WO2005107140A1 - System and method for generating reproducible session keys - Google Patents
System and method for generating reproducible session keys Download PDFInfo
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- WO2005107140A1 WO2005107140A1 PCT/CA2004/002043 CA2004002043W WO2005107140A1 WO 2005107140 A1 WO2005107140 A1 WO 2005107140A1 CA 2004002043 W CA2004002043 W CA 2004002043W WO 2005107140 A1 WO2005107140 A1 WO 2005107140A1
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
Definitions
- This invention relates to wireless communications devices.
- this invention relates to a system and method for generating session keys for secure communications between a mobile communication device and a network server or gateway.
- Wireless mobile communication devices which can communicate via one or more of email, phone, SMS messaging, Internet and intranet-based applications, are widely used in business and personal applications. These include self-contained devices, and wireless modems which can be integrated into portable computers. In a typical business environment with multiple users, a plurality of mobile communication devices communicate through a local server, which manages communications traffic and relays communications signals to a telecommunications carrier.
- the local server encrypts all messages before transmission to a mobile communication device, and encrypted messages transmitted to the mobile communication device are decrypted by suitable software or hardware in the mobile communication device.
- the encryption and decryption processes typically operate using a "public key" infrastructure in which a trusted third party certifies the authenticity of the public/private key pair generated by a user.
- the public key is used to encrypt messages and verify digital signatures while the private key is used to decrypt messages and digitally sign documents.
- This combination of public and private keys commonly known as “asymmetric cryptography,” can be used to effectively encrypt messages and create digital signatures, as is well known to those skilled in the art.
- the wireless component of the commumcations system is thus secured, so that if the wireless signal is intercepted by a malicious attacker, it cannot be decrypted.
- a session key is generated each time the user's mobile communication device requests the transfer of a message from the local server to the mobile communication device.
- the mobile communication device may encrypt a 'signed only' message to generate a link between the local server and the mobile communication device at the commencement of each message transfer session, and as part of this process the session key is generated and encrypted with the user's public key.
- Memory in the mobile communication device is at a premium, and sometimes messages are too large to conveniently download the entire message to the mobile communication device.
- the local server typically sends batches or blocks (for example 2KB) of data to the mobile communication device at one time. For some messages, the first block will include the entire message and the session thus ends as the message transmission is completed.
- the remainder of the message data is held back from the mobile communication device until a MORE request for further message data is transmitted to the local server. For example, when the user scrolls down the message to the point where the mobile communication device nears the end of the downloaded block of data, the device automatically sends a MORE request to the local server. Upon receiving a MORE request, the next block of data in the message is transmitted to the mobile communication device.
- the local server Whenever a MORE request is received from the mobile communication device, in order to prevent errors in the decrypted message the local server needs to encrypt the next block of data with the same session key as used for the previous block(s) of data. However, it is not desirable to store the session key in the local server, both because this uses additional memory unnecessarily, and because it is advantageous to limit the amount of secret information that must be stored on the local server. It would accordingly be advantageous to provide a method of creating a secure, reproducible session key and a system utilizing such a method.
- the present invention provides a system and method for generating reproducible session keys.
- the session key is generated based at least in part on a hash of the message itself. Since the local server stores the message at least until the session is complete, it can then easily regenerate the same session key in response to each MORE request.
- additional data is added to the hash to ensure that it is unique. The additional data could for example be the email address of the user, some random bytes stored in the local server, or an increasing counter (so that, for example if the same message is sent to the user multiple times, the session key will be different each time). If no additional data is used, the session key is generated based solely on a hash of the message itself.
- the present invention accordingly provides a system and method for generating a reproducible session key. Moreover the method of the invention can be implemented with only the stored original message, the public key, and an algorithm for generating the session key based on a hash of the message.
- the present invention thus provides a method of generating a reproducible session key for encrypting data in a data item for transmission to a remote communication device during a session, wherein if the data item exceeds a selected batch size a plurality of batches of data are transmitted during the session and encrypted with the same session key, comprising the steps of: a. storing the data item in at least one memory addressable by a data processing device, and b.
- the present invention further provides a system for generating a reproducible session key for encrypting data in a data item for transmission to a remote communication device during a session, wherein if the data item exceeds a selected batch size a plurality of batches of data are transmitted during the session and encrypted with the same session key, comprising a data processing device in communication with at least one memory for storing the data item and comprising a processor for applying a deterministic algorithm to all or a portion of the data item to generate a hash of the data item for use as a unique session key associated with the data item.
- the present invention further provides a computer program product for use with a computer, the computer program product comprising a computer usable medium having computer readable program code means embodied in said medium for generating a reproducible session key for encrypting message data, said computer program product having a. computer readable program code means for reading the data item from at least one memory, and b. computer readable program code means for applying a deterministic algorithm to all or a portion of the data item to generate a hash of the data item for use as a unique session key associated with the data item.
- Fig. 1 is a block diagram of a system overview of a conventional hand-held mobile communication device.
- Fig. 2 is a flow chart illustrating a method of encrypting and decrypting a message using the method of the invention.
- the hand-held mobile communication device 10 includes a housing, a keyboard 14 and an output device 16.
- the output device shown is a display 16, which is preferably a full graphic LCD. Other types of output devices may alternatively be utilized.
- a processor 18, which is shown schematically in Fig. 1 is contained within the housing and is coupled between the keyboard 14 and the display 16. The processor 18 controls the operation of the display 16, as well as the overall operation of the mobile device 10, in response to actuation of keys on the keyboard 14 by the user.
- the housing may be elongated vertically, or may take on other sizes and shapes (including clamshell housing structures).
- the keyboard 14 may include a mode selection key, or other hardware or software for switching between text entry and telephony entry.
- Fig. 1 In addition to the processor 18, other parts of the mobile device 10 are shown schematically in Fig. 1. These include a communications subsystem 100; a short- range communications subsystem; the keyboard 14 and the display 16, along with other input/output devices 106, 108, 110 and 112; as well as memory devices 116, 118 and various other device subsystems 120.
- the mobile device 10 is preferably a two- way RF communication device having voice and data communication capabilities.
- the mobile device 10 preferably has the capability to communicate with other computer systems via the Internet.
- Operating system software executed by the processor 18 is preferably stored in a persistent store, such as a flash memory 116, but may be stored in other types of memory devices, such as a read only memory (ROM) or similar storage element.
- system software, specific device applications, or parts thereof may be temporarily loaded into a volatile store, such as a random access memory (RAM) 118.
- Communication signals received by the mobile device may also be stored to the RAM 118.
- a predetermined set of applications that control basic device operations, such as data and voice communications 130A and 130B, may be installed on the device 10 during manufacture.
- a personal information manager (PIM) application may be installed during manufacture.
- the PIM is preferably capable of organizing and managing data items, such as e-mail, calendar events, voice mails, appointments, and task items.
- the PIM application is also preferably capable of sending and receiving data items via a wireless network 140.
- the PIM data items are seamlessly integrated, synchronized and updated via the wireless network 140 with the device user's corresponding data items stored or associated with a host computer system.
- the communication subsystem 100 includes a receiver 150, a transmitter 152, and one or more antennas 154 and 156.
- the communication subsystem 100 also includes a processing module, such as a digital signal processor (DSP) 158, and local oscillators (LOs) 160.
- DSP digital signal processor
- LOs local oscillators
- a mobile device 10 may include a communication subsystem 100 designed to operate with the MobitexTM, Data TACTM or General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) mobile data communication networks and also designed to operate with any of a variety of voice communication networks, such as AMPS, TDMA, CDMA, PCS, GSM, etc. Other types of data and voice networks, both separate and integrated, may also be utilized with the mobile device 10.
- GPRS General Packet Radio Service
- Network access requirements vary depending upon the type of communication system. For example, in the Mobitex and DataTAC networks, mobile devices are registered on the network using a unique personal identification number or PIN associated with each device. In GPRS networks, however, network access is associated with a subscriber or user of a device. A GPRS device therefore requires a subscriber identity module, commonly referred to as a SIM card, in order to operate on a GPRS network.
- SIM card subscriber identity module
- the mobile device 10 may send and receive communication signals over the communication network 140. Signals received from the communication network 140 by the antenna 154 are routed to the receiver 150, which provides for signal amplification, frequency down conversion, filtering, channel selection, etc., and may also provide analog to digital conversion.
- Analog-to-digital conversion of the received signal allows the DSP 158 to perform more complex communication functions, such as demodulation and decoding.
- signals to be transmitted to the network 140 are processed (e.g. modulated and encoded) by the DSP 158 and are then provided to the transmitter 152 for digital to analog conversion, frequency up conversion, filtering, amplification and transmission to the communication network 140 (or networks) via the antenna 156.
- the DSP 158 provides for control of the receiver 150 and the transmitter 152.
- gains applied to communication signals in the receiver 150 and transmitter 152 may be adaptively controlled through automatic gain control algorithms implemented in the DSP 158.
- a received signal such as a text message or web page download
- the communication subsystem 100 is input to the processor 18.
- the received signal is then further processed by the processor 18 for an output to the display 16, or alternatively to some other auxiliary I/O device 106.
- a device user may also compose data items, such as e-mail messages, using the keyboard 14 and/or some other auxiliary I/O device 106, such as a touchpad, a rocker switch, a thumb-wheel, or some other type of input device.
- the composed data items may then be transmitted over the communication network 140 via the communication subsystem 100.
- Each data item is transmitted over the communication network 140 in an encrypted form during a "session,” which involves transmitting one or more batches of data until the data item has been completely transmitted to the device 10.
- the data transmitted during each such session is encrypted using a common "session key,” as described in detail below.
- a voice communication mode In a voice communication mode, overall operation of the device is substantially similar to the data commumcation mode, except that received signals are output to a speaker 110, and signals for transmission are generated by a microphone 112.
- Alternative voice or audio I/O subsystems such as a voice message recording subsystem, may also be implemented on the device 10.
- the display 16 may also be utilized in voice communication mode, for example to display the identity of a calling party, the duration of a voice call, or other voice call related information.
- the short-range commumcations subsystem enables communication between the mobile device 10 and other proximate systems or devices, which need not necessarily be similar devices.
- the short-range communications subsystem may include an infrared device and associated circuits and components, or a BluetoothTM communication module to provide for communication with similarly- enabled systems and devices.
- the invention applies to the transmission of data items, for example email messages, over the communication network 140.
- data items are transmitted in batches of data, for example in 2 kb batches (although any suitable batch size may be selected), until the entire message has been transmitted to the device 10, known as a "session.”
- the data item is transmitted in an encrypted form during the session.
- a deterministic algorithm is employed to generate a hash of the message.
- a hash is the result of processing a batch of data with a compression function that takes the batch of data and compresses it down to a smaller, unique identifier.
- a deterministic algorithm for example a hash algorithm (such as, for example, SHA-256 as defined in Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) publication 180-2 published August 1, 2002, which is incorporated herein by reference) or a key derivation function (a generic construction that uses a hash algorithm, along with other data, to repeatedly hash data to produce a key of a specified length) is applied to the message m to be encrypted.
- a hash algorithm such as, for example, SHA-256 as defined in Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) publication 180-2 published August 1, 2002, which is incorporated herein by reference
- a key derivation function a generic construction that uses a hash algorithm, along with other data, to repeatedly hash data to produce a key of a specified length
- the session key is generated based at least in part on the hash of the message. It is possible to generate the session key based solely on a hash of the message itself, however in the preferred embodiment additional data is added to the hash to ensure that it is unique so that, for example, if the same message is sent twice the two different sessions will have different session keys.
- additional data is added to the message m to ensure that the hash is unique.
- the additional data r could for example be the email address of the user, randomly generated bytes stored on the local server, or an incremental counter.
- a hash of additional data r may be combined with the hash of the message m.
- additional data r there are different ways in which to make use of additional data r. Since the use of additional data r is optional, r could also be empty. A malicious attacker who wants to decrypt the message must determine the session key. To do this, the attacker would have to read the original message, which cannot be done without the session key since the original message is encrypted with the session key, or decrypt the session key, which cannot be done because the session key is encrypted with the user's public key and the malicious attacker does not have access to the corresponding private key.
- the session key k is created by a hash of the concatenation (
- the encrypted session key e k and the encrypted message e m are sent to the user's mobile commumcation device 10, which can then decrypt the session key in conventional fashion using the private key that corresponds to public key/?, and then thus decrypt the message data using the session key.
- the session key may be stored on the mobile device 10 for the duration of the session.
- the mobile communication device 10 transmits a MORE request to the local server, for example as the user scrolls down the message toward the end of the first batch of message data.
- the process described above is then repeated for the next batch of message data.
- the local server recreates the session key from the hash of the message data (and optionally external data r, if used), re-encrypts the session key using the public key to recreate the encrypted session key, encrypts the next batch of message data using the same session key, and transmits the next batch of encrypted message data to the mobile device 10 in the same fashion.
Abstract
Description
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Priority Applications (7)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE602004018395T DE602004018395D1 (en) | 2004-05-03 | 2004-11-26 | SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR PRODUCING REPRODUCIBLE MEETING KEYS |
JP2006545858A JP4570626B2 (en) | 2004-05-03 | 2004-11-26 | System and method for generating reproducible session keys |
EP04802220A EP1741224B1 (en) | 2004-05-03 | 2004-11-26 | System and method for generating reproducible session keys |
CA2540720A CA2540720C (en) | 2004-05-03 | 2004-11-26 | System and method for generating reproducible session keys |
BRPI0418366-5A BRPI0418366B1 (en) | 2004-05-03 | 2004-11-26 | SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR GENERATING REPRODUCABLE SESSION KEYS |
AU2004319170A AU2004319170B2 (en) | 2004-05-03 | 2004-11-26 | System and method for generating reproducible session keys |
CN2004800311306A CN1871809B (en) | 2004-05-03 | 2004-11-26 | System and method for generating reproducible session keys |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US56761104P | 2004-05-03 | 2004-05-03 | |
US60/567,611 | 2004-05-03 |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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WO2005107140A1 true WO2005107140A1 (en) | 2005-11-10 |
WO2005107140A8 WO2005107140A8 (en) | 2005-12-29 |
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Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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PCT/CA2004/002043 WO2005107140A1 (en) | 2004-05-03 | 2004-11-26 | System and method for generating reproducible session keys |
Country Status (11)
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US (1) | US7929702B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP1741224B1 (en) |
JP (1) | JP4570626B2 (en) |
KR (1) | KR100734836B1 (en) |
CN (1) | CN1871809B (en) |
AT (1) | ATE417428T1 (en) |
AU (1) | AU2004319170B2 (en) |
BR (1) | BRPI0418366B1 (en) |
CA (1) | CA2540720C (en) |
DE (1) | DE602004018395D1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2005107140A1 (en) |
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
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CA2540720C (en) | 2010-08-10 |
CN1871809B (en) | 2011-04-06 |
BRPI0418366B1 (en) | 2018-04-10 |
CA2540720A1 (en) | 2005-11-10 |
WO2005107140A8 (en) | 2005-12-29 |
EP1741224A4 (en) | 2007-08-01 |
US20050254658A1 (en) | 2005-11-17 |
ATE417428T1 (en) | 2008-12-15 |
JP2007521772A (en) | 2007-08-02 |
JP4570626B2 (en) | 2010-10-27 |
CN1871809A (en) | 2006-11-29 |
AU2004319170B2 (en) | 2008-05-01 |
KR20060086969A (en) | 2006-08-01 |
EP1741224B1 (en) | 2008-12-10 |
US7929702B2 (en) | 2011-04-19 |
AU2004319170A1 (en) | 2005-11-10 |
BRPI0418366A (en) | 2007-05-15 |
KR100734836B1 (en) | 2007-07-06 |
DE602004018395D1 (en) | 2009-01-22 |
EP1741224A1 (en) | 2007-01-10 |
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