.
- Network 104 may include multiple domains, one or more grid networks, and so forth. Each of these networks or combination of networks may be operating in accordance with any networking standard.
- device 102(1) corresponds to a user 106 that is interacting with it.
- Device 102(2) corresponds to a service 108 that is executing on it.
- Device 102(3) is associated with a resource 110.
- Resource 110 may be part of device 102(3) or separate from device 102(3).
- User 106, service 108, and a machine such as any given device
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating an example security environment 200 having two devices 102(A) and 102(B) and a number of example security-related components.
- Security environment 200 also includes an authority 202, such as a security token service (STS) authority.
- STS security token service
- Device 102(A) corresponds to an entity 208.
- Device 102(B) is associated with resource 110.
- STS security token service
- device 102(A) includes two security-related components: a security token 204 and an application 210.
- Security token 204 includes one or more assertions 206.
- Device 102(B) includes five security- related components: an authorization context 212, a resource guard 214, an audit log 216, an authorization engine 218, and a security policy 220.
- Security policy 220 includes a trust and authorization policy 222, an authorization query table 224, and an audit policy 226.
- Each device 102 may be configured differently and still be capable of implementing all or a part of security scheme 100.
- device 102(A) may have multiple security tokens 204 and/or applications 210.
- device 102(B) may not include an audit log 216 or an audit policy 226. Other configurations are also possible.
- authority 202 issues security token 204 having assertions 206 to entity 208.
- Assertions 206 are described herein below, including in the section entitled "Security Policy Assertion Language Example Characteristics”. Entity 208 is therefore associated with security token 204. In operation, entity 208 wishes to use application 210 to access resource 110 by virtue of security token 204.
- Resource guard 214 receives requests to access resource 110 and effectively manages the authentication and authorization process with the other security-related components of device 102(B).
- Trust and authorization policy 222 includes policies directed to trusting entities and authorizing actions within security environment 200.
- Trust and authorization policy 222 may include, for example, security policy assertions (not explicitly shown in FIG. 2).
- Authorization query table 224 maps requested actions, such as access requests, to an appropriate authorization query.
- Audit policy 226 delineates audit responsibilities and audit tasks related to implementing security scheme 100 in security environment 200.
- Authorization context 212 collects assertions 206 from security token 204, which is/are used to authenticate the requesting entity, and security policy assertions from trust and authorization policy 222. These collected assertions in authorization context 212 form an assertion context. Hence, authorization context 212 may include other information in addition to the various assertions.
- authorization engine 218 The assertion context from authorization context 212 and an authorization query from authorization query table 224 are provided to authorization engine 218. Using the assertion context and the authorization query, authorization engine 218 makes an authorization decision. Resource guard 214 responds to the access request based on the authorization decision. Audit log 216 contains audit information such as, for example, identification of the requested resource 110 and/or the algorithmic evaluation logic performed by authorization engine 218.
- FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating example security environment 200 in which example security-related data is exchanged among the security-related components.
- the security-related data is exchanged in support of an example access request operation.
- entity 208 wishes to access resource 110 using application 210 and indicates its authorization to do so with security token 204.
- application 210 sends an access request* to resource guard 214.
- an asterisk i.e., "*" indicates that the stated security-related data is explicitly indicated in FIG. 3.
- entity 208 authenticates* itself to resource guard 214 with a token*, security token 204.
- Resource guard 214 forwards the token assertions* to authorization context 212.
- These token assertions are assertions 206 (of FIG. 2) of security token 204.
- Security policy 220 provides the authorization query table* to resource guard 214.
- the authorization query table derives from authorization query table module 224.
- the authorization query table sent to resource guard 214 may be confined to the portion or portions directly related to the current access request.
- the policy assertions may include both trust- related assertions and authorization-related assertions.
- Security policy 220 forwards the policy assertions* to authorization context 212.
- Authorization context 212 combines the token assertions and the policy assertions into an assertion context.
- the assertion context* is provided from authorization context 212 to authorization engine 218 as indicated by the encircled "A".
- An authorization query is ascertained from the authorization query table.
- Resource guard 214 provides the authorization query (auth. query*) to authorization engine 218.
- Authorization engine 218 uses the authorization query and the assertion context in an evaluation algorithm to produce an authorization decision.
- the authorization decision (auth. den.*) is returned to resource guard 214.
- Whether entity 208 is granted access* to resource 110 by resource guard 214 is dependent on the authorization decision. If the authorization decision is affirmative, then access is granted. If, on the other hand, the authorization decision issued by authorization engine 218 is negative, then resource guard 214 does not grant entity 208 access to resource 110.
- the authorization process can also be audited using semantics that are complementary to the authorization process.
- the auditing may entail monitoring of the authorization process and/or the storage of any intermediate and/or final products of, e.g., the evaluation algorithm logically performed by authorization engine 218.
- security policy 220 provides to authorization engine 218 an audit policy* from audit policy 226.
- an audit record* having audit information may be forwarded from authorization engine 218 to audit log 216.
- audit information may be routed to audit log 216 via resource guard 214, for example, as part of the authorization decision or separately.
- FIG. 4 is a block diagram of an example device 102 that may be used for security-related implementations as described herein.
- Multiple devices 102 are capable of communicating across one or more networks 104. As illustrated, two devices 102(A/B) and 102(d) are capable of engaging in communication exchanges via network 104. Although two devices 102 are specifically shown, one or more than two devices 102 may be employed, depending on the implementation.
- a device 102 may represent any computer or processing-capable device, such as a client or server device; a workstation or other general computer device; a PDA; a mobile phone; a gaming platform; an entertainment device; one of the devices listed above with reference to FIG. 1; some combination thereof; and so forth.
- device 102 includes one or more input/output (I/O) interfaces 404, at least one processor 406, and one or more media 408.
- Media 408 include processor-executable instructions 410.
- I/O interfaces 404 may include (i) a network interface for communicating across network 104, (ii) a display device interface for displaying information on a display screen, (iii) one or more man-machine interfaces, and so forth.
- network interfaces include a network card, a modem, one or more ports, and so forth.
- display device interfaces include a graphics driver, a graphics card, a hardware or software driver for a screen or monitor, and so forth.
- Printing device interfaces may similarly be included as part of I/O interfaces 404.
- man-machine interfaces include those that communicate by wire or wirelessly to man-machine interface devices 402 (e.g., a keyboard, a remote, a mouse or other graphical pointing device, etc.).
- processor 406 is capable of executing, performing, and/or otherwise effectuating processor-executable instructions, such as processor-executable instructions 410.
- Media 408 is comprised of one or more processor-accessible media. In other words, media 408 may include processor- executable instructions 410 that are executable by processor 406 to effectuate the performance of functions by device 102.
- processor-executable instructions include routines, programs, applications, coding, modules, protocols, objects, components, metadata and definitions thereof, data structures, application programming interfaces (APIs), schema, etc. that perform and/or enable particular tasks and/or implement particular abstract data types.
- processor-executable instructions may be located in separate storage media, executed by different processors, and/or propagated over or extant on various transmission media.
- Processor(s) 406 may be implemented using any applicable processing-capable technology.
- Media 408 may be any available media that is included as part of and/or accessible by device 102. It includes volatile and non-volatile media, removable and non-removable media, and storage and transmission media (e.g., wireless or wired communication channels).
- media 408 may include an array of disks/flash memory/optical media for longer-term mass storage of processor-executable instructions 410, random access memory (RAM) for shorter-term storing of instructions that are currently being executed, link(s) on network 104 for transmitting communications (e.g., security-related data), and so forth.
- media 408 comprises at least processor-executable instructions 410.
- processor-executable instructions 410 when executed by processor 406, enable device 102 to perform the various functions described herein, including those actions that are illustrated in the various flow diagrams.
- processor- executable instructions 410 may include a security token 204, at least one of its assertions 206, an authorization context module 212, a resource guard 214, an audit log 216, an authorization engine 218, a security policy 220 (e.g., a trust and authorization policy 222, an authorization query table 224, and/or an audit policy 226, etc.), some combination thereof, and so forth.
- processor-executable instructions 410 may also include an application 210 and/or a resource 110.
- SecPAL security policy assertion language
- the SecPAL implementation of this section is described in a relatively informal manner and by way of example only. It has an ability to address a wide spectrum of security policy and security token obligations involved in creating an end-to-end solution. These security policy and security token obligations include, by way of example but not limitation: describing explicit trust relationships; expressing security token issuance policies; providing security tokens containing identities, attributes, capabilities, and/or delegation policies; expressing resource authorization and delegation policies; and so forth.
- SecPAL is a declarative, logic- based language for expressing security in a flexible and tractable manner.
- the uniform mechanism can be comprehensive, and it can provide a uniform mechanism for expressing trust relationships, authorization policies, delegation policies, identity and attribute assertions, capability assertions, revocations, audit requirements, and so forth.
- This uniformity provides tangible benefits in terms of making the security scheme understandable and analyzable.
- the uniform mechanism also improves security assurance by allowing one to avoid, or at least significantly curtail, the need for semantic translation and reconciliation between disparate security technologies.
- a SecPAL implementation may include any of the following example features: [1] SecPAL can be relatively easy to understand. It may use a definitional syntax that allows its assertions to be read as English-language sentences. Also, its grammar may be restricted such that it requires users to understand only a few subject- verb-object (e.g., subject-verb phrase) constructs with cleanly defined semantics. Finally, the algorithm for evaluating the deducible facts based on a collection of assertions may rely on a small number of relatively simple rules.
- SecPAL can leverage industry standard infrastructure in its implementation to ease its adoption and integration into existing systems. For example, an extensible markup language (XML) syntax may be used that is a straightforward mapping from the formal model. This enables use of standard parsers and syntactic correctness validation tools. It also allows use of the W3C XML Digital Signature and Encryption standards for integrity, proof of origin, and confidentiality. [0053] [3] SecPAL may enable distributed policy management by supporting distributed policy authoring and composition. This allows flexible adaptation to different operational models governing where policies, or portions of policies, are authored based on assigned administrative duties. Use of standard approaches to digitally signing and encrypting policy objects allow for their secure distribution. [4] SecPAL enables an efficient and safe evaluation. Simple syntactic checks on the inputs are sufficient to ensure evaluations will terminate and produce correct answers.
- XML extensible markup language
- SecPAL can provide a complete solution for access control requirements supporting required policies, authorization decisions, auditing, and a public-key infrastructure (PKI) for identity management. In contrast, most other approaches only manage to focus on and address one subset of the spectrum of security issues.
- PKI public-key infrastructure
- SecPAL may be sufficiently expressive for a number of purposes, including, but not limited to, handling the security issues for Grid environments and other types of distributed systems. Extensibility is enabled in ways that maintain the language semantics and evaluation properties while allowing adaptation to the needs of specific systems.
- FIG. 5 is a block diagram illustrating an example assertion format
- assertion format 500 for a general security scheme.
- Security scheme assertions that are used in the implementations described otherwise herein may differ from example assertion format 500.
- assertion format 500 is a basic illustration of one example format for security scheme assertions, and it provides a basis for understanding example described implementation of various aspects of a general security scheme.
- an example assertion at a broad level includes: a principal portion 502, a says portion 504, and a claim portion 506. Textually, the broad level of assertion format 500 may be represented by: principal says claim.
- an example claim portion 506 includes: a fact portion 508, an if portion 510, "n" conditional factj n portions 508(1... n), and a c portion 512.
- the subscript "n” represents some integer value.
- c portion 512 represents a constraint portion. Although only a single constraint is illustrated, c portion 512 may actually represent multiple constraints (e.g., C 1 , ..., C n ).
- the set of conditional fact portions 508(1... n) and constraints 512(1... m) on the right-hand side of if portion 510 may be termed the antecedent.
- claim portion 506 may be represented by: fact if fact ⁇ ,
- the overall assertion format 500 may be represented textually as follows: principal says fact if fact ⁇ , ... , fact n , c. However, an assertion may be as simple as: principal says fact. In this abbreviated, three- part version of an assertion, the conditional portion that starts with if portion 510 and extends to c portion 512 is omitted.
- Each fact portion 508 may also be further subdivided into its constituent parts.
- Example constituent parts are: an e portion 514 and a verb phrase portion 516.
- e portion 514 represents an expression portion.
- a fact portion 508 may be represented by: e verbphrase.
- Each e or expression portion 514 may take on one of two example options. These two example expression options are: a constant 514(c) and a variable 514(v). Principals may fall under constants 514(c) and/or variables 514(v).
- Each verb phrase portion 516 may also take on one of three example options. These three example verb phrase options are: a predicate portion 518 followed by one or more ei ...n portions 514(1... n), a can assert portion 520 followed by a fact portion 508, and an alias portion 522 followed by an expression portion 514. Textually, these three verb phrase options may be represented by: predicate e x ... e n , can assert fact, and alias e, respectively. The integer "n” may take different values for facts 508(1... n) and expressions 514(1...n).
- SecPAL statements are in the form of assertions made by a security principal.
- Security principals are typically identified by cryptographic keys so that they can be authenticated across system boundaries.
- an assertion states that the principal believes a fact is valid (e.g., as represented by a claim 506 that includes a fact portion 508). They may also state a fact is valid if one or more other facts are valid and some set of conditions are satisfied (e.g., as represented by a claim 506 that extends from a fact portion 508 to an if portion 510 to conditional fact portions 508(1... n) to a c portion 512). There may also be conditional facts 508(1... n) without any constraints 512 and/or constraints 512 without any conditional facts 508(1... n).
- facts are statements about a principal.
- Four example types of fact statements are described here in this section.
- a fact can state that a principal has the right to exercise an action(s) on a resource with an "action verb".
- Example action verbs include, but are not limited to, call, send, read, list, execute, write, modify, append, delete, install, own, and so forth.
- Resources may be identified by universal resource indicators (URIs) or any other approach.
- a fact can express the binding between a principal identifier and one or more attribute(s) using the "possess" verb.
- Example attributes include, but are not limited to, email name, common name, group name, role title, account name, domain name server/service (DNS) name, internet protocol (IP) address, device name, application name, organization name, service name, account identification/identifier (ID), and so forth.
- DNS domain name server/service
- IP internet protocol
- ID account identification/identifier
- An example third type of fact is that two principal identifiers can be defined to represent the same principal using the "alias" verb.
- Quantifiers or fact qualifiers may be included as part of any of the above three fact types. Qualifiers enable an assertor to indicate environmental parameters (e.g., time, principal location, etc.) that it believes should hold if the fact is to be considered valid. Such statements may be cleanly separated between the assertor and a relying party's validity checks based on these qualifier values.
- An example fourth type of fact is defined by the "can assert” verb.
- This "can assert” verb provides a flexible and powerful mechanism for expressing trust relationships and delegations. For example, it allows one principal (A) to state its willingness to believe certain types of facts asserted by a second principal (B). For instance, given the assertions "A says B can assert fact ⁇ " and "5 says factO”, it can be concluded that A believes factO to be valid and therefore it can be deduced that "A says factO”.
- Such trust and delegation assertions may be (i) unbounded and transitive to permit downstream delegation or (ii) bounded to preclude downstream delegation.
- qualifiers can be applied to "can assert” type facts, omitting support for qualifiers to these "can assert” type facts can significantly simplify the semantics and evaluation safety properties of a given security scheme.
- concrete facts can be stated, or policy expressions may be written using variables.
- the variables are typed and may either be unrestricted (e.g., allowed to match any concrete value of the correct type) or restricted (e.g., required to match a subset of concrete values based on a specified pattern).
- Security authorization decisions are based on an evaluation algorithm (e.g., that may be conducted at authorization engine 218) of an authorization query against a collection of assertions (e.g., an assertion context) from applicable security policies (e.g., a security policy 220) and security tokens (e.g., one or more security tokens 204).
- Authorization queries are logical expressions, which may become quite complex, that combine facts and/or conditions. These logical expressions may include, for example, AND, OR, and/or NOT logical operations on facts, either with or without attendant conditions and/or constraints.
- This approach to authorization queries provides a flexible mechanism for defining what must be known and valid before a given action is authorized.
- Query templates e.g., from authorization query table 2244 form a part of the overall security scheme and allow the appropriate authorization query to be declaratively stated for different types of access requests and other operations/actions .
- Security is critical in modern computing systems. Security may be facilitated with an efficient, high assurance, and flexible mechanism for determining authorized access. This is achievable using a policy-based approach. In such systems, policy can change to reflect current needs without having to change the underlying code for making and enforcing access decisions.
- FIG. 6 is a block diagram illustrating an example security scheme
- Security scheme 600 having a security language 602 that enables flexible specification and enforcement of decentralized authorization polices.
- Security scheme 600 includes an assertion syntax 604 and an authorization query syntax 606.
- Security scheme also includes a number of semantics rules 608(x).
- Example semantics rules include, but are not limited to: conditional semantics rule 608(1), delegation semantics rule 608(2), and alias semantics rule 608(3). These semantics rules 608(x) jointly form language semantics 602.
- Assertion syntax 604, authorization query syntax 606, and language semantics 608 each contribute to the formation and governance of example security language 602.
- Security scheme also includes assertion syntax safety checks 610 and authorization query safety checks 612.
- Assertion syntax safety checks 610 and authorization query safety checks 612 may be integrated into security language 602 to help ensure authorization query tractability.
- example syntax and semantics for assertions of the security language are described.
- example syntax and semantics for authorization queries are described.
- safety principles for the assertions and authorization queries are described. These safety properties, when properly applied, can guarantee that an authorization query evaluation will terminate and can ensure that the evaluation will proceed efficiently.
- Additional syntax for a security language may provide for the grouping of assertions, for example to delegate a series of rights in a single assertion; however, additions such as these can be reduced to the core syntax.
- An example implementation of the security language may also enforce a typing discipline for constants, functions, and variables, but such typing enforcement is omitted here to concentrate on the core syntax. Assertions
- assertions may be similar to Horn clauses, with the difference that (1) they are qualified by some principal A who issues and vouches for the asserted claim; (2) facts can be nested, using the keyword can assert, by means of which delegation rights are specified; and (3) variables in the assertion are constrained by c, a first order formula that can express, e.g., temporal, inequality, tree structure, regular expression constraints, and so forth.
- PredicateNames predicate name, e.g possesses, can
- variables only range over strings and integers — but not predicates, facts, claims or assertions.
- a phrase of syntax is ground when it contains no variables.
- the set PredicateNames may not contain can ass ⁇ rt ⁇ , can assert (1 , and alias.
- Functions and predicates have a fixed arity.
- a predicate is a verb phrase with holes for its object parameters. If it has multiple words, these holes may appear at any fixed position within it, e.g. has access from [— ] t i l l [— ].
- Facts can be nested, as can be seen from the syntax definition above. Nested facts are of the form e ⁇ can assert m ... e n can assert ⁇ fact, for some n ⁇ l, where fact is flat, as defined next.
- Definition 2.1 A fact is flat iff can assert does not occur in it, and nested otherwise. For example, the fact Alice says Bob can read /is flat, but Alice says Charlie can assert 0 Bob can read/is not flat.
- Constraints range over any constraint domain that extends the example basic constraint domain shown below.
- Basic constraints include integer inequalities (e.g., for expressing temporal constraints), tree order constraints (e.g., for directories), and regular expressions (e.g., for ad hoc filtering). Examples of basic constraints are set forth below:
- Delegation semantics rule 608(2) with a "can assert" verb implementation for the general delegation-directive verb, is as follows:
- Alias semantics rule 608(3) is as follows:
- Rule (cond) allows the deduction of matching assertions in AC with all free variables substituted by constants.
- conditional facts must be deducible, and the substitution must also make the constraint(s) valid.
- the delegation flag D is propagated to all conditional facts.
- Rule (can assert) deduces an assertion made by A by combining a can assert assertion made by A and a matching assertion made by B. In a described strict logical implementation, this rule applies when the delegation flag is ⁇ . The matching assertion made by B must be proved with the delegation flag D obtained frame's can assert assertion.
- Authorization requests are decided by querying an assertion context (containing local as well as imported assertions).
- an authorization query may include a collection of atomic queries of the form A says fact and constraints c, combined by logical connectives, including negation.
- An example authorization query syntax 606 is as follows:
- the resulting query language is more expressive than in other logic-based languages where only atomic queries are considered. For example, separation of duties, threshold and denying policies can be expressed by composing atomic queries with negation and constraints.
- negation is not allowed within the assertion language, as coupling negation with a recursive language results in semantic ambiguities, and often to higher computational complexity or even undecidability.
- By restricting the use of negation to the level of authorization queries (rather than adding these features to the assertion language itself), we effectively separate it from recursion, thereby circumventing the problems usually associated with negation.
- the semantics of queries is defined by the relation AC, ⁇ ⁇ - q. In the following, let ⁇ be the empty substitution. Note that negated queries and constraints are grounded, and that conjunctions are not commutative, as the second query may be instantiated by the outcome of the first query.
- an authorization algorithm Given a query q and an authorization context AC, an authorization algorithm should return the set of all substitutions ⁇ such that AC, ⁇ ⁇ - q. If the query is ground, the answer set will be either empty (meaning "no") or be a singleton set containing the empty substitution ⁇ (meaning "yes"). If the query contains variables, then the substitutions in the answer set are all the variable assignments that make the query true. [0108] In the following section, section 4, safety conditions for ensuring that this set of variable assignments is finite and meaningful are described. Section 9 below gives an algorithm for evaluating authorization queries.
- authorization queries are part of the local policy and may be kept separate from imperative code.
- authorization queries belonging to a local assertion context are kept in a single place, termed the authorization query table.
- the table provides an interface to authorization queries by mapping parameterized method names to queries.
- the resource guard calls a method (instead of issuing a query directly) that gets mapped by the table to an authorization query, which is then used to query the assertion context.
- an authorization query table could contain the mapping: canAuthorizePaymentfr ⁇ /t ⁇ ester, payment) :
- the authorization algorithm is required to terminate and return a complete set of answers with respect to the described semantics, no matter what the inputs are. Without further restrictions, this cannot be guaranteed as the constraint domain is not constraint compact. Thus, in a described implementation, relatively simple, purely syntactic restrictions are enforced on assertions and queries. [0113] Definition 4.1. (Assertion safety check 610 (of FIG. 6)): Let
- Vars(c) c Vars(fact) u Vars(factj) u ... u Vars(fact n );
- the safety condition guarantees that the evaluation of the logic language translation, as described below in section 8, terminates in all cases and is complete. Furthermore, the safety condition enables a simple handling of constraints within the evaluation algorithm of section 8 : as long as the query is flat, all variables of a constraint are fully instantiated when conditional predicates are processed, so constraints do not need to be propagated, and there is no need to implement complex constraint solving algorithms. [0117] We now define a safety condition on authorization queries that guarantees that the set of substitutions is finite, given that the assertions of the assertion context is safe.
- a safe assertion inference rule is:
- a safe conjunction inference rule is:
- a safe disjunction inference rule is:
- a safe negation inference rule is: 1 Ih ⁇ q : U
- a safe constraint inference rule is:
- An authorization query q is safe iff there exists a set of variables O such that 0 If- gr .- O.
- Checking safety can be done by recursively traversing all subqueries and thereby constructing the set O (which is always uniquely determined by the query and I).
- FIG. 7 is a flow diagram 700 that illustrates an example of a method for checking the safety of a security language to guarantee authorization query evaluations complete efficiently.
- Flow diagram 700 includes three (3) "primary” blocks 702-706 and four (4) "secondary" blocks 702(1 )/(2)/(3) and 704(1-5).
- the actions of flow diagram 700 may be performed in other environments and with a variety of hardware/software/firmware combinations, some of the features, components, and aspects of FIGS. 1-6 are used to illustrate an example of the method.
- the safety of the assertions of the assertion context are checked. For example, definition 4.1 may be applied to each assertion of an assertion context AC.
- the initial variables of an assertion are safe.
- part (1) of definition 4.1 may be applied.
- the initial variables are the variables of fact (if fact is flat) or the variables of the expression e (if ' fact is not flat).
- any constraint variables are also present somewhere else in the assertion.
- part (2) of definition 4.1 may be applied.
- part (3) of definition 4.1 may be applied.
- definition 4.2 may be applied to the authorization query.
- one or more of the safe inference rules is applied to the authorization query to confirm compliance and ensure the query's safety.
- Example inference rules are: assertion, conjunction, disjunction, negation, and constraint.
- expiration dates can be expressed as ordinary verb phrase parameters:
- Assertions may have to be revoked before their scheduled expiration date. If the revocation is necessitated due to the compromise of an explicitly trusted issuer's cryptographic key, then revocation is done by informing the relying party that the key should no longer be trusted. The relying party then removes the policy expressing the explicit trust in that key. But it is far more common that an issuer needs to revoke an assertion it has made in the past. This could be due to compromise of the cryptographic key associated with the principal whom the assertion is about, some change in the principal's relationships (e.g., change in employment), or malicious behavior on the part of the principal. For instance, the assertion in the example above has to be revoked if Alice drops out of her university.
- the security language may be translated into a logic language, as described in section 7.
- Section 8 describes an evaluation algorithm with tabling that is performed in the logic language.
- the evaluation algorithm can produce a proof graph in the logic language.
- section 9 a technique is described for translating the proof graph reflecting the logic language into a proof graph reflecting the security language.
- the authorization process including the evaluation algorithm, may be analyzed in terms of the security language.
- Example assertion semantics for a described security language is defined by the three deduction rules of section 2. This semantics is more comprehensible and intuitive than one defined in terms of a translation into some form of formal logic, which has been proposed. Nevertheless, it is useful to be able to efficiently translate security language assertion contexts into equivalent logic language programs. We can then leverage known complexity results (e.g., polynomial data complexity) and use the translated logic language program for query evaluation, which is described in section 8.
- complexity results e.g., polynomial data complexity
- e o can assert ⁇ o ... e n ⁇ can asserWi fact, for some n ⁇ 1, where ⁇ / ⁇ ct is flat.
- x is a fresh variable.
- k is not a fresh variable, but either a constant or a variable taken from the original rule.
- FIG. 8 is a flow diagram 800 that illustrates an example of a method for translating a security language into a logic language.
- Flow diagram 800 includes seven (7) blocks 802-814. Although the actions of flow diagram 800 may be performed in other environments and with a variety of hardware/software/firmware combinations, some of the features, components, and aspects of FIGS. 1-6 are used to illustrate an example of the method.
- Flow diagram 800 at least partially represents Algorithm 7.1 above.
- a security language assertion with an asserted fact and zero or more conditional facts is extracted from an assertion context.
- it is determined whether the asserted fact is flat.
- the assertion is translated into a logic language rule having a primary fact and zero or more side conditions.
- part 1 of Algorithm 7.1 may be performed.
- the primary fact corresponds to the asserted fact
- the side conditions correspond to the conditional facts.
- the security assertion is translated by blocks 808 and 810. If the fact is not flat, then the assertion is a delegation assertion with at least one delegation-directive verb (e.g., can assert, can say, etc.).
- a logic language rule having a primary fact and zero or more side conditions is added (e.g., to a growing logic language program). For example, part 2 (a) of Algorithm 7.1 may be performed.
- a logic language rule having an unbounded delegation depth and a fresh variable representing the delegatee is added. More specifically, the fresh variable represents the principal to whom rights are being delegated.
- part 2 (b) of Algorithm 7.1 may be performed.
- another logic language rule having an alias capability and a fresh variable representing the object of the alias is added to the logic language program.
- part 3 of Algorithm 7.1 may be performed.
- a logic language program segment corresponding to the input assertion of the security language assertion context is thereby produced.
- the actions of flow diagram 800 are repeated for each assertion in a given assertion context.
- a saySoo C can read z : — x sayso C can read z , A says., x can asserto C can read z
- a saySoo x can read z : — A says k x alias C, A saySoo C can read z
- T P is a function between sets of ground predicates and is defined as:
- Tp(I) ⁇ P ⁇ (P' :- P h .. ,P n , C) G ?
- the operator T P is monotonic and continuous, and its least fixed point T P W (Q)
- SLD resolution As is used in Prolog.
- SLD resolution can run into infinite loops even for safe Datalog programs, if some of the predicates have recursive definitions.
- the problem remains even if instead of a depth- first a breadth-first search strategy is employed: the looping occurs because the SLD search tree is infinite.
- Tabling, or memoing is an approach to guarantee termination by incorporating some bottom-up techniques into a top-down resolution strategy.
- the basic idea is to prune infinite search trees by keeping a table of encountered subgoals and their answers, and to compute a subgoal only if it is not already in the table.
- FIG. 9 is a block diagram illustrating an example deterministic evaluation algorithm with tabling 900.
- Evaluation algorithm 900 includes five modules 902: a QUERY module 902(1), a RESOLVE-CLAUSE module 902(2), a RESOLVE module 902(3), a PROCESS-ANSWER module 902(4), and a PROCESS- SUBGOAL module 902(5).
- Evaluation algorithm 900 also includes two tables 904: an Ans table 904(1) and a Wait table 904(2).
- Ans table 904(1) maps predicates to sets of ground predicates. If a subgoal P (uninstantiated or partially or fully instantiated) is computed, P is added to the domain of Ans, and at any point in time, Ans (P) returns the set of answers to P (these are ground instances of P) that have been found so far. At the end of the evaluation process, Ans will contain the complete answers to all encountered subgoals including the root goal.
- the second table is Wait table 904(2). It maps predicates P to
- P is the top-level predicate of the proof tree
- P 0 is the top-level predicate of the proof tree
- P is the list of predicates that have to be solved after P 0 ;
- c is a constraint on the predicate variables; and
- S is an instance of P that keeps track of the instantiations found so far by being continuously narrowed down.
- P and Q be two predicates.
- a substitution ⁇ is a most general unifier of P and Q iff it is more general than any other unifier of P and Q.
- a variable renaming for a predicate P is a substitution ⁇ such that # defines a permutation on the set of variables occurring in P.
- QUERY (module 902(1)) spawns a new proof tree by calling
- RESOLVE-CLAUSE (module 902(2)) resolves each rule in K against Fresh(P) by calling RESOLVE.
- the function Fresh(P) renames all variables in P to fresh ones that do not occur anywhere in K.
- RESOLVE (module 902(3)) takes as parameters a subgoal of the
- the Simplify function in RESOLVE may perform any kind of equivalence-preserving simplifications on a constraint (e.g. (False, c) ⁇ False). At the very least, it should simplify ground constraints to true or false. It is safe to over-approximate the satisfiability check on line 1, i.e., "false” should only be returned if c ⁇ really is unsatisfiable, but "true” may be returned even in the case if c ⁇ is unsatisfiable, as long as Simplify (c ⁇ ) is not fully instantiated. A simple implementation of the approximate satisfiability check could thus return "true” whenever the simplified constraint is not yet fully instantiated. [0165] If the unification and the satisfiability check succeed, there are two
- PROCESS-ANSWER (module 902(4)) takes an answer to P and updates Ans table 904(1). Wait table 904(2) contains all the suspended subgoals that are waiting for this answer. Each suspended subgoal is resumed by calling RESOLVE together with the newly found answer.
- PROCESS-SUBGOAL (module 902(5)) takes as argument a subgoal with P 0 as the next predicate to solve, and checks if there already is an existing subgoal PO in Ans table 904(1) that subsumes it. If there is, P O 'S existing answers can be reused (by calling RESOLVE), SO there is no need to start a new proof tree for P 0 - Additionally, a copy of the subgoal is added to the Wait entry for P'o SO that any future answers to PO will be used as well. Only if no entry in Ans table 904(1) subsumes P 0 a new proof tree is spawned by a call to RESOLVE-
- FIG. 10 is a block diagram of an example logic language proof graph 1000 that is produced during an evaluation algorithm and that includes graph fragments 1006.
- logic language proof graph 1000 includes multiple nodes 1002 and multiple directed edges 1004.
- logic language proof graph 1000 includes 10 nodes 1002(1...1O).
- a logic language proof graph 1000 may include any number of nodes 1002 and any number of directed edges 1004.
- Two directed edges 1004(1) and 1004(2) are explicitly labeled.
- Directed edges 1004 indicate logical deductions between nodes 1002.
- Leaf nodes of logic language proof graph 1000 are represented by rectangular nodes 1002(4), 1002(5), 1002(6), 1002(8), 1002(9), and 1002(10).
- Non-leaf nodes are represented by circular nodes 1002(1), 1002(2), 1002(3), and 1002(7).
- the circles are nodes that prove side conditions (e.g., body predicates).
- the rectangular leaf nodes of logic language proof graph 1000 are rules translated from assertions from the original assertion context.
- the other nodes are derived statements, which are taken from the answers table (e.g., Ans table 904(1)) if the deterministic tabling algorithm described above is employed in the evaluation.
- Logic language proof graph 1000 is separated into example fragments 1006. Specifically, three fragments 1006(1, 2, 3) are shown, but a proof graph may be separated into any number of fragments 1006. Each fragment 1006 forms part of a structure of the overall proof graph.
- each fragment 1006 includes node(s) 1002 and directed edge(s)
- logic language proof graph 1000 may be translated into a corresponding security language proof graph (not separately shown in whole). To effect the translation, a pattern matching process is performed. A logic language fragment 1006 is matched to a corresponding security language fragment.
- sample security language fragments that may be used in the pattern matching process are each respectively associated with a semantics rule from the security language.
- Example fragment correspondences between logic language fragments and security language fragments are described below with reference to FIGS. 12 A, 12B, 13A, 13B, 14A, and 14B.
- a proof graph is a directed acyclic graph. For each answer to a query, there is a root node in the graph. Every non-leaf node is a ground Datalog predicate of the form A says D fact and has as child nodes the Datalog rule, the instantiated conditional facts, and the instantiated constraint. Leaf nodes are either Datalog rules in AC or ground constraints that are valid. Examples are shown as the left panels of FIGS. 12 A, 13 A, and 14 A.)
- FIG. 11 is a flow diagram 1100 that illustrates an example of a method for translating a logic language proof graph to a security language proof graph.
- Flow diagram 1100 includes five (5) blocks 1102-1110. Although the actions of flow diagram 1100 may be performed in other environments and with a variety of hardware/software/firmware combinations, some of the features, components, and aspects of FIGS. 1-10 are used to illustrate an example of the method.
- a first proof graph that reflects a logic language during a logical evaluation is produced.
- a logic language proof graph 1000 may be produced during a logical evaluation.
- the logical evaluation is effected on a logical language program that is derived from a security language assertion context via a translation.
- a fragment of the first proof graph is identified.
- a fragment 1006 of logic language proof graph 1000 may be identified.
- the fragment of the first proof graph reflecting a logic language is translated into a corresponding fragment of a second proof graph reflecting a security language.
- fragment 1006 of logic language proof graph 1000 that reflects a logical language e.g., Datalog, etc.
- a security language e.g., a policy assertion security language
- a logic language pattern of the fragment of the first proof graph may be matched to a corresponding security language pattern selected from multiple possible security language patterns. These security language patterns may, for example, be associated with semantics rules of the security language.
- the identification of a fragment and the translation thereof is repeated for each fragment of the first proof graph.
- FIGS. 12A and 12B are block diagrams of example proof fragments for a logic language and a corresponding security language, respectively, for a conditional semantics rule.
- the security language proof graph fragment sample 1200B for the conditional semantics rule is shown at FIG. 12B.
- FIG. 12A The corresponding logic language proof graph (e.g., proof node with parent) fragment 1200A that may exist in a proof graph produced during an evaluation is shown at FIG. 12A.
- the oval nodes represent proved side conditions, and the rectangular nodes represent rules or constraints.
- These graph fragments 1200 relate to translation steps 1 or 2(a) of Algorithm 7.1.
- FIGS. 13A and 13B are block diagrams of example proof fragments for a logic language and a corresponding security language, respectively, for a delegation semantics rule.
- the security language fragment sample 1300B for the delegation semantics rule is shown at FIG. 13B.
- the corresponding logic language fragment 1300A that may exist in a proof graph produced during an evaluation is shown at FIG. 13 A.
- These graph fragments 1300 relate to translation step 2(b).
- FIGS. 14A and 14B are block diagrams of example proof fragments for a logic language and a corresponding security language, respectively, for an alias semantics rule.
- the security language fragment sample 1400B for the alias semantics rule is shown at FIG. 14B.
- the corresponding logic language fragment 1400A that may exist in a proof graph produced during an evaluation is shown at FIG. 14A. These graph fragments 1400 relate to translation step 3.
- AuthAns AC (qi, qz) ⁇ fi 2 ⁇ ⁇ j e AuthAns AC (qi) and Q 2 e AuthAns AC (q2 ⁇ j) ⁇
- AuthAns AC (qi or q 2 ) AuthAns AC (q2) u AuthAns AC (q2)
- FIGS. 1-14B The devices, actions, aspects, features, functions, procedures, modules, data structures, protocols, components, etc. of FIGS. 1-14B are illustrated in diagrams that are divided into multiple blocks. However, the order, interconnections, interrelationships, layout, etc. in which FIGS. 1-14B are described and/or shown are not intended to be construed as a limitation, and any number of the blocks can be modified, combined, rearranged, augmented, omitted, etc. in any manner to implement one or more systems, methods, devices, procedures, media, apparatuses, APIs, protocols, arrangements, etc. for security language translations with logic resolution.
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EP2062150A1 (en) | 2009-05-27 |
CN101512505A (en) | 2009-08-19 |
CA2884079A1 (en) | 2008-03-20 |
IL225701A (en) | 2015-02-26 |
US20080066171A1 (en) | 2008-03-13 |
CN101512505B (en) | 2011-09-07 |
EP2062150A4 (en) | 2012-02-15 |
JP5145340B2 (en) | 2013-02-13 |
JP2010503129A (en) | 2010-01-28 |
KR101448319B1 (en) | 2014-10-07 |
IL225701A0 (en) | 2013-06-27 |
CA2658132A1 (en) | 2008-03-20 |
IL196524A (en) | 2013-04-30 |
US20140165139A1 (en) | 2014-06-12 |
EP2062150B1 (en) | 2017-10-25 |
KR20090055555A (en) | 2009-06-02 |
US8656503B2 (en) | 2014-02-18 |
CA2658132C (en) | 2016-01-05 |
US9282121B2 (en) | 2016-03-08 |
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