WO2004030312A1 - Verifying a node on a network - Google Patents
Verifying a node on a network Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2004030312A1 WO2004030312A1 PCT/IB2003/004123 IB0304123W WO2004030312A1 WO 2004030312 A1 WO2004030312 A1 WO 2004030312A1 IB 0304123 W IB0304123 W IB 0304123W WO 2004030312 A1 WO2004030312 A1 WO 2004030312A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- node
- response
- query
- measure
- target
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
- H04L41/50—Network service management, e.g. ensuring proper service fulfilment according to agreements
- H04L41/5003—Managing SLA; Interaction between SLA and QoS
- H04L41/5009—Determining service level performance parameters or violations of service level contracts, e.g. violations of agreed response time or mean time between failures [MTBF]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0492—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload by using a location-limited connection, e.g. near-field communication or limited proximity of entities
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
Definitions
- This invention relates to the field of communications security, and in particular, to a system and method that verifies the proximity of a node on a network.
- Network security can often be enhanced by distinguishing between 'local' nodes and
- Local nodes for example, are typically located within a particular physical environment, and it can be assumed that users within this physical environment are authorized to access the network.
- Remote nodes are susceptible to unauthorized physical access. Additionally, unauthorized intruders on a network typically access the network remotely, via telephone or other communication channels. Because of the susceptibility of the network to unauthorized access via remote nodes, network security can be enhanced by imposing stringent security measures, or access restrictions, on remote nodes, while not encumbering local nodes with this same restrictions. It is an object of this invention to provide a system and method that facilitates a determination of whether a node on a network is local or remote.
- the node-verification protocol includes a query-response sequence, wherein the source node communicates a query to the target node, and the target node communicates a corresponding response to the source node.
- the source node establishes a lower bound on the distance between the source node and the target node, based on a measure of the time required to effect this query-response sequence.
- the time required to effect this sequence includes the time required to communicate the query and response, as well as the time required to process the query and generate the response.
- the target node includes a measure of the time required to process the query and generate the response to the source node.
- the source node subtracts this time from the total query-response time to determine the time consumed for the communication. This communication time is compared to a threshold value to determine whether the target node is local or remote relative to the source node.
- FIG. 1 illustrates an example block diagram of a network of nodes.
- FIG. 2 illustrates an example block diagram of a source and target node that effect a query- response protocol in accordance with this invention.
- FIG. 1 illustrates an example block diagram of a network 150 of nodes 110.
- One of the nodes, NodeD 110 is illustrated as being distant from the other nodes 110.
- each of the nodes 110 is configured to be able to determine the proximity of each other node 110.
- the proximity determination is limited to a determination of whether the other node is "local” or "remote", although a more detailed determination of distances can be effected using the techniques disclosed herein.
- FIG. 2 illustrates an example block diagram of a source node 110S and target node HOT that effect a query-response protocol to determine the proximity of the target node 110T to the source node 11 OS in accordance with this invention.
- the source node 110S includes a processor 210 that initiates a query, and a communications device 220 that transmits the query to the target node HOT.
- the target node HOT receives the query and returns a corresponding response, via its communications device 230.
- the protocol calls for the target node 110T to process at least a portion of the query and to include a result of this processing in the response, via a processor 240.
- the source node 11 OS is configured to measure the time consumed by the query- response process, illustrated in FIG. 2 as T que ry- res p ons e 280.
- This query-response time 280 includes the time to communicate the query and response, T CO mmunicate 260, as well as the time to process the query and generate the response at the target node HOT, T proce ss 270.
- the target node HOT is configured to include a measure of this processing time 270 within the response provided to the source node 110S.
- the source node 110S subtracts the processing time 270 from the query-response time 280 to determine the communication time 260.
- the distance between the source 110S and target HOT can be calculated using this determined communication time 260.
- the communication time 260 is used to determine whether the target 110T is local or remote from the source 110S. This determination is made in a preferred embodiment of this invention by comparing the communication time 260 to a nominal threshold value, typically not more than a few milliseconds. If the communication time 260 is below the threshold, the target 110T is determined to be local; otherwise, it is determined to be remote.
- the source 110S uses the remote/local proximity determination to control subsequent communications with the target HOT. For example, some files may be permitted to be transferred only to local nodes, all communications with a remote node may be required to be encrypted, and so on.
- multiple threshold levels may be defined to distinguish different ranges of distances, such as whether a remote target node is located within the same country as the source node, and so on.
- the above query-response process is integrated within a node-authentication process, such as a key-exchange process, which typically includes one or more query-response sequences.
- a node-authentication process such as a key-exchange process, which typically includes one or more query-response sequences.
- the reported processing time is verified as being authentic.
- the OCPS protocol for example, includes an authentication stage, a key exchange stage, a key generation phase, and subsequent data transmission phases.
- the key exchange phase is effected via a modified Needham-Schroeder key exchange protocol, as described in "Handbook of Applied Cryptography", Menezes et al.
- each of the source 110S and target HOT nodes authenticates a public key of each other.
- the source 110S encrypts a random number and a random key, using the public key of the target HOT, and transmits both encryptions to the target 110T.
- the source node 110S initiates a timer when these encryptions are transmitted to the target HOT.
- the target HOT decrypts the random number and random key, using the private key of the target.
- the target HOT generates a new random number and a new random key, and encrypts the new random number, the new random key, and the decrypted random number from the source 110S, using the public key of the source 110S, to form a response that is to be communicated to the source 110S.
- the target HOT optionally signs the response, using the target's private key.
- the target HOT also includes a measure of the time required to effect the decryption, encryption, and signing witliin the signed response.
- This processing time is optionally encrypted using the public key of the source.
- the target node is preferably configured to provide a predefined processing time as the measure of time to effect tins processing.
- the source node 110S When the source node 110S receives the response, it terminates the aforementioned timer.
- the source node 110S verifies the signed message, using the public key of the target HOT, and decrypts the random numbers and random key from the response, using the private key of the source 110S. If the processing time within the response is encrypted, it is also decrypted at this time by the source 110S, using the private key of the source 11 OS.
- the source 110S subtracts the processing time from the time duration measured by the timer between the transmission of the encrypted query from the source 110S and the reception of the encrypted response from the target 110T to determine the round-trip communication time between source 110S and target HOT.
- the source 110S transmits the decrypted new random number back to the target HOT. Both the source 110S and target HOT control subsequent communications based upon receipt of the proper decrypted random numbers. In accordance with this invention, the source 110S also controls subsequent communications based upon the determined communication time.
- the target node HOT may also be configured to determine the proximity of the source node 110S, by timing the process between the transmission of the encrypted response and the receipt of the decrypted random number from the source 11 OS.
- the source 11 OS is configured to include a measure of the time required to process the encrypted response and transmit the decrypted random number in the last key exchange message that includes the decrypted random number, digitally signed by the source 110S.
- the target HOT subtracts this processing time from its measured time between transmission and receipt to determine the round-trip target-source-target communication time, and thus the proximity of the source 11 OS to the target 110T.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
- Computer And Data Communications (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (5)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
AU2003260890A AU2003260890A1 (en) | 2002-09-30 | 2003-09-22 | Verifying a node on a network |
EP03798316A EP1550285B1 (en) | 2002-09-30 | 2003-09-22 | Verifying a node on a network |
US10/529,778 US8762727B2 (en) | 2002-09-30 | 2003-09-22 | Verifying a node on a network |
DE60321368T DE60321368D1 (en) | 2002-09-30 | 2003-09-22 | VERIFYING A NODE ON A NETWORK |
JP2005501942A JP4464918B2 (en) | 2002-09-30 | 2003-09-22 | How to verify a node on the network |
Applications Claiming Priority (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US41494402P | 2002-09-30 | 2002-09-30 | |
US60/414,944 | 2002-09-30 | ||
US44526303P | 2003-02-05 | 2003-02-05 | |
US60/445,263 | 2003-02-05 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2004030312A1 true WO2004030312A1 (en) | 2004-04-08 |
Family
ID=32045303
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/IB2003/004123 WO2004030312A1 (en) | 2002-09-30 | 2003-09-22 | Verifying a node on a network |
Country Status (10)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US8762727B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP1550285B1 (en) |
JP (1) | JP4464918B2 (en) |
KR (1) | KR100992008B1 (en) |
CN (1) | CN100579111C (en) |
AT (1) | ATE397347T1 (en) |
AU (1) | AU2003260890A1 (en) |
DE (1) | DE60321368D1 (en) |
ES (1) | ES2306917T3 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2004030312A1 (en) |
Cited By (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP1761861A1 (en) * | 2004-06-28 | 2007-03-14 | Nds Limited | System for proximity determination |
WO2007033555A1 (en) * | 2005-09-19 | 2007-03-29 | Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. | Method, device and system for obtaining link performance parameter |
WO2007043019A2 (en) | 2005-10-14 | 2007-04-19 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Improved proximity detection method |
EP1788745A1 (en) * | 2004-09-07 | 2007-05-23 | Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. | Communication apparatus |
CN102474724A (en) * | 2009-07-15 | 2012-05-23 | 皇家飞利浦电子股份有限公司 | Method for securely broadcasting sensitive data in a wireless network |
US8276209B2 (en) | 2004-09-17 | 2012-09-25 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Proximity check server |
Families Citing this family (11)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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EP1486045A1 (en) * | 2002-03-12 | 2004-12-15 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Using timing signals to determine proximity between two nodes |
DK1973297T3 (en) * | 2002-07-26 | 2011-12-19 | Koninkl Philips Electronics Nv | Secure, authenticated distance measurement |
JP4270033B2 (en) * | 2004-06-11 | 2009-05-27 | ソニー株式会社 | Communication system and communication method |
US8607350B2 (en) * | 2006-03-30 | 2013-12-10 | International Business Machines Corporation | Sovereign information sharing service |
US8117449B2 (en) * | 2007-12-27 | 2012-02-14 | Mastercard International, Inc. | Method to detect man-in-the-middle (MITM) or relay attacks |
US9923719B2 (en) * | 2014-12-09 | 2018-03-20 | Cryptography Research, Inc. | Location aware cryptography |
CN107852324B (en) * | 2015-06-02 | 2020-11-10 | 瑞典爱立信有限公司 | Method for encrypting messages and encryption node |
EP3375140A4 (en) | 2015-11-13 | 2019-04-10 | eBay Inc. | Distributed database job data skew detection |
EP3700235A1 (en) | 2019-02-19 | 2020-08-26 | Koninklijke Philips N.V. | System for trusted distance measurement |
EP3700234A1 (en) | 2019-02-19 | 2020-08-26 | Koninklijke Philips N.V. | System for trusted distance measurement |
US20230308298A1 (en) * | 2020-08-07 | 2023-09-28 | Google Llc | Encrypted Response Timing for Presence Detection |
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- 2003-09-22 DE DE60321368T patent/DE60321368D1/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2003-09-22 ES ES03798316T patent/ES2306917T3/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2003-09-22 EP EP03798316A patent/EP1550285B1/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2003-09-22 AT AT03798316T patent/ATE397347T1/en not_active IP Right Cessation
- 2003-09-22 JP JP2005501942A patent/JP4464918B2/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2003-09-22 WO PCT/IB2003/004123 patent/WO2004030312A1/en active IP Right Grant
- 2003-09-22 CN CN03823282A patent/CN100579111C/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2003-09-22 KR KR1020057005178A patent/KR100992008B1/en active IP Right Grant
- 2003-09-22 AU AU2003260890A patent/AU2003260890A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2003-09-22 US US10/529,778 patent/US8762727B2/en active Active
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Cited By (12)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP1761861A1 (en) * | 2004-06-28 | 2007-03-14 | Nds Limited | System for proximity determination |
EP1761861A4 (en) * | 2004-06-28 | 2009-12-16 | Nds Ltd | System for proximity determination |
AU2005273532B2 (en) * | 2004-06-28 | 2011-04-07 | Acano (Uk) Limited | System for proximity determination |
US8051292B2 (en) | 2004-06-28 | 2011-11-01 | Nds Limited | System for proximity determination |
EP1788745A1 (en) * | 2004-09-07 | 2007-05-23 | Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. | Communication apparatus |
EP1788745A4 (en) * | 2004-09-07 | 2014-04-16 | Panasonic Corp | Communication apparatus |
US8276209B2 (en) | 2004-09-17 | 2012-09-25 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Proximity check server |
WO2007033555A1 (en) * | 2005-09-19 | 2007-03-29 | Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. | Method, device and system for obtaining link performance parameter |
CN100421395C (en) * | 2005-09-19 | 2008-09-24 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method based on elastic group ring for obtaining link evaluating parameter |
WO2007043019A2 (en) | 2005-10-14 | 2007-04-19 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Improved proximity detection method |
US8312166B2 (en) | 2005-10-14 | 2012-11-13 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Proximity detection method |
CN102474724A (en) * | 2009-07-15 | 2012-05-23 | 皇家飞利浦电子股份有限公司 | Method for securely broadcasting sensitive data in a wireless network |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
KR20050087783A (en) | 2005-08-31 |
US20060294362A1 (en) | 2006-12-28 |
ES2306917T3 (en) | 2008-11-16 |
KR100992008B1 (en) | 2010-11-04 |
CN100579111C (en) | 2010-01-06 |
JP4464918B2 (en) | 2010-05-19 |
EP1550285B1 (en) | 2008-05-28 |
JP2006501790A (en) | 2006-01-12 |
DE60321368D1 (en) | 2008-07-10 |
US8762727B2 (en) | 2014-06-24 |
CN1685688A (en) | 2005-10-19 |
ATE397347T1 (en) | 2008-06-15 |
AU2003260890A1 (en) | 2004-04-19 |
EP1550285A1 (en) | 2005-07-06 |
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