WO2005004381A1 - Verfahren zur verschlüsselten datenübertragung über ein kommunikationsnetz - Google Patents
Verfahren zur verschlüsselten datenübertragung über ein kommunikationsnetz Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2005004381A1 WO2005004381A1 PCT/EP2004/007378 EP2004007378W WO2005004381A1 WO 2005004381 A1 WO2005004381 A1 WO 2005004381A1 EP 2004007378 W EP2004007378 W EP 2004007378W WO 2005004381 A1 WO2005004381 A1 WO 2005004381A1
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- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- data
- participants
- stochastic
- communication network
- key
- Prior art date
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Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method for encrypted data transmission, as well as a corresponding computer program product and a communication system, in particular for the participants in an automation system.
- Symmetrical encryption methods are also known as "private key" encryption. In the case of symmetrical encryption, the participants in the communication have the same secret key that is used both for encryption and for decryption. Examples of symmetrical encryption methods known from the prior art are DES, Triple-DES, RC2, RC4, IDEA, Skipjack.
- a common disadvantage of symmetrical encryption methods known from the prior art is that the symmetrical keys have to be transmitted to the individual subscribers before the encrypted communication begins, and this transmission can be spied on.
- a public key is used for encryption.
- the data encrypted with the subscriber's public key can only be decrypted with the subscriber's secret private key.
- Known asymmetrical encryption methods are Diffie-Hellmann and RSA.
- the invention is based on the object of providing an improved method for encrypted data transmission and a corresponding computer program product and communication system for encrypted data transmission.
- a symmetrical encryption method is used for the protected data transmission, for example via a public communication network such as the Internet.
- a public communication network such as the Internet.
- the data which form the basis for the generation of the symmetric keys in the participants are generated by means of a random number generator which uses a stochastic process such as e.g. B. uses resistance noise or a radioactive decay process for generating random numbers.
- a random number generator which uses a stochastic process such as e.g. B. uses resistance noise or a radioactive decay process for generating random numbers.
- a random number generator has the advantage that they are not pseudo random numbers.
- the generator polynomial can in principle by an attacker can be determined by evaluating the communication of the participants, in particular if it is cyclical communication.
- At least one measured value is determined from a stochastic process.
- the data required for the generation of the symmetrical keys are obtained from the low-significant bit positions of the measured value or values.
- At least one time-variable parameter of an automation system is used as a stochastic process.
- various measured values that are supplied by sensors of the automation system, such as B. temperature, speed, voltage, current, flow, speed, concentration, humidity, ... in question.
- the corresponding measured values are stochastic, but can, for example, have periodic components. To reduce such periodic components, for example, only the low-significant bit positions of the measured values can be used to form the symmetrical keys.
- At least two of the participants independently collect stochastic data.
- the stochastic data recorded by one of the participants is transmitted to the other participant (s).
- each of the participants receives all of the stochastic data in this way. These are then combined with one another in order to obtain a basis for the respective generation of the symmetrical key.
- the data which form the basis for the symmetrical key generation in the subscribers are transmitted, via a public network, such as the Internet, or an Ethernet, such as a LAN, WAN or WLAN.
- a public network such as the Internet
- an Ethernet such as a LAN, WAN or WLAN.
- the key is generated in the participants at the request of a master participant, the corresponding request being transmitted to the participants via the communication network.
- a corresponding request is made when the utilization of the communication network with user data transmission is relatively low in order to use the unused bandwidth for the transmission of data as the basis for the key formation in the participants. This procedure is particularly advantageous if the participants communicate via the Internet.
- Ethernet for example, all participants can "listen" to the data traffic on the Ethernet. In this case, the key formation in the individual participants can be initiated so that the master participant issues a corresponding trigger command on the Ethernet.
- the transmission of the stochastic data and the key generation in the participants take place at predetermined times or after predetermined time intervals.
- the participants in the communication network have a synchronous time base.
- different symmetrical encryption methods are used by the participants for key generation and corresponding different symmetrical keys are generated.
- For the encrypted data transmission for example, there is a periodic switch between the encryption methods in order to further increase the security of the encrypted data transmission.
- the data for the different encryption methods are formed by different combinations of the stochastic data supplied by the individual participants.
- the present invention is particularly advantageous for use in automation systems.
- the algorithms for key generation can be defined in the individual participants when configuring the system.
- the corresponding algorithms for key generation are kept secret by the manufacturer of the system.
- this also provides protection against the use of unauthorized components, for example from a third-party manufacturer, in the automation system.
- the algorithms are preferably stored in protected memory areas of the automation devices of the automation system, e.g. in EPROMs or chip cards that are inserted into the card readers of the automation devices by authorized users.
- the application of the present invention is particularly advantageous for components of automation systems linked to one another via public networks.
- the encrypted data transmission according to the invention between the participants in such an automation system prevents unauthorized interference by third parties, in particular even when wireless transmission technology is used between the participants.
- the encrypted data transmission is used for the purposes of remote maintenance or the so-called teleservice of the system.
- the data transmission method according to the invention offers protection against spying on the transmitted system data or manipulative interventions.
- the invention can advantageously also be used for the purposes of telecommunication between subscribers or for the purposes of communication between the components of a motor vehicle, ship, aircraft or railroad electronics.
- FIG. 1 shows a block diagram of a first embodiment of a communication system according to the invention
- FIG. 2 shows a flow diagram of a first embodiment • the data transfer method according to the invention
- FIG. 3 shows the generation of data as the basis for the key generation from a measured value
- FIG. 4 shows a block diagram of a further preferred embodiment of a communication system according to the invention
- FIG. 5 shows a block diagram of a preferred embodiment of an automation system according to the invention.
- FIG. 1 shows a communication system 100 in which at least participants 102 and 104 can exchange data via a network 106.
- communication system 100 may include a plurality of such subscribers.
- the participants 102, 104 of the communication system 100 each have a program 108 for a symmetrical encryption method.
- programs 108 Symmetrical keys are formed on the basis of input data, and user data to be transmitted are encrypted and decrypted.
- the participants 102, 104 also each have a memory 110 for storing the symmetrical key generated by the respective program 108.
- the subscriber 102 is connected to an acquisition module 112; the acquisition module 112 is used to acquire stochastic data from a stochastic process 114.
- the stochastic process 114 can be, for example, the voltage signal of a noisy resistor.
- the subscriber 102 is also connected to a data source 116. Data supplied by data source 116 are to be transmitted from subscriber 102 to subscriber 104 via network 106.
- the acquisition module 112 acquires stochastic data from the stochastic process 114.
- the stochastic data is entered in subscriber 102.
- the stochastic data are transmitted from the subscriber 102 to the subscriber 104 via the network 106. This can be encrypted or unencrypted.
- the program 108 is started in the subscriber 102 in order to generate a symmetrical key based on the stochastic data supplied by the acquisition module 112, which key is stored in the memory 110. Accordingly, program 108 is started in subscriber 104 in order to use the stochastic data received from subscriber 102 via network 106 to generate the same symmetrical key that is stored in memory 110 of subscriber 104. If there are further participants in the communication system 100, the further participants also receive the stochastic data from the participant 102 via the network 106 and each locally generate the symmetrical key with the aid of the respective program 108.
- Data that are supplied from the data source 116 to the subscriber 102 can now be transmitted in encrypted form to the subscriber 104 via the network 106.
- the user data to be transmitted are encrypted with the aid of the program 108 of the subscriber 102 and the symmetrical key stored in the memory 110 of the subscriber 102.
- the encrypted user data are transmitted via the network 106 and received by the subscriber 104. There, the data from the program 108 of the subscriber 104 is decrypted using the symmetric key stored in the memory 110 of the subscriber 104.
- the generation of the stochastic data as the basis for the generation of the symmetric keys in the participants 102, 104 can be done by a stochastic random number generator, which, for.
- a stochastic random number generator which, for.
- the output voltage of an existing resistor is used as a stochastic process.
- the data supplied by the data source 116 can also be used as stochastic data as the basis for the generation of the symmetrical keys.
- the data source 116 supplies measured values of variables or parameters that change over time, for example of an automation system.
- certain process parameters in such an automation system such as temperature, pressure, speed, etc., are not deterministic, but are more or less random with more or less periodic components.
- a corresponding measured value supplied by data source 116 can therefore be used as a stochastic data for the symmetrical key generation, in which case a separate acquisition module 112 or an additional stochastic process 114 are unnecessary.
- FIG. 2 shows a corresponding flow chart.
- stochastic data is acquired. This can be stochastic data supplied by a random generator or the user data supplied by a data source.
- the stochastic data are transmitted to the participants in the communication system. This can be encrypted or unencrypted over a public network.
- step 204 the subscribers locally generate identical symmetrical keys on the basis of the stochastic data.
- a secret encryption method is used for this purpose, which is implemented in the participants by a computer program.
- Each of the subscribers who received the stochastic data in step 202 thus enters this stochastic data into the computer program in order to generate a symmetrical key which is stored locally by the respective subscriber.
- FIG. 3 shows an exemplary embodiment for the generation of stochastic data as the basis for the generation of the symmetrical keys.
- data source 116 (compare FIG. 1) supplies a measured value 300, which has a length of 32 bits, for example. For example, only the eight least significant bit positions ("least significant bits" - LSB) of the measured value 300 are used for key generation.
- the least significant bit positions of the measured value 300 form the stochastic data which are used for the key generation.
- the use of only the least significant bit positions of the measured value 300 has the advantage over the use of the complete measured value 300 or only the most significant bit positions ("Most significant bits" - MSB) that periodic portions of the measured signal are reduced or eliminated.
- FIG. 4 shows a block diagram of a communication system 400. Elements of FIG. 4 which correspond to elements of the embodiment of FIG. 1 are identified by reference numbers increased by 300.
- the subscriber 402 is connected to the data sources 418 and 420, which continuously supply the measured values a and b.
- the subscriber 404 is connected to the data source 422, which continuously supplies the measured value c.
- the measured value a is e.g. B. a temperature, for the measured value b by a speed and for the measured value c by a pressure.
- the participants 402 and 404 each have a memory 424 for storing the measured values a, b and c.
- the participants 402 and 404 each have a memory 426 for storing the symmetrical keys SI and S2.
- the key SI is generated by the program 408 on the basis of a combination of the measured values a and c and the key S2 on the basis of the measured values a and b.
- the symmetrical keys SI and S2 are generated in the subscribers 402 and 404 and in other subscribers of basically the same structure.
- the measured values a, b and c output by the data sources 418, 420, 422 at a specific point in time are stored in the memory 424.
- the participant 402 stores the measured values a and b in its memory 424 and transmits them via the network 406 to the other participants, i. H. in particular to subscriber 404, where measured values a and b are also stored in memory 424.
- participant 404 stores the measured value c in its memory 424 and transmits the measured value c via the network 406 to the other participants, i. H. in particular to subscriber 402, where the measured value c is also stored in the respective memory 424.
- the least significant bit positions are preferably stored in the memories 424 instead of the complete measured values.
- the program 408 of the subscriber 402 combines the measured values a and b, which are stored in the memory 424, or the least significant bit positions of these measured values, one by one, for example by appending the corresponding bits to one another.
- the resulting data word is used by program 408 to generate key S2.
- the key SI is generated on the basis of the measured values a and c using the program 408.
- Keys SI and S2 are stored in the memory 426 of the subscriber 402.
- the process which is basically the same, takes place in subscriber 404 and in the other subscribers of communication system 400, so that the keys SI and S2 are present in all subscribers.
- an encrypted transmission of the measured values a, b and c takes place via the network 406, the key SI being used at certain times and the key S2 being used for the encrypted data transmission at certain times. These times can be predefined or event-driven.
- one of the participants can have the function of a master participant for initiating the key generation or for switching between the keys in the different participants.
- different data words are formed from the measured values a, b and c by a predetermined combinatorial system, which in turn are the basis for generating different symmetrical keys.
- This combinatorics can be unchangeable in time or changeable in time.
- FIG. 5 shows an automation system 500 with the automation devices 502, 504, 506, 508, 510 and 512.
- the automation devices 502 to 512 are connected to one another by a data bus 514. This can be e.g. B. is an Ethernet.
- Another automation device 516 can be connected via a public network 518, e.g. B. exchange the Internet or a wireless cellular connection data.
- Each of the automation devices 502 to 512 and 516 has an encryption program 520 and an encryption program 522.
- further encryption programs can be present.
- the encryption programs 520 and 522 each provide different symmetrical encryption methods.
- the automation devices 502 to 512 and 516 each have a timer 524.
- the timers 524 are synchronized with one another, so that a synchronous time base is created for the automation system 500.
- Each of the automation devices 502 to 512 also has a memory 526 and a memory 528.
- the memory of the automation device 502 is used to store the “value 1” which is output by a corresponding measurement transmitter 1.
- the memory 528 of the automation device 502 serves to store the “value 5” which is output by a measuring value transmitter 5.
- the data word which serves as the basis for generating a symmetrical key, is generated by a predetermined combination, for example from the concatenation of the values 1, 2, 3 and 4.
- the data word obtained by this concatenation is entered into the encryption programs 520 and 522, to generate corresponding symmetric keys.
- the encryption programs 520 and 522 are used in a pre-configured chronological order, ie for every point in time is preconfigured whether the encryption program 520 or 522 is to be used for encrypted data transmission.
- the automation device 516 is, for example, a remote maintenance device.
- the automation device 516 also receives the measured values 1, 2, 3 and 4 via the network 518 in order to use the encryption programs 520 and 522 to form the respective keys.
- the measurement values are transmitted from the automation devices 502, 504 and 510 to the automation device 516 via the data bus 514 and the network 518.
- the automation device 516 can perform remote maintenance, in this case via the Network 518 transmitted data are protected against spying and manipulation.
- the network has network accesses 530 and 532, via which the data traffic between data bus 514 and automation device 516 takes place. During the transmission over the network 518, further encryption can be carried out by encrypting the already encrypted data again. This further increases security against external attacks.
- Network 518 is a public network.
- the further encryption for the transmission via the network 518 can take place analogously to FIG. 1, the network access 530 taking the role of the subscriber 102 and the network access 532 taking the role of the subscriber 104.
- the protected data transmission between the automation devices is independent of. general security infrastructures, such as B. from central trust centers, but based on time-varying data that originate from the system itself.
- Another advantage is that due to the secret programs 520, 522 also implicit authentication of the automation devices. Unauthorized automation devices for which the system is not approved, or automation devices from third-party manufacturers that do not have the required licenses, do not have the secret encryption programs 520, 522 and therefore cannot be used in the automation system.
- a list of encryption programs can be loaded in the individual automation devices. These encryption programs are preferably loaded in the offline mode of the automation system in order to avoid spying out the encryption programs.
- the encryption programs are stored in protected memory areas of EPROMs or chip cards.
- the change times for the change of the encryption programs and the associated keys can be command-controlled determined by one of the automation devices, which thus takes on the function of a master.
- the change times can be configured by predetermined absolute times or can take place cyclically or periodically.
- an algorithm fed by random values from the system can also be used to determine the change times.
- a further possibility is that the utilization of the data bus 514 is monitored and the key generation or the change of the encryption programs is initiated at a time when the utilization of the data bus 514 is low. This has the advantage that unused bandwidth of the data bus 514 can be used for the transmission of the measured values to the individual automation devices.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
- Telephonic Communication Services (AREA)
- Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
- Computer And Data Communications (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE502004002636T DE502004002636D1 (de) | 2003-07-07 | 2004-07-06 | Verfahren zur verschlüsselten datenübertragung über ein kommunikationsnetz |
US10/563,504 US7702102B2 (en) | 2003-07-07 | 2004-07-06 | Method for encoded data transmission via a communication network |
EP04740702A EP1642412B1 (de) | 2003-07-07 | 2004-07-06 | Verfahren zur verschlüsselten datenübertragung über ein kommunikationsnetz |
CN2004800193808A CN1820449B (zh) | 2003-07-07 | 2004-07-06 | 通过一种通讯网络进行数据加密传输的方法 |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE10330643.9 | 2003-07-07 | ||
DE10330643A DE10330643A1 (de) | 2003-07-07 | 2003-07-07 | Verfahren zur verschlüsselten Datenübertragung über ein Kommunikationsnetz |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2005004381A1 true WO2005004381A1 (de) | 2005-01-13 |
Family
ID=33559943
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/EP2004/007378 WO2005004381A1 (de) | 2003-07-07 | 2004-07-06 | Verfahren zur verschlüsselten datenübertragung über ein kommunikationsnetz |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US7702102B2 (de) |
EP (1) | EP1642412B1 (de) |
CN (1) | CN1820449B (de) |
DE (2) | DE10330643A1 (de) |
ES (1) | ES2279393T3 (de) |
WO (1) | WO2005004381A1 (de) |
Cited By (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7619110B2 (en) | 2004-12-23 | 2009-11-17 | Xenoport, Inc. | Amino acid derived prodrugs of propofol, compositions, uses and crystalline forms thereof |
CN103986570A (zh) * | 2014-04-10 | 2014-08-13 | 深圳清华大学研究院 | 智能仪表系统的数据安全传输方法 |
WO2017063997A1 (de) * | 2015-10-15 | 2017-04-20 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Verfahren und vorrichtung zum etablieren eines gemeinsamen geheimnisses |
Families Citing this family (9)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JP2009130726A (ja) * | 2007-11-26 | 2009-06-11 | Kyocera Mita Corp | 画像読取装置、及び画像形成装置 |
CN102177500B (zh) * | 2008-10-15 | 2014-03-12 | 富士通株式会社 | 信息处理装置以及启动完成通知程序 |
FR2941507A1 (fr) | 2009-01-29 | 2010-07-30 | Lisi Aerospace | Filetage a distribution de contraintes |
CN101908962B (zh) * | 2009-12-24 | 2012-02-01 | 中国航空工业集团公司第六三一研究所 | 综合化航空电子系统密钥管理方法 |
US9319877B2 (en) | 2010-12-21 | 2016-04-19 | Massachusetts Institute Of Technology | Secret key generation |
US9270448B2 (en) * | 2014-03-11 | 2016-02-23 | The Texas A&M University System | Encryption key distribution system and method |
US9794059B2 (en) * | 2015-08-31 | 2017-10-17 | The Boeing Company | Lightweight cyber secure bi-directional aircraft communications addressing and reporting system (ACARS) transmission |
CN105757878B (zh) * | 2016-02-19 | 2018-07-27 | 广东美的暖通设备有限公司 | 通讯数据的编码及解码方法、装置和空调器 |
CN115987698B (zh) * | 2023-03-22 | 2023-05-30 | 深圳市移联通信技术有限责任公司 | 一种gps定位信息加密传输方法及系统 |
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WO1997049213A1 (en) * | 1996-06-17 | 1997-12-24 | Ericsson Inc. | Apparatus and method for secure commmunication based on channel characteristics |
US20020034300A1 (en) * | 2000-06-07 | 2002-03-21 | Mikael Thuvesholmen | Method and device for encrypting a message |
WO2002063462A2 (en) * | 2001-02-05 | 2002-08-15 | Cambridge Silicon Radio Ltd | Generating random data |
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US5768372A (en) * | 1996-03-13 | 1998-06-16 | Altera Corporation | Method and apparatus for securing programming data of a programmable logic device |
US5781458A (en) * | 1997-03-05 | 1998-07-14 | Transcrypt International, Inc. | Method and apparatus for generating truly random numbers |
US6154542A (en) * | 1997-12-17 | 2000-11-28 | Apple Computer, Inc. | Method and apparatus for simultaneously encrypting and compressing data |
US6947559B2 (en) * | 2000-02-18 | 2005-09-20 | Kent State University | Random number generator based on turbulent convection |
US6973499B1 (en) * | 2000-04-07 | 2005-12-06 | Intertrust Technologies Corp. | Ticketing and keying for orchestrating distribution of network content |
JP3552648B2 (ja) * | 2000-06-20 | 2004-08-11 | インターナショナル・ビジネス・マシーンズ・コーポレーション | アドホック無線通信用データ送受システム及びアドホック無線通信用データ送受方法 |
US7170997B2 (en) * | 2000-12-07 | 2007-01-30 | Cryptico A/S | Method of generating pseudo-random numbers in an electronic device, and a method of encrypting and decrypting electronic data |
US20020131592A1 (en) * | 2001-03-16 | 2002-09-19 | Harris Hinnant | Entropy sources for encryption key generation |
JP2003051819A (ja) * | 2001-08-08 | 2003-02-21 | Toshiba Corp | マイクロプロセッサ |
SG105005A1 (en) * | 2002-06-12 | 2004-07-30 | Contraves Ag | Device for firearms and firearm |
-
2003
- 2003-07-07 DE DE10330643A patent/DE10330643A1/de not_active Withdrawn
-
2004
- 2004-07-06 WO PCT/EP2004/007378 patent/WO2005004381A1/de active IP Right Grant
- 2004-07-06 DE DE502004002636T patent/DE502004002636D1/de active Active
- 2004-07-06 ES ES04740702T patent/ES2279393T3/es active Active
- 2004-07-06 CN CN2004800193808A patent/CN1820449B/zh not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2004-07-06 US US10/563,504 patent/US7702102B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2004-07-06 EP EP04740702A patent/EP1642412B1/de not_active Not-in-force
Patent Citations (3)
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WO1997049213A1 (en) * | 1996-06-17 | 1997-12-24 | Ericsson Inc. | Apparatus and method for secure commmunication based on channel characteristics |
US20020034300A1 (en) * | 2000-06-07 | 2002-03-21 | Mikael Thuvesholmen | Method and device for encrypting a message |
WO2002063462A2 (en) * | 2001-02-05 | 2002-08-15 | Cambridge Silicon Radio Ltd | Generating random data |
Cited By (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7619110B2 (en) | 2004-12-23 | 2009-11-17 | Xenoport, Inc. | Amino acid derived prodrugs of propofol, compositions, uses and crystalline forms thereof |
CN103986570A (zh) * | 2014-04-10 | 2014-08-13 | 深圳清华大学研究院 | 智能仪表系统的数据安全传输方法 |
WO2017063997A1 (de) * | 2015-10-15 | 2017-04-20 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Verfahren und vorrichtung zum etablieren eines gemeinsamen geheimnisses |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
EP1642412A1 (de) | 2006-04-05 |
DE502004002636D1 (de) | 2007-02-22 |
ES2279393T3 (es) | 2007-08-16 |
CN1820449A (zh) | 2006-08-16 |
CN1820449B (zh) | 2012-04-25 |
DE10330643A1 (de) | 2005-02-10 |
EP1642412B1 (de) | 2007-01-10 |
US20060230269A1 (en) | 2006-10-12 |
US7702102B2 (en) | 2010-04-20 |
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